From atomic bombs to harsh military occupations in the World War II period, the past is very much the present in the Asia Pacific region.

Stanford scholars are striving to help heal these wounds from yesteryear. Helping old enemies better understand each other today is the aim of the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project, a multi-year comparative study of the formation of historical memory regarding the wartime period in countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.

Left unattended, misguided wartime narratives may exacerbate current disputes to the point of armed conflict, said Daniel Sneider, associate director of research at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He leads the Divided Memories project along with Gi-Wook Shin, a Stanford sociology professor and the Shorenstein center director.

Sneider points out the critical importance of textbooks and what is taught in schools – especially given the rise of nationalism among youth in China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

"Dialogue among youth of the different nations is needed, along with an appreciation for the diversity of views and the complexity of history," he said.

Shin said, "Each nation in northeast Asia and even the U.S. has selective or divided memories of the past, and does not really understand the views of the other side."

Education and history

Launched in 2006, the Divided Memories project has published research findings, issued recommendations and convened conferences. In the early days, the researchers examined high school history textbooks in China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and America.

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"Formal education is a powerful force in shaping our historical understandings," Sneider noted. "We wanted to look at the textbooks that have the most impact and usage."

A 2014 book, Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies, which was co-edited by Shin, Sneider and Daniel Chirot, a sociologist with the University of Washington, compared successful European WWII reconciliations with lagging Asian efforts. Another book, Divided Lenses, published earlier this year, examined the impact of dramatic film and other forms of popular culture on wartime memory. A new book is due out this summer, Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War, which focuses on leaders in politics, the media and academia in Japan, China, South Korea and the U.S.

The Divided Memories project aims to generate discussions and collaborations among those who create "historical memories" – educators, policymakers and government leaders. One report that grew out of such dialogues included suggestions for reconciliation:

• Create supplementary teaching materials on the issue. 
• Launch dialogues among Asian, American and European historians. 
• Offer educational forums for journalists, policymakers and students. 
• Conduct museum exchanges and create new museums, such as one wholly dedicated to WWII reconciliation in Asia. 
• Increase student exchanges among all the countries involved. 

History is reflected in today's geopolitics, as noted in the revived disputes by these nations over rival claims to islands in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Without resolution, these disagreements can flare up into military conflicts, Sneider wrote.

"The question of history taps into sensitive and deeply rooted issues of national identity," he noted.

Whether recounting Japanese atrocities in China, China's exaggerated account of its Communist fighters' role in World War II, or the U.S. decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, no nation is immune to re-creating the past to further its own interests today, Sneider wrote.

For example, Divided Memories research on Chinese textbooks shows how the Chinese government in recent decades embarked on a "patriotic education" campaign to indoctrinate young people by exaggerating its role in Japan's WWII defeat. This narrative suits the nationalistic desires of a Chinese government no longer exclusively motivated by communist ideology, Sneider said.

One project of APARC and its Japan Program that was also an outgrowth of Divided Memories involved Stanford scholars urging Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to show "clear, heartfelt remorse" in a 2015 speech on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. A 15-page report featured hypothetical statements suggesting what Abe might say to make amends for Japanese actions in China and Korea.

"While we cannot claim to have directly influenced the prime minister, his statement did go further in the direction of an expression of remorse over the war and the need to continue to look clearly and honestly at the past than many expected," said Sneider.

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A workshop on history textbooks co-hosted by Shorenstein APARC and Academia Sinica's Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies takes places in Taipei, Sept. 3, 2008.

Generations and grievances

Consciousness-raising on other fronts, however, is getting results, thanks to Stanford's Divided Memories project. A 2015 landmark agreement between Japan and South Korea over the WWII "comfort women" dispute was reached due to extensive U.S. involvement. Comfort women were women and girls who were forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army in occupied territories before and during World War II.

In an article, Sneider explained how the U.S. perceived that the dysfunctional relationship between South Korea and Japan over this issue, among others, threatened to undermine American strategic interests in Asia. 

Shin highlights the importance of U.S. involvement. "The U.S. is not just an outsider to historical and territorial disputes in the region," he said. "From a geopolitical perspective, the U.S. has done a wonderful job in reviving the devastated region into a prosperous one after 1945, but from a historical reconciliation perspective, the U.S. has done a poor job."

He suggests that America should "play a constructive role in promoting historical reconciliation" among the countries involved. And so, the Divided Memories project has included the United States in its efforts.

According to Sneider, Divided Memories is unique among all reconciliation projects for its emphasis on the inclusion of the U.S.; comparative analyses across countries; and real-world policy impacts. As part of the Shorenstein research center, it is housed within Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

"This project reflects what Stanford, our center and the Freeman Spogli Institute are all about – true interdisciplinary research and engagement," Sneider said.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

In a new book, David Straub explains why massive anti-American protests erupted across South Korea in 2002 and considers whether it could happen again.

South Korea is often seen as a pro-American ally, a model country that went from a poor, postwar nation into a maturing democracy in just four short decades.

But despite a historic alliance between South Korea and the United States, anti-Americanism flared throughout the Asian nation between 1999-2002 when a series of events and longstanding tensions aligned, according to Stanford researcher David Straub.

“It was a sort of venting of steam,” said Straub, an associate director at Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

“Many Koreans at the time were grossly overinterpreting issues and incidents involving the United States. And this was because they were viewing the U.S.-Korea relationship through a lens of historic victimization by other nations, including the United States,” he added.

Straub, who held a thirty-year diplomatic career in the State Department, headed the political section of the American embassy in Seoul during those years and was deeply involved in managing problems in the bilateral relationship.

Boiling point

Since the end of the Korean War, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) has been stationed in Seoul – now about 28,500 uniformed personnel.

In June 2002, a USFK vehicle struck two Korean students in a tragic accident. In December of that same year, after a U.S. court martial found the drivers of the vehicle not guilty of wrongdoing, hundreds of thousands of people protested in Seoul and other major Korean cities. Not only did activists partake but ordinary citizens too, he said.

Straub said the South Korean public had been “unintentionally primed” for such a reaction to the USFK traffic accident; it was the “spark that lit the firestorm” after years of escalation. A series of events led-up to the mass protests, they included:

• A few months before the USFK traffic accident, a Korean athlete was disqualified at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City during a speed skating competition. American athlete Apolo Anton Ohno instead won gold after a disputed call.
• A non-governmental organization in May 2000 revealed that USFK personnel dumped formaldehyde into a drain that ran into the Han River in Seoul.
• In Sept. 1999, the Associated Press published its first investigative story examining the Nogun-ri incident of 1950, when hundreds of Korean refugees were killed in an alleged massacre by U.S. service members.

Asymmetry of attention

Straub said the shaping of Koreans’ views of Americans and fanning of tensions could be attributed in part to an “asymmetry of attention” on the part of the Korean and American publics to the U.S.-Korean relationship.

While the Korean public put tremendous focus on U.S.-Korean relations and the presence of U.S. military personnel in Korea, the American public was unaware of Korean attitudes and feelings, he said.

Similarly during the 1999-2002 period, Korean media reported hypercritical views of the United States and USFK, while the American media paid far less attention.

In negotiating with U.S. officials, South Korean officials would often allude to strong Korean public opinion and demand U.S. concessions. With no American public opinion on Korea issues to point to, U.S. officials were at a major disadvantage, Straub said.

U.S. officials would sometimes note opinions shared by members of Congress, he said, “however, for Korean officials, those claims weren’t as powerful as having a social movement literally on the front doorstep.”

In plain terms, the United States is much larger than South Korea. This very imbalance – which translates to military and economic power – added to Koreans’ assumption that they were “getting the worse end of the bargain,” he added.

“Most Koreans saw Korea as a victim of great powers,” Straub said. “It’s not just the media. It’s more than that, it was – and still is – a shared national narrative.”

Koreans’ sense of national vulnerability is magnified by their historic victimization to neighbors. South Koreans do not want to become a de facto tributary state of China or a colony of Japan again, he said.

Will anti-Americanism return?

USFK incidents were a main focus of Korean attention during the 1999-2002 period, and while there is always a possibility of problems arising, the intensity is gone now, Straub said.

“Some steam is under the lid again,” Straub said. “But I don’t think it’s nearly at the level like it was back then. I’m doubtful that we’d see an exact repeat.”

The media landscape in South Korea has improved and shifted away from its earlier position of “criticize the United States first and ask questions later,” Straub said.

Today, South Korea and the United States are in good standing at the government-level and among the people. President Obama and Korean President Park Geun-hye have an established rapport.   

What troubles Koreans now is North Korea, a Japan focused on collective defense, and the strategic rivalry between the United States and China and its possible implications for Korea, he said.

“South Korea being sandwiched between the United States and China – based on a perception that China is going to be the world’s dominant power – is a real worry for many Koreans,” Straub said, and a large number of Koreans – albeit still a minority – feel that their country must find a more equidistant ground between the two.

Most Koreans, however, still believe in the need for the continued presence of USFK personnel, at least for the time being, said Straub, and must be reassured of their strategic alliance with the United States.

Obama and Park are expected to meet in Washington in mid-October, and Straub said it will be used as an opportunity for both sides to reinforce the importance they attach to the alliance and to pressing North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs.

Links to related articles

NK News: South Korean anti-Americanism dwindles, but roots remain: diplomat

NK News: South Korean anti-Americanism: a thing of the past?

Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea, July 2015

Asia Times: American faces Seoul court over infamous unsolved murder

The Christian Science Monitor: South Korea: 20 years later, Californian son faces trial for Seoul murder

JoongAng Ilbo: Is anti-Americanism dead?

JoongAng Ilbo (Korean): 한미동맹은 빈틈없이 튼실한가 전 미국 국무부 한국과장의 진단

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center honored Wall Street Journal reporter Jacob Schlesinger with the Shorenstein Journalism Award last Monday. Schlesinger received the award, which includes a $10,000 cash prize, for his work on Japan that spans nearly three decades.

Since 2002, the annual award has sought to recognize journalists who are outstanding in their field of reporting on the Asia-Pacific, and whose work has helped enhance Western understanding of the region. A jury selects the finalist, which alternates each year between an American and Asian journalist.

At an evening ceremony, Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin presented Schlesinger with the award surrounded by supporters and friends including Michael Armacost and John Roos '77, (J.D. ‘80), two former U.S. ambassadors to Japan, who both came to know Schlesinger personally during their diplomatic posts.

Earlier in the day, Schlesinger delivered a keynote speech on Japan’s economy and the media. Stanford economist Takeo Hoshi and Shorenstein APARC associate director Daniel Sneider joined him on the panel, along with New York Times deputy executive editor Susan Chira.

Schlesinger was a visiting fellow at Shorenstein APARC at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Under the advisory of then-Shorenstein APARC director Daniel Okimoto, he worked on a book manuscript at Stanford which became Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Postwar Political Machine.

“No foreign journalist has covered Japan longer, or understood its political economy more deeply, than Jacob M. Schlesinger…” Okimoto said in the award announcement.

Schlesinger is based at the Journal’s Tokyo bureau as Senior Asia Economics Correspondent and Central Banks Editors, Asia, and tweets with the handle @JMSchles.

He answered a few questions for Shorenstein APARC about Japan’s political and economic climate, as well as the changing face of media there.

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Schlesinger spoke on a panel with Stanford's Daniel Sneider and Takeo Hoshi, and The New York Times's Susan Chira, followed by a private evening reception.

You’ve covered Japan for the Wall Street Journal for nearly a decade on the ground, in the late 1980s and early 90s and again since 2009. What has changed, or remained the same?

When I first covered Japan in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, there was huge interest in -- and also a fair amount of mistrust and hostility toward -- Japan. Americans feared that Japan’s economy was going to somehow “defeat” ours (though I don’t think that notion ever really made sense), and constantly accused Japan of unfairly taking advantage of the global free trade system, exporting heavily to us while keeping its market closed to our goods.

After the bubble burst, and, more recently, Japan’s trade surplus disappeared, the anger toward Japan dissipated. But so, in some ways, did the interest. There are far fewer foreign correspondents today in Japan than there were when I was first there 25 years ago.

I think that the rise of Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe, and Abenomics, has revived interest in Japan a bit, but in different ways. People want to know if Japan will rebound, in part as a counterweight to China, which has really surged in economic and political influence in the time since I was last in Japan. That perhaps may be one of the biggest changes -- the fact that so much is now seen through the prism of China. For a time China simply overshadowed Japan but now it has actually, in some ways, revived interest in it. 

What are the greatest challenges you’ve found in explaining the state of the Japanese economy and U.S.-Japan relations?

As I say, one challenge has been in getting people interested, and in explaining to them why it matters. China in particular has become such a big story that Americans sometimes lose sight of Japan's significance as well.

Another challenge is that Japan is a country where change, even big change, often happens in slow, subtle, steady steps. Japanese rhetoric tends to downplay the dramatic and to cast things in indirect terms, which can make it harder to describe statements and developments in ways that are accurate, and will seem interesting to readers.

Can you describe Abenomics and its current status?

Abenomics is Prime Minister Abe's program to try and end Japan's long slump, sometimes branded the “lost decades.” The most concrete and effective action to date has been a much more aggressive policy of monetary stimulus, following Abe's shake-up at the Bank of Japan (the nation’s central bank), where he imposed new leadership. That might be able to lift short-term growth. But Abe’s ambition to raise Japanese growth over the long-run – to a pace near that enjoyed by the United States and other advanced economies – requires extensive structural reforms. Abe has talked a lot about implementing such reforms, but has so far been rather timid in what he has proposed and pursued.

Abenomics also hit a deep pothole in 2014, when Abe decided to proceed with a plan to raise the sales tax, a policy aimed at reducing Japan’s very large outstanding government debt. The depressing impact of the tax basically offset the gains from the Bank of Japan’s stimulus, and Japan last year fell into recession.

It now appears that Japan is slowly pulling out of the recession, and, to ensure that his stimulus polices now work at full force, Abe has delayed plans for a second tax hike that had been scheduled for this year. That may set back long-held goals to reduce government debt, but it should help the chief Abenomics goal of exiting the long deflationary slump.

I'd say overall that Abenomics has a decent chance of lifting Japanese growth a bit higher than it would otherwise have been, but that a dramatic change in Japan’s fortunes would probably require a more dramatic change in policies, something Abe has promised but hasn’t really shown signs of seriously pursuing.

Recently, the United States invited Prime Minister Abe for a state visit (in addition to leaders of other Asian nations). What issues would likely top the agenda?

Both countries are hoping, overall, that the visit will deepen ties between the two governments at a time of great change and challenge in Asia. Whatever one might think of Prime Minister Abe and his agenda, this visit does offer a special opportunity to expand relations, simply because he has now been in office long enough to make multiple trips to Washington as prime minister -- a rare feat over the past quarter century of Japan's notorious carousel politics. The Japanese government is eager for Abe to be able to address a session of the U.S. Congress, which could carry great symbolic significance. He would be the first Japanese leader to do so in more than half a century, since Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in the early 1960s. That's a pretty long gap, when you consider that Japan has, over that period, long been hailed as one of America's most important allies.

In terms of specific issues, the chief economic agenda item is the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade pact. It's an ambitious project attempting to set the economic rules for the Pacific economies for the 21st century. And while 12 countries are included, the United States and Japan are by far the biggest, and both sides are hoping that a bilateral agreement by the time Abe meets President Obama could give the broader deal sufficient momentum to be concluded this year.

On the military front, the United States and Japan are updating the terms of their mutual defense pact and hope to do so in ways that will give Japan's military more latitude to participate in joint operations.

While not part of the official agenda, Americans will be eager to hear what Abe has to say about history issues as the world marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II.

Abe and his aides have repeatedly challenged some of the established views of Japan and its behavior during the war, including recently directly asking the American publisher McGraw-Hill to change its account of so-called “comfort women,” women forced into prostitution under Japan's war-time military. Such statements and actions have irritated many Americans and stoked anger in China and South Korea. American officials in particular are concerned about deteriorating relations between Japan and South Korea -- the two principle U.S. military allies in Asia -- and are eager for Abe to try and do more to bridge the gap, particularly on history issues. 

Newspapers have played a large role in Japanese society; the nation boasts one of the highest readerships in the world. Where do you see the future of news media in Japan?

Japan, as you say, has one of the most -- perhaps the most -- literate and well-informed populations in the world. News readership and news viewership is extremely high. People are extremely knowledgeable about current events.

Oddly, for a country that is also very tech literate, digital media has been relatively slow to catch on in Japan. Most people still get their main news from print papers, or magazines, and there has not been -- at least not yet -- a real surge in new, credible online-only, or online-originated media sources to challenge the mainstream media, the way platforms like Politico, the Huffington Post, or BuzzFeed have popped up in the United States.

The Japanese media has also suffered from some serious setbacks to its credibility in recent years. There was tremendous soul-searching after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster about whether the Japanese press had done enough, either before the accident, or in the immediate aftermath, to cover aggressively the flaws and mistakes in the country's nuclear energy policies.

More recently, over the past year there have been damaging battles, in varying degrees, over the accuracy, and independence, of three of the country's largest, and most-respected news organizations, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, and the NHK national broadcaster. I worry that the result, fair or not, could prompt further erosion in the credibility of the Japanese media. That's potentially a big problem at a time of great change, great political and policy debate -- and when the political opposition is so weak that the media arguably has a heightened role at this moment as a check on power.

You were a visiting scholar at Shorenstein APARC. How did your time at the Center impact your work?

The Center was a tremendous opportunity for me in so many ways. It is rare for a journalist to be able to break out of the steady deadline pressures of a newsroom, and soak up an academic atmosphere. Being at Shorenstein APARC was a fantastic way to do that. It offered the best elements of an ivory tower, without feeling isolated. It gave me chances to interact with policymakers there as visiting fellows, as well as some of the top experts in the field who were based there.

I have to give particular thanks to Dan Okimoto, who ran Shorenstein APARC at the time and Jim Raphael, who was director of research. When I was at Shorenstein APARC, I was researching and writing a book on Japanese politics. The feedback from Dan, Jim and others made it a much better work. But beyond the book, the depth and perspective that I gained from my immersion at Shorenstein APARC has helped shape my writing since then.