U.S. role and responsibility in effecting reconciliation in Northeast Asia
In this fifth session of the Forum, former senior government officials and other leading experts from the United States and South Korea discussed current developments in North Korea and North Korea policy, the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and a strategic vision for Northeast Asia. The session was hosted by the Sejong Institute, a top South Korean think tank, in association with Shorenstein APARC.
Seoul, Korea
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The Sino-Japanese War has inspired numerous specialized studies—some analyzing diplomatic relations, some addressing specific incidents, and still others documenting the rise of Communism in China. The war itself, however, has usually been presented from the perspective of the West.
Departing from this tradition, the Battle for China brings together Chinese, Japanese, and Western scholars of the first rank to provide a comprehensive and multifaceted overview of the military operations that shaped much of what happened in political, economic, and cultural realms. Given the volatility of the events covered and their disputed histories, the volume's diverse contributors have taken pains to sustain a scholarly, dispassionate tone throughout their analyses of the course and the nature of military operations, ranging from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937 to the final campaigns of 1945. They present Western involvement in the war, but in Sino-Japanese contexts, and establish the war's place in World War II and world history in general.
Reviews
"[The Battle for China] is by far the best academic treatment of the military history of the [Sino-Japanese] war in English . . . A chronology, fourteen maps, and a select bibliography in three languages make this an indispensable work for historians of modern China . . . In scope, it is the most comprehensive work on the military history of the war in English. It makes available a diverse body of scholarship, much of which has not been translated. It should stimulate additional research into one of the most significant events in the history of modern China."
-Parks M. Cole, Chinese Historical Review
"The Battle for China, an excellent collection of more than a dozen essays by nearly a score of American, British, Chinese, and Japanese scholars, is the first full English-language account of the Sino-Japanese War. Its unique description and analysis of military operations should please both the general reader and the specialist."
-Colonel Stanley L. Falk, ARMY Magazine
"A model of scholarship and tone, the Battle for China is a uniquely comprehensive overview of the military operations that shaped events in both China and Japan from 1937–1945. Each of the chapters has something to teach general readers and specialists about the semi-modern war that defined modern Asia."
—Dennis Showalter, Colorado College
"The Battle for China is a rare treasure that will likely renew interest in this underdeveloped field. For those interested in the Pacific war or greater insight into modern Chinese history, I highly recommend it."
-Major Robert S. Burrell, United States Marine Corps, Naval History Magazine
Over the past year, the
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) has
engaged in leading-edge research on demographic change in East Asia. Karen Eggleston, director of the Asia Health Policy Program at Shorenstein APARC,
discusses the recent book Aging Asia: The
Economic and Social Implications of Rapid Demographic Change in China, Japan,
and South Korea, and the
workshop on the economic, social, and political/security implications
of demographic change in East Asia, held January 20-21 at
Shorenstein APARC.
Across Northeast Asia, countries are facing the issue of an aging population,
which causes socio-economic challenges that have policy implications. You
explore this phenomenon in your forthcoming book Aging
Asia: The Economic and Social Implications of Rapid Demographic Change in
China, Japan, and South Korea. When did aging begin to become an issue
and what are some of the greatest factors that you address in the book?
Aging started at different times in the countries of East Asia. The country
with the oldest life expectancy in the world and the oldest age structure of
its population is Japan. It had a very short baby boom after the war and has
had a steep decline in fertility. Mortality has also been falling around the
world, and so this creates a change in the population. Japan is already at the
fourth stage of demographic transition. South Korea is rapidly moving towards
that and already has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world. Of course,
neither of them have policies to reduce fertility; in fact, they are trying to
encourage it. China, on the other hand, has long been trying to control
fertility and is not as extreme in terms of the population age structure, but
it is rapidly changing. China will be older in median age than the United
States soon—this is not a trivial factor when you think in terms of the
absolute size of the Chinese population.
One of the things that we wanted to study in this project is the premise that
the demographic transition is a "problem." It is true that you need to think
about and have policy responses to it. But it can also be seen as a sign of
success, and as an opportunity. We wanted to reframe the issue and think about
evidence on both sides. There is some research highlighted in the book, for
example, that looks at the impact of population aging on economic growth, which
is one of the first things that comes to many people's minds. For example, if
you have a lot of elderly people, they are not in the work force and they need
to be supported. It is true that this can be bad for economic growth, but there
also are policy and individual responses that may moderate the effects. Our
research is trying to highlight several different aspects of aging, including
the question of opportunity. For example, there is more investment in
individual children now and elderly persons' savings have actually contributed
to economic growth. In some aspects, this has been a sign of resiliency for
Japan where there are a lot of transfers to the working-age population.
Ronald Lee at the University of California, Berkeley and Andrew Mason at the
East-West Center at the University of Hawai'i, who is participating in the
January workshop, have been working on the concept of a "second demographic dividend."
They find that as countries have an older age structure, there are more people
that are saving. In the widely accepted "first demographic dividend," there are
more people in the working-age part of the population—more people employed and
more people contributing to the GDP. You get a boom contributing to growth. We
know that this contributed to Japan and South Korea's earlier growth, and to
China's in the 80s and part of the 90s, but only one or two percent of GDP. The
question then is whether it is a problem that with aging you are losing that first
demographic dividend. A second demographic dividend might arise because people
who are preparing for a longer retirement life are saving more, and those
savings are then invested in the economy and the investment drives economic
growth.
Is there any correlation to demographic issues
faced by the United States?
Interestingly, the aging issue is more pronounced in East Asia than in the
United States for several reasons. We have a higher fertility rate than in
Japan and South Korea, and many other countries in Europe as well. We also
historically are much more open to immigration than most other countries, and
this has led to a certain vitality in the population mix that has slowed the
impact of demographic change. That said, of course, there are issues with
having a lot of baby boomers. Sometimes, depending on the specific question or
the specific area of policy, you find other factors that are much more
important than aging. For example, the growth of healthcare spending has been
in the news a lot lately. Although obviously there is an impact from having
more elderly people, there are much bigger issues, such as what we are spending
per person per age group and the growth of that spending. Just aging per se is not as big of an issue as
people might think.
In late January, you will be holding the
workshop Comparative
Policy Responses to Demographic Change in East Asia: Defining a Research Agenda. What
are the major issues you will explore in the conference? Who will be involved?
Finally, what is the publication or research project that you will launch from
this?
We had an Aging
Asia conference in February 2009, co-sponsored with the Global Aging
Program at the Stanford Center on Longevity. The outcome of this is the
forthcoming volume, co-edited with Shripad Tuljapurkar of the Department of
Biology at Stanford University. We started with a basic survey of the region
and thought about the basic trends-demographic, social, and economic-and built
upon that to figure out where the gaps are in the literature and where the
interesting research questions are. That is where the January 2011 workshop
comes in as the next step. We are bringing in some of the same and some
different people to focus on three specific themes: economics, society, and
politics/security. The upcoming event again focuses on East Asia and there will
be a public component, but it is a smaller event and its main goal is to dig
deeper into these themes to figure out an interesting research agenda on the
policy responses to demographic transition.
We decided to focus again on East Asia, which is the research focus of a lot of
our Shorenstein APARC faculty. Masahiko Aoki and Michael Armacost are going to
chair sessions, and Gi-Wook Shin is going to kick it all off and talk about the
social aspects of demographic change. Andrew Walder will be participating in
that session as well. Thomas Fingar will be covering the political and security
implications. All Shorenstein APARC faculty have been invited to participate
and think about how this issue of demographic change—and particularly policy
responses—might be related to their own areas of research.
An illustration that I like to give when people ask about how demographic
change is related to other things is from Andrew Walder when he was talking
about China's transition in the 1980s. He received a question about whether or
not there had been an impact from the One Child policy. He said that obviously
there are many different impacts, but the one thing that he noted was that students
in China now, especially if they are only children, are under a lot of career
pressure. This has changed the space or the freedom for self-exploration. Why
does this have broader implications? Young people see access to political power
as one key for their careers and this changes their views about joining the
Communist Party, which has big implications for China's political future. This
is just one illustration of how we are trying to explore the broader
implications of demographic change.
Finally, what is the outcome that you
would most hope to achieve through Aging
Asia and the upcoming demographic change workshop?
I think that the biggest hope would be to develop a much better understanding
of what is going on with demographic change: what are the processes and how is
society changing? What are the individual challenges that families are facing
and what are they are doing about it? What is the broader social or even global
perspective on how this is going to shape our future world? For me, I think
about the world that my children are going to grow up in.
Through our research, I hope that we will impact not only the understanding of what
has driven past developments, but create policy recommendations for each of the
societies that were are examining—including our own—on the opportunities and
the challenges related to changes in population. That hopefully will be useful
as these different societies think about how to respond.
Our research on the economic, the social, and political/security aspects of
demographic change is intended to be tangible for individuals and families as
well as for broader national policy.
In 1998, in the twilight of the 20th century, the resignation of Indonesia's autocratic president Suharto ushered in a new political era. Corresponding changes occurred in Indonesia's economic, social, and cultural landscape. That transformation challenged and transformed the thinking of many Indonesians. One of them was Dr. Dino Patti Djalal, who recently became his country's ambassador to the United States. "I entered the twenty-first century with a new mindset," said Djalal to an overflow audience at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) on November 18, 2010.
As the son of a renowned Indonesian diplomat, Djalal spent much of his youth and early adulthood abroad. He attended high school in the United States and college in Canada, and went on to earn his doctorate from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Djalal's diverse professional talents and experience encompass writing, politics, and film production. Passionate about inspiring and empowering young Indonesians, Djalal founded Modernisator, a youth leadership movement in Indonesia. Before becoming ambassador to the United States in September 2010, he served on the staff of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as a spokesperson and special adviser on foreign affairs.
Djalal's speech at Shorenstein APARC featured his top eight personal beliefs about the 21st century. His remarks were a mixture of optimism and wonder tempered by caution. This new century in Djalal's eyes promises great progress and opportunity, in contrast to the 20th century, which he called "probably the bloodiest century ever in human history." Looking forward, he spoke of an "explosion of creativity," the growth of emerging and developing economies, and major advances in technology. The power to eradicate poverty and to achieve world harmony is within our grasp, he argued, provided countries are willing to be open to new ideas and to embrace progress and change.
The last century, Djalal noted, saw the fall and fragmentation of empires and the birth of many new states. Looking ahead, he did not foresee great changes in the world's geopolitical map. He hoped that world leaders would not promote a further proliferation of new countries, which would increase rivalry and instability. Instead the goal should be unification, as in the case of the Korean Peninsula. He spoke optimistically of the trend whereby existing countries such as Indonesia manage to "proliferise," or acquire new and greater global relevance, and advocated a "geopolitics of cooperation" among larger and smaller countries, as in the Group of 20.
Djalal stressed the need for rapid innovation and ongoing social, economic, and educational change. A nation that wants to succeed in the 21st century must be open and adaptable. Analysts once thought that major changes could only unfold over several generations, but now, Djalal argued, dramatic change can occur in the span of a single generation. In addition to developing open and progressive political thinking, said Djalal, good governance is essential if the world is to enjoy stability and prosperity in this century. Having a democratic government does not automatically ensure good governance, he argued. Political leaders must strive to build strong, accountable institutions that emphasize positive outcomes in key sectors such as health, education, and entrepreneurship.
Addressing the younger generation, Djalal said, "skill is your best currency" in the present century. Individuals, empowered by education and technology, are now free to make their way in the world based on their own talents. He recalled that in an earlier era in Indonesia, as in many other parts of the world, access to information was limited by social status, wealth, and gender. More than any other factor, according to Djalal, technology is the "most important driver of change." It is the small, innovative technologies such as cell phones and online banking that will most change the world, provided we learn "how to adopt it without destroying the human soul."
Globalization is here to stay, Djalal argued, so it
is crucial to "embrace it intelligently." Indonesia is a large
country. But rather than rely on superior physical size, Indonesia and other
large countries must climb the global ranks on less tangible dimensions such as
education, including the skill sets needed to develop their economies. While
being open to engaging with the rest of the world, he added, countries must
also cultivate a strong sense of national identity.
Djalal closed on a high and provocative note, suggesting that the free, innovative, and global nature of the current
century provides the means for young people today to become "potentially the best
generation of all previous generations." How then should we proceed, as
individuals and as countries, to realize that bright future? Djalal left that
question hanging in the air for his audience to consider and to answer.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and with the advent of a new Japanese government, the long-simmering concept of an East Asian Community (EAC) has come to a boil. Trilateral discussions among China, Japan, and South Korea--the "Plus Three"--have accelerated, including early steps toward formation of a trilateral free trade area. The Obama administration has responded with new interest in regionalism, including discussion of new trans-Pacific trade agreements and a bid to join the budding East Asia Summit process. In November 2010, the trans-Pacific APEC will convene in Japan, and the next annual meeting, in 2011, will take place in Hawaii.
This period could shape the future of regionalism in East Asia, but many questions have yet to be answered. Will former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's initiative to build a new regional order on the core of Japan-China-ROK ties bear fruit? How does this concept of an EAC compare to other visions of regional integration, from APEC to the ASEAN-plus process? Will the ASEAN member nations cede leadership of the drive for tighter integration to Northeast Asia? Will the gravitational power of China's booming economy overwhelm concerns about its political system, military nontransparency, and possible ambition for regional hegemony? What role will the United States seek to play in Asian regionalism, and what will Asia's response be?
On September 9 and 10, 2010, the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) at Stanford University convened the second Stanford Kyoto Trans-Asian Dialogue. This distinguished gathering discussed the latest research into the course of regionalism across several dimensions: regional vs. trans-Pacific trade and production networks; traditional and nontraditional security; the intersection of historical memories and national cultures in forging, or thwarting, a new regional identity; and possible futures for the regional order and how it might interact with other transnational institutions.
The goal of the Dialogue was to facilitate discussion, on an off-the-record basis, among scholars, policymakers, media, and other experts from across Asia and the United States, and to establish trans-Asian networks that focus on issues of common concern.
The first Stanford Kyoto Trans-Asian Dialogue was held September 10-11, 2009, in Kyoto, on the theme of "Energy, Environment, and Economic Growth in Asia."
Kyoto International Community House Event Hall
2-1 Torii-cho, Awataguchi,
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8536
JAPAN