The April 10 parliamentary elections in South Korea resulted in a landslide victory for the liberal opposition, dealing a resounding setback to President Yoon Suk Yeol and his ruling conservative People Power Party. While the liberal Democratic Party fell short of achieving a super majority, the outcome reflects pervasive public discontent with Yoon's administration amid economic challenges and political controversies, placing Yoon in a difficult position for the remainder of his three-year term.

“In a sense, this was a rematch between President Yoon and Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung, whom Yoon defeated in the 2022 presidential race by a razor-thin margin, and Lee won in a big way,” explains Stanford sociologist and APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin. “Now the Democratic Party really became Lee’s party.”

Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and the director of the Korea Program at APARC, joined the Korea Society for a livestreamed election analysis session. Watch it here:

The election outcomes reflect the increased political division and polarization gripping South Korea, which is poised to be a major issue for Korean politics in the coming years, Shin notes. Shin has written extensively about the roles of illiberalism, populism, and polarization in the decline of Korean democracy and their implications for Korean society and politics.

“I have said before that Korea is facing a crisis in democracy. Now I can say that Korea is also facing a crisis in political leadership,” he tells Korea Society Policy Program Officer Chelsie Alexandre.

In this session, Shin explores in detail what the election results mean for Korea’s political, economic, and social policy, its alliance with the United States, and its relations with regional states.

Shin has also contributed to election analysis in national and international media.

Reboot of Adversarial Politics

South Korean voters’ verdict on the Yoon government’s performance reflects deep disappointment and even resentment about some of his policies and leadership styles, Shin shares with Bloomberg News. As the opposition holds a large majority in the National Assembly, Yoon appears destined to complete his remaining three years in office as a lame duck, unable to push for any major policy initiatives, domestic or foreign. We should expect a reboot of adversarial politics in South Korea as the opposition looks to obstruct Yoon’s legislative agenda, Shin predicts. 

Voter turnout for the parliamentary elections reached 67 percent, marking the highest turnout for general elections in 32 years. Liberals expressed discontent with the government by sending a strong message through voting, while the ruling conservative party tried to mobilize its supporters to minimize losses. Ultimately "there were no major policy debates between the ruling and main opposition parties," says Shin in an interview with Singaporean public broadcast service CNA.

Shin anticipates the Democratic Party will likely contest Yoon's stance toward Tokyo and Washington. Speaking with French international news agency AFP, Shin explains the potential return of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who held high-profile but unsuccessful summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his presidency, could add to the tension. If Trump were to reengage with North Korea, then the Yoon government would have to decide whether to shift from its hardline policies against the North or risk friction between Washington and Seoul, Shin says.

The election outcomes could also hinder the Yoon government’s momentum for improving ties with Japan, especially since Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, too, is facing low domestic approval ratings, Shin tells The Korea Herald. "It is unfortunate for the Korea-Japan relationship that both leaders are politically struggling."

Despite facing legal issues, controversial opposition leader Lee Jae-myung remains a leading contender for the presidency when Yoon's term ends in 2027, echoing the situation with former U.S. President Donald Trump, he tells AFP.

Gender and Generational Gaps

The parliamentary election has also brought to relief the tremendous underrepresentation of women and young people in Korean politics. Only 20% of parliamentary seats are held by women, and over 85% of elected members are over the age of 50. The older establishment and the conservative People Power Party have failed to connect with South Korea's young people, Shin says. While the country is a global cultural force and excelling in semiconductor exports, South Korea’s younger people are facing intense competition in education, limited job prospects, and soaring housing prices. “The lack of understanding of the challenges the youth face is contributing to the country's rising generational conflict,” Shin explains via AFP.

Center Director Gi-wook Shin discussed the results of the South Korean presidential election on CNBC's "Squawk Box Asia." 

After a particularly contentious race, conservative People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, who won with less than one percent of the popular vote, indicated his resolve to bring unity to the country. Shin, however, is skeptical of the new president's ability to do so, stating "I have been warning about backsliding in Korean democracy...the new president has a lot of challenges to integrate Korean society, [which] has become divisive and highly polarized...We might expect a lot of tensions and fights in the coming years."

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When asked about how domestic political polarization might translate into policymaking, Shin said that Yoon's lack of formal political experience, combined with the opposition party holding control over the legislature, will prove to be a challenge in tackling both domestic and international issues.

"It is one thing to win the election, but [Yoon] still has no experience as a political leader, and Korea has a lot of challenges, a lot of problems internally and also in foreign policy. So will [Yoon] be able to bring unity to Korean society? I hope he could, but frankly speaking, I am skeptical he will be able to."

Shin has written about South Korea's democratic backsliding and has offered analyses of Korea's presidential election on numerous media outlets. APARC's resource page on the ROK 2022 presidential election and the future of Korean democracy curates these insights and more. Among other media interviews, Shin discussed Yoon's ascendance with AFP, noting that the president-elect "built his reputation as a fierce fighter against power abuse, not a conventional democratic leader who would value negotiation and comprise." 

Yoon became the conservatives' "icon" because he was "seen as the best person to beat the Democratic Party candidate, despite his lack of political leadership experience," Shin said.

"That does not bode well for Korean democracy as we may expect further polarization," he added.

This article first appeared in the online magazine American Purpose.  

On March 9, South Koreans head to the voting booths to elect their new president. Although conventional wisdom posits that foreign affairs have little effect on voting preferences, South Koreans have defied this prediction in the past—and now, they may once again. Indeed, the atmosphere in this year’s election recalls that of 2002, when anti-American sentiments swept the South Korean presidential election. This time, it may be anti-Chinese sentiments that make an impact.

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According to our survey of over one thousand South Koreans, conducted this past January, a large majority of respondents—78 percent—indicated that Republic of Korea (ROK)-China relations will be an important consideration when deciding which presidential candidate to vote for. Given that younger South Koreans are expected to be the deciding factor in this election, it is particularly significant that the figure rises to 82 percent for respondents in their twenties. Twenty years ago, anti-American sentiments tipped the vote in favor of Roh Moo-hyun, the liberal candidate, who pledged not to kowtow to the United States. This time, how will anti-Chinese sentiment play out in Seoul? Will it work in favor of the conservatives, who tend to be tougher on China and emphasize the U.S.-ROK alliance? And what does this mean for Washington?

South Korean President Moon Jae-in's Democratic Party suffered a devastating defeat in a special election for mayoral posts in the country’s two largest cities, Seoul and Busan. “These mayoral elections became a referendum on the ruling party,” says APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin in an interview on CNBC Squawk Box Asia. “South Korean voters gave the Moon administration a red card.”

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Anger at soaring housing prices and ongoing investigations into accusations of corruption has decimated the credibility of Moon and his left-leaning Democratic Party in the eyes of many voters. “The South Korean people have begun to believe that the current government is quite incompetent,” Shin says. In the foreign policy arena, too, the Moon administration has been on a downhill slide. It has failed to make a breakthrough on the stalemate with North Korea, has seen the relationship with Japan deteriorating to the worst it has ever been and is struggling to contend with China.

But it is domestic policy, particularly containing housing prices, that will be the key issue in next year’s presidential election, Shin argues. Another issue to watch is COVID-19, he notes. A year ago, South Korean voters rewarded the administration’s handling of the pandemic, but now the government is facing a backlash over its slow vaccine rollout.

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Soft Power and U.S.-China Competition

One thing the Trump administration has identified correctly and managed to get consensus on, says Chinese military and security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, is that the United States is in a great-power competition with China. Biden now accepts this framework, and Mastro expects him to maintain the basic principles of U.S. Asia policy, such as strategic ambiguity and ensuring Taiwan’s defense through arms sales. The difference will be in Biden’s approach, which is based on “multilateralism, strengthening partnerships, and not trying to provoke Beijing for the sake of provoking Beijing.” This approach, believes Mastro, is going to improve the U.S. position in terms of competition.

A core component of the U.S.-China great-power competition, however, is soft power — the ability of countries to get what they want through persuasion or attraction in the form of culture, values, and policies. Soft power, argues Mastro, is an area that is very hard for a president to have control over and rebuild, and American soft power has taken a tremendous hit with the breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6. Demonstrating the decline of American democracy, the scenes from the pro-Trump mob attack have been a win for China and are hardly encouraging for U.S. partners and allies.

Biden can do a lot to tackle U.S. domestic problems and improve the political image of America abroad. But soft power, concludes Mastro, is organic. “I fear that President-elect Biden is going to learn that soft power, once lost, is very difficult to regain.”

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Security in the Asia-Pacific

In shifting to relations between the United States and Japan, Kiyoteru Tsutsui focuses on how the traditional aspects of the Japan-U.S. alliance are playing out in the current geopolitical theater. In Tsutsui’s view, Japan’s early brushes with Chinese might in the 2010s has left the country particularly keen on ensuring that a strong counterbalance exists to China’s strategic advantage.

To that end, Japan has proactively partnered with other nations on trade deals such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The fact that both of these major free trade agreements were concluded without U.S. involvement is significant, and whether President Biden makes any response will be “one the more closely watched issues among foreign policy experts in the coming years,” by Tsutsui’s measure.

The reemergence of ‘the Quad,’ and even discussions of a ‘Quad+’ that includes nations such as South Korea, is of particular interest to Tsutsui. Such groups provide additional avenues for further developing the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy originally envisioned by Prime Minister Abe. But Tsutsui is also not opposed to the idea of engaging China directly in multilateral efforts as long as China understands the U.S. and Japan’s resolve in countering Chinese aggression and non-peaceful ambitions.

The Korean Peninsula in the Spotlight

When it comes to engagement on the Korean peninsula, Gi-Wook Shin hopes the new administration will avoid a reactionary response and backsliding into old habits. The temptation to respond with an “anything but Trump’s” approach to handling relations with North Korea may be strong, particularly given the president’s unusually forward relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, but Shin counsels to not set aside everything Trump did in regards to the DPRK.

“Bringing North Korea and Kim Jong Un more into the international community was an important step that no other president has made,” he says. Shin strongly cautions against a return to the strategic patience typical of the Obama era. With Kim’s consolidated control and North Korea’s wielding far more advanced nuclear capabilities and significantly strengthened ties to China than it did eight years ago, a return to previous patterns of diplomacy would fail to address the present circumstances on the Korean peninsula. Shin urges the Biden administration to reemphasize human rights and deepening dialogues with its diplomatic counterparts in Seoul. He foresees an improvement in U.S.-ROK relations but warns that North Korea can be a source of tension between the two allies.

Opportunities for Allies in Southeast Asia

Donald Emmerson also recommends strengthening diplomatic ties to the nations of Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By his assessment, “ASEAN needs creativity. It needs new ideas rather than simply following the path of least resistance.” Emmerson envisions this well-spring of creativity coming in part from robust new efforts by the United States to engage with the region diplomatically and academically.

Existing forums such as the Bali Democracy Forum can provide a ready-made platform for engagement, while active participation in gatherings such as the Global Town Hall organized earlier this year by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) provide easy opportunities for the United States to meaningfully engage with Southeast Asia.

An Outlook on the Broader Asia-Pacific

Closing out the panel’s remarks, Thomas Fingar offers measured optimism for the future. “I think the incoming U.S. approach to the countries in Asia, China included, is going to be pragmatic and instrumental, not transactional. Every nation who thinks they can contribute, does contribute, and is willing to play by a rules-based order can be part of the solution.”

Fingar expects the Biden administration’s foreign policy to be “focused on problems, not places” — to be driven less by particular animosity or affection for certain countries and more by addressing global issues that promote American interests, such as climate change, the impediments in the international system to advancing American economy, and preserving security.

By consensus, the incoming Biden administration’s most immediate concerns are overwhelmingly domestic. But as Mastro articulated, the effects of the United States’ domestic policies directly impact its perception, standing, and sphere of influence around the globe.

Effective relationships between the United States and the Asia-Pacific cannot be sustained in the long term with an ongoing ‘America first’ agenda or by pursuing zero-sum goals. Rather, the Biden administration must focus on finding solutions to multilateral needs by working side-by-side with Asian nations as co-sponsors and co-leaders.

This podcast conversation with Gi-Wook Shin was originally produced by CSIS.

South Korea may seem to be a mature democracy from the outside, but Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC and the Korea Program, warns that internally, democratic norms in the ROK are starting to weaken and crumble. He joins Victor Cha and Andrew Schwartz on The Impossible State, a podcast by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), to further discuss his recent Journal of Democracy article, "South Korea's Democratic Decay," and how democratic backsliding in the Moon administration is part of a broader trend of the global decline of democracy. Listen above to the full conversation.

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