The six-party agreement reached last week in Beijing to cap North Korea's nuclear program was a triumph for diplomacy. But contrary to much of the conventional wisdom in recent days, the fruits of the victory fall mostly to the North Koreans.

In the short term, the deal will halt the country's production of nuclear materials, limiting its ability to expand a nuclear arsenal tested in October. But for this concession, the North Koreans get to keep that arsenal intact, at least for now, and stand to make significant economic and political gains in relations with the United States, China and South Korea.

Some critics say the Beijing agreement is a lesser version of "the Agreed Framework" reached in 1994 by the Clinton administration, later cast aside by President Bush. Former Clinton-era Defense Secretary William Perry, speaking Tuesday at the Asia Society, characterized the new agreement as "thin gruel," while backing it as "a small but a very important step forward."

The ultimate judgment will await the uncertain implementation of numerous crucial, but still vaguely defined, steps down the road. The North Koreans are certain to exploit every ambiguity in the text and to drag out the phase that calls for actual dismantlement of their nuclear program and weapons.

Unfortunately, the process that led to this moment suggests that this will not go well. Contrary to the administration's version of events, Pyongyang was not dragged to this deal by pressure -- not from Washington and not from North Korea's angry patrons in Beijing.

"We don't have the North Koreans on the ropes," a former senior U.S. intelligence analyst who has watched that closeted country for decades said. "We don't have them on the run."

On the contrary, there is ample evidence that this agreement is yet another demonstration of North Korea's uniquely successful brand of negotiation via escalation: a use of brinkmanship and willingness to go up to and over the line that converts weakness into leverage.

Against that approach, the Bush administration's preference for using tools of coercion and threat, even of pre-emptive war, failed. If anything, it brought about the very opposite outcome than the United States envisioned: it encouraged North Korea to move even more rapidly to develop and test a nuclear weapon.

The pattern of brinkmanship was already clear during the Clinton years -- what Korea expert Scott Snyder famously termed "negotiating on the edge." When confronted, Snyder noted, the North Koreans typically responded by accelerating the crisis, unworried by the consequences. The fear of appearing weak has underlined all North Korean behavior.

The Bush administration came into office almost seeking a confrontation, as the president and many of his advisers were convinced the 1994 deal was fatally flawed. Ironically, the North Koreans thought they were on the verge of strategic breakthrough, after a deal to halt missile tests and preparations for President Clinton to visit Pyongyang in the final weeks of his administration. An improved relationship with the United States would balance the power of its Chinese patron, whom North Korea deeply distrusts, and give it legitimacy in an ongoing struggle with South Korea for leadership on the Korean peninsula.

Instead Bush froze the Clinton framework and sought a new, tougher approach. In January 2002, Bush delivered his famous State of the Union depiction of North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil," along with Iran and Iraq. That October, U.S. negotiators confronted Pyongyang with accusations of cheating by pursuing a clandestine uranium-enrichment program.

The 1994 agreement collapsed amid a tit-for-tat series of escalatory moves -- beginning with a U.S. cutoff of heavy fuel oil and leading to North Korea ousting international inspectors, withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and restarting its reactor and recycling facility to produce plutonium. Bush vowed that the United States would not "be blackmailed."

Meanwhile, preparations for war in Iraq were mounting. The Bush administration was convinced the awesome display of U.S. power would successfully intimidate the other two points on the axis of evil, North Korea and Iran.

"We are hopeful," then senior State Department official John Bolton dryly said as the invasion came to a close, "that a number of regimes will draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq -- that the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is not in their interest."

American threat

The North Korean officials drew an entirely different conclusion: they could not afford to seem weak in the face of what they perceived as an American threat to terminate their regime.

"Only tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by ultra-modern weapons can avert a war and protect the security of the country," said an official statement issued April 6. "This is the lesson drawn from the Iraqi war."

A drawn-out process of negotiations began later that month, beginning with a three-way meeting in China and moving that summer to six-party talks that also included South Korea, Japan and Russia. The U.S. position was to deny Pyongyang what it wanted most -- direct talks with Washington -- and to demand verified dismantlement of its nuclear program, on the model of Libya, before any rewards, economic or political, were provided.

As the war in Iraq wore on, and the threat of military force became less credible, the administration looked for other coercive tools. It forged a multinational agreement to intercept suspicious cargoes and launched a crackdown on illicit North Korea trafficking in drugs and counterfeit currency and goods, which are believed to be the main source of support for the regime's elite.

The North Koreans countered with their own demands, offering a plan to freeze their nuclear program, with compensation, followed by a coordinated series of reciprocal steps leading toward eliminating the program. Their offers were accompanied by statements that they already had the bomb and were prepared to test it.

When the Bush administration started its second term in 2005, it attempted to escalate pressure -- this time with charges that North Korea was exporting nuclear materials to the Middle East and calls for China to put pressure on its difficult clients. Pyongyang moved to unload a second set of spent fuel from its reactor and reprocess it -- American experts believe North Korea created six to eight bombs worth of plutonium after 2002.

Agreement sours

A return to the bargaining table in September 2005 yielded an agreement on the principles that would underlie a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. But that sign of progress disappeared within hours as both sides sparred over the meaning of a pledge to build nuclear power reactors for North Korea as compensation for it dismantling its nuclear weapons.

The imposition of measures to curb the flow of North Korean "illicit" money through Chinese and other banks added to the acrimony. Administration officials described this as a legal issue driven by Treasury Department efforts to curb counterfeiting. But as Bush admitted recently, it was used as leverage in the nuclear talks.

Throughout the past year, Bush administration officials expressed confidence that these measures were causing serious pain to the North Korean leadership. Some even talked boldly of "turning out the lights" in Pyongyang through such sanctions.

But Pyongyang could read the news from Iraq as well as any American voter. Instead of having its lights turned out, North Koreans put up their own light shows. On July 4, a date chosen with apparent intent, they carried out a test of a battery of ballistic missiles, in defiance of warnings, including one from China. A U.N. resolution condemning the action -- and other steps, including a South Korean suspension of food and fertilizer aid and Chinese attempts to slow trade -- followed.

In October, again in defiance of pressure from all fronts, the North Koreans tested a nuclear device. This prompted another U.N. resolution, backed by China, to impose limited economic sanctions. But although China was clearly angered, there is little evidence it moved to cut off the lifeline of trade, particularly energy supplies.

North Korea's willingness to cross what everyone believed was a "red line" changed the equation permanently. It allowed Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks, stalled for more than a year, but now from a position of strength. At the meeting in December, the North Koreans refused to discuss any other issues unless the U.S. financial sanctions were removed. North Korean officials hinted of preparations for a second test.

The United States blinked, agreeing to hold long-sought direct talks, held in Berlin in mid-January. The talks yielded the outlines of the Beijing deal but also a separate U.S. concession to lift the financial measures within 30 days of signing a broader deal.

The Beijing agreement more closely resembles North Korea's June 2004 freeze proposal than it does the U.S. insistence that dismantling nuclear weapons precede any substantial rewards. Clearly, this is a deal the Bush administration would not have made, says Scott Snyder, "if it were not tied down with so many other problems."

North Korea made its own concessions in the Beijing agreement. But "it doesn't necessarily mean Pyongyang is backing down or preparing to abandon its nuclear weapons," argues Kim Sung Han, a senior analyst at the South Korean Foreign Ministry's research institute.

N. Korea's rewards

Administration officials point out that the initial freeze of North Korea's nuclear program, to be implemented in two months, yields only minor compensation, about 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. But that is not what Pyongyang sees as its real reward. The lifting of financial measures will facilitate its rapidly growing trade with China and South Korea. Even more important, the South Korean government has already signaled it will now lift the ban on large-scale fertilizer and food shipments -- which are crucial to North Korea's spring planting.

Less visible, but no less vital, the North Koreans are trying to hold off a conservative comeback to power in the South Korean presidential election in December. A North-South summit meeting may take place, which would be part of an effort by the progressive South Korean government to shore up its support.

Ultimately, the Beijing agreement may yield a trade of nuclear facilities for economic and political relations, leaving the nuclear arsenal capped but still intact. For some U.S. experts, that is sufficient.

"It will limit the size of the nuclear arsenal and the amount of bomb fuel," observes former Los Alamos nuclear laboratory director and Stanford scholar Siegfried Hecker. And that, he says, should make it less likely North Korea would sell its nuclear materials or expertise to Iran.

The bargain made in Beijing flows inexorably from North Korea's skillful playing of the escalation game. But it may be the best outcome possible, given that North Korea has already crossed the nuclear threshold and that the Bush administration has squandered U.S. power in the deserts of Iraq.

Reprinted with permission from the San Jose Mercury News.

"Pan-Asian regionalism remains a long-term aspiration rather than a short-term prospect, but that having been said, that was true of Europe fifty years ago." - Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow

On November 2 Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in association with University of California at Berkeley's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center, convened regional and economic experts to discuss the role of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and its relationship to the future of regionalism and regional integration in East Asia.

The meeting was timely, as APEC's annual week of high-level meetings begins on November 12th in Hanoi, Vietnam. It will culminate in a summit of heads of state (and a representative from Taiwan) on November 18-19 -- a key opportunity for President Bush to talk with regional leaders about a range of issues, including North Korea. In examining APEC's agenda and its potential institutional challengers, scholars focused on how the US might get more out of the forum and how the US could alter its approach to Asian regionalism to ensure continued relevance and influence in the region.

According to Dr. Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum and senior fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), "Asian regionalism is at a crossroads, and it may be at a crossroads for sometime." Recent events have demonstrated that countries in the region face a crucial choice: Will they move in the direction of an East Asian identity that actively excludes the US, or more toward trans-Pacific networks such as APEC that include the US? Or both?

As Asian countries consider the merits of APEC and American inclusion, US policy on Asian regionalism has been "curiously passive," especially when juxtaposed with the positive role the US played in supporting development of the European Union, according to Ambassador Michael Armacost, who was US ambassador to Japan and the Philippines and held senior policy positions on the staff of the National Security Council and in the Departments of State and Defense.

Dr. Vinod Aggarwal, a professor of political science and director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center, pointed to the example of the European Union (of which the US is not a member), urging that the US seek compatibility among regional and trans-Pacific institutions. Armacost agreed and maintained that the US should not fear exclusion from regional forums, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), an outgrowth of the annual dialogue between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other powers, which held its first meeting in Malaysia last year.

North Korea has said it will rejoin the six-party talks, but a meeting will not take place until after the APEC meeting. Here is an illustration of the utility of APEC that has nothing to do with economics. There could be an informal meeting of the five parties (without North Korea) in Hanoi. And that could be quite helpful in terms of coordinating strategy, especially with China. - Donald Emmerson, director, Southeast Asia Forum, Shorenstein APARC

Armacost underlined that American participation needs to correspond with American interests. In this sense, the US should put more effort into the Asian organizations of which it is already a member, including APEC. Armacost also suggested looking to Northeast Asia --"where the interests of the great powers intersect most directly" and there is no ASEAN counterpart -- according special attention to the six-party talks convened to denuclearize North Korea. He told the group that "fortuitously in the six-power talks, one has a negotiation which could be in embryonic form a regional security institution, in which American participation is not an issue -- it's self-evident. The US should put effort into the six-power talks succeeding, not only because of the substance of those talks, but because if they do succeed, then that format can provide a basis for a sub-regional institution of great importance to us, one that will give us a continuing role in the larger institutions that may emerge in Asia."

Emmerson said that there are essentially two views in Washington on US participation in Asian regional institutions: "one is to say that if these meetings are merely 'talk shops,' then our absence doesn't matter, and the other is to say that we are being, as the phrase goes, 'absent at the creation' of regional architecture, which we will regret not having been able to influence from the beginning, the longer we stay out." He urged greater US involvement in regional organizations and more creative approaches to tackling obstacles to involvement, such as finding a way to compromise on accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a key criterion for membership in the EAS. Attending that summit, in Emmerson's view, "would send a clear signal to East Asians that the US does want to be involved on the ground floor in the creation of an emerging regional architecture in Asia for the 21st century."

As the panelists encouraged the US to devote greater effort to the project of Asian regionalism, they also acknowledged that President Bush and other US delegates to this year's APEC meetings would not be in a position to embark on any bold initiatives, including the talked-of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, or FTAAP. According to Aggarwal, "in the current climate, the FTAAP is a political non-starter." Preoccupied by US midterm elections and the Iraq issue, "the administration is unlikely to put a lot of political capital into pushing for something like an FTAAP," not least because of the upcoming expiration of President Bush's Trade Promotion Authority. Aggarwal said, "I just can not imagine that any congressmen or senators will advocate free trade with countries with which we have our largest trade deficits. These massive trade deficits make the issue a political hot potato and no one will touch it." Instead, he recommended a less direct approach for trade liberalization. (A spokesman for the US Trade Representative's office has said that while they are still in the process of preparing their APEC agenda, they would consider discussing the FTAAP with their regional trading partners.)

But if you're ever going to pump new life into [APEC] you've got to find some practical projects around which people can rally. I would have thought the one economic issue that seems to be very timely, although some of the timeliness is being lost as prices sink, is energy. Virtually everybody in Asia is an importer of energy, and there are a lot of consumer interests that would benefit from the kind of collaboration that you could organize at a meeting like this. I would try to get subjects like that on the agenda, maybe more than trade liberalization. - Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow

Founded in 1989, APEC has 21 member economies on both sides of the Pacific. As a trans-Pacific, network, APEC connects the US, Chile, Mexico, and Canada on one side of the Pacific with a diverse group of Asian economies including China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand. Aggarwal described the body as more of a "discussion forum" than an organization, as it explicitly rejects the deeply institutionalized approach taken by the European Union in Brussels - something he said should be reconsidered if it is to become more effective.

Panelists raised the paradox that APEC's agenda seems overly ambitious, yet at the same time the forum is under-utilized, in terms of addressing some pressing issues in the region, including as energy, avian flu, and maritime security.

Aggarwal acknowledged that APEC has been host to a wide range of activities, including security, environment, women's rights, finance, and technology policy. "What's striking is that these activities have been discussed in the European Union, for example, but really only in any significant way after 25 years of economic integration." In the mid-1990s, APEC set deadlines for trade liberalization -- 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for other countries. These goals will be hard to meet.

Security in the Asia-Pacific means lots of things. If we always focus on the latest American security issue, then that becomes the driving factor in Asians saying because the Americans have their own agenda, we want to have our own organization. So, yes, I think we should revitalize some of [APEC's] trade goals, we should try to work toward that, but we should be willing to address broader issues, other than only counterterrorism or only North Korea. - Vinod Aggarwal, director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center (BASC) at UC - Berkeley

Armacost compared APEC to the European Union, asserting that the EU succeeded in large part because it "started small, built gradually and focused on depth rather than breadth at outset." In addition, the European body, considered the gold standard of regional integration, concentrated on very practical projects that yielded tangible benefits and generated political support for further endeavors.

In this vein, Armacost recommended two practical purposes for the group. "Virtually everybody in Asia is an importer of energy, and there are a lot of consumer interests that would benefit from the kind of collaboration that you could organize at a meeting like this." Also, returning to one of the organization's fundamental purposes, Armacost contended that in large part, "APEC is only useful insofar as the US uses it as a place to rally support for making one last ditch effort in trying to stimulate the Doha Round."

"I don't think that these bilateral trade agreements are particularly good for American business, or in general for trade negotiations at the Doha Round." - Vinod Aggarwal, director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center (BASC) at UC - Berkeley

"If APEC members really wanted to get the Doha Round back on track, they should agree to a moratorium on preferential trade agreements for a period of one year and challenge the Europeans and other non-APEC members to match them in this moratorium on preferential trade agreements," urged Aggarwal.

Overall, the group agreed that despite inherent problems in APEC, overall participation in this trans-Pacific institution should be considered important to the United States. Armacost made the practical point that "APEC happily provides the major occasion in which the President goes out to the region. Basically, it's an opportunity to cultivate your allies, find out what your adversaries in the region may be up to, and to have a point in your schedule where you've got that agenda of Asian concerns that you are forced to wrestle with. For that reason alone it's worth keeping APEC alive."

All the panelists acknowledged Asian countries' criticisms that the US had too much control over APEC's agenda, and that Washington utilizes the forum to discuss its "issue of the day." Emmerson called on the US to remember that "from the standpoint of a number of developing Asian economies, the American emphasis on trade liberalization has been somewhat distorting. These are low-income countries; they're interested in economic cooperation that can somehow help them raise their populations above poverty levels. There's a whole agenda there that we really haven't discussed, and in a way it has been slighted in APEC by this overriding emphasis on trade liberalization. If trade liberalization turns out to be unrealistic at least in the short run, development goals are an alternative agenda that has some utility, and is worth exploring."

Similarly, Armacost stated that APEC would be a "more valuable institution to us, if we stopped talking for a while and listened a bit." Reflecting on US policy more broadly, he said he "personally regrets that in recent years the institution building instinct, or reflex, in the US has been directed at remaking other people's institutions internally. The international institution focus has been on relieving ourselves of the burdens of institutions which cramp our style or impose limits on diplomatic maneuverability."

I do believe we're not paying enough attention to a region whose importance to us will be greater than any other region ten to fifteen years from now. We should devote more attentiveness to Asia. - Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow, Shorenstein APARC

Shorenstein APARC's associate director for research Daniel Sneider moderated the panel. This seminar was an outgrowth of the center's work on the role of regionalism in East Asia. The research center will publish a book on this subject next spring, in conjunction with the Brookings Institution.

About the Panelists:

Vinod Aggarwal is professor in the Department of Political Science, affiliated professor of Business and Public Policy in the Haas School of Business, and director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center (BASC) at the University of California at Berkeley.

Michael H. Armacost has been the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow since 2002. From 1995 to 2002, Armacost served as president of the Brookings Institution. Previously, during his twenty-four year government career, Armacost served, among other positions, as undersecretary of state for political affairs and as ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.

Donald K. Emmerson is director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Shorenstein APARC and a senior fellow at FSI. He also teaches courses on Southeast Asia in International Relations and International Policy Studies.

Daniel C. Sneider is the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC. He was a 2005-06 Pantech Fellow at the center, and the former foreign affairs columnist of the San Jose Mercury News.

To read the seismic signal sent from an abandoned coal mine in the mountains of North Korea's coast, you must first recognize that it represents four major failures, two grave dangers, and one big opportunity.

The apparent explosion of a nuclear device, coming after two decades of trying to stop North Korea from achieving this goal, is a manifest failure of policy on four fronts -- a failure of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy, a failure of international diplomacy, a failure of Chinese leadership and a failure of South Korea's strategy of engaging the North.

Having failed so completely, the world now faces two grave dangers. The first is the very real threat of war on the Korean Peninsula, triggered by a series of escalatory actions in the wake of the bomb test. The second is the danger that North Korea will proliferate its nuclear technology, materials or know-how to others -- not the least to another nuclear hopeful, Iran.

But there remains a lone and tenuous opportunity. Having removed all ambiguity about its nuclear ambitions, North Korea may finally have created a common sense of threat that will galvanize the kind of concerted international action that so far has been absent.

THE FOUR FAILURES

Non-proliferation failure

The United States has spent two decades trying to stop North Korea from going nuclear, a turbulent period of crisis and negotiation that even went to the brink of war. At least three administrations confronted this problem and none, certainly not the Bush administration, can escape blame.

North Korea agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but it stalled before signing an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992 to place its nuclear facilities under international safeguards and inspections. During that time the North Koreans reprocessed some spent fuel from their reactor into plutonium - an amount that American intelligence believes was enough for building one or two warheads.

North Korea's resistance to full inspections, while it kept pulling spent fuel rods out of its reactor, provoked a crisis in 1994 and led the Clinton administration to ready military forces to strike the North's nuclear facilities. In a last-minute deal, North Korea froze its reactor and reprocessing facilities, effectively halting plutonium production under IAEA supervision. In exchange, the United States, Japan, South Korea and others agreed to construct two light-water reactors for North Korea and to supply fuel oil until the reactors came online.

The deal was troubled from the start. Neither party was satisfied with the compromise or the way it was to be implemented. By the late 1990s, the North had begun a secret effort to acquire uranium-enrichment technology from Pakistan and, in 1998, tested a long-range ballistic missile. Despite this, the plutonium freeze remained in place. But it did not survive the Bush administration.

The Bush administration came into office challenging the value of the agreement and froze contacts with the North. After receiving intelligence showing moves to build enrichment facilities, it confronted North Korean officials at an acrimonious meeting in Pyongyang in October 2002.

The United States halted fuel shipments a month later, and, in early 2003, the North Koreans expelled IAEA inspectors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They proceeded to reprocess the fuel rods they had stored for a decade, producing enough plutonium, intelligence estimates say, for four to six nuclear warheads. In February 2005, the North Koreans announced they had manufactured nuclear weapons. Last week, they apparently made good on that declaration.

Blame aside, North Korea's emergence as the world's ninth nuclear power may be the most serious failure in non-proliferation history. Unlike India and Pakistan, which remained outside the system of international treaties, North Korea acted in defiance of those controls. Who might be next?

Diplomatic failure

Unlike Iraq, the attempt to stop North Korea's nuclear program has relied on the tools of diplomacy, accompanied by economic incentives and coercive sanctions.

But serious questions have been raised from the start about the sincerity and methods of the diplomatic efforts, particularly on the part of the United States and North Korea. The Bush administration has insisted -- and the president continues to make this argument -- that direct talks with North Korea do not work. Pyongyang has tried to frame everything as an issue with Washington, undermining talks that involved others, including South Korea.

Bush's stance lends credibility to those who charge the administration seeks "regime change," not a compromise that it believes will lend legitimacy to Kim Jong Il. The North Koreans now appear to have used the talks to buy time and build bombs.

Diplomacy has, at American insistence, consisted of six-party talks, held under Chinese auspices and including both Koreas, Japan and Russia. In truth, little real negotiating went on at these gatherings, at least until the last full round of talks in September 2005. In contrast to the thousands of hours of negotiations between Americans and North Koreans that led to the 1994 deal, there have been only tens of hours of actual give and take.

It is intriguing that the September agreement on a statement of principles for denuclearization came only after the State Department's chief negotiator was finally allowed to talk to his North Korean counterpart at length. Even then, their agreement evaporated almost immediately as they dueled publicly over the deal's meaning. American financial sanctions against North Korean currency counterfeiting further clouded the atmosphere, and direct contacts ground to a halt.

China's failure

The North Korean nuclear crisis is also a failure of China's bid for regional, if not global leadership. North Korea is an ally of China, a relationship that goes back more than half a century to the Korean War, when Chinese "volunteers" poured across the border to prevent an American victory. Their relationship has become more difficult since China embarked on market reforms while North Korea clung to its peculiar brand of Stalinism.

China has been torn between its loyalty to Pyongyang, its desire to maintain a stable balance of power in the region and its fear that the North's nuclear ambitions could provoke conflict on its borders. By becoming host for the six-party talks, Beijing stepped into an unusual leadership role.

The Bush administration was eager to move the burden of the North Korean problem onto the Chinese. Some administration hard-liners argued that China had the power to trigger the collapse of Kim Jung Il's regime by cutting off energy and food supplies.

Time and again, Beijing dragged the North Koreans back to the negotiating table, while also pushing Washington to engage Pyongyang in the talks. But Chinese irritation over American inflexibility has now been trumped by North Korea's defiance. Chinese policy-makers now wonder how they can punish the North without creating chaos, or war.

Failure of engagement

The final failure lies on the doorstep of South Korea's 10-year-long policy of engagement. The "sunshine policy" asserted that the North could be induced to give up its nuclear option by opening up the isolated communist state and promoting the forces of Chinese-style reform.

After a historic summit meeting in 2000, South Korean aid and trade, even tourists, flowed into the North. South Koreans lost their fear of a former foe, seeing it more as an impoverished lost brother than a mortal threat. Tensions with their American allies rose because of a gap in the North's perceived threat. The United States wondered why its troops should continue to defend South Korea.

Now South Koreans must confront the possibility that the North may have used engagement only to buy time.

THE TWO DANGERS

Threat of war

With eyes on Iraq and the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula has been far from the center of American attention. American forces based in South Korea and Japan have been dispatched to Iraq.

Yet the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas remains the most militarized frontier on the planet, with hundreds of thousands of well-armed soldiers poised against each other. Clashes along that frontier used to be commonplace and there are signs of a renewal of tensions. The danger of unintended escalation cannot be dismissed.

What might happen if a U.S. naval vessel, moving to inspect a North Korean freighter - as the U.N. resolution may authorize - is fired on or even captured, as the USS Pueblo was in 1968? It is a frightening scenario already worrying some at the Pentagon and the State Department.

Risk of proliferation

More than anything else, American policy-makers fear that North Korea, emboldened by its nuclear success and perhaps desperate for funds amid economic sanctions, might sell its nuclear expertise to Iran and others, including terrorist groups.

For Pyongyang, an alliance with Iran is a logical response to American and global pressure. The North Koreans have sold ballistic missiles to Tehran since the 1980s and rumors of nuclear cooperation persist.

An American effort to interdict the movement of ships and planes to Iran -- with possible U.N. backing - is probable. But the most likely transit is across the long and loosely controlled land border with China. The amount of plutonium needed to make a warhead is the size of a grapefruit and hard to detect - creating yet another nightmare scenario.

THE OPPORTUNITY

In this otherwise bleak landscape, there is an opportunity. For the first time, there is a chance of a consensus among the key players -- China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States. The passage of a U.N. resolution is a small step in that direction. But the real test will come next, as the nations must cooperate to put pressure on North Korea, while coolly navigating the perils of war and making sure to leave open a diplomatic exit.

There is a slim chance of such concerted action, and a limited window for achieving it. Not everyone sees the dangers the same way. Signs of rethinking errors of the past are no more evident in Beijing and Seoul than they are in Washington or Tokyo. Ultimately, however, if they are to seize this moment of opportunity, all parties must face up to the fact that the policies of the past have failed.

For Vice President Dick Cheney, the question of how to deal with would-be nuclear powers in Iran and North Korea is disarmingly simple.

"We don't negotiate with evil; we defeat it,'' Cheney reportedly pronounced, dismissing a State Department bid in late 2003 to make a deal with North Korea. A similar prescription was offered when moderates in the Iranian regime made a secret approach that year to begin talks with the United States.

The long history of the Cold War is replete with the issue of whether -- and how -- to talk with a mortal foe. U.S.-Soviet relations froze time and again. For two decades, there was no dialogue at all with Communist China. But in the end, American policymakers have always chosen the path of negotiation.

For Cheney -- and for President George W. Bush -- sitting down at a table with the likes of North Korea's Kim Jong Il would be an act of weakness, a lessening of American power and prestige that granted undeserved legitimacy to despised regimes.

In recent months, and most prominently last week, the Bush administration has appeared to reverse its stance, opening the door to direct talks with North Korea and Iran.

These moves are carefully constrained, reflecting in part the ongoing divisions in the Bush administration about the advisability of going down this path. Contacts with both regimes will take place only within the framework of multilateral talks and focused solely on the issue of their nuclear programs. One-on-one talks on a broader agenda, including establishing basic diplomatic relations, have been explicitly ruled out, for now.

The decision to talk seems driven in large part by the realization that defeating evil has proven to be more difficult than some in the administration assumed. After Iraq, the use of military force against Iran -- and even more so against a North Korea already probably armed with nuclear weapons -- is highly unlikely. Potential allies in imposing economic and political sanctions -- the Europeans, Russians and Chinese, along with South Korea and Japan -- won't even consider such steps without a greater show of American willingness to negotiate with the evil enemy.

Limited as it is, the significance of this shift has to be seen against the backdrop of deep resistance to such diplomatic engagement in the Bush administration.

"There is a fundamental disagreement over how to approach the North Korea problem,'' explained Richard Armitage, who served as deputy secretary of state from 2001-05.

"'Those of us at the State Department concluded: From the North Korean point of view, the nuclear issue is the only reason we Americans talk with them,'' Armitage recounted in a recent interview with the Oriental Economist newsletter. "Therefore, the North Koreans would be very reluctant to let go of the nuclear program. We knew it was going to be a very difficult process. But you have to start somewhere. You start by finding out what their needs and desires are, and seeing if there is a way of meeting those needs and desires without giving away something that is sacred to us.''

But the White House and others in the administration blocked at every turn their attempts to open direct dialogue with Pyongyang. "There is a fear in some quarters, particularly the Pentagon and at times in the vice president's office, that if we were to engage in discussions with the North Koreans, we might wind up with the bad end of the deal,'' Armitage said. "They believe that we should be able to pronounce our view, and everyone else, including the North Koreans, should simply accept it. This is not a reasonable approach.''

Six-party talks

The compromise was the decision, through the good offices of China, to convene six-party talks that included surrounding countries such as Russia, South Korea and Japan. Administration officials have argued that this format rallies others to back the United States in pressing the North Koreans, effectively isolating them.

The same argument was made for the United States to support, but not directly join, until this past week, European negotiations with Iran. As recently as April, Bush was still publicly wedded to this logic.

"With the United States being the sole interlocutor between Iran, it makes it more difficult to achieve the objective of having the Iranians give up their nuclear weapons ambitions,'' Bush said in answering questions following an April 10 speech. "It's amazing that when we're in a bilateral position, or kind of just negotiating one on one, somehow the world ends up turning the tables on us.''

Arguably, however, the opposite has been true. In the case of Iran, the Europeans, including Great Britain, have consistently urged the United States to talk directly to Iran.

An excuse not to talk

All the other partners in the six-party talks, including the closest U.S. ally, Japan, have held their own direct talks with Pyongyang and pushed the United States to do the same. Ultimately, it is the United States that has found itself isolated.

North Korean experts in the State Department had warned against relying only on this approach.

"In the case of negotiating with North Korea, more is not merrier and certainly not more efficient,'' says Robert Carlin, a longtime CIA and State Department intelligence expert on North Korea who participated in virtually all negotiations with the North from 1993-2000. "The more parties and people at the table, the greater the likelihood of posturing, and the harder it is to make concessions.''

In his view, the insistence on a multilateral approach was initially an excuse not to talk. "They didn't want bilateral talks with Pyongyang and they certainly didn't trust the State Department to conduct any such thing.''

These divisions have persisted. Last September, with the backing of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the State Department's chief negotiator was finally allowed to meet his North Korean counterpart. This led to an agreement in the six-party talks last September, a compromise that conceded in principle the North Korean right to have a nuclear power reactor.

That deal prompted a backlash from Cheney and others, according to senior officials within the administration, and fresh curbs on direct contacts with Pyongyang. But the new proposal to Iran apparently also includes an offer to supply power reactors.

What still has resonance is the belief that direct talks with North Korea and Iran amount to acceptance of the regimes in power in both countries.

Resistant to deal

"Ultimately the president is, on this issue, very, very resistant to the idea of doing a deal, even a deal that would solve the nuclear problem,'' Flynt Leverett, who dealt with Iran for the Bush National Security Council, said in a recent interview. "You don't do a deal that would effectively legitimate this regime that he considers fundamentally illegitimate.''

The administration may calculate that this offer of talks will only serve to isolate Iran and shore up ties with Europe. But it may have stepped onto a slippery slope toward a bargain that will necessarily involve painful concessions to Iran and lead toward a resumption of diplomatic relations broken off almost three decades ago.

Opposition to negotiating with the enemy is deeply embedded in the Bush administration. There is, however, a precedent for a sea change -- Ronald Reagan. President Reagan came to office in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Dialogue with the Soviets was halted and the staff of the Reagan National Security Council opposed any contacts with Moscow.

Reagan himself, in a famous 1983 speech, referred to the Soviet Union as an ``evil empire,'' followed two weeks later by the launching of the "star wars'' missile-defense program. Soviet leaders, we learned later, were convinced that the United States might launch a first strike. In August of that year, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down a Korean Airlines passenger jet that had strayed from its flight path, a sign of sharply increasing tension.

In the Reagan administration, against fierce internal opposition, Secretary of State George Shultz pushed to resume dialogue with the Soviets, beginning with achievable steps such as resuming grain sales. Reagan ultimately agreed, starting down a road that led to the series of dramatic summits from 1985 with incoming Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Reagan's willingness to sit down with the "evil'' foe flowed from a sense of conviction in American strength. It is not yet evident that his Republican successor shares the same sense of confidence.