Thomas Fingar, who has observed developments in U.S.-China relations since "ping-pong diplomacy" in the early 1970s, spoke with China-based Leaders Magazine about the significance of—and hype surrounding—the Obama administration's "Asia pivot." The following is an edited version of the interview transcript.

President Obama recently announced a new military strategy, in which he stated that budget cuts will not weaken the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific. How do you interpret this?

The Asia-Pacific is the most economically dynamic region in the world, and it has the largest military forces and the most nuclear powers. U.S. interest has always been there. Our interest, our stake, and our involvement as a Pacific power is very great.

President Obama has been talking about our overall budget deficit and the need to reduce spending, including on defense. Some savings have already come from ending the war in Iraq and winding down the war in Afghanistan, which then increases the relative percentage of the military budget for East Asia. In the process of balancing its budget, the United States is not going to do anything to destabilize the region.

Is this just the policy of the Obama administration, or is it a longer-term strategic shift that could lead to a cold war?

I would distinguish between the rhetoric of "pivoting" toward Asia and the fact that the United States never left Asia. The George W. Bush administration did not send representatives to a number of ASEAN meetings and that troubled people in the region. But U.S. economic and political involvement and military deployments in the region, as well as the alliance structure, have not changed for decades.

American engagement has been important to the threat of nuclear weapons and to the freedom of the seas in the Asia-Pacific. Our allies and China can be confident that this policy is not aimed against anybody—it is not a cold war.

Some experts say that relations between Washington and Beijing are actually doing much better than the media portrays. Do you agree with this perspective?

I do agree with it. I have been involved in U.S.-China relations since "ping-pong diplomacy" in 1972, and we still have ups and downs and swings in our relationship, but the pattern is clear and the magnitude of the swing is much smaller than it used to be. In recent years, we have bumped up against one another in more places around the world, on more issues, because we are both global players. Most issues are handled pretty smoothly, however, and in a pretty routine fashion. The strength of the bilateral relationship—the depth of the interdependence—keeps growing.

From your experience, will there be a big impact on bilateral relations when the new Chinese leadership takes office later this year?

I think it used to be the case that personalities mattered a great deal, but it does not make so much of a difference now in both countries. I do not expect China’s policies and objectives to change, or its perceptions of the United States. In addition, if we elect a new presidential administration, I also do not expect a change in American perceptions of the opportunities and challenges China poses.

Which issue in U.S.-China relations most concerns you?

Mutual suspicion concerns me the most. Some people in China believe the United States will attempt to stop China’s rise or to contain it at some point. In the United States, the things we do not understand about China's intentions and aspirations lead to a similar kind of “worst case” thinking. I think the two countries need to do more to talk directly to one another about their concerns, and to find new approaches. For example, China does not like the bilateral alliance structure the United States has in Northeast Asia. The United States is quite prepared to acknowledge it is an arrangement that was developed for a different time and conditions. What kind of a new collective security arrangement can we have in the region that then? We are a long way from figuring it out, but we need to start talking about it together. 

Original article

"American experts discuss the significance and outcomes of the 'Asia pivot'"
(in Chinese)

A revelatory story emerged in China this spring: Bo Xilai, Chongqing’s powerful Communist Party head, was stripped of both his post and party membership and accused of shocking abuses of power, including covering up his wife’s alleged involvement in the death of a shadowy British businessman.

On May 2, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center held a special seminar to make sense of what this unusual high-level scandal could mean for the future of China’s current political system, erupting just months ahead of a once-in-a-generation leadership transition.

Minxin Pei, director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College, said the scandal is a severe test for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which balances on a knife’s edge as it prepares to replace the majority of its Politburo members—the highest CCP echelon. The Bo affair has exposed the existence of serious corruption at a very high level of government, calling into question the party’s image and credibility.

“This is the biggest threat to party unity since 1989,” he said.

More potentially damaging still, however, is the negative light it has cast on China’s overall political system. The scandal has revealed weaknesses and loopholes in the power structure, and the government’s poor crisis management skills.

“The Bo Xilai affair is the beginning of the end of the Tiananmen era,” Pei said. “Twenty years from now, historians will make this point.”

Xueguang Zhou, a professor of sociology and Freeman Spogli Institute senior fellow, agreed with Pei’s analysis that Bo’s fall from power has tarnished the party’s image and deeply disrupted the cohesiveness of its upper leadership.He spoke also of the outpouring of criticism on social media sites for the government’s inability to reign in corruption—so much so that censors have not been able to keep up.

“These voices have been so fierce in criticizing the top leadership that it has huge implications for the emergence of China’s civil society,” Zhou said. 

He expressed his concern for the future of local politics after the smoke from the Bo affair has cleared. Although it is widely acknowledged in China that shady political dealings go hand-in-hand with local-level politics, positive innovations in governance also frequently occur at the city and county level.

“I hope that local governments will still have the power to experiment,” he said.

After all is said and done, China’s top leadership is at a major turning point. Only time will tell the full impact of the fall of Bo Xilai, both during this year’s power transition and the evolution of China’s government structure in the coming decades.