"I would like to invite my colleagues, students, friends, and supporters to celebrate what we have worked together to achieve over the last decade and I ask you all to join me in continuing this record of achievement in the decade to come."

Gi-Wook Shin
Stanford KSP Director
 

Gi-Wook Shin came from the University of California, Los Angeles to Stanford University in 2001 to establish a program in Korean studies. "Naturally, I had mixed feelings—of excitement and hope, but also of anxiety and uncertainty," says Shin. "Looking back, I made the right decision." The Stanford Korean Studies Program (KSP), today a thriving and vibrant program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), recently held a series of major events to celebrate its tenth anniversary in February 2011.

Stanford KSP is unique among other Korean studies programs in its interdisciplinary, social science-based research focus on contemporary Korea. The U.S.-Korea relationship, particularly policy issues, is strongly emphasized in the program's research and publishing activities. Stanford KSP is instrumental in the success of Shorenstein APARC's two initiatives—the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum and the New Beginnings policy study group—aimed at improving policy-making decisions in the two countries.

The program is grateful for the strong and generous support it has received from individuals, corporations, and foundations since the very beginning. In 1999, an endowment was established for the professorship that Shin holds, the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies, which was followed closely by funding for two more Korea chairs. In 2004, Dr. Jeong H. and Cynthia Kim provided funding to establish a professorship named after former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry. Dr. Kim is President of Bell Labs at Alcatel-Lucent and a member of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Advisory Board. A search is currently underway to fill this important position. The Korea Foundation then donated funds in 2005 to establish a third professorship, which is currently held by Yumi Moon of the Department of History.

Stanford KSP has successfully established two annual professional fellowship programs, the Pantech Fellowship for Mid-Career Professionals and the Koret Fellowship, something unparalleled by other Korean studies programs. The program's faculty, fellows, and visiting scholars—most of whom teach courses and speak at public events—greatly contribute to the intellectual vigor of the Stanford community. Paul Y. Chang, PhD '08, an assistant professor at Yonsei University's Underwood International College, says, "The program provided the ideal context to engage with passionate scholars and develop my research program."

Stanford KSP's visitors find themselves, in turn, rewarded by the experience of being at Shorenstein APARC. Former Korean Minister of Unification Jongseok Lee, a visiting scholar from 2008 to 2009, says, "While enjoying every bit of life at Stanford . . . I worked hard in the office from early morning to late evening, as if I were a graduate student preparing his final dissertation . . . It was a truly meaningful and memorable year." Stanford KSP maintains strong ties with its former students, fellows, visiting scholars, and other affiliates, in part through the Stanford Shorenstein APARC Forum in Korea, an organization that has grown since 2003 to boast a roster of over 100 members.

In addition to the interaction with Stanford KSP's faculty and visitors, Stanford students benefit greatly from numerous social science and language courses, internship and overseas seminar opportunities, and the ever-growing Korean-language library collection supported by the program. Social science courses cover such topics as the Korean economy, the politics of the Korean Peninsula, modern Korean history, and many others. Through the Stanford Language Center, students may take a rigorous, comprehensive offering of beginning- through advanced-level Korean-language courses. An internship program co-sponsored with the Center for East Asian Studies provides students with the valuable opportunity to live and work in Korea each summer. Since its establishment in 2005, Stanford's Korean-language library collection has expanded to include a total of 41,300 print volumes and 13 electronic databases.

On an annual basis, Stanford KSP offers innovative and impactful programs addressing current, policy-relevant issues and events, as well as historical factors with contemporary relevance, that are shaping the future of the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.-Korea relationship. Conferences and workshops bring together leading Korea scholars with policymakers and other subject experts, including business leaders and international journalists, for productive and meaningful dialogue, research, and publishing activities. Stanford KSP's popular, long-time seminar series and special events afford members of the Stanford community and the general public the opportunity to listen to and engage with distinguished political figures and prominent scholars.

Stanford KSP celebrated its tenth anniversary on February 23 with a special public seminar examining the state and prospects of science, technology, and economics in Korea and Northeast Asia. The next day, it held its annual Koret Conference, a major event bringing together prominent Korea experts to discuss the future of North Korea. The anniversary activities concluded that evening with a dinner and reception to honor the generosity of Stanford KSP's long-time donors.

Proud of the program's accomplishments to date and optimistic about the future, Shin says, "I would like to invite my colleagues, students, friends, and supporters to celebrate what we have worked together to achieve over the last decade and I ask you all to join me in continuing this record of achievement in the decade to come."

The world first became concerned about North Korea's nuclear development program in 1989 through satellite photos of a facility under construction near the town of Yongbyon. Since then, there have been on-again, off-again negotiations with North Korea by the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other countries in the region to halt and dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

A consistent strategy focused on dialogue and diplomacy is essential to get out of the current quagmire, urged Song Min-soon, a member of the Korean National Assembly and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, at a Korean Studies Program public seminar on October 18. Although the United States and the ROK must lead efforts, China's active involvement is also crucial. Resolving the nuclear issue is necessary to help ensure the long-term peace and prosperity of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the entire East Asia region.

Song explored reasons why previous negotiation attempts failed, especially the lack of a shared vision among the concerned countries for the future of the peninsula and region. He suggested that this rendered China less willing to play a stronger role in the negotiations. The imbalance of power among the negotiating countries is another significant factor. North Korea's only effective bargaining card is its nuclear weapons program, argued Song, while countries like the United States have the capability to offer or withhold important aid, such as energy and development assistance.

Song advocated a firm, direct approach, stating that the United States has not adopted a real strategy for effecting nuclear disarmament. Instead, it has opted for the "slogan" of "strategic patience." He cautioned against taking a hard line, such as the current ROK administration is pursuing. Song expressed the hope that the United States would focus more on developing a well-planned diplomatic strategy for resolving the nuclear issue and that the ROK would adopt a more conciliatory approach toward North Korea.

To move forward in the Six-Party Talks-negotiations among the United States, the ROK, North Korea, China, the Russian Federation, and Japan-and effectively resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, Song made several recommendations. He pointed to the long-term benefit of building trust incrementally by fulfilling small, strategic commitments to North Korea. To balance the asymmetry of negotiating cards, Song suggested that the other countries proceed with fulfilling their commitments and allow North Korea more time to fulfill its own obligations. Bringing China fully on board by building a logical basis for its involvement is also a crucial element of the negotiations, he offered. Finally, Song asserted that the United States, the ROK, and China must develop a shared, solid vision for peaceful coexistence on the peninsula, taking into account different scenarios and the roles each country should play.

Song expressed confidence that the approach he outlined would not only eventually resolve the nuclear issue but would also open the way for stability and prosperity for everyone in East Asia, including North Korea.

The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his youngest son and presumed successor, Kim Jong-un, jointly attended military maneuvers on an unspecified date. This was the first official outing of the 27-year-old youngest son of the "Dear Leader." These maneuvers were held just before the Sunday celebration of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University, discussed the informal transfer of power that took place last week.

What was learned last week about the succession to Kim Jong-il in North Korea?

The maneuvers confirmed with near certainty the past few years of speculation that the third son of Kim Jong-il has been informally designated as his successor. This process is now public. This is the first time that the name of Kim Jong-un has been published in North Korea. However, as long as his father is alive and can govern, he will remain in power. But, clearly, his health is not good. This official outing of the son seems in preparation for the possibility that Kim Jong-il may die suddenly. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008, after which he disappeared for several months. Upon his return, he had lost weight and appeared stiff and impaired on his left side.

Was Kim Jong-un touted as the successor?

There were no signs until a few years ago. First, it was Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son, who was favored. Officially, he fell out of the race when he was caught entering Japan with a forged passport. At the time, he told Japanese officials he wanted to take his son to Tokyo Disneyland [the target of an attempted contract killing by Kim Jong-un in 2008, the eldest now lives happily in Macao, ed.]. It is then the second son, Kim Jong-chol, who was poised to be the successor. But in Pyongyang, it was thought that he was not sufficiently ambitious and aggressive. Then, all eyes turned to Kim Jong-un, who has the personality of his father: ambitious, aggressive, and ruthless.

The main question then was how Kim Jong-un would be promoted. Most observers were betting on a gradual process. In this sense, it is not really surprising. He was appointed as a four-star general, which is a mostly symbolic distinction. He was also made vice-president of the Central Military Party. This underscores how strong the military is in North Korea. What surprised me most is that the younger sister of Kim Jong-il was also appointed as a four-star general. In line with the predictions of observers, Kim Jong-il has mobilized his immediate family to create a sort of regency capable of supporting his son in the event of his sudden death.

What is known about Kim Jong-un?

He was probably born in 1983 or 1984. However, the regime may try to say he was born in 1982. In Chinese culture-and also in North Korea-numbers are significant. Kim Il-sung, his grandfather, was born in 1912. Kim Jong-il was born in 1942. That would put Kim Jong-un in a kind of celestial lineage. It is almost certain that he attended school in Switzerland, where he was a quiet student. He had a false name, Pak-un, and one or two close friends. He also liked basketball. He then returned to Pyongyang. Some unconfirmed reports say he studied at a military university. A few years ago, it was said he had been appointed to the office of the Workers Party and the office of National Defense Committee, which is the highest organ of power in North Korea.

Who now heads North Korea? What is the power structure like?

The general view is that Kim Jong-il is the supreme leader-an absolute dictator-and he has tremendous latitude. He bases his legitimacy on the fact that he is the son of the founder of the regime. But nobody can run a country alone. He must therefore take into account various factors. In North Korea in recent decades, the military has played a growing role and seems to occupy a dominant place today.

A university professor based in South Korea believes that the regime in Pyongyang has greatly copied Japanese pre-war fascism, even though Korea fought against imperialism. The scheme is based on a totalitarian structure, relying in particular upon the military. Information is very strictly controlled and the population is monitored, as in East Germany. The structure remains very closed, and the leadership is afraid to open up to the outside world and receive investment or foreign aid. Finally, family occupies an important place. North Korea is part of China's cultural sphere, with a strong presence of Confucianism. The notion of the state is close to the family structure model. The king is seen as the head of the family.

Does a period of transition put the regime in danger? What took place before?

It is inevitable that one day a regime that is so rigid and incapable of transformation will suffer major changes. However, we cannot say when or what form this will take. But it is clear that unusual things can happen during a period of change like this. The last transition was very similar to the current process. The difference is that Kim Jong-il had been clearly designated as the successor by his father and he had decades to gradually gain experience and consolidate his power within the system. Kim Jong-il managed most affairs of state since 1980, when the last Workers Party meeting was held. He was the de facto leader for 14 years. When his father died in 1994, however, he took three years to formally become established as the leader. The difference today is that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008. Some people in North Korea are afraid that his son had not had enough time to prepare for power. Kim Jong-un must particularly ensure that the military is loyal to him. That is why he was made a general.

What legacy does he leave his son Kim Jong-un?

Although North Korea has said for decades that it follows the principles of juche or self-sufficiency, it largely sustained itself during the Cold War by trade with the USSR and its satellite states, and China. It received much help. Now that the USSR has collapsed and China has turned to a market economy, the economic situation in North Korea has become untenable. The country suffered a terrible famine in the mid-1990s. Nobody knows for sure how many people died, but it was certainly several hundred thousand. Some say that there were more than one million deaths, out of a total population of 22-23 million people. The government then had to loosen its grip on the system. This has helped the country recover. Today, access to basic resources is much better in North Korea than it was fifteen years ago.

The country was also helped by foreign aid from Japan, South Korea, the United States, and China. Now, because of the crisis over its nuclear program, the only foreign aid that comes into Pyongyang is from China. The North Korean regime faces a dilemma: its only resource is its workers. It fears opening up to accept foreign capital and technology, which would expose the people to outside reports that fundamentally contradict the regime's decades-old claims. That is why the few commercial contacts are with ideologically similar countries, like Syria or Iran. As for the industrial project in Kaesong near the border between North and South, it is very closely monitored by the authorities.

What is the situation at the diplomatic level?

North Korea has no close allies in the world. It cooperates with Cuba, Syria, or Iran, but these countries are isolated. Their relationship is either rhetorical or in connection with the nuclear program. As for its neighbors, North Korea does not like them. The South is seen as an existential threat; it is another Korean state, comprising two-thirds of the Korean nation, and has been a phenomenal success. The situation is different with China. Officially, both countries are driven by an eternal friendship, but this is based primarily on strategic considerations. Nevertheless, China provides a lifeline to North Korea.

Finally, I think in the last two decades, Pyongyang has toyed with the idea of a strategic alliance with the United States to counterbalance Chinese influence. But for domestic political reasons and because of the situation of human rights in North Korea, the Americans have never pushed this idea further. The North Koreans have realized that this strategic relationship was probably a dream.

The fundamental problem behind all of this is due to an accident of history. After the liberation of the peninsula from Japanese occupation in 1945, the division between the Soviets and Americans-for practical reasons-was not intended to be permanent. Today, there are two states, each of which thinks that it best represents the Korean nation and that  it should be in charge of the affairs of the peninsula in its entirety. It is a zero-sum game. All issues about the current succession flow from this.