South Korean President Moon Jae-in's Democratic Party suffered a devastating defeat in a special election for mayoral posts in the country’s two largest cities, Seoul and Busan. “These mayoral elections became a referendum on the ruling party,” says APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin in an interview on CNBC Squawk Box Asia. “South Korean voters gave the Moon administration a red card.”

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Anger at soaring housing prices and ongoing investigations into accusations of corruption has decimated the credibility of Moon and his left-leaning Democratic Party in the eyes of many voters. “The South Korean people have begun to believe that the current government is quite incompetent,” Shin says. In the foreign policy arena, too, the Moon administration has been on a downhill slide. It has failed to make a breakthrough on the stalemate with North Korea, has seen the relationship with Japan deteriorating to the worst it has ever been and is struggling to contend with China.

But it is domestic policy, particularly containing housing prices, that will be the key issue in next year’s presidential election, Shin argues. Another issue to watch is COVID-19, he notes. A year ago, South Korean voters rewarded the administration’s handling of the pandemic, but now the government is facing a backlash over its slow vaccine rollout.

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Soft Power and U.S.-China Competition

One thing the Trump administration has identified correctly and managed to get consensus on, says Chinese military and security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, is that the United States is in a great-power competition with China. Biden now accepts this framework, and Mastro expects him to maintain the basic principles of U.S. Asia policy, such as strategic ambiguity and ensuring Taiwan’s defense through arms sales. The difference will be in Biden’s approach, which is based on “multilateralism, strengthening partnerships, and not trying to provoke Beijing for the sake of provoking Beijing.” This approach, believes Mastro, is going to improve the U.S. position in terms of competition.

A core component of the U.S.-China great-power competition, however, is soft power — the ability of countries to get what they want through persuasion or attraction in the form of culture, values, and policies. Soft power, argues Mastro, is an area that is very hard for a president to have control over and rebuild, and American soft power has taken a tremendous hit with the breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6. Demonstrating the decline of American democracy, the scenes from the pro-Trump mob attack have been a win for China and are hardly encouraging for U.S. partners and allies.

Biden can do a lot to tackle U.S. domestic problems and improve the political image of America abroad. But soft power, concludes Mastro, is organic. “I fear that President-elect Biden is going to learn that soft power, once lost, is very difficult to regain.”

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Security in the Asia-Pacific

In shifting to relations between the United States and Japan, Kiyoteru Tsutsui focuses on how the traditional aspects of the Japan-U.S. alliance are playing out in the current geopolitical theater. In Tsutsui’s view, Japan’s early brushes with Chinese might in the 2010s has left the country particularly keen on ensuring that a strong counterbalance exists to China’s strategic advantage.

To that end, Japan has proactively partnered with other nations on trade deals such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The fact that both of these major free trade agreements were concluded without U.S. involvement is significant, and whether President Biden makes any response will be “one the more closely watched issues among foreign policy experts in the coming years,” by Tsutsui’s measure.

The reemergence of ‘the Quad,’ and even discussions of a ‘Quad+’ that includes nations such as South Korea, is of particular interest to Tsutsui. Such groups provide additional avenues for further developing the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy originally envisioned by Prime Minister Abe. But Tsutsui is also not opposed to the idea of engaging China directly in multilateral efforts as long as China understands the U.S. and Japan’s resolve in countering Chinese aggression and non-peaceful ambitions.

The Korean Peninsula in the Spotlight

When it comes to engagement on the Korean peninsula, Gi-Wook Shin hopes the new administration will avoid a reactionary response and backsliding into old habits. The temptation to respond with an “anything but Trump’s” approach to handling relations with North Korea may be strong, particularly given the president’s unusually forward relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, but Shin counsels to not set aside everything Trump did in regards to the DPRK.

“Bringing North Korea and Kim Jong Un more into the international community was an important step that no other president has made,” he says. Shin strongly cautions against a return to the strategic patience typical of the Obama era. With Kim’s consolidated control and North Korea’s wielding far more advanced nuclear capabilities and significantly strengthened ties to China than it did eight years ago, a return to previous patterns of diplomacy would fail to address the present circumstances on the Korean peninsula. Shin urges the Biden administration to reemphasize human rights and deepening dialogues with its diplomatic counterparts in Seoul. He foresees an improvement in U.S.-ROK relations but warns that North Korea can be a source of tension between the two allies.

Opportunities for Allies in Southeast Asia

Donald Emmerson also recommends strengthening diplomatic ties to the nations of Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By his assessment, “ASEAN needs creativity. It needs new ideas rather than simply following the path of least resistance.” Emmerson envisions this well-spring of creativity coming in part from robust new efforts by the United States to engage with the region diplomatically and academically.

Existing forums such as the Bali Democracy Forum can provide a ready-made platform for engagement, while active participation in gatherings such as the Global Town Hall organized earlier this year by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) provide easy opportunities for the United States to meaningfully engage with Southeast Asia.

An Outlook on the Broader Asia-Pacific

Closing out the panel’s remarks, Thomas Fingar offers measured optimism for the future. “I think the incoming U.S. approach to the countries in Asia, China included, is going to be pragmatic and instrumental, not transactional. Every nation who thinks they can contribute, does contribute, and is willing to play by a rules-based order can be part of the solution.”

Fingar expects the Biden administration’s foreign policy to be “focused on problems, not places” — to be driven less by particular animosity or affection for certain countries and more by addressing global issues that promote American interests, such as climate change, the impediments in the international system to advancing American economy, and preserving security.

By consensus, the incoming Biden administration’s most immediate concerns are overwhelmingly domestic. But as Mastro articulated, the effects of the United States’ domestic policies directly impact its perception, standing, and sphere of influence around the globe.

Effective relationships between the United States and the Asia-Pacific cannot be sustained in the long term with an ongoing ‘America first’ agenda or by pursuing zero-sum goals. Rather, the Biden administration must focus on finding solutions to multilateral needs by working side-by-side with Asian nations as co-sponsors and co-leaders.

This podcast conversation with Gi-Wook Shin was originally produced by CSIS.

South Korea may seem to be a mature democracy from the outside, but Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC and the Korea Program, warns that internally, democratic norms in the ROK are starting to weaken and crumble. He joins Victor Cha and Andrew Schwartz on The Impossible State, a podcast by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), to further discuss his recent Journal of Democracy article, "South Korea's Democratic Decay," and how democratic backsliding in the Moon administration is part of a broader trend of the global decline of democracy. Listen above to the full conversation.

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In South Korea’s case, the politicization of the court system serves as a prime example of this subtle subversion. To date, Moon has named 10 of the fourteen-member Supreme Court and will have an opportunity to appoint three more before the end of his term. He has also named eight of the nine judges to the Constitutional Court. Many of these appointees have left-wing connections, and some even openly echo the administration’s rhetoric to “expel deep-rooted evils.” Many of the judges and prosecutors were appointed from partisan positions, and many have entered politics immediately following their tenures in law using a loophole in the 2017 amendment of the Korean Prosecutor’s Act.

The appointments follow the letter of the law and fall within the purview of the executive office, but the clear partisanship at work is at odds with the spirit of democratic tradition. While it technically breaks no laws, it calls into question the impartiality of the courts, the legitimacy of the law, and the separation of powers within the government.

Similarly, the administration plays favoritism with the standards of free speech, another essential element of democracy. Free speech and a politically active society served Moon Jae In well in 2017 when protestors and an ultra-loyal cohort of civically-engaged citizens propelled him to victory. But in 2018, Moon’s government declared a “war on fake news.” Rather than expunge falsehoods, it used this effort to stifle voices critical of the administration both in and outside of Korea. In February 2020, the Democratic Party sued a professor for her newspaper op-ed urging people to vote against Moon. In 2018, the U.S.-Korea Institute, a Johns-Hopkins-affiliated think tank, closed after the Moon administration ended financial support to the institution, citing concerns its directors were “too conservative.”

These actions are indications that Korea is slipping towards a “democratic depression,” says Shin. “Both the spirit of democracy and actual liberal-democratic standards are under attack,” he writes. “Opponents are demonized, democratic norms are eroded, and political life only grows more polarized.”

Left shaken by COVID-19, the trajectory of the country is uncertain. Still in control of the executive, with supportive judges stacked in the judiciary and control of a majority of seats in the legislature, there are few checks left to balance Moon’s ambitions and aggressive reforms. Though he was elected as a champion against corruption and authoritarianism, Moon’s dismantling of democratic norms now leaves him teetering on the edge of becoming the thing he promised to eradicate.

On whether or not Korea can arrest its slide towards a democratically-sanctioned regime, Shin says, “For Korea to have a chance at overcoming the polarizing forces that are pulling it apart, the president must hold himself to a higher standard. Nothing but democratic ideals hold the power to revive a politics of concord big and strong enough to contain the politics of anger and revenge.”

Read the full article at the Journal of Democracy.

On April 15, 2020, South Korea became the first country in the world to hold a national election amidst the coronavirus pandemic. Gi-Wook Shin, APARC's director, joined the Korea Society's Stephen Noerper and Jonathan Corrado for an open analysis of the election results and its implications.

While the safe execution of the election is certainly a success, Shin cautions that the real challenge for Moon Jae-In's reelected administration will now be to bolster the Korean economy.

“Even before the health crisis, the Korean economy was going through a very tough time . . . My worry is that the [Moon administration] might interpret the election outcome as a confidence vote on their policy, and they might push forward more aggressively even though the performance of the last three years has not been that great.”

Watch Dr. Shin's full analysis and commentary with the Korea Society below.

In October's Journal of Democracy, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center director Gi-Wook Shin and 2016-17 Koret Fellow Rennie Moon examine Park Geun Hye's fall from power and impeachment, the challenges facing President Moon and the Democratic Party, and what it all spells for the future of Korean democracy.

As expected, Moon Jae-in has been elected as South Korea’s 19th president. In a five-way contest, Moon garnered 41.1 percent of the vote, with strong support from those in their 20s to 50s, winning most of the regions in the country. 

South Koreans’ longing for change had been expressed through the now-famous candlelight demonstrations that lasted for almost twenty consecutive weekends culminating in the impeachment of now former president Park Geun-hye. It was also reflected in the highest voter turnout in two decades, at 77.2 percent.

Just hours after his decisive victory, Moon began his five-year term without the usual practice of a transition team. Moreover, he took office during turbulent times — domestically and internationally — perhaps even more so than when former president Kim Dae-jung took office in 1998 when the nation was struggling with the Asian financial crisis.

First and foremost, Moon must deal with the mounting social and economic challenges that the country is facing. Having entered a period of low-growth coupled with an aging population, the economy confronts a host of difficult issues, including high levels of youth unemployment, income inequality, household debt, elderly poverty and rising social welfare expenditures.

The Moon administration immediately established a ‘job creation committee’ and pledged to create 810,000 jobs in the public sector. But it will not be easy to amass the financial resources needed by a government already struggling with serious budget deficits. Most agree that ‘economic democratisation’ is needed, but the details of how to achieve that — including reforming the chaebol — remain unclear.

Economic uncertainties have been a key factor contributing to social unrest. Words in vogue among South Koreans in their 20s and 30s reflect the social discontent with youth unemployment and inequality that ultimately erupted in the demonstrations.

‘Hell Joseon’ captures a sentiment of what it means to live in South Korea’s hellish reality. ‘Golden Spoons Dirt Spoons’ levels the charge that one’s life course is decided for good by one’s family background. ‘Gapjil’ refers to acts of impunity by the powerful against the weak, while the ‘Sampo generation’ is a generation forced to give up three things: courtship, marriage and children. If Moon fails to live up to the expectations of the country’s youth, a bloc that widely supported him, social discontent and symptoms of unrest will likely return.

Moon also faces daunting tasks in national security matters. North Korea has continued to develop weapons of mass destruction and relations have been all but completely severed. As controversy over the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) has shown, South Korea remains caught in the middle of a hegemonic struggle between the United States and China.

If that wasn’t enough, South Korea made a deal with Japan on the comfort women issue in late 2015 but the public now demands its renegotiation. South Korean–Russian relations are also at their grimmest. To top it all off, Moon must deal with a formidable set of nationalist and populist leaders — Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Shinzo Abe, Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin — all known for their very strong characters, in stark contrast to Moon’s nice-guy, everyman personality.

The most urgent but also most challenging task is managing inter-Korean relations. As Pyongyang steps up its nuclear and missile programs, Seoul must reaffirm to the international community that it will continue its efforts to denuclearise the North. At the same time, relations between the two Koreas must be improved to strengthen South Korea’s strategic position in the region as well as reduce tensions on the peninsula.

Trump has been sending out confusing messages probably because he has no suitable plan to deal with Pyongyang. As such, if Seoul were to bring to the table a persuasive policy of engagement, Washington would be receptive unless it weakens US efforts towards denuclearisation. Both Beijing (pressured by Washington to solve the North Korean nuclear issue) and Pyongyang (concerned about becoming overly dependent on China) would welcome Seoul taking the initiative to improve inter-Korean relations.

Some pundits at home and abroad worry that the Moon administration might follow in the footsteps of the Roh administration (2003–2008), whose outcomes lagged too far behind its good will to bring about reform. Moon served as Roh’s chief of staff and the two administrations overlap in manpower. But Moon and his team have also learned many lessons from the trial and error of the Roh administration, preparing themselves over the past ten years of conservative rule.

With the new administration in place, political turmoil over the last six months has finally ended. Moon’s first moves as president, including key appointments in the Blue House and opening up communication channels with the public, have been well received. A public poll conducted by Gallup Korea one week after the inauguration showed that 87 percent of the respondents expected him to do well. Despite mounting challenges, South Koreans remain hopeful that their new leader can take the nation to the next level.

This piece was originally carried by East Asia Forum on May 23, 2017, and reposted with permission.