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Democracy in South Korea is Crumbling from Within
The fusion of political polarization and populism is characteristic of the trend of democratic recession sweeping the globe. Be it Boris Johnson, Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duterte, or Narendra Modi, contemporary populist leaders are winning through populist appeals that promote chauvinistic nationalism. While populist sentiments often emerge from hyper-conservative factions of right-wing parties, liberal, leftist governments are in no way immune to power grabs fueled by nationalistic fervor. This is precisely the situation that is unfolding in South Korea and driven by the Moon Jae In’s government, fears APARC and the Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin.
In “South Korea's Democratic Decay,” published in the Journal of Democracy, Shin warns that the current administration in South Korea is “more than a little drunk on its own sense of moral superiority.” Moon and his administration came to power in 2017 following the impeachment of then-president Park Geun Hye on corruption charges. Their campaign rallied around the cry to “eradicate deep-rooted evils” from Korean society and politics. The rhetoric was massively popular and easily won Moon the election.
According to Shin, Korea is following the same precarious path many democracies have stumbled on to in recent years. He explains the insidious danger of leaders like Moon: they come to power through legitimate, established democratic processes, but once in power, the chauvinistic populism and seemingly righteous dogma that fueled their campaign becomes a tool for eroding democracy from within. Though not as outwardly dramatic as a regime change or military coup, the result is just as damaging to democratic ideals.
In South Korea’s case, the politicization of the court system serves as a prime example of this subtle subversion. To date, Moon has named 10 of the fourteen-member Supreme Court and will have an opportunity to appoint three more before the end of his term. He has also named eight of the nine judges to the Constitutional Court. Many of these appointees have left-wing connections, and some even openly echo the administration’s rhetoric to “expel deep-rooted evils.” Many of the judges and prosecutors were appointed from partisan positions, and many have entered politics immediately following their tenures in law using a loophole in the 2017 amendment of the Korean Prosecutor’s Act.
The appointments follow the letter of the law and fall within the purview of the executive office, but the clear partisanship at work is at odds with the spirit of democratic tradition. While it technically breaks no laws, it calls into question the impartiality of the courts, the legitimacy of the law, and the separation of powers within the government.
Similarly, the administration plays favoritism with the standards of free speech, another essential element of democracy. Free speech and a politically active society served Moon Jae In well in 2017 when protestors and an ultra-loyal cohort of civically-engaged citizens propelled him to victory. But in 2018, Moon’s government declared a “war on fake news.” Rather than expunge falsehoods, it used this effort to stifle voices critical of the administration both in and outside of Korea. In February 2020, the Democratic Party sued a professor for her newspaper op-ed urging people to vote against Moon. In 2018, the U.S.-Korea Institute, a Johns-Hopkins-affiliated think tank, closed after the Moon administration ended financial support to the institution, citing concerns its directors were “too conservative.”
These actions are indications that Korea is slipping towards a “democratic depression,” says Shin. “Both the spirit of democracy and actual liberal-democratic standards are under attack,” he writes. “Opponents are demonized, democratic norms are eroded, and political life only grows more polarized.”
Left shaken by COVID-19, the trajectory of the country is uncertain. Still in control of the executive, with supportive judges stacked in the judiciary and control of a majority of seats in the legislature, there are few checks left to balance Moon’s ambitions and aggressive reforms. Though he was elected as a champion against corruption and authoritarianism, Moon’s dismantling of democratic norms now leaves him teetering on the edge of becoming the thing he promised to eradicate.
On whether or not Korea can arrest its slide towards a democratically-sanctioned regime, Shin says, “For Korea to have a chance at overcoming the polarizing forces that are pulling it apart, the president must hold himself to a higher standard. Nothing but democratic ideals hold the power to revive a politics of concord big and strong enough to contain the politics of anger and revenge.”
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South Korea is following global trends as it slides toward a “democratic depression,” warns APARC’s Gi-Wook Shin. But the dismantling of South Korean democracy by chauvinistic populism and political polarization is the work of a leftist government, Shin argues in a ‘Journal of Democracy’ article.
Alvin Shiqi Wang (王世琪) has served as CEO and President of 21Vianet Group, Inc. since February 2018. Currently, Mr. Wang serves as Vice President of TUS Digital Group, a subsidiary of TUS Holdings, and serves on the board of directors of Beijing CIC Technology Co., Ltd. and Guangzhou Tuwei Technology Co., Ltd. . Mr. Wang has nearly 20 years of experience in the telecommunications industry, working at various renowned international companies, including 11 years with Ericsson, focusing primarily on strategy development and execution, corporate management, and equity investments. Mr. Wang received a bachelor's degree from Tsinghua University and an MBA from Peking University-Vlerick MBA Programme (BiMBA).
Xiang Wang (王翔) is President and Acting CFO of Xiaomi Corporation, responsible for platform functions and for assisting the CEO with Group operations. Mr. Wang joined Xiaomi Corporation in July 2015 served as its Senior Vice President and President for International Business, responsible for global expansion, IP strategy, and strategic partner relationship management. Mr. Wang has more than 20 years of experience in the semiconductor and communications fields, with great vision and comprehensive understanding of next-generation wireless communications. He has played an integral role in shaping Xiaomi’s international business operations including with respect to its intellectual property compliance, management and strategy throughout the world. In 2016, Mr. Wang put together an international team of sales and marketing teams to expand into more markets outside of China. Within just 3 years, he led his teams into over 90 markets. As of Q3 2019, Xiaomi’s international revenue accounted for 48.7% of its total revenue. Today, Xiaomi is ranked among top 5 smartphone brands in over 40 markets. Mr. Wang previously served as the Senior Vice President of Qualcomm and President of Qualcomm Greater China, leading the company’s business and operations in Greater China. Prior to that role, he was Vice President of Qualcomm CDMA Technology, responsible for Qualcomm chipset business and customer service in China. Under his leadership, Qualcomm rapidly extended and strengthened its partnerships with increasing numbers of Chinese manufacturing customers. Before joining Qualcomm, Mr. Wang held key positions in sales and marketing at internationally leading companies, including Motorola and Lucent/Agere. Mr. Wang earned his BSEE from Beijing Polytechnic University.
Zhiqiang (ZZ) Zhang (张志强) is President of ABB in China since October 2018. He has extensive management experience and a deep understanding of the Chinese market, developed during his career at several large global companies over the past three decades. He joined ABB from Sandvik where he was Asia- Pacific Regional Holding Officer and President of Sandvik China, and Member of Sandvik Group Executive Committee. Prior to that, he held leadership positions at several other companies, including Nokia Siemens Networks, where he was President of the Greater China Region, and Siemens VDO Automotive, China, where he was President and CEO. Mr. Zhang is Non-Executive Board member of Georg Fischer AG (Switzerland) and Daetwyler Holding AG (Switzerland). He holds a bachelor’s degree in electronic engineering from Beijing Jiaotong University, China, and a master’s degree in business administration from the Smith School of Business at Queen’s University in Canada.
Jean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She directs the China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. Professor Oi has published extensively on China’s reforms. Recent books include Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County, coedited with Steven Goldstein (Stanford University Press, 2018), and Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization, coedited with Karen Eggleston and Yiming Wang (2017). Current research is on fiscal reform and local government debt, continuing SOE reforms, and the Belt and Road Initiative.
Christopher Thomas was most recently a partner with McKinsey & Company. He served as co-Managing Partner for the Firm’s Global Digital Strategy service line as well as its Global IoT service line; and as the leader of its Asia Semiconductor Practice. Prior to McKinsey, Mr. Thomas spent ten years at Intel. He was the General Manager of Intel China, with joint ownership for the region’s $5 billion-plus P&L. In this role, he grew revenues by more than 50% and oversaw China’s successful elevation from a sales unit to an independent regional P&L business reporting directly into headquarters. Mr. Thomas began his career as a private equity investor at The Blackstone Group in New York City. He is currently a Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University, China’s leading educational institution. He received an MBA from Stanford Business School, where he was an Arjay Miller scholar; a Master of Arts in Political Science from Stanford University; and a Bachelor of Science in Economics, summa cum laude, from the Wharton School.
Karen Eggleston is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University, director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program, and deputy director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a fellow with the Stanford Center for Innovation in Global Health and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Eggleston earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University, studied in China for two years, and was a Fulbright scholar in South Korea. Her research focuses on comparative health systems and health reform in Asia, especially China; government and market roles in the health sector; supply-side incentives; healthcare productivity; and economic aspects of demographic change.
Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Previous positions include assistant secretary of state for Intelligence and Research (2000-2001, 2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and chief of the China Division. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history) and Stanford University (MA and PhD, both in political science). His most recent books are Uneasy Partnerships: China’s Engagement with Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (editor) (Stanford University Press, 2017); The New Great Game: China’s Relations with South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform (editor) (Stanford University Press, 2016); and Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011).
Andrew G. Walder is the Denise O’Leary and Kent Thiry Professor of Sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. A political sociologist, Walder has long specialized in the study of contemporary Chinese society and political economy. After receiving his PhD at the University of Michigan, he taught at Columbia, Harvard, and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. At Stanford he has served as chair of the Department of Sociology, director of the Asia-Pacific Research Center, and director of the Division of International, Comparative, and Area Studies in the School of Humanities and Sciences. His most recent books are Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement (2009), China under Mao: A Revolution Derailed (2015), and Agents of Disorder: Inside China’s Cultural Revolution (2019).
I currently live in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, though I am originally from Japan. Naypyitaw is currently not under shelter-in-place, though the city of Yangon is. In Naypyitaw, restaurants are serving only take-out meals, and most amusement facilities like movie theaters, karaoke boxes, bars, and beauty salons have been closed. There are still a few big department stores open, as well as the public golf course and tennis courts.
