Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping recently visited the United States to meet with top officials and tour various cities. China experts followed the trip closely because Xi is anticipated to become China’s next president. Thomas Fingar spoke with the Shanghai Oriental Morning Post about the visit, and about the Obama administration’s Asia policy.

How will the Obama administration’s strategic adjustments towards the Asia-Pacific shape or influence Xi’s visit? Given the fast-changing environment and shift of power towards Asia, will there be any changes or differences in the United States’s treatment of China’s anticipated future leader?

The primary impact is likely to be on the discussions between Xi and his American interlocutors. I assume that U.S. officials will want to explain the announced strategic adjustments and that Xi will seek authoritative answers to questions that he and other Chinese leaders have about the objectives and implications of the adjustments.

Contrary to your question, I do not believe the environment is changing rapidly—shifts in the global system and the shift in dynamism and wealth toward Asia have been under way for decades. The United States has been and will remain a part of that transition. The U.S. goal is to ensure that the changes result in increased security and prosperity for all—a win-win situation not unlike what happened when first Japan and then the other “Asian tigers” preceded China on the path toward greater wealth and power. 

What interests Washington most about Vice President Xi? What expectations does the United States have for his visit?

Washington expects Xi to succeed Hu Jintao and understands that he will be first among equals in a collective leadership that constrains Xi’s ability to act independently. But U.S. officials also understand that Xi, like all leaders, brings personal preferences and agendas to the job and that dealing with him will be influenced by his personality, understanding of American culture, and goals for the relationship. Simply stated, the Americans Xi meets will want to get to know him and what he is like.

U.S. officials understand that he is here as China’s vice president and therefore is unlikely to be bringing new initiatives. They do expect him to have questions about U.S. and Obama administration positions on a wide range of global issues and to have questions about U.S. intentions in Asia.

Is the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy aimed at containing or encircling China? Almost all U.S. official statements try to clarify that the United States is not trying to contain China, but its policy focus and military deployments in the Asia-Pacific have made many Chinese scholars doubtful of U.S. intentions. What are your observations? Is U.S. rhetoric consistent with its actions?

I do not like the term “pivot to Asia” and am pleased that U.S. officials seem to have stopped using that term. The United States is not returning to Asia; we never left. I think the basic point of recent statements is that with the end of the U.S. role in the conflict in Iraq and plans to draw down in Afghanistan, the United States will be able to focus more attention on other parts of the world. Asia is, and has been, the most dynamic, fastest changing, and in many ways most-challenging region of the world for many years. The region is also very important to the United States and deserves more attention than it has received. The Asia-Pacific is a region of superlatives—biggest economies, largest militaries, most nuclear powers, largest military budgets, largest foreign exchange reserves, etc. It would be unwise and impossible not to pay attention to developments in and affecting the region and its relations with other parts of the global system.

I have been working on China for more than 45 years and working with Chinese counterparts for 40 years. I must say that I have just about abandoned efforts to persuade important groups in China that the United States is not attempting to surround, contain, or thwart China’s rise. They seem determined to believe that it is the case no matter what we say or do. It is impossible for me to look at the policies and actions of the last eight administrations and come to any conclusion except that the United States means what its leaders have said: that it is in the interest of the United States for China to be strong, secure, and prosperous. The record shows quite clearly that the United States has assisted China’s rise. It also shows that China’s rise has been beneficial to the United States. We are not poorer or weaker or more insecure because China’s people live better and China plays an increasingly important role on the world stage. 

Do you think the Obama administration has changed the direction of U.S. strategy toward China or Asia compared with the Bush administration?

The short answer is, “no. ” The Bush administration was preoccupied by terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan and devoted less time and attention to Asia. Obama is redressing the balance and better aligning attention with current interests. Arguably what has changed is the perception of China held by others in the region. A series of foreign policy blunders in 2010 undercut the success of China’s diplomacy and increased regional concern about China’s intentions. That prompted requests for reassurance that the United States would remain engaged in the region and that the Bush administration’s “neglect” of certain regional meetings was not a harbinger of a retreat from Asia. The Obama administration seeks to provide that assurance and to make clear that we are engaged in Asia because we are a Pacific power with great interests in the region. We are not there to contain or block anybody.

The United States is struggling with its economy and also cutting its defense budget. Do you think this strategy comes at the right time?

Downturns in the economy never come at a good time. The great recession has taken a heavy toll but we are recovering and will recover. We have been spending too much for too long and need to cut back. In my opinion, we also need to tax ourselves more to pay for modernization of infrastructure, better schools, and other requisites of continued prosperity. We are winding down two long and expensive wars and should reduce our defense budget. It will take time to replace worn out equipment and to reduce the large role that defense expenditures played in the U.S. economy during the Cold War, but we will get there eventually. More importantly, now is a good time to reduce defense expenditures and reorganize our military because we do not have any enemies and are not bent on conquering other nations.

Is the “pivot to Asia” strategy concrete or more of a “paper tiger” given the fact that other challenges, including Iran, are still occupying the United States?

As previously noted, the term “pivot to Asia” exaggerates the amount of change. The United States never left or lost interest in Asia, but is now able to devote more attention to the most dynamic, and in some respects most dangerous place in the world. Building a new security architecture that is inclusive—including China—and addresses concerns in and about North Korea is and should be a priority. Forging institutions to ensure continued stability and prosperity in the region despite paralysis at the global level and adjusting to changes in production and supply chains are among the long list of specific issues that need attention. The United States has a stake in the way these issues are addressed and must be engaged in the search for solutions.

The United States and the ASEAN group of nations have further strengthened political, economic and security ties, after their second full-scale summit in New York.

President Barack Obama said the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which groups ten countries, had the potential for true world leadership. President Obama also made it clear that he saw Asia as a vital plank of US foreign policy.

DR EMMERSON: In the run-up to the summit, there was a big question. Would the partnership be declared as being strategic in nature? That was a key word in the discussion and what happened was the leaders basically finessed the issue. It's not hard to suspect that they worried that if they declared a strategic partnership with the United States, this would cause alarm in Beijing. Because let's remember in the run-up to this summit, we've had a lot of activity - the split between China and Japan over the disputed islands, one could continue with some evidence of a more muscular Chinese foreign policy, its commitment to its claim to possess basically the entire South China Sea, escalating that to the level of a core interest, presumably equivalent to their interest in recovering Taiwan. I could go on, but in many case, it was understandable that the subtext of the meeting was what will China think? So basically what the summit did was to finesse the issue. They decided to pass on the question of raising the partnership to quote - a strategic level - unquote, to the ASEAN US Eminent Persons Group, presumably expert advisors that would be convened and would make recommendations down the road.

And one of the most remarkable things about the statement was how much ground it covered. I mean, among the topics and issues that the leaders committed themselves to do something about, were 14 as I count them, 14 different subjects. Human rights, educational change, trade and investment, science, technology, climate change, interfaith dialogue, disaster management, illicit trafficking, international terrorism, I could go on. So it is clear to me that one of the tasks that ASEAN and the US will have to face in the coming months, is to try to insert some sense of priority.

LAM: On that issue of priority, the US President, Barack Obama, of course, postponed a couple of visits to Indonesia due to pressing domestic demands. Did he in anyway express American commitment to the ASEAN region?

DR EMMERSON: Yes, this was particularly kind of, I suppose you could say, evident in the fact that the meeting occurred at all, finally it was organized. It lasted two hours. He was apparently quite engaged and engaging during that period of time. And I think there is no question that the United States under his administration is committed to South East Asia as a region, indeed has agreed with the leaders of ASEAN, that ASEAN should play a central role in the process of building regional cooperation in East Asia.

LAM: And, of course, one of the topics that came up as well was the South China Sea, that entire region, given the competing maritime and territorial claims vis-à-vis the Spratley and Paracel Island groups. Do you think China is watching the US relationship with ASEAN, this growing relationship - do you think Beijing might be watching it with unease?

DR EMMERSON: Yes, absolutely. I am confident that they are watching it with considerable unease and I note that the statement that the leaders made, made no reference whatsoever to the South China Sea, presumably because of sensitivity with regard to Beijing's possible reaction. The topic was implicitly mentioned, but not explicitly.

LAM: And what about within ASEAN, the grouping itself? The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, on the weekend said that the ASEAN nations' credibility might suffer if they did not take a tougher line with Burma and this is in view of the upcoming elections in November. This is presumably directed at specifically China and India, but it could also be referenced to ASEAN could it not, because Burma is a member of ASEAN. Do you see that changing anytime soon with ASEAN, that ASEAN countries, leading members like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, that they might take a stronger stand with the military junta in Rangoon?

DR EMMERSON: The election in Myanmar, if I can call it an election, since it will be highly compromised and manipulated will take place, at least is scheduled to take place November 7th. Indonesia does not take over the chairmanship of ASEAN until the 1st January. So the question is, since Indonesia is a democratic country, arguably, the most democratic of any country in South East Asia, will it use its opportunity to try to put pressure on Burma in the year 2011? My own view is that ASEAN will probably not fulfill Ban Ki-moon's hope, will not exercise significant pressure on the junta. Instead, we could get the opposite situation in which so long as there is not major violence associated with the election, it will essentially be received by ASEAN as a kind of minimally-acceptable basis for assuring the Burmese junta that ASEAN still treats them as a full member. In other words, it's quite possible that the junta may get away with what I take to be a kind of facade effort to legitimate their rule.

Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam was published by Stanford University Press in November 2009. But the story behind the book dates back five years to November 2004. It was then that Donald K. Emmerson and Daniel M. Varisco agreed to disagree.

Emmerson spoke on "Islamism: What Is to Be Said and Done?" (video link and discussion) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC on 30 November 2009.

Varisco, a Hofstra University anthropologist with expertise on Islam and the Middle East, had invited Emmerson to join a panel on "Islam and Political Violence: The ‘Ismhouse' of Language" at the 2004 annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association.

Emmerson was pleased to accept. Not since graduating from high school in Beirut had he lived in the Middle East. He had specialized instead on Indonesia, famously known as having more Muslims than any other country, yet spatially and spiritually peripheral to the Middle Eastern locations of Mecca, Medina, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Emmerson relished the chance to interact with experts whose knowledge of Muslim societies had been acquired mainly in Arab settings. He also shared Varisco's interest in discussing the controversial and contested meanings of the words "Islamism" and "Islamist." Since 9/11 these terms had become increasingly common in English-language discourse on Islam, Muslims, and violence by Muslims claiming to be acting in the name of their religion.

On the panel, before some two hundred MESA attendees, Varisco and Emmerson politely disagreed. Varisco argued that "Islamism" and "Islamist" were invidious terms that falsely linked Islam to terrorism. For the sake of consideration and accuracy, he said, they should not be used. Without advocating self-censorship, he defended his refusal to use "Islamism" or "Islamist" in his own writing and teaching.

"Inventing Islamism: The Violence of Rhetoric" is the title of Varisco's MESA paper as it appears in the book. "Why," he asks, "do we need a term that uniquely brands Muslims as terrorists rather than just calling them terrorists and militants, the way we could easily do for followers of any religion or any ideology? As scholars and students of religion, should we not be doing all we can to refute the notion that Islam is intrinsically more violent than other religions?" (Islamism, p. 33.)

Emmerson agreed with Varisco that the terms "Islamism" and "Islamist" were often used to conflate Islam, Muslims, and violence. But Emmerson argued that the words were not so uniformly and falsely invidious as to warrant their deletion. In his view, in addition to referencing radical views and acts, the terms usefully named a variety of mostly peaceful ways of expressing and advancing subjective interpretations of Islam in public life. Phrases such as "democratic Islamism" and "moderate Islamists," hr argued, were already fairly common in scholarship and the media. His chapter is entitled, accordingly, "Inclusive Islamism: The Utility of Diversity."

After the session at MESA, Varisco, Emmerson, and copanelist Richard C. Martin, an Islamic studies professor at Emory University, spoke of someday turning the discussion into a book. Busy with other projects, they postponed this one, but eventually took it up again as an experiment with an unusual format: As a neutral party, Martin (with the later addition of one of his graduate students, Abbas Barzegar) would edit the book, which would open with chapters by Emmerson and Varisco stating their views. Scholars of Islam from around the world would be invited to comment briefly on the dispute. More than a dozen experts in or from the Middle East, North Africa, North America, and Southeast Asia contributed remarks, which fill the middle of the book. Varisco and Emmerson end the volume with chapters that update and extend their respective arguments in response to each other's and the commentators' views.

An anonymous reviewer of the manuscript for Stanford University Press suggested that Islamism as a phenomenon was on the decline, implying that the relevance of Islamism would follow suit. In Emmerson's opinion, this may not happen soon. Juxtapositions of Islam, Muslims, and violence continue to occur in a range of Muslim-majority countries. At the same time, a great variety of Muslim leaders and organizations committed to peace, dialogue, and democracy continue to demonstrate the civility of Islam as they understand it. This rich spectrum of motives and associations will continue to challenge analysts around the world -- scholars, journalists, and policymakers alike.

Is Islam a religion of peace? War? Neither? Both? In the case of those Muslims who do carry out acts of violence or intolerance in the name of Islam, should their claims to have been motivated by religious imperatives be accepted as true, rejected as false, or bracketed as subjective? How considerate and how accurate is it to assert that any Muslim who engages in terrorism must not be a true Muslim? What is a "true Muslim"? By whose standards?

Is it appropriate to argue, with Emmerson, that to speak of "Islamic terrorism" wrongly and hurtfully implies that terrorism is intrinsic to Islam as a religion, whereas the notion of "Islamist terrorism" merely links such violence to one among many possible ways of interpreting Islam as an ideology? Or should these distinctions about words be ignored in favor of actions, including possible revisions of American policy, that can help to diminish the incidence of supposedly religious violence, whatever its actual nature may be?

In months and years to come, Muslims accused of having planned or committed violence against American targets will be judged in a series of civilian and military trials here in the United States. The defendants will likely include high-profile individuals such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, charged with plotting 9/11, and Nidal Malik Hassan, accused of the November 2009 rampage at Fort Hood. Some of the accused may admit responsibility for acts of violence and portray what they did as required by Islam. Some may accuse the US government of waging war against Islam. Some may claim innocence, or attribute what they did to personal reasons unrelated to religion. Stimulated by these proceedings, commentators on the Internet, in the press, and on talk shows can be expected to debate "Islamic terrorism" versus "Islamophobia."

Quite apart from whether fresh acts of terror occur, interest in the questions that Islamism features seems, at least to Emmerson, unlikely to decrease.

More than any of his predecessors, President Obama has reached out to "the Muslim world." But what of the terms and the timing of that demarche? If, as expected, he visits Indonesia next year, he will try to build on his oratorical successes in Istanbul and Cairo by addressing Muslims in the country that has more of them than any other. He has a way with words. But what words should he use? Is "the Muslim world" too diverse even to exist? Do "radical Islam" and "Islamism" defame a religion for acts of violence done in its name, or are these terms only politically incorrect? Among Muslims around the world, sympathy for terrorism as jihad appears to have declined. Would the US be better off ignoring religion and dealing with Muslim-majority countries from Morocco to Malaysia in purely secular terms: as nations not congregations? Is it time to revisit the entrenched assumption that the revival of religion has killed secularism and rendered policies based on it as offensively ethnocentric as they are empirically naive? If the "clash of civilizations" misnames a plethora of clashes between Muslims themselves, should the enlightened mutual reassurances of elite-level "inter-faith" dialogues give way to less rhetorical and more realistic efforts toward "intra-faith" understanding and conciliation?

What, in short, is to be said, and done? Prof. Emmerson's talk will also reference his latest co-authored book, Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam (Stanford University Press, November 2009).