On a rainy day last November, twelve fellows made their way up the steps of San Francisco’s City Hall, a true initiation to the town that’s often shrouded in fog. But the grey didn’t affect the day’s mood. Meeting with representatives from the Mayor’s Office, the fellows learned about California’s legislature through the unique lens of San Francisco, the only city statewide that is also designated as a county.

City Hall is just one of many site visits that the fellows attended during their time in the Corporate Affiliates Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, a cornerstone initiative that has brought professionals from Asia to Stanford since 1982.

“This year, our class was one of the most diverse ever, with fellows coming from Northeast to South Asia and representing a wide array of expertise from business to aerospace,” says Denise Masumoto, the manager of corporate relations at Shorenstein APARC. “We structured the program to support their interests and spur conversation with APARC scholars, and with those in the community beyond.”

The Corporate Affiliates Program provides yearlong fellowships for professionals from Asia who come to Stanford to learn about the United States, exchange ideas and participate in activities of mutual interest. The fellows keep a busy schedule: conducting a research project, auditing classes and attending site visits and seminars.

Now at the end of the academic year, the 2013–14 class has all but just departed. Before this, Shorenstein APARC spoke with three fellows about their experience: Tetsuo Ishiai from Tokyo, Japan; Tejas Mehta from Mumbai, India; and Wendy (Wei) Wang from Beijing, China. Highlighting moments and memories, the fellows struck conversations that underlined a few common themes.   

Thinking dynamically

At the heart of Silicon Valley, Stanford offers a unique base for fellows. As a hub for technology and venture capital, the area has an entrepreneurial buzz that grabs your attention, Ishiai says.

“To move toward open architecture, this entails movement to a more service-oriented structure,” he explains, and says that industry must ask the right questions. “What specialized services and facilities are required for this? What should be developed as the standard going forward?”Ishiai, who normally works at Mitsubishi Electric’s headquarters in Japan, has examined the shift in data management practices and its implications for business during his time at Shorenstein APARC, leveraging his experiences from over twenty years at the company.

When asked if he would share anything when he arrived back home, Ishiai says a message he will convey is the importance of creativity and determination.Ishiai says Silicon Valley offered an excellent environment to perform his research; he joined conferences at Stanford and visited many IT companies in the Bay Area. Ishiai also talked with industry executives through his courses at Stanford’s d.school.

“Exciting thinking and passion for starting new business ventures was very evident in Silicon Valley culture,” he says. “This type of support and ambition should be encouraged in Japanese corporate culture, especially among young employees, who can often be less recognized.”

Ishiai says he made many connections here, and looks forward to returning to Stanford in the future.

Finding partners

When asked to describe a favorite memory, Wang says that challenges have brought forth her richest experiences as a fellow. Speaking English on a daily basis and finding a stride in university life again were obstacles at first, she says, but when paired with the right people and resources, good things happened.

“I connected with a graduate student at CEAS, who I met with weekly to practice my language skills and share cultural observations,” she says. “We became close friends – I even hosted members of his family when they visited California.”Wang normally works in corporate banking at the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), an entity with an expanding scope of business overseas. To suit this trend, Wang says she sought to improve her English skills while in the United States. Masumoto encouraged her to seek out Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies (CEAS), which offers advanced Chinese language instruction. There, Wang found a surplus of graduate students who were eager to help.

The theme of collaboration echoed in the courses she audited at the Graduate Business School, which allowed her to interface with top executives from JetBlue and Nike in a small group setting, and through dialogue with her research advisor, Jean C. Oi, a professor and director of the Stanford China Program at Shorenstein APARC. 

“Each time I met with Jean, she would offer up a slew of new questions,” Wang says. “She pushed me to really examine the details of my research – a different experience than I’m used to in China where expression is less direct, open.”

Comparative perspective

The global pharmaceutical industry sees extensive overlap between the government, business and academic sectors worldwide, but the variation across countries is what makes it so interesting, says Mehta, who has worked in medical marketing at Reliance Life Sciences for nearly a decade.

“A significant difference between India and the United States is the two country’s health care systems with respect to their insurance structures,” he says. “However, all stakeholders, whether in the United States or India or elsewhere, share the common objective of improving patient’s treatment outcomes and reducing overall cost of healthcare.”

Mehta analyzed challenges for pharmaceutical businesses through his courses at the Graduate Business School, such as “Leading Strategic Change in the Health Care Industry.” The course is structured to examine the environment for incumbent health care players like companies and hospitals, but also to look at the dynamics for entrepreneurial start-ups. A prime opportunity, given the budding initiatives for innovative treatment and health information services in Silicon Valley. A comparative perspective is necessary to learn from and question how things are done both at home and abroad. Mehta says being at Stanford, an institution with a strong foundation in medicine, greatly informed his research. His focus on theranostics, an emerging field of customizable testing and treatment for patients, was enhanced through dialogue on- and off-campus.

The classroom experience, coupled with visits to a variety of businesses in the Bay Area, gave Mehta a fuller view of the intricate market for U.S. medicine, and its relations with government and the private insurance system.

Looking back, he says it is hard to single out a few memories because there are many, but one that would top his list is visiting City Hall.

Northeast Asia is a global center of economic dynamism, propelled by phenomenal growth in social and cultural interactions among the region's nations. Still, wounds from past wrongs, committed during times of colonialism and war, have not yet fully healed, and the question of history has become a highly contentious diplomatic issue. After one and a half years in office, the leaders of China and South Korea (Korea hereafter) still refuse to hold bilateral summits with their Japanese counterpart, largely due to disputes over the past. Questions about history touch on the most sensitive issues of national identity, making it very difficult for countries to compromise.

How should we understand and approach current historical tensions in Northeast Asia? Pessimists worry that the legacies of the past will persist and that there is not much we can do about it. Optimists believe that these issues will inevitably fade over time as the wartime generation passes away and the countries of the region become increasingly integrated economically and culturally.

Last summer, I had an opportunity to deliver a special lecture series at a Korean university. More than 30 students from China, Japan, Korea, the U.S. and Europe attended the lectures, which focused on problems related to the modern history of Northeast Asia and territorial disputes. I asked students whether they thought Japan had apologized for its past actions of aggression. Korean and Chinese students mostly replied that Japan had either "not apologized at all" or was "not sincere." In contrast, most Japanese students were hardly aware of the misfortunes of the past and the controversies about the government's stance.

The historical amnesia of Japanese students is most worrisome, but the insistence by Chinese and Korean students that the Japanese have not apologized at all is troubling, too. Although the definition of "apology" may vary depending on circumstances, it is undeniable that Japanese leaders, including prime ministers, have directly expressed regret about Japan's actions of aggression to Koreans and Chinese. Of course, legitimate doubts arise in Korea and China as to Japan's sincerity. More than once, a prime minister's apology has been undercut by the denial of wartime responsibility by his education minister, or by a subsequent visit by the prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine to Japan's war dead.

My teaching experience illustrates the danger posed by a crucial gap in perceptions. History does not merely narrate events or developments. In reconstructing the past, it is inevitable that certain parts are omitted or stressed, producing different views. Divided historical memories separate nations, resulting in distinct, often contradictory, perceptions. Those perceptions become deeply embedded in the public consciousness, transmitted to succeeding generations formally by education and informally through the arts, popular culture and mass media.

Time isn't a cure-all

Why have these nations developed distinct, and incomplete, memories of the wartime period?

One common answer is that Japan was an aggressor while China and Korea were victims, but this is too simplistic to explain the complexities of modern history and collective memory in Northeast Asia. Different events acquire disproportionate weight in the formation of each nation's historical consciousness. For China and Korea, Japanese acts of aggression -- such as the Nanjing Massacre or forced labor and sexual slavery -- constitute the most crucial elements. For Japan, events related to U.S. actions, such as the firebombings of Japanese cities or the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are more important. Korea and China are a less significant element in Japan's memory, while Japan looms large in theirs.

Japan's focus on U.S. actions, over the sufferings of Koreans and Chinese, explains the country's historical amnesia and reluctance to come to terms with its Asian neighbors. Unlike Germany, postwar Japan developed a mythology of victimhood, shaped by the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the massive incendiary and atomic bombings of its cities. Victim consciousness provided fertile soil for the growth of postwar neo-nationalism that justified colonialism and war and denied Japan's responsibility for atrocities.

Balanced historical memory with a better understanding of the perspective of the other side is urgently needed. Japan needs to clearly comprehend the mindset of its neighbors, instead of complaining about its "apology fatigue." China and Korea are also responsible for educating their citizens about Japan's own struggle to come to terms with its past. That kind of mutual understanding rests on resuming efforts at joint historical study with a commitment to open-minded debate. Only then can the nations of Northeast Asia begin to narrow perception gaps and forge a shared view.

This is a task not only for governments but for civil society. We should encourage exchanges among young people from the three countries, including joint visits to historic sites such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Seodaemun Prison History Museum in Seoul. Such gatherings would constitute a regionwide attempt to share and heal the pains of the past. Disregarding or ignoring dark events means not only evading historical accountability but also missing the opportunity to learn from history. Germany's failure to learn from its defeat in World War I led to the rise of Nazism and another world war. The German experience should provide a valuable lesson for all, especially Japan.

We cannot depend on time alone to heal these wounds. When issues of the past posed a stumbling block in improving relations between China and Japan in the 1970s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said, "Because our generation is not wise enough to resolve all of the pending questions, let's leave the unsettled ones to the next generation." Contrary to his expectations, however, the two countries are stricken today with a worse situation involving history and territorial disputes, and the younger generation tends to be even more swayed by the fever of nationalism.

This is a moment of both danger and opportunity for Northeast Asia. The current impasse in regional relations demands a commitment to confronting the corrosive nationalism fed by the unresolved issues of history. As the wartime generation passes from the scene, they are called upon to leave behind a wiser generation capable of realizing the potential of Northeast Asia to be the center of the 21st century.

This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on 25 July and reposted with permission.

Human Capital & Ageing

as part of the "Next World Program"

Harvard School of Public Health

Boston, Massachusetts

April 13-14, 2015

Organized by:

David E. Bloom, Harvard School of Public Health, USA; David Canning, Harvard School of Public Health, USA; Karen Eggleston, Stanford University, USA; Wang Feng, Fudan University, China; Hans Groth, World Demographic & Ageing Forum, Switzerland; Alfonso Sousa-Poza, University of Hohenheim, Germany; Thomas Zeltner, Special Envoy, World Health Organization, Switzerland.

Topic

One of the challenges faced by ageing societies is maintaining a workforce large enough to supply the goods and services needed by a country's entire population. In the coming decades, industrialized countries will experience a steep increase in the share of elderly persons in the population and a fall in the share of the working-age population. In some countries, the number of people aged 60-64 (many of whom are about to retire) already exceeds the number of people aged 15-19 (the cohort soon entering the labour market). There will, however, be mitigating factors that will tend to decrease the effects of declines in the working-age share of the population: (a) the burden of caring for a high number of elderly people will be offset by there being fewer children to support, and (b) the proportion of adult women who work will rise when there are fewer children to take care of. Still, if there is no change in work and retirement patterns, the ratio of older inactive persons per worker will almost double from around 38 percent in the OECD area in 2000 to just over 70 percent in 2050 (OECD, "Live Longer, Work Longer", 2006). In Europe, this ratio could rise to almost one older inactive person for every worker over the same period.

Ageing on the anticipated scale will place substantial pressure on public finances and economic growth. According to the OECD, on the basis of unchanged participation patterns and productivity growth, the growth of GDP per capita in the OECD area would decline to around 1.7 percent per year over the next three decades, as compared with about 2.4 percent per year between 1970 and 2000. These negative consequences of ageing could be possibly offset by postponement of retirement, greater immigration, faster productivity growth, or higher fertility (although the positive economic effects of higher fertility would only come several decades after an uptick in fertility rates). While these developments would all help offset the negative effects, they need to go hand-in-hand with attempts to mobilize available labour in order to sustain economic growth. One of the most significant sources of additional labour supply is older people who are currently inactive. Indeed, as labour markets tighten, companies will soon have little choice but to be more welcoming of older employees. Prompt action to harness – and enhance – the contributions of older workers could become a key competitive advantage.

The objective of this workshop would be to discuss one important topic related to an ageing workforce, namely human capital. How does a worker’s human capital change over the life course and what role does the health and skill status of workers play? The answer to these questions is of great importance, not only for adequate human resource policies, but also for macroeconomic policies, especially those associated with retirement and economic growth. Despite the importance of this issue, this question is not easily answered.

The workshop will bring together researchers to present recent research on ageing and human capital. Research questions and topics that could be dealt with include:

• Human capital, economic growth, and the demographic dividend.
• Firm-level experience in promoting human capital among older workers.
• Evaluation of policies aimed at enhancing the quantity, quality, and value of older workers’ human capital.
• The relationship between human capital and productivity.
• Training and wages of older workers.
• Technological change, knowledge replenishment, and productivity. 

Submission for the Workshop

Interested authors are invited to submit a 1-page abstract by the 30th of September 2014 to David E. Bloom (dbloom@hsph.harvard.edu) and Alfonso Sousa-Poza (Alfonso.sousa-poza@uni-hohenheim.de). The authors of accepted abstracts will be notified by the end of October and completed draft papers will then be expected by the 28th of February 2015.

Economy class travel and accommodation costs for one author of each accepted paper will be covered by the organisers.

A selection of the papers presented at the workshop will (assuming successful completion of the review process) be published in a special issue of the Journal of the Economics of Ageing.

Submission for the Special Issue

Interested authors (also those not attending the workshop) are invited to submit papers for the special issue in the Journal of the Economics of Ageing by the 31st of May 2015. Submissions should be made online at http://ees.elsevier.com/jeoa. Please select article type “SI Human Capital.”

About the Next World Program

The Next World Program is a joint initiative of Harvard University’s Program on the Global Demography of Aging, the WDA Forum, Stanford University’s Asia Health Policy Program, and Fudan University’s Comparative Aging Societies. These institutions will organize an annual workshop and a special issue in the Journal of the Economics of Ageing on an important economic theme related to ageing societies.

The Japanese Cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, announced a reinterpretation of the country’s Constitution on July 1st, marking a significant shift in its pacifist security policy that it has held for nearly seventy years.

A controversial aspect of the Constitution’s reinterpretation concerns Article 9, a defense clause that outlaws a traditional military and use of force to settle disputes. The recent announcement, however, suggests lifting Japan’s ban on collective self-defense, extending the country’s ability to apply use of force not only to respond to an armed attack against Japan but also when an armed attack occurs against its allies.

Ryo Sahashi, a visiting associate professor at Shorenstein APARC, writes on the %link1% that it is necessary for Japan to enhance its deterrence through greater diplomacy, not just an enlargement of its military. He says Japan, like other nations, is entitled to secure its territory and pursue its own alliance partners. However, the lack of public support toward the reinterpretation is concerning, and will present challenges as the administration seeks to implement its new policies.

Sahashi also spoke with %link2% about Japan’s changing security paradigm in the context of Mr. Abe’s state visit to Canberra, Australia. He points out that it will take a year for the administration to change the laws associated with the Constitution’s reinterpretation, saying this time gap will allow the Government to shore up national support. His interview is available below, it starts around minute 1:12.

Following the Cabinet’s announcement, a poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun reported a 48 percent approval rating of the Abe administration, down nine percentage points when compared to last month. Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, says in the %link3% that the poll reflects the public’s lack of support for the policy changes.

Eyes remain focused on Indonesia as votes for candidates Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto are counted in the country’s landmark presidential election.

On Wednesday, the polls reflected a precariously even divide between Widodo, also referred to as "Jowoki," the governor of Jakarta, and Prabowo, an ex-general and son-in-law of the country’s former dictator Suharto. Initial polls show Jowoki holds a slight lead, but the government has yet to declare an outright winner, with neither side conceding at the moment. 

Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Shorenstein APARC, answers a few questions about the election and what it could mean for Indonesia’s fledging democracy.

This election will transfer power from incumbent president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the first to lead the country since its democratic transition. Is this election a turning point for Indonesia?

It is. It is only the third direct presidential election in the history of Indonesia. The first two, in 2004 and 2009, yielded landslide victories for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), giving him two consecutive presidential terms as president. His large margins of victory were, in effect, incontestable. In contrast, the presidential election on 9 July is being sharply contested, based on various "quick count" estimates of who won and by how much. Some of those estimates say that Joko Widodo ("Jokowi") has won. A smaller number of estimates assign victory to his opponent, Prabowo Subianto. These estimated margins of "quick count" success by one candidate over the other are typically small: the differences run between 1 and 5 percent.

These small margins asserted on behalf of contradictory outcomes have politicized the voting-and-counting procedure and stimulated fears of fraud. Prabowo in particular appears to be challenging the legitimacy of a possible win by Jokowi when the official result is announced. That announcement is scheduled to be made by the General Elections Commission on 22 July.

If the official margin of victory is very slender, whether for Jokowi or for Prabowo, the losing campaign could request a ruling on the matter by the Constitutional Court. If the request is taken up by the court, another month could elapse before a legal judgment is issued. Under this alarming if hypothetical scenario, Indonesia's political future could remain in a prolonged limbo conducive to major unrest. 

Given that the polls reflect a tightly contested race, will the losing party accept defeat?

Who knows? It will depend on what happens. That said, there are powerful reasons to believe that the loser, whoever he is, will think twice before taking his case to the streets. The onus on such vengeance as endangering Indonesia's fledgling democracy would be great. We also need to remember that if, as many expect, the election commission (and perhaps, later, the Constitutional Court) validates Jokowi as the next president, he is likely to face a parliamentary majority that supported Prabowo. Indeed, only 37 percent of the seats in the main national legislature are occupied by members of parties that endorsed Jokowi. If Prabowo is declared the loser, and the evidence of electoral malfeasance is absent or minor, Prabowo may accept having lost if he knows he can retain substantial influence over national policy while preparing for another presidential run in 2019. 

Both candidates campaigned on widespread platforms that called for reform in many areas ­– from energy to anti-corruption. What issues are Indonesians most concerned about?

Basically, poverty and corruption. But many Indonesians allocate their votes based less on policy distinctions than on the personalities of the candidates. Prabowo's ability to catch up with Jokowi in popularity during the campaign reflects in no small measure his more charismatic and commanding personality in contrast to Jokowi's relatively lackluster performance.

What steps can the next administration take to keep Indonesia from slipping back to its authoritarian past?

The two candidates are very different in this regard. Prabowo is a former general. He has been implicated in major violations of human rights. He is linked to the autocratic regime that preceded Indonesia's current democratic experiment. One can imagine many steps that Prabowo could take as president to nudge Indonesia back onto its former authoritarian track. He has already said that direct elections are not good for Indonesia.  

As for Jokowi, were he to become president, his task would be to achieve a level of probity and progress in Indonesia sufficient to convince the country that democracy can be effective not just in theory but in practice as well.

Emmerson also spoke about the election with Deutsche Welle on 16 July, and the Voice of America on 9 July.

Stanford economist Takeo Hoshi’s new co-authored working paper, “Implementing Structural Reforms in Abenomics: How to Reduce the Cost of Doing Business in Japan,” is cited in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formed a panel to rewrite national textbooks that reference the country's wartime past. Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, says those actions are a “backdoor way of limiting references to Japanese aggression” in an Economist article analyzing the history debates.

Update: A full report summarizing the discussion of the 12th Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum is available below.

Northeast Asia has been rife with animosity over the past year. Among the outstanding concerns are China’s naval movements in the South China Sea and the threat of a fourth nuclear missile test by North Korea. While no major incidents have occurred in recent months, the uncertainty weighs heavily on policymakers and observers. What if an accidental clash happens in the sea or air?

Senior security scholars and practitioners from South Korea and the United States recently gathered for the Korea–U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, a Track II workshop to exchange views on these major issues impacting the Northeast Asia region.

The Strategic Forum, established in 2006, is held semiannually and alternates between Seoul and Stanford, hosted by the Korean Studies Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The Korean counterpart organization is the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, the foreign ministry’s think tank within the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. 

Twenty-four participants gathered on June 20 at the Bechtel Conference Center, and offered a diversity of opinions on Korean peninsula issues and the potential impact they could have on the countries’ allies. The participants collectively expressed a desire for regional stability, increased dialogue, and commitment to maintaining the U.S.–ROK alliance and cooperation on other trust-building activities.

The conference operates under the Chatham House Rule of individual confidentiality to allow for candid conversation. A few main points from the sessions are disclosed below:

Session I: Northeast Asia Regional Dynamics

Many participants shared the concern that trilateral relations between China–South Korea–Japan are at one of the worst points in recent history.

China’s current attitude toward its neighbors and the United States was discussed at length. Many participants discussed the strategic trajectory of China and how the country’s domestic situation may challenge its ability to effectively move forward, contrary to popular perceptions that simply straight-line its current growth rate into the indefinite future. 

Korean participants expressed concern toward Japan’s position, particularly following Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the stance he has taken on other wartime issues like “comfort women.” They said they hoped the United States would do more to help Korea–Japan relations, as participants recognized the desirability of increased trilateral U.S.–Japan–Korea security and diplomatic cooperation.

Session II: U.S.­–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)

Participants shared the view that the U.S.­–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is serving to broaden and deepen the U.S.­–ROK relationship.

The KORUS FTA is only in its second year of implementation, so additional time is needed to make a comprehensive evaluation, but it appears that it will significantly increase bilateral trade as time passes.

Session III: U.S.–ROK Alliance

The U.S.­–ROK relationship, on the whole, is in very good shape. South Korea and the United States have similar policies in most strategic areas.

The two countries cooperate on many diplomatic and security initiatives, such as the U.S. 28,500-strong troop presence in South Korea and many United Nations peacekeeping missions abroad. 

Session IV: North Korea

Participants agreed that North Korea continues to engage in provocative behavior. This remains the chief concern of the U.S.–ROK alliance, as well a priority of the international community in total.

The policies of the United States and South Korea toward North Korea are well-coordinated and principled, but a number of Korean and American participants expressed concern that more creative thinking was needed, as the challenges North Korea poses are increasing. 

Reports from past forums are available on the Shorenstein APARC website.

The Korean Studies Program at Shorenstein APARC welcomes Mike Cowin, the deputy head of mission at the British Embassy in Pyongyang as a Pantech Fellow, and Oh Yeon-Cheon, the president of Seoul National University as a Koret Fellow.

Announcements about both appointments are posted below.