Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
Viewed from the realist perspective of mainstream international political economy, economic and elite-based political integration are the keys to building a region; “soft” or “normative” questions of identity can be ignored. Contesting that view, Dr. Pietsch will argue that research on regionalism, especially in Southeast Asia, could benefit from a focus on the nature and role of national and regional identity in that process. Compared with the growing body of scholarship on European identity as a means of understanding “Europeanization,” regional identity in Southeast Asia is still underexplored. Addressing this gap is important especially in relation to issues of democratization such as human rights, migrant labor, access to citizenship, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and corruption. These questions necessarily invoke national cultural and political values and their implications for regional identity.
Drawing on relevant theories, Dr Pietsch will use AsiaBarometer data to examine public opinion on democratization, national identity, and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Her preliminary findings underscore the need to broaden scholarship on regionalism in Southeast Asia to encompass both cultural and political manifestations of identity. In addition, she will show how identity helps explain why ASEAN-style regionalism is often thought by analysts to have succeeded in economic and security terms but to have failed in the consciousness of Southeast Asians themselves.
Dr. Juliet Pietsch is a senior lecturer in political science in the Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations. She studies broad patterns of social and political behaviour in Australia and East Asia. Recent publications include Dimensions of Australian Society (co-authored, 2010), and "Generational Change: Regional Security and Australian Engagement with Asia," The Pacific Review (co-authored, 2010).
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
Focus
In 2008, for the first time a majority of the world's population lived in cities. Rapidly rising standards of living and migration are contributing to an unprecedented worldwide surge in urbanization--in China alone, if trends continue, by 2025 more than 220 cities will each have more than one million inhabitants. The explosive growth of cities around the Pacific has widespread implications for energy use and has led to the demand for cities to become both smart and green.
But while billions of dollars of investments are pouring into urban energy solutions, and around the Pacific "low-carbon cities" and "eco-cities" are moving center stage, there are enormous challenges (and opportunities) facing the effective application of information technologies (IT), other innovative technologies and industrial growth.
The intersection of IT and environmental sustainability on the urban scale will require a complex integration of expertise, tools, and know-how from multiple disciplines--from building design and real estate development, to mobility and water systems, IT hardware and software, and energy providers. Although innovations in strategies and implementation are evolving quickly in pockets of excellence around the globe, early results have been highly uneven. Frameworks for understanding and analysis are still fragmented, innovative design and implementation rapidly changing, and best practices have yet to be defined.
Purpose
Led by SPRIE at Stanford University, this conference aims to gather an elite group of experts, decision makers, and thought leaders from across disciplines and geographical boundaries to focus on smart green cities around the Pacific. Participants will:
Participants
"Smart Green Cities" will invite a select group of government, business, and academic leaders from the United States and Asia for two days of expert presentations and fruitful discussion at Stanford University. The summit will enable participants to better lead to improved strategy, action, and outcomes for building the next generation of smart green cities.
Agenda
Agenda is preliminary and not all speakers are confirmed. Please download below
Sponsors
Many thanks to our sponsors for making this event possible.
Image
Image
Image
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Building
366 Galvez Street
Stanford, CA
As one of the core features of modern states, universal schooling provided a tool with which to disseminate the skills and knowledge demanded by the new era of industrialization and interstate competition, as well as to impart what it meant to be a citizen. Citizenship education, in fact, or "civics," lay at the heart of the education enterprise in the modern world, reflecting the new circumstances of competing nation-states and hence prioritizing the cultivation of the population’s identification with and allegiance to a particular nation and/or the state. An education system, then, came to be regarded as a strategic necessity if not entirely an idealistic or humanitarian one.
This presentation explores modern Korean state making through an examination of citizen education at the turn of the 20th century. How did the larger purpose of universal schooling and citizenship education evolve as the Korean state underwent so many dramatic shifts in form, function, and even sovereignty? What role did the educational institutions, from the state bureaucracy to the schools themselves, play in spreading the lessons of loyalty, allegiance, and identity? And finally, How did Confucian ethics and statecraft affect the demands of the modern schooling system? Indeed the legacies of pre-20th century Korea extended well into the colonial era (1910-45), including the period of wartime mobilization in the 1930s and 40s, when schooling became central to the intensified, radical assimilation policy of turning Koreans into "imperial subjects."
Professor Hwang conducts research on the modern transformation of Korea, broadly conceived. He is the author of Beyond Birth: Social Status in the Emergence of Modern Korea (2004), and co-edited, with Professor Gi-Wook Shin of Stanford, Contentious Kwangju: The May 1980 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present (2003). His latest book, History of Korea: An Episodic Narrative (Palgrave Macmillan) is expected to be published in 2010. He teaches courses on Korean history and society, East Asian and world history at the University of Southern California. He is a graduate of Oberlin College (AB) and Harvard University (Ph.D).
This seminar is supported by a generous grant from Koret Foundation.
Philippines Conference Room
The exploration of visual archives related to Korean history has grown at an exponential rate over the past decade. While photographs ostensibly hold the possibility of tranforming the captured ephemeral moments into the fixity of celluloid perpetuity, they can have profound effects on changing memories of the past, and collapsing time and space. This lecture examines the history and the meanings of photography in modern Korean history through the two dual prisms of "wormholes" and "phantom zones."
Lynn is the AECL/KEPCO Chair in Korean Research at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia. He is also the editor for the journal Pacific Affairs which has been published continuously since 1928. His research covers a range of topics relating to modern and contemporary Korea (both South and North), and Japan. His publications include Bipolar Orders: The Two Koreas Since 1989 (2007); "History of Gendered Migration in the Two Koreas," Harvard Asia Quarterly (2008); "Moving Pictures: Postcards of Colonial Korea," International Institute of Asian Studies Newsletter (2007); and "Vicarious Traumas: Television and Public Opinion in Japan's North Korea Policy," Pacific Affairs (2006).
Lynn received a B.A and an M.A from University of British Columbia, and a Ph.D. from Harvard University.
Philippines Conference Room
When discussing Korea's "Chinese Decade," roughly defined as the dozen or so years prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, most of the attention is focused on the heavy-handed activities of Yuan Shikai in Seoul. Less well known is that part of this Chinese effort to bind Korea more closely to China involved the absorption of Korea's newly-formed Maritime Customs Service. Several scholars have looked at this period and the actions of some of the key players such as Sir Robert Hart, Li Hongzhang, Henry F. Merrill, and Paul Georg von Mollendorff. Using the recently-discovered correspondence of the first commissioner of customs in Pusan, this talk will discuss some heretofore unknown aspects of this attempted takeover by China.
Wayne Patterson received his undergraduate degree in history from Swarthmore College, and his graduate degrees in history and international relations from the University of Pennsylvania. He has authored or edited eleven books on modern Korea, including The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910 (1994) and The Ilse: First-Generation Korean Immigrants in Hawaii, 1903-1973 (2000). He has taught Korean history at a number of institutions in the United States, including Harvard University, the University of Chicago, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of South Carolina, the University of Kansas, and the University of Pennsylvania. He has also taught Korean history abroad, including Ewha University, Korea University, Yonsei University, as Fulbright Distinguished Lecturer, and most recently, at the University of the Philippines, as Korea Foundation Visiting Professor. His home institution is St. Norbert College in Wisconsin, where he is professor of history. He is currently teaching Korean history as a visiting professor at the University of California - Berkeley.
Philippines Conference Room
Written and edited by many of the world’s foremost scholars of transnational history, this dictionary challenges readers to look at the contemporary world in a new light. It contains over 400 entries on transnational subjects such as food, migration, and religion, as well as traditional topics such as nationalism and war.
Rafiq Dossani, a Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center senior research scholar, contributed the chapter about offshoring.
The coming to power of a new party in Japan, with a strong mandate to rule, is unprecedented in the postwar era. In the aftermath of the Japanese elections in August of this year, there has been much discussion, particularly in the Japanese media, about the foreign policy orientation of the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led administration. Some commentators see an “anti-American” tilt—evidenced by differing views on the relocation of U.S. bases in Okinawa and the renewal of Japanese naval refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.
This viewpoint misses the foreign policy forest for its trees. The paradigm-shifting potential of this change lies much more in the DPJ’s desire to re-center Japan’s foreign policy on Asia. Across the spectrum of the DPJ, from former socialists on the left to those who came out of the conservative Liberal Democratio Party (LDP), there is broad agreement on the need to put much greater emphasis on Japan’s ties to the rest of Asia, particularly to China and South Korea.
The new Asianism in Japanese foreign policy was on display at the October 10 triangular summit of the Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese leaders, held in Beijing. It was only the second time these three have met on their own and the meeting was substantive, covering everything from coordinating on North Korea and economic stimulus policy to taking initial steps toward formation of a new East Asian Community. “Until now, we have tended to be too reliant on the United States,” Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama told reporters after the meeting, adding that “The Japan-U.S. alliance remains important, but as a member of Asia, I would like to develop policies that focus more on Asia.”
The dominant foreign policy camp in Japan has been what Hitoshi Tanaka, a former senior foreign ministry official and close advisor to the DPJ, calls “alliance traditionalists,” whom he defines as those who “place the maintenance of a robust alliance with the United States above all other foreign policy priorities.” In the view of some DPJ policy advisors, the previous conservative governments mistakenly tried to cope with the challenge of a rising China by getting as close to the United States as possible. The decision to send troops to Iraq and the Indian Ocean was prompted not by any deep support for those causes but rather by the belief that this would ensure U.S. support in any tensions with China, and with North Korea.
All this took place as Sino-Japanese relations descended into their most troubled phase in the postwar period, prompted by former Prime Minister Koizumi’s provocative visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead. High-level contacts with China were frozen, tensions rose over territorial issues in the East China Sea, and rising nationalism on both sides culminated in the outbreak of government-sanctioned anti-Japanese riots in 2005 and a Chinese campaign to block Japan’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.
There was an attempt by Koizumi’s conservative successors to roll back some of these tensions. But those signals were always mixed with the persistence of anti-Chinese views and the powerful camp of rightwing nationalists in and around the LDP who cling to a revisionist view of Japan’s wartime role, some even indulging in a vigorous defense of Japanese imperialism.
In the view of DPJ policy advisers, this pseudo-containment strategy is doomed to failure. Given the increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China, and their overlapping strategic interests, the United States will never form an anti-China front. Japan cannot rely solely, these advisers argue, on the U.S.-Japan security alliance to deal with China’s bid for regional hegemony.
Nor can Japan afford to indulge fantasies of confrontation with China, given its own extensive ties to its economy and society. Rather, the greater threat, in the view of many Japanese analysts, is being abandoned by the United States through the formation of a U.S.-China “Group of Two” that effectively excludes Japan, or relegates it to second-level status in the region.
Japan, those policymakers argue, needs to preempt that threat by engaging Asia on its own—not only China, but the entire region, from India back to Korea. The DPJ’s own policy vision, articulated by Prime Minister Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, and party strongman Ichiro Ozawa, remains vaguely defined but has three clear elements:
What does this mean? There should be little question, particularly after the initial meetings between the new government and the Obama administration, that the DPJ seeks to back away from the security alliance. Over the past fifteen years, the DPJ leadership has not only supported, but even led, the expansion of Japan’s security role, beginning with the passage of the 1992 law permitting Japanese participation
in peacekeeping operations and including the initial dispatch of naval forces to the Indian Ocean in response to 9/11. Though the DPJ has made commitments to reduce the U.S. presence in Okinawa, it is already realizing how difficult that is to accomplish; some kind of compromise on this issue is imminent. Similarly, Foreign Minister Okada’s visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrated a willingness to contribute, mostly through economic aid, to the security effort in both countries.
Prime Minister Hatoyama presented his somewhat romantic desire to reproduce the European experience to create an East Asian Community in September before the United Nations General Assembly. Hatoyama has indicated that he understands this is a long process, and has been careful to make clear that Japan has no intention of excluding the United States’ role in the region, nor the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. As Hatoyama put in his UN address:
Today, there is no way that Japan can develop without deeply involving itself in Asia and the Pacific region. Reducing the region’s security risks and sharing each other’s economic dynamism based on the principle of “open regionalism” will result in tremendous benefits not only for Japan but also for the region and the international community.
Given the historical circumstances arising from its mistaken actions in the past, Japan has hesitated to play a proactive role in this region. It is my hope that the new Japan can overcome this history and become a “bridge” among the countries of Asia.
I look forward to an East Asian community taking shape as an extension of the accumulated cooperation built up step by step among partners who have the capacity to work together, starting with fields in which we can cooperate—free frade agreements, finance, currency, energy, environment, disaster relief and more. Of course, Rome was not built in a day, so let us seek to move forward steadily on this, even if at a moderate pace.
DPJ policymakers advocate pursuit of an East Asian community as only one of a nest of regional structures, including a regional security system that might grow out of the Six Party talks on North Korea. They also embrace the idea of a Japan-U.S.-China strategic dialogue, based on their own perception that without the combined muscle of the United States and Japan, they cannot bring China to the table on a range of issues from energy to intellectual property.
The last element of the DPJ’s policy vision is to take another major step in clearing away the legacy of the wartime past. Hatoyama personally reaffirmed his government’s adherence to the statement on war responsibility issued by then Prime Minister Murayama in 1995, at the time of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war.
Hatoyama, Ozawa and others in the DPJ leadership are determined to confront the history issue in a way that eases tensions with China and South Korea and also closes doors backward. They will not only refuse to go to the Yasukuni Shrine but also want to remove the Class A war criminals whose “souls” are enshrined there by decision of the shrine authorities, to the consternation of the Emperor, among others. The DPJ led the hue and cry over the unapologetic revisionism of former Japanese air force chief of staff, General Toshio Tamogami, who wrote an essay justifying Japan’s colonialism and wartime aggression, including the attack on Pearl Harbor. Foreign Minister Okada has backed the creation of a joint history textbook by China, Japan and South Korea, based on the model followed by France and Germany. These are stances the LDP has been historically incapable of taking.
The DPJ draws some inspiration from the anti-imperial form of Asianism—“Small Nipponism”—championed by the late Tanzan Ishibashi, who served briefly as premier in the mid-1950s and who was allied to Hatoyama’s beloved grandfather, and former premier, Ichiro Hatoyama.
In the coming months, the Hatoyama government will have numerous opportunities to develop its new policies, particularly in the run-up to Japan’s hosting of the APEC summit next year. Undoubtedly, it will be difficult to implement in practice, but this new Asianism marks a clear turning point in Japan’s postwar foreign policy.
