A delegation from the China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA) headed by its president, Mr. Zhongyu Yu, visited Stanford University on November 5, 2005. As part of its visit on campus, the delegation was invited to speak at SPRIE's seminar series on the rise of China's innovation competence. Mr. Yu and his colleagues shared with the audience the latest developments in China's integrated circuit (IC) industry as well as their understanding of the underlying driving forces, the level of competency, the role of the government and China's integration into the global innovation system.

Phenomenal growth of China's IC industry

Mr. Yu first shared with the audience some striking data that clearly illustrated the growth of China's IC industry since 2000. In 2000-2004, the industry grew with a CAGR of 31% from $2.2 billion to $6.7 billion. In 2004, there were 670 IC companies employing a workforce of 130,000, of which 40,000 were engineers. The growth is pronounced throughout the value chain from IC design to IC manufacturing and IC packaging and assembly. In 2004, there were 476 IC design companies and their revenue reached $1 billion, an 81.5% increase from 2003. Domestic companies have made impressive inroads into the development and commercialization of a few specific IC products such as second generation ID cards, audio decode chips, third generation cell phone base band chips and MP3 chips. In IC manufacturing, there were a total of 39 fabrication plants by the end of 2004: one 12-inch plant, nine 8-inch plants and 29 4-inch to 6-inch plants. These plants generated a revenue of $2.24 billion in 2004, a 90% increase from 2003. Meanwhile, three more 12-inch plants are under consideration by SMIC, HHNEC and Hynix. IC packaging and assembly reached $3.49 billion in revenue in 2004.

Multiple forces drive the growth

What has been behind such phenomenal growth? Mr. Yu identified three major driving forces. First is the continuing growth of the domestic market that has provided new demand for outputs from the industry. China has become the largest manufacturing base for most consumer electronics products such as televisions, DVDs, personal computers and mobile phones. For example, in the year of 2004, China manufactured 74 million television sets and 230 million mobile phones. These consumer electronics products are fueling the growth of the China's domestic IC market. In 2004, the market reached $40 billion, making China the second largest IC market in the world with a global share of 22%. The second driving force has resulted from the reform of the financial system, which has substantially improved the investment environment--especially for foreign investment. Foreign investment now accounts for 80% of total investment in the IC industry, even when domestic bank loans are taken into account. Venture capital has become a considerable source of capital. $424 million was invested in 2004. The third driving force is the global recession of the IC industry after 2000. The recession exerted tremendous economic pressure for multinational corporations to relocate their manufacturing and R&D activities to China to take advantage of China's cost advantage.

China still weak in innovation in IC

While the growth of China's IC industry has been impressive, Mr. Yu also pointed out some noticeable weaknesses of the industry. The industry is dominated by low value-added IC packaging and assembly, which accounts for half of the industry's revenue. High value-added IC design work only generated 15% of the total revenue in 2004. Most of the 476 IC design companies are very small. In 2004, only 17 companies had revenues over 100 million RMB (which was about 12 million USD). Among them, only two had revenues over 500 million RMB (about 60 million USD). The technical competence of IC design companies is still very weak. Except for the few aforementioned emerging niches, IC design is very much lagging behind the cutting edge. Most domestic demand for IC is still met by import. As Mr. Yu pointed out, "all the micro components and memory [of domestically manufactured consumer electronics products] are imported."

Government policy

The government is well aware of these shortfalls and policies have been put in place to support the next-phase growth of the industry. Factor inputs need to be boosted. In terms of capital, Mr. Yu estimated that a total of $30 billion investment will be needed in the coming five years to fuel the growth of the industry. Yet, the government will cede its role as a director investor in any IC programs while promoting investments from other sources, being it bank loans, domestic private investment, foreign direct investment or venture capital investment. Human resource is another prime area for improvement since there is a serious shortage of experienced IC engineers. The government has put in plans to "cultivate 40,000 IC designers and 10,000 IC processing technologists" over the coming 6-8 years. More importantly, however, indigenous competence needs to be built. "Independent innovation" has been identified as a priority for public policy in China's 11th five-year development plan. Mr. Yu declared, "our goal is not to copy others' chips but instead to have our own."

China's integration into the global innovation system

Looking into the future, as China's IC industry and market continue to grow, Mr. Yu articulated for the audience the importance of China being integrated into the global innovation system. In the coming five years, there will be plenty of opportunities for Chinese companies and universities to collaborate with innovators from abroad, whether it is to shape next-generation technologies and technical standards, for multinational corporations to set up research and development centers in China, or for universities to collaborate on cutting-edge research. As Mr. Yu declared, "China welcomes mutually beneficial cooperation with American industry and academia in the area of [IC] manufacturing and the innovative work of R&D."

Biography of Zhongyu Yu

Mr. Yu Zhongyu has been engaged in semiconductor research and management for many years and is one of the leaders of China's integrated circuit industry. He has engaged in research and design of IC products and was honored with the National Science and Technology Award. Having joined the government in 1988, he was responsible for organizing and leading the IC project during "7th five-year plan" and "8th five-year plan"; he acted as a member of the leading group for the National "908" project and headed the construction leading group of the Huahong factory in the "909" project. These projects made important contributions to China's IC industry development. Mr. Yu has been the President of the China Semiconductor Industry Association since 2001.

Despite its attempt to soften criticism of the war, there is no evidence the Bush administration is capable of self-correction.

That came home to me the other day while listening to a senior administration official deliver an off-the-record tour d'horizon of American foreign policy. He is among the best minds in this administration, counted among the ranks of the realists, rather than the neoconservatives.

The United States stands alone as the most powerful nation in the world, the official began. In no previous moment of human history has a single state enjoyed such a dominant position.

When it comes to managing its relations with other would-be powers -- Europe, China, Japan and India -- the United States has done "extraordinarily well,'' he said.

The tensions generated by the war in Iraq have eased, the senior foreign policy official confidently asserted. The Europeans are content to gaze intently inward, he observed, while America strides the globe.

Japan is embracing the United States in a very close relationship that shows no sign of unraveling. Meanwhile the Bush administration has forged a growing partnership with India.

When it comes to China, the administration has chosen the path of accommodation and integration rather than containment of the rising power. He expressed confidence that American power and the prospect of democracy in China will secure the peace.

The only remaining challenge for the United States is to combat the threat of a radical Islamist movement that seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction. For that, there is the promotion of democracy and American values around the world. After all, the official said with not even a nod to humility, "the U.S. is the most successful country that has ever existed.''

A year or two ago, the American people embraced this vision of a confident colossus, a Gulliver among the Lilliputians. That was before they watched the giant tied down in its attempt to export those American values by force of arms in Iraq.

The arrogance of this administration would be barely tolerable if it were not paired with a stunning incompetence, on display from Kabul to Katrina. That deadly combination has weakened American strength in the world. It has emboldened far more serious challengers in Iran and North Korea, who see the United States as too bogged down in Iraq to credibly threaten them with the use of force.

The war rated barely a mention in the sweeping view offered by the senior administration official, except indirectly. He offered a realist defense of the administration's democracy crusade.

World War II was fought with democratic goals, the official pointed out. And the Cold War -- the model for the current struggle against Islamic extremism -- was not just about balancing the power of the Soviet Union. The wars in Korea and Vietnam were really about determining which system those countries chose, he argued.

Those are curious examples to cite as a defense of the decision to go to war in Iraq. The United States shored up authoritarian regimes in Korea and Vietnam to counter the communist threat. Vietnam was a strategic mistake that took decades to overcome. And democracy came to Korea more than 35 years later, after a long period of economic development.

President Bush cited the democratic transformation of Korea -- along with Taiwan and Japan -- in a recent speech during his trip to Asia. But these are examples of the "conventional story in which you become rich and then you become democrats,'' as the senior official put it so well.

The administration proposes however to skip this long, but necessary, path to democratic capitalism when it comes to the Middle East. The policies of security and stability have failed there and a quicker route to democratic change is called for. But there is no historical evidence to suggest that this is any more than another manifestation of a blind belief in American power.

Democratic values have always been essential to American foreign policy. In practice, however, American administrations have often made painful choices between stability and the promotion of democracy. We saw that too often during the Cold War -- in Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968 or Tibet in 1959.

The administration might do well to recall the words of candidate Bush, uttered Oct. 11, 2000.

"It really depends on how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation they'll resent us,'' Bush said. "But if we are a humble nation, they'll respect us.''

Over the last several decades, there has been a strenuous debate about policies for economic development between the Washington Consensus promoted by the major international financial institutions and the revisionist political economists . Followers of the former view advocate free and unfettered markets buttressed by institutions to protect property rights. The revisionists argue that development involves social and political processes not adequately captured by the narrow prescriptive focus of the Washington Consensus.

In confronting globalization, there is also a new split among the revisionists themselves. Whereas the Washington Consensus welcomes globalization as a boon to developing countries through expanding the scope of market forces, the revisionists divide over the prospects for developing countries under globalization. The optimists, such as Ernst and Saxenian, see transnational networks as providing opportunities for developing countries to continue to learn the skills and competencies necessary to further their progress. The pessimists of the revisionist camp, such as Stiglitz and Strange, see globalization eroding the capabilities of the state or state-societal alliances necessary for development.

Using the case of technological upgrading (one aspect of economic development) in China's information technology (IT) industry, I demonstrate that opportunities for development exist under globalization. These paths to development are not simply the result of picking the right international networks to join nor are they due to the continued efficacy of state action. They also do not arise from well-developed market institutions within China. China's development success in spite of low levels of state industrial policymaking capacity and very incomplete market institutions tells us that other developing countries similarly unequipped can develop even in this globalized world.

In China's IT industry, two local institutional variables, firm operational strategies and state-firm relations, have interacted with the technology flows present in global networks to create opportunities for certain types of firms to upgrade. A firm's operational strategy (OS) determines its motivation to upgrade in China as opposed to doing so elsewhere. The relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance i.e. whether or not they can access functioning financial institutions.

The relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance and these sources of finance in turn impact their ability to upgrade. Sources of finance that provide credit with hard budget constraints give firms incentives to upgrade. Firms have hard budget constraints when they do not receive free help in covering their own financial obligations. With hard budget constraints forcing firms to meet their financial obligations, firms have to remain competitive to survive. For technology firms, a critical part of their competitiveness is their technology so they have every incentive to improve their technologies to keep pace with competitors. Finance that provides credit with soft budget constraints deprives firms of the incentives and even the capabilities to upgrade. Firms have soft budget constraints when they do not have to pay for some or all of their financial obligations themselves. These firms can rationally expect to survive even if not competitive because others are willing to bail them out. A third possibility is no source of finance. Firms without financing will not be able to invest in technological development.

There are four types of firms in China: the favored domestic firms, the neglected domestic firms, the hybrid foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and the regular FIEs. Financing and motivation have varied across firm categories. Due to different state-firm relations, FIEs rely on foreign finance and domestic firms do not. Hybrid FIEs differ from regular FIEs because the hybrids have a China-based operational strategy. This operational strategy (OS) is a mix of interests and ideational factors that causes these firms to perceive China either as the vital center of their operations (the China-based OS) or as just another location among many (the non-China-based OS). Thus, variation in firm-state relations (finance) and operational strategy (motivation) determine the variation in technological upgrading.

This thesis finds that the two types of FIEs are more likely to contribute to upgrading in China than the two types of domestic firms. Among the FIEs, the hybrid FIEs are more likely to contribute than the regular FIEs though the discrepancy is not as large as it is between the FIEs and domestic firms.

The hybrids are the most successful upgraders because they have both disciplined finance (i.e. credit with relatively hard budget constraints) from foreign financial institutions and the motivation to upgrade in China due to their China-based OS. The unsuccessful domestic upgraders lack finance (neglected domestic firms) or financial discipline (the favored domestic firms) due to their particular relationships to the state. The regular FIEs have the capabilities to upgrade due to their financial discipline and access to transnational technology networks, but undertake less upgrading in China than the hybrids because they lack the China-based operational strategy.

Dr. Liu first offered his view on the current state of the software industry's development and in particular software outsourcing to China. Software prices and margins continue to drop. Coupled with this reality is Liu's view that "only 10-15% of software development is truly innovative and therefore suitable to be developed in Silicon Valley". As software development platforms and communication technologies, especially the Internet, become ubiquitous and affordable, distributed software development is becoming the rule.

China's challenges and advantages in software outsourcing

Compared to India, the leader in software outsourcing, China has its own distinct challenges. Chinese software companies have almost no U.S. customers for a number of reasons: language barriers, different working styles, customers' concern for software piracy, and the lack of experienced programmers and technical managers in China. Yet, China also has its advantages. Not only does it have a rapidly expanding domestic software market, but it also has a large pool of fresh engineering talent. "The key, therefore," asserted Dr. Liu, "lies in someone creating the right environment to train and build a local team to be able to develop and deliver world-class software products."

Augmentum's software development goals

This is what Augmentum has set out to accomplish. "...[W]e want to build a world-class, distributed development team for software product development... like the ODM model in the PC world..." declared Dr. Liu. Based on this vision, Augmentum's strategy hinges on its insistence to develop software for top US customers, such as Motorola, Business Objects, and PalmSource--and to rely primarily on local Chinese engineers. Explained Liu: "We want to make sure that the center of most of the people of that team is going to be in China, even though the locomotive, the teachers, is in the U.S., because that's where the leadership is in the software product development world."

Drawing on decades of experience developing top software teams at IBM and other companies, Dr. Liu detailed his company's efforts to attract the brightest local engineers and train them to be even better. He explained, "Culture and team is the true differentiation of Augmentum.... The real...challenge is to build the right culture with the right core team." The company insists on having no expatriates in their China operations but promoting close interaction between experienced mentors in the U.S. and the young teams in China, sometimes using some creative approaches for recruitment and training. For example, Augmentum puts all of its new hires under "a stress test" after hiring and proactively maintains an "upfront churn of at least 30%" in the first three-month period." Their end goal: "a world-class software development team that can bridge the East and the West but still has a cost structure comparable to local companies."

Liu's focus for the future

Despite experienced leadership, ties to leading U.S. companies, and strong young software teams, Augmentum faces real challenges. Liu acknowledged skeptics who question the ability to build a world-class team through working on the "crumbs of companies" of "projects they don't want to work on themselves." Nevertheless, he is confident in the trajectory of Augmentum's future growth, as the company is expecting to double its employees every year for the coming few years. In addition, Dr. Liu's vision includes a landscape beyond Augmentum. "I have a very simple focus. I want to train a lot of world-class software developers in China to serve the world. Many of them will not be working for Augmentum. It is fine...I want to bring my experience to there to make it happen. And the best vehicle to do that at this moment and time, the wave [that] I want to jump on is outsourcing, because it is growing the fastest."

Biography of Leonard Liu

Leonard Liu has spent 30 years in the systems industry, with a track record of developing innovative computing technologies into successful businesses. Most recently, he served as president of ASE Group, a leading provider of IC test and packaging services, having held roles as Chairman and CEO of Walker Interactive Systems, COO of Cadence Design Systems, and President of Acer Group. He was an early champion of outsourcing to India and China at Cadence and Walker. Dr. Liu began his career at IBM where he was responsible for the creation and implementation of SQL and the management of CICS, SNA and AIX, eventually overseeing the worldwide Database and Language lines-of-business. He received his undergraduate degree from Taiwan University and his Ph.D. from Princeton University.

Focus on Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Greater China

SPRIE is a multidisciplinary research program at Stanford University that focuses on innovation and entrepreneurship in leading high technology regions in the United States and Asia. SPRIE has an active community of scholars at Stanford as well as research affiliates in the United States, Mainland China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India. During 2005-2006, SPRIE is expanding a new initiative on the rise of leading high technology regions in Greater China and their impact on the global knowledge economy. Specific research topics include globalization of R&D, executive leadership, university-industry linkages, venture capital industry development and leading high technology clusters in Greater China. In addition, industries of ongoing research at SPRIE include semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, and software.

SPRIE Graduate Research Fellows: Research Assistantships & Support for International Field Research

As part of its new initiative on innovation and entrepreneurship in Greater China, SPRIE will select outstanding Stanford students as SPRIE Graduate Research Scholars. SPRIE Graduate Research Scholars will work with SPRIE faculty and senior researchers at Stanford for two (or more) academic quarters in 2005-2006 to gather and analyze data, conduct interviews in Silicon Valley, contribute to publications, and advance progress on the overall project agenda. During summer 2006, they will conduct SPRIE field research through interviews or surveys with business and government leaders in Beijing, Shanghai, or Hsinchu. As part of SPRIE's international research team, they will have the opportunity to interact closely with project leaders and visiting scholars at Stanford as well as partners in Asia, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, or Zhongguancun Science Park in Mainland China or the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan. They will also participate in SPRIE's public and invitation-only seminars and workshops with academic, business, and government leaders. The financial award will include RA support at 15-20 hours/week (or equivalent) plus summer stipend to cover travel, living expenses, and research.

How To Apply (limited to current Stanford graduate students)

Successful candidates will have demonstrated a track record of superior analytical ability, strong oral and written communication skills (including full fluency in English and Chinese), knowledge of high technology and entrepreneurship, high motivation, and willingness to be part of a dynamic international research team.

Applicants should submit:

1. A brief statement (not to exceed two single-spaced pages), which describes the candidate's interests and skills,
2. a curriculum vitae
3. contact information for 2 references, preferably recent professors, advisors, or employers

Send applications to:

SPRIE
Encina Hall - East 301
Stanford University 94305-6055

or by email to George Krompacky. Questions? Please contact George Krompacky, Program Coordinator, by email or call 650.725.1885

Deadline for receipt of all materials: December 30, 2005

Applicants will be notified of decisions in January 2006