Since opening its doors to the world in 1978, China has pursued a sometimes erratic but reasonably steady course leading to increasing global economic and political interaction. Its interests now extend from Pyongyang to New York and Sydney to Riyadh. U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement of a new “pivot” toward Asia, recent events on the Korean Peninsula, and China’s upcoming leadership transition provide additional reasons to seek greater understanding of China’s goals and interactions with other nations.

Thomas Fingar, Stanford’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, is leading a new multiphase Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) initiative to explore the nuances and complexity of China’s foreign relations and domestic issues. The China and the World research project aims to contextualize and better understand China’s regional and global interactions, both from the perspective of China itself and from that of other countries. Beginning with Northeast Asia, the project will analyze China’s relations region-by-region throughout the world, and will involve experts from Stanford, China, and the regions studied. It kicks off with a Shorenstein APARC-organized workshop held Mar. 19 and 20 at the new Stanford Center at Peking University.

Fingar discusses the development of China’s foreign relations since 1978, and describes the project and workshop’s background.

In the three decades since Deng Xiaoping enacted his 1978 Open Door reforms, what have been the main trends in China’s global engagement?

The general trend since 1978 has been for China to become increasingly active and engaged in a growing number of places around the world. There have been a number of phases to this.

The “honeymoon period” of U.S.-China relations (1979–1989) was a period of essentially no competition to China’s interaction within the U.S.-led world economic system. China concentrated on the OECD countries—especially the United States, Japan, and Western Europe—that had money to invest and willingness to trade.

After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, China’s international options became more constrained as its relations with the developed world plateaued. It began to reach out to the places that would deal with it: Southeast Asia and particularly Africa. This was in part diplomatically motivated, and in part a search for new markets for the low-end goods it was beginning to produce. It was also the beginning of its search for energy.

Around 2000, China transitioned from building a more modern economy towards being one—beginning the era of its “rise.” China’s demand for resources went up, as did its capacity to supply more markets and its ability to invest more of its growing foreign exchange earnings. It became globally active, proclaiming that it had a new, less exploitative model than what the United States and Europe offered.

What Northeast Asia issues do you think China will focus on this year, especially as it plans for a major leadership transition?

North Korea’s stability and China’s growing investments in the DPRK. Beijing is acutely interested in whether Kim Jong Un will prove a viable leader and whether the regime will be able to manage its new challenges. China is concerned about possible North Korean provocations that might trigger responses by South Korea and/or the United States, putting at risk the peaceful regional and international situation China needs for its political and economic development.

The second issue is answering the question: what does the U.S. pivot toward Asia mean? What does it mean in terms of security, economics, and relations with Japan and Korea? China is the largest trading partner for each of these countries. They value it as a market, and as a source of resources. Yet they also worry about being excessively dependent on China. They appear not to have worried about this quite so much when their dependence on the U.S. market was comparable.

Two full workshop sessions will be devoted to Japan and South Korea, both countries with close U.S. ties. What are the most important factors with regard to China’s rise for these two countries? What about for Southeast Asia?

One of the reasons for our upcoming Beijing workshop is to develop a general template of questions we can ask for each region. We want to avoid focusing the questions too narrowly on Northeast Asia.

For Japan and Korea, one factor has to do with economic opportunities and with their own vulnerabilities. The other has to do with the security challenges of China’s rise, and the uncertainty of its military aspirations. Japan and Korea do not want to be drawn into U.S.-led activities, but they still value the United States for protection. They are concerned about managing the decoupling of economic and security dependence, about no longer being dependent on the same country for both.

Many regional issues are interrelated, such as maritime territorial claims and naval expansion. China is an economic player in Southeast Asia, and the Philippines and Thailand have an alliance with the United States. Indonesia is a rising county in Southeast Asia, and India is an outside player in the region. The U.S. 7th Fleet currently defends the shipping lanes to Northeast Asia that go through Southeast Asia, which probably is not the long-term solution.  

Russia played an important role in shaping the political ideology in the early days of the People’s Republic of China, and the politics of both countries—especially Russia—have changed so much. What is their relationship like now?

Correct and limited. The West imposed a military hardware embargo on China after Tiananmen, so Russia is a limited alternative for that, and it is also a source of energy and other resources. It is fair to say China has something close to disdain for Russia, for what it sees as political confusion and economic mismanagement. The idea of a strategic triangle—using Russia to balance U.S. influence—is something China sees as unviable.

As you move forward with this project, what is the ultimate goal?

The goal is to understand the dynamics of interaction—to understand the bigger picture. Other countries have objectives and concerns with regard to China, while China has objectives and concerns of its own. It is about identifying things such as where they see the same and different kinds of opportunities; what concerns they have about third country interests or involvement; and how they evaluate the success of policies to date.  

The Center for East Asian Studies and the Korean Studies Program are pleased

to announce the

1st Annual
Korean Studies Program Prize for Writing in Korean Studies

The Korean Studies Program Prize for Writing in Korean Studies recognizes and rewards outstanding examples of writing in an essay, term paper, or thesis produced during the current academic year in any discipline within the area of Korean Studies, broadly defined. This competition is open to both undergraduate and graduate students. The prize will be awarded at a special ceremony in the spring, and the winning essays will be published in the Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs. The first place winner will receive a certificate, a copy of the 
Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, and $1,000; honorable mention winner(s) will receive a certificate and a copy 
of the Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs.

To apply for this award, submit:
Your piece of writing (minimum 20 pages double-spaced, Times 12pt., 1" margins)
  Your CV
  One recommendation letter from a Stanford Professor (mailed or e-mailed directly to CEAS, John Groschwitz, jgroschwitz@stanford.edu)

  

Materials should be received at the Center for East Asian Studies by 5:00 p.m. on June 1, 2012.

Riding around on the back of a motorcycle in 2009, Jeremy Menchik snapped photos of hundreds of Indonesian campaign posters. That number has now grown to over 5000 images, which Menchik and Colm Fox have painstakingly coded and analyzed to better understand the politics of identity in Indonesia. The initial results of their research reveal similarities between the United States and Indonesia, and shed light on the transitional democracies of the Arab Spring.

Menchik is a 2011–12 Shorenstein Fellow at Stanford University, and will take up a position as an assistant professor in international relations at Boston University in 2013.

Fox is a doctoral student at the George Washington University’s Department of Political Science.

How important is political identity in Indonesia? Why?

Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and one of the most diverse. But what we found was that rather than being unique, Indonesian politicians behave remarkably similar to American politicians in using a variety of regional, religious, and ethnic identity symbols to court voters.

For example, just recently on NPR, I heard Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich using broken Spanish to appeal to Latino voters in Florida. That is no different than candidates for mayor in northern Sumatra, who often print one poster with them wearing Islamic clothing for one neighborhood, and another poster with them wearing Batak clothing for a different neighborhood. And a third where they are draped in the Indonesian flag.

Our research suggests that despite the obvious differences between a developed, Western country like the United States, and a developing, Muslim-majority country like Indonesia, politicians often act similarly when they are trying to win elections.

What is an important factor in determining a candidate’s use of identity symbols?

What we found is that the election rules matter, a lot. Candidates are far more likely to use religious and ethnic symbols in a plurality (“winner-take-all”) system like the United States than in a proportional representation system (PR) like Indonesia. This is an important finding, because tinkering with election rules is one of the tools that international relations practitioners can use to reduce ethnic and sectarian violence. And what we are saying is that it works. Changing election rules can change the types and levels of identities that are politicized. And that is an important lesson for conflict resolution.

What are some of the most surprising results to come out of your research?

The first is how badly the dominant explanations for identity politics—modernization theory and secularization theory—fared when they were tested on a large dataset. We are at an interesting juncture in time, where our theories of religion and politics have not caught up with the way the world works.

A second surprising finding is how much electoral rules shape the use of identity symbols. Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country, but you would not know it in many of the PR elections. Having strong party backing is so crucial to winning seats in the legislature that it overrides candidates’ religious identity. This points to a similarity between a developed, consolidated Western democracy like the United States, and a developing, unconsolidated Muslim-majority country like Indonesia. The rules are really important for understanding "how politics works" in the Muslim world.

Finally, it was interesting to see the continued importance of history for understanding contemporary political behavior. Regional rebellions that happened in the 1950s continue to echo in politics today. There are certainly ways that changing electoral rules and economic development can result in a shift in political identity, but without understanding the specific Indonesian context, a lot of our results do not make sense. That is an important lesson that for understanding how people in a Muslim country vote; the regionally specific history of that country is very important.      

During last year’s Arab Spring, the ideal of democracy was celebrated throughout the world. How might your research shed light on understanding the complexities of these transitioning democracies?

Well this research has clear implications for the Arab Spring, particularly for understanding the future of Egypt. Just because religious parties like the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafist Nour party come into office does not mean that democracy is doomed, or that religious minorities are going to suffer. As long as secular Muslims, Christians, liberals, and other groups have a stake in elections, we are likely to see cross-ethnic and cross-religious coalitions emerge. This is a very good thing. One obvious difference, however, is that we did not see a lot of overt military participation in politics in Indonesia after 1999. The military was largely absent. And that is one way that Egypt is very different from Indonesia. If there is a big threat to democracy in Egypt, it is not coming from the politicization of identity—it is coming from the suppression of the people's voice by the military.

The Asia Pacific Observatory of Health Systems and Policies (APO) is a new regional initiative to promote evidence-based health policymaking in the Asia-Pacific region. The Observatory represents a unique partnership of governments, development agencies, and the research community working together to support policymakers to develop health systems that are equitable, efficient, responsive, and transparent.

At the Steering Committee meeting in Bangkok in late January, the appointed members of the APO Research Advisory Group met for the first time, including Karen Eggleston, director of Stanford’s Asia Health Policy Program.

The APO has prepared two Health Systems in Transition reports providing in-depth profiles of the health systems of the Philippines and Fiji. Additional country health system profiles and policy briefs will be published in 2012. The research and analysis generated by the Observatory is considered as a public good and is freely available at the APO website.

Gi-Wook Shin, founding director of Stanford's Korean Studies Program (KSP), spoke with the Stanford Daily about creating a unique niche for KSP over the past 11 years, and about being a student during an era of change in Korea.

South of Mount Fuji, along Japan’s central eastern coast, sits Shizuoka Prefecture. Home to green tea plantations, hot springs resorts, and Yamaha pianos and motorcycles, Shizuoka Prefecture is a vibrant agricultural, tourist, and manufacturing region. It is also home to Katsunori Hirano, a current Corporate Affiliates Visiting Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC).

Hirano was born and has lived most of his life in Shizuoka Prefecture, and has worked for the prefectural government for nearly 20 years. He specialized in energy and environmental policy while pursuing a master’s degree in urban affairs and public policy at the University of Delaware (UD). His research explored ways to apply watershed management framework concepts to forest resources management in Japan. While at Stanford, he is studying biodiversity conservation and enhancement while also seeking to re-envision the path to a clean and safe sustainable future.

Last year’s Fukushima nuclear disaster has inspired him to explore ways for Japan to reduce its dependency on nuclear energy. Under the direction of political science professor Phillip Lipscy, Hirano is currently researching incentive mechanisms for financing energy efficiency and renewable energy in place in the United States.

At the very beginning of his UD program, Hirano learned about the distinction between “economic growth” and “development.” “People tend to use the Japanese-language terms interchangeably,” he says.

He is currently exploring case studies from Costa Rica and Bhutan—two countries that have been successfully managing biodiversity—in his search for sustainability models. He says the United States also offers a variety of practical examples of environmental and social sustainability. This year, Hirano plans to study the lifestyle of Amish villagers in Pennsylvania.  
 
Hirano also actively participates in Shorenstein APARC-organized visits to local companies and government organizations such as Facebook and San Francisco City Hall. He says that such site visits help broaden his thinking about innovation and sustainability.

Hirano will continue taking Stanford courses related to his research, attending on-campus workshops and seminars, and speaking with the many people he meets through his campus activities. “Stanford’s extraordinary breadth of teaching and research resources is just wonderful. To me, the learning opportunities that Stanford offers are limitless,” he says, adding that the value of in-person learning far outweighs book-based knowledge.

As Hirano pursues his research at Stanford on energy efficiency and renewable energy and searches for a redefinition of sustainable development, he hopes Japan will begin to pursue social-based development. “I believe that the challenges posed by the Fukushima experience will help inspire Japan to lead the world in creating a sustainable future for generations to come.”