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Does entrepreneurship cause local employment and wage growth, and if so, how large is the impact? Empirical analysis of such a question is difficult because of the joint determination of entrepreneurship and economic growth. This article uses two different sets of variables—the homestead exemption levels in state bankruptcy laws from 1975 and the share of metropolitan statistical area (MSA) overlaying aquifers—to instrument for entrepreneurship and examine urban employment and wage growth between 1993 and 2002. Despite using different sets of instrumental variables, the ranges of two-stage least squares estimates are surprisingly similar. A 10% increase in the birth of small businesses increases MSA employment by 1.3–2.2%, annual payroll by 2.4–4.0%, and wages by 1.2–2.0% after 10 years. Furthermore, an accounting exercise shows that the employment and payroll growth from entrepreneurship are not confined to the initially created businesses but spillover to the aggregate urban economy.

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Journal of Economic Geography
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Yong Suk Lee
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RSVPS ARE NO LONGER BEING ACCEPTED AS WE HAVE REACHED VENUE CAPACITY. PRESS FILMING IS PROHIBITED.

Seating is first come, first served.

 

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A Panel Discussion Featuring

Ambassador HE Yafei

Former China Ambassador

to the United Nations

 

Panelists:

Ambassador Michael H. Armacost

Shorenstein APARC Distinguished Fellow, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Philippines

Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry

Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative; former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Professor Jean C. Oi (Moderator)

Director Shorenstein APARC China Program; William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics

 

Ambassador HE Yafei served as Vice Minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.; Counselor of the Chinese Permanent Mission to the United Nations; Deputy Director General of the Arms Control Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Minister Counselor and Minister of the Embassy of China in the United States; Director General of the America and Pacific Department; Assistant Minister and Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Representative and Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other international organizations in Switzerland.

 

Co-sponsored by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center’s U.S.–Asia Security Initiative and the China Program

Seminars
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Since its formation in 2014, the administration of Indonesian President Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) has faced opportunities and challenges in many sectors and on many issues: security and economy, terrorism and radicalism, maritime resources and incursions, not to mention foreign-policy dynamics with the US, China, and the rest of Southeast Asia. How has Indonesia responded to these chances and concerns? How will it manage them going forward? Few Indonesians are better equipped to address these questions than retired Brig. Gen. Pandjaitan, who has dealt with them daily since joining Jokowi’s administration in 2014 as the president’s chief of staff and in subsequent cabinet positions.

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Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan began his current ministership in July 2016 after serving as Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs in 2015-16. Earlier civilian positions include vice-chair of the Golkar Party’s advisory council (2008-2014); founding president of a resources company (2004-2014); trade and industry minister (2000-01); and ambassador to Singapore (1999-2000). His Indonesian army service dates back in time from an assignment as training and education commander (1997-99) through a series of leadership positions to his award as the best graduate of the army academy (1970). Other honors include Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year (2011) and a national best coaching award related to his work on behalf of karate in Indonesia (2001-2010). In 1990-91 he studied in Washington DC at the National Defense University and George Washington University, earning an MPA from GWU (1991), and he is an alumnus of the Indonesia Army Staff College (1983).

 

Presentation slides
Luhut B. Pandjaitan Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Republic of Indonesia
Seminars
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How do weak organizations engage in mobilization under duress? Based on ethnographic work inside labor organizations in China, this talk makes the case that in a repressive environment, civil society organizations can mobilize through a counter-intuitive mechanism. Instead of amassing the crowds to take to the streets, groups can mobilize without the masses. Rather than citizens forming groups in order to trigger larger-scale contention, they form groups in order to better contend as individuals or as small bands of the aggrieved. The clear advantage of this strategy is that it lowers the cost of activism in an authoritarian state. Because it is highly risky for civil society groups to organize large-scale contention, they must devise ways to work around this constraint. Civil society groups coach citizens to adopt a grammar of contention that effectively threatens local social stability and challenges the moral authority of officials. However, at the point of contention, these groups disperse. By sending out only a sole contender or a limited number of contenders to confront state authorities, organizations minimize their risk of being targeted by authorities.

 

Diana Fu is an assistant professor of Asian Politics at the University of Toronto. Her research examines the relationship between popular contention, state power, and civil society, with an emphasis on contemporary China. Her book manuscript, Mobilizing Without the Masses in China examines state control and civil society contention under authoritarian rule. Based on two years of ethnographic research that tracks the development of informal labor organizations, the book explores counterintuitive dynamics of organized contention in post-1989 China.  

Prior to joining the Univeristy of Toronto, Professor Fu was a Walter H. Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University and a Predoctoral Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Political Science. She holds a D.Phil. in Politics and an M.Phil. in Development Studies with distinction from Oxford University, where she studied as a Rhodes Scholar. 

Diana Fu <i>Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto</i>
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In the first five years after the onset of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, one of the largest political upheavals of the twentieth century paralyzed a highly centralized party state, leading to a harsh regime of military control. Despite a wave of post-Mao revelations in the 1980s, knowledge about the nationwide impact of this insurgency and its suppression remains selective and impressionistic, based primarily on a handful of local accounts. Employing a data set drawn from historical narratives published in 2,213 county and city annals, this article charts the temporal and geographic spread of a mass insurgency, its evolution through time, and the repression through which militarized state structures were rebuilt. Comparisons of published figures with internal investigation reports and statistical estimates from sample selection models yield estimates that range from 1.1 to 1.6 million deaths and 22 to 30 million direct victims of some form of political persecution. The vast majority of casualties were due to repression by authorities, not the actions of insurgents. Despite the large overall death toll, per capita death rates were considerably lower than a range of comparable cases, including the Soviet purges at the height of Stalinist terror in the late 1930s.

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Social Science History
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Andrew G. Walder
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Gi-Wook Shin
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Japan and South Korea face serious demographic crises. Japan has the oldest population in the world and South Korea is one of the most rapidly aging. Together they top the list in terms of proportion of elderly by 2050, with 40.1% and 35.9% respectively being 65 and over, according to a U.S. Census Bureau forecast. Both nations are seeing shrinking working-age populations, with their birthrates among the lowest in the world. This puts them at great risk as they struggle to find new engines of economic growth.

Some experts argue that Japan and South Korea should encourage immigration. The former head of Tokyo's Immigration Bureau, Hidenori Sakanaka, said that "we need an immigration revolution to bring in 10 million people in the next 50 years, otherwise the Japanese economy will collapse." Jongryn Mo, a professor at Yonsei University in Seoul has written a book, "Strong Immigration Nation," urging a similar policy for South Korea.

Is migration the answer?

Japan and South Korea are already supplementing their shrinking workforce with foreign labor, mostly unskilled migrant workers from China and Southeast Asia doing jobs that locals shun.

But it is time to attract more skilled workers. In Japan, only 18.4% of foreign workers were technicians or professionals in 2015, while the figure in Korea is just 7.8% this year. Skilled foreign workers can fill many jobs from staffing hospitals to working as technicians in middle-tier companies and software engineers in large ones.

The challenge, however, is that both countries remain exclusionary, closed societies despite a substantial rise in the numbers of foreigners. Politicians fear losing votes from workers worried about foreigners taking their jobs.

According to a recent report by the French business school INSEAD, Japan and South Korea are ranked 53rd and 61st, respectively in their level of tolerance for immigrants. Most foreign skilled workers have little intention to settle down in Japan or South Korea on a permanent basis, although unskilled ones might be more willing to stay.

Maria, a Guatemalan professional, decided to leave South Korea after working for six years in the overseas marketing department of a large Korean corporation. "Some Koreans complain that foreigners leave after a few years, but we leave because we're never included in the first place. Korean companies pay a lot to bring foreigners here. And then they don't even ask these people about their opinion."

Srey, a Cambodian student studying in Japan, said, "The Japanese are very helpful and very friendly, but at the same time they look at me as a 'gaijin' no matter how good I am at Japanese or able to speak to them. I am not planning to work in Japan."

Bridging strategy

South Korea and Japan need to find a more creative strategy in utilizing foreign talent. In particular, they should pay close attention to their transnational networks rather than pushing for permanent migration. Not only should both countries focus on the knowledge and skills of foreign labor talent, but also the social networks they can possess.

This calls for a particular type of social capital: transnational bridging. A person who has social ties in more than one place can serve as a bridge between those different places. Such bridging can be performed within a city or a country or across borders, but the latter is becoming more important with globalization. By bridging distant networks, people can connect disparate cultures, build trust and facilitate cross-national cooperation that are essential in business transactions. Many Indian and Chinese entrepreneurs and engineers working in Silicon Valley are active in transnational bridging with their home country.

Transnational bridging can be a good new strategy for South Korea and Japan in attracting foreign skilled labor since they can offer valuable experiences and networks as advanced economies, if not permanent places to live. They can help foreign talent to build social ties while studying and working and encourage them to serve as a bridge between South Korea and Japan and their next destination once they leave in what could be called "brain linkage."

They can still contribute to South Korea or Japan even after they depart. Maria said she was willing to do business involving both South Korea and her home country. Srey is also eager to do business with Japan after graduating, even though he will not work in the country.

South Korea and Japan should adopt a policy of "Study-Work-Bridge" rather than the "Study-Work-Migration" pathway commonly encouraged by settler societies. This new policy framework would establish programs providing systematic networking opportunities for skilled foreigners while in Japan or South Korea. It would upgrade the quality of campus life for foreign students and work environments for foreign professionals so they leave with positive experiences.

Most importantly, it would provide institutional support to help maintain transnational networks between foreigners and South Koreans and Japanese.

In Japan, a Study-Work framework has already begun to take shape. Among foreign students seeking employment in Japan in 2013, approximately 24% found jobs. According to the country's ministry of justice, 10,696 of 11,698 foreign students are successful in applying for a change of visa status after graduating from college. This is very encouraging. Still, foreign students feel that Japanese companies are reluctant to embrace their full potential and largely expect them to assimilate, often leading them to stay in Japan only for a short time.

In South Korea, with a shorter history of foreign student intake, a Study-Work framework has yet to emerge. While 64.3% of South Korean companies say they need and want to hire foreign students, only a very small portion of foreign students work in South Korean companies after graduation, perhaps as low as 1%. South Korea's immigration laws for foreign students have eased slightly in recent years, but there is an urgent need to develop solid, institutionalized support for responding to the substantial demand by foreign students who wish to find employment after their studies.

Challenges ahead

Both countries are moving in the right direction, but until they are ready to embrace a more comprehensive migration policy down the road, they should develop the "bridging" component of a Study-Work-Bridge framework as an interim strategy. That means considering how foreign skilled labor can contribute to their economies even if they stay only temporarily.

This non-migration-bridging concept can be also appealing to foreign workers who like to move on after gaining valuable experiences and networks. By activating the social networks they have left behind, foreigners can later become powerful "transnational bridges." With economic globalization, such linkages will be all the more important.

Research shows that science and engineering majors may have more to contribute as human capital, but business and social science majors are more inclined to play a bridging role. Universities and corporations should establish diversity offices, as seen in the U.S. and elsewhere, to promote a culture of tolerance and non-discrimination.

The challenges associated with aging, depopulation and a shrinking workforce are expected to intensify in the coming years. Yet foreign talent is readily at hand for both countries. They need to look no further than the skilled foreigners who already have connections with South Korea or Japan either through schooling or employment and to continue to cultivate such connections through a Study-Work-Bridge approach.


Gi-Wook Shin is director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University and co-author of Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea. Rennie J. Moon is an associate professor at the Underwood International College at Yonsei University in Seoul.

This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on Aug. 31 and reposted with permission.

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Two elderly women chat at a park in Kyoto, Japan.
Flickr/Silvia Sala
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Sex differences in mortality vary over time and place as a function of social, health, and medical circumstances. The magnitude of these variations, and their response to large socioeconomic changes, suggest that biological differences cannot fully account for sex differences in survival. Drawing on a wide swath of mortality data across countries and over time, we develop a set of empiric observations with which any theory about excess male mortality and its correlates will have to contend. We show that as societies develop, M/F survival first declines and then increases, a “sex difference in mortality transition” embedded within the demographic and epidemiologic transitions. After the onset of this transition, cross-sectional variation in excess male mortality exhibits a consistent pattern of greater female resilience to mortality under socio-economic adversity. The causal mechanisms underlying these associations merit further research.

 

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SSM - Population Health
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Karen Eggleston
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The sixteenth session of the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, held at Stanford University on June 28, 2016, convened senior South Korean and American policymakers, scholars and regional experts to discuss North Korea policy and recent developments on the Korean Peninsula. Hosted by the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, the Forum is also supported by the Sejong Institute.

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Shorenstein APARC
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Three-time U.S. Ambassador (Korea, Philippines, Tunisia), former North Korea Special Envoy, and Fletcher School Dean Emeritus, Stephen Bosworth, was the 2014 Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.  During his Stanford appointment, he gave three lectures, drawing lessons from his own diplomatic career, examining efforts to deal with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and discussing the role of U.S. alliances in Asia. Ambassador Bosworth also actively engaged with students and colleagues throughout the Stanford community, sharing his wisdom, wit, and experience.  We mourn his passing earlier this year.

The panel, all of whom knew and worked closely with Ambassador Bosworth – and in who succeeded him in several of his postings – will carry forward a discussion of the themes from Bosworth’s Payne lectures, including the challenges facing U.S. diplomacy, particularly in East Asia, and how to address them.

 

Panelists:

 

Ambassador Sung Kim

U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea 

Former U.S. Ambassador to Republic of Korea

Ambassador-designate to Philippines

 

Ambassador Michael Armacost

Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and Philippines

 

Ambassador Kathleen Stephens

Former U.S. Ambassador to Republic of Korea

 

Ambassador Bosworth’s Payne Lecture transcripts are available for free download from our website

 

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