Japan’s first decade of the twenty-first century was both disappointing and bewildering, producing wildly contrasting evaluations. Many have come to call this period the “second lost decade,” characterized by policy paralysis and overall lackluster economic growth.

For those studying Japan more closely, however, the same decades reveal nothing short of a broad transformation in numerous core tenets of Japan’s postwar political economy. How can we best capture this transformation?

Each chapter in this volume examines a different aspect of Japan’s political economy within a longer historical trajectory, from multiple angles, to depict a flexible but resilient system. We characterize Japan’s process of change as syncretism—practices foreign, domestic, old and new were selectively adopted, mixed and matched, along the way creating a new and unique hybrid system.

Syncretism: The Politics of Economic Restructuring and System Reform in Japan, edited by Kenji E. Kushida, Kay Shimizu, and Jean C. Oi, is available for purchase from Brookings Institution Press.

Scholars, policymakers and business leaders from Japan and the United States recently gathered at Stanford to analyze energy innovation and build new bilateral endeavors.

“With rapid economic growth in emerging countries, world energy consumption has been and will be increasing, everyone has been wondering if there are enough energy resources for this growth," said Hideichi Okada, a former vice minister for International Affairs at Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Panelists weigh in on the changing energy picture in the U.S. and Japan.

Okada said Japan and the U.S. share concerns about world geopolitical change in energy supply and demand, and nuclear policy. Okada is at Stanford as the Sasakawa Peace Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) this year.

Okada's remarks came during the the New Channels Dialogue, a two-day conference organized by the Japan Program at Shorenstein APARC and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. It is the first of three annual conferences aimed to stimulate debate on 21st century problems faced by both nations. 

“In the aftermath of the disaster at Fukushima, Japan has reinvigorated its search for cutting-edge technologies and alternative sources of energy,” said Yuji Takagi, president of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. In parallel, the U.S. has increased its production of shale gas as a viable alternative of natural gas.

Confluence of national interest and demand, and shared historical connections between the U.S. and Japan, suggest an ideal environment for further partnerships between the two countries.

“We have entered an especially important period in bilateral relations between the Asia-Pacific [and the U.S.] – it is undergoing such rapid change and technology is transforming. In this context, I believe the U.S.-Japan relationship will only become more important,” Takagi said.

Experts and Stanford scholars discuss electricity systems in California and Japan.

Okada cited the joint U.S.-Japan wind power project in Hawaii as an example of recent cooperation. Last December, Maui became the site of a multi-year renewable energy project between the American and Japanese governments.

Other panelists offered different perspectives on energy opportunities from across sectors, included among them were Julia Nesheiwat, the State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of Energy Resources; Hirofumi Takinami, a member of the Japan’s House of Councilors and former visiting fellow at Shorenstein APARC; Thomas Starrs, SunPower vice president; Nobuo Tanaka, former IEA Executive Director; and Frank Wolak, Stanford economics professor and director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development.

Topics discussed included:

• Energy constraints experienced by Japan since the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and challenges facing Japan’s electricity industry liberalization.
• Regional implications of China’s rise as a major energy consumer and producer.
• Geopolitical and trade balance effects on the United States and Japan resulting from the shale gas revolution transforming the U.S. into a major energy producer.
• Broad impacts to the energy industry caused by geopolitics and financial instability.
• Lessons learned from California’s experience with electricity industry liberalization.
• Multilateral partnerships for energy technology and innovation.

The second day of the conference was a closed session in which candid, in-depth discussions were held. Participants also went on a site visit to Bloom Energy led by principal cofounder and chief executive officer K.R. Sridhar.

The New Channels Dialogue highlighted energy imperatives and created a network of exchange anticipated to continue beyond the conference. A report that encompasses major points and policy recommendations will be published in the forthcoming months. 

Warning against the “dangers of excessive hubris,” former U.S. Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth emphasized the intricacies and complexity of creating American foreign policy and called for the government to exercise greater restraint and better understand the countries it engages with.

The veteran diplomat and visiting lecturer at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies called for the United States to exercise greater self-restraint and better understand the history and current circumstances of countries it engages with. 

“The making of U.S. policy is inherently a very, very difficult enterprise,” said Bosworth, positioned at Stanford for winter quarter.

“The issues tend to be complex, and they frequently pose moral as well as political choices,” he said. “I found that perfection is usually the enemy of the good in the making of foreign policy and is, for the most part, unattainable.”

Foreign policy can be ambiguous and difficult at times; it is a process that can be compared to gardening because “you have to keep tending to it regularly,” Bosworth said, referencing former Secretary of State George Shultz’s well-known analogy.

Bosworth, who served for five decades in the U.S. government and for 12 years as dean of Tuft’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, delivered these thoughts in the first of three public seminars this quarter. He is the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer in residence at FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC).

He cautioned against America’s tendency to revert to military power when crisis occurs. “I believe that when at all possible, we need to choose diplomacy over force,” Bosworth asserted, “although it is sometimes true that diplomacy backed by potential force can be more effective.” 

Citing Afghanistan, Iraq and Southwest Asia, Bosworth noted these among other examples as situations of excessive power projected by the American foreign policy arm. In some cases, pride may have gotten the better of policymakers who sometimes “want to be seen as doers and solvers.”

Bosworth pointed out that the nature of our actions speaks loudly – both at home and abroad – thus sensitivity and sincerity are important in any international exchange.

Since the Vietnam War, American values and the push for democracy are not always well received by other countries. And there’s often good reason for that, he said.

“It is awkward for the U.S. to campaign for more democracy elsewhere when our own model seems to have increasing difficulty in producing reasonable solutions for our own problems,” he said.

Democracy is “not a cure-all” for every nation and this is reflected in the amended model adopted by countries such as Singapore, Indonesia and Burma. However, Bosworth said he remains confident that the American democratic system “will prevail and eventually work better than it seems to be working now.”

Bosworth will explore the challenges of maturing democracies in Japan and South Korea and negotiations and management of relations with North Korea in his two other Payne lectures. The Payne Lectureship brings prominent speakers to campus for their global reputation as visionary leaders, a practical grasp of a given field, and the capacity to articulate important perspectives on today’s global challenges.

Bosworth entered the Foreign Service in 1961, a difficult yet “exciting time to join the government,” he said.

“At the age of 21, I was the youngest person entering my class,” he said, “and of the 38 people, there were only two women…and were zero persons of color and only a handful who were not products of an Ivy League education.” The State Department of then is very different compared to the one that exists today; this signals positive, necessary change in the diplomatic corps.

Bosworth, having served three tours as a U.S. ambassador in South Korea (from 1997 to 2001); the Philippines (from 1984 to 1987); and Tunisia (from 1979 to 1981) and twice received the State Department’s Distinguished Service Award (in 1976 and 1986), has a long established career.

He brings great wisdom on foreign affairs given his extensive engagement as a practitioner and a writer, said former colleague and Shorenstein APARC distinguished fellow Michael H. Armacost.

“To say that Steve has had an extraordinarily distinguished career in the Foreign Service doesn't quite capture the range of his accomplishments, I can’t think of very many Foreign Service officers in this or any other generation that have left a footprint on big issues in three consecutive decades,” Armacost acknowledged. 

During his time at Stanford, Bosworth will hold seminars and mentor students who may be interested in pursuing a career in the Foreign Service, in addition to the two upcoming public talks.

A student seeking this very advice posed a question in the discussion portion following Bosworth’s talk.

Speaking to anyone considering a Foreign Service career, Bosworth said one must “think about it hard, and think again.” He said public service is a privilege, not so much a sacrifice as the typical notion holds. “It can be a great career as long as you have the right perspective on it,” he ended.

"The INSEAD's Global Talent Competitiveness Index ranked Korea 66th in the degree of openness to minorities and immigrants. Korea needs a government policy to attract high-quality human capital," says Gi-Wook Shin.

The coastal seas of East Asia, particularly from the East China Sea down to the South China Sea, have become an arena for growing tension and even the threat of military conflict, sparked by contention over maritime freedom, territorial disputes, and great power rivalry.

The East China Sea has developed into a major theater for these tensions, driven by the larger strategic rivalry between China and Japan. The two countries continue to clash over competing claims to uninhabited islets currently administered by Japan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. That dispute gained added steam recently when China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that overlapped those islands.

As both countries assert their presence, American policymakers worry about the maintenance of peace and security in the region, as well as ensuring freedom on the seas and of the air, including for U.S. military forces.

Two important seminar series at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center this winter quarter—one examining the future of China under the new leadership of Xi Jinping, and a second looking at the Sino-Japanese rivalry—explore these issues in depth and examine the dynamics of China-Japan-U.S. relations in the region, delving into the territorial and security tensions between China and Japan, the U.S. role and the implications of this for long-term stability. 

Andrew Erickson, an associate in research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, offered a detailed account of China’s maritime and military development and how it fits into long-term Chinese strategy. Erickson, who recently deployed with the USS Nimitz in the Asia-Pacific, painted China’s development as rapid yet uneven.

Erickson argued that China is much more intensely focused on advancing its interests in the “Near Seas,” an area that groups the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea, than in the more distant “Far Seas.”

Erickson said, “Washington must redouble its efforts to communicate effectively with Beijing and cooperate in areas of mutual interest, particularly in the 'Far Seas,' he recommended, “while maintaining the capability, credibility, and determination to ensure the bottom-line requirement for Asia-Pacific peace and stability: that no one can use force, or even the threat of force, to change the status quo.”

In a separate lecture focused on Sino-Japanese rivalry in the East China Sea, Richard C. Bush III, director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, said our concern should be focused on how Japan and China seek to assert their conflicting island and maritime claims. Even though the likelihood of war between the two countries is low, Bush argued that the climate still deserves careful attention because history shows territorial issues can be a casual factor for conflict.

Further to this point, Bush said the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and ADIZ disputes are “exposed lightning rods for domestic politics” that could encourage each nation’s leadership toward hasty and perhaps regrettable decisions. He asserted that risk reduction measures in the region should be improved including reestablishing communication channels and creating “rules of the road” for the ADIZ and island territories.

The Sino-Japanese Rivalry and China under Xi Jinping seminar series will continue through spring quarter. Please consult the events section for further detail.