Policy Analysis
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The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) Japan Program with the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI) as well as the Stanford Graduate School of Business, the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), and the Stanford Department of Economics will be hosting a memorial conference and service on December 4th and 5th in honor of the late Masahiko Aoki. December 4th will be a full day conference featuring topics within Masa's extensive field of study and research including theoretical and applied economics, theory of institutions, corporate architecture and governance, and the Japanese and Chinese economies. The day will culminate with a cocktail reception. The Celebration of Life on December 5th will be a gathering for family and friends in remembrance of Masa with a light lunch reception to follow.

December 4, 2015

Memorial Conference

Bechtel Conference Center, 616 Serra Street
Stanford University

Agenda

8:30am - 8:50am            Breakfast & Registration

8:50am - 9:00am            Welcome Remarks: Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University)

9:00am - 9:30am            Kenneth Arrow (Stanford University), “The Role of Organizational Structure in the Economy”

9:30am - 10:00am          Paul Milgrom (Stanford University), "Designing the US Incentive Auction"

10:00am - 10:30am        Break

10:30am - 11:00am        Koichi Hamada, Yale University, “Masahiko Aoki: A Social Scientist"

11:00am - 11:30am        Kotaro Suzumura (Hitotsubashi University), “Masahiko Aoki (1938-2015): Recollections of his Pilgrimage and Legacy in Japan”

11:30am - 12:00pm       Yingyi Qian (Tsinghua University), "Masahiko Aoki and China"

12:00pm - 1:15pm          Lunch

1:15pm - 1:45pm            Jiahua Che (Chinese University of Hong Kong) presenting Masahiko Aoki's

                                            "Three-person game of institutional resilience vc transition: A model and

                                              China-Japan comparative history"

1:45pm - 2:15pm           Miguel Angel Garcia Cestona (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona), "Corporate Governance and Employee Participation: some lessons from Mondragon"

2:15pm - 2:45pm           Herbert Gintis (Santa Fe Institute), "General Social Equilibrium and its Dynamics"

2:45pm - 3:15pm           Break

3:15pm - 3:45pm           Dale Jorgenson (Harvard University), "

"

3:45pm - 4:15pm           Avner Greif (Stanford University), "Comparative Institutional Analysis: China and Europe Compared"

4:15pm - 4:45pm           Francis Fukuyama (Stanford University), "Asian Kinship, Industrial Structure, and Trust in Government"

4:45pm - 5:00pm           Closing, Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University)

5:00pm - 6:00pm           Cocktail Reception

*Agenda is subject to change and will be updated as speakers are confirmed

 

December 5, 2015

Celebration of Life

Bechtel Conference Center, 616 Serra Street
Stanford University

Agenda

10:30am - 11:00am          Registration

11:00am - 12:00pm          Celebration of Life

12:00pm - 1:30pm            Lunch Reception

 

 

Bechtel Conference Center616 Serra StreetStanford UniversityStanford, CA 94305
Conferences
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Toru Hashimoto was a member of the Board of Directors and President and Chief Executive Officer of the Development Bank of Japan Inc. (DBJ) from June 2011 to June 2015. He is currently Senior Advisor of the DBJ. Previously, Mr. Hashimoto was Chairman of Deutsche Securities Inc., an investment banking subsidiary in Japan of Deutsche Bank, from July 2003 to September 2008 after serving as Senior Advisor from January 2003 to June 2003. Prior to joining Deutsche Securities, he was Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Fuji Bank, Limited (currently the Mizuho Financial Group) from June 1996 to March 2002. Earlier, he was President and Chief Executive Officer from 1991 to 1996. He began his career at the bank in 1957. Mr. Hashimoto served as Vice Chairman of the Board of Councilors of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations from 1997 to 2001 and Chairman of the Japanese Bankers Association from 1995 to 1996. He was also Vice Chairman of the Institute of International Finance, Inc. from 1997 to 1999. Mr. Hashimoto received a bachelor's degree in law from the University of Tokyo in 1957. He was a Fulbright Scholar at the Graduate School of Economics of the University of Kansas from 1959 to 1960.

DBJ Initiatives for Japan's Growth Strategy Presentation
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Philippines Conference RoomEncina Hall, 3rd Floor616 Serra StreetStanford, CA 94305
Toru Hashimoto, Former President and CEO, Development Bank of Japan Inc.
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Encina Hall E301616 Serra StreetStanford, CA94305-6055
(650) 723-6530
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huijun_gu.jpg Ph.D.

Huijun Gu joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) for the 2015-16 year as a visiting scholar from Jiangsu Administration Institute, where he serves as an associate professor.

His research interests include Planning (规划) and Governance, industrial upgrading and government behavior.

Huijun Gu obtained his Ph.D. at Nanjing University in 2013, focusing on organizational behavior.

Visiting Scholar
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Abstract:

Both South Korea and Taiwan are considered consolidated democracies, but the two countries have developed very different sets of electoral campaign regulations. While both countries had highly restrictive election laws during their authoritarian eras, they have diverged after democratic transition. South Korea still restricts campaigning activities, including banning door-to-door canvassing, prohibiting pre-official period campaigning, and restricting the quantity and content of literature. Taiwan has removed most campaigning restrictions, except for finance regulations. This study explores the causes of these divergent trajectories through comparative historical process tracing, using both archival and secondary sources. The preliminary findings suggest that the incumbency advantage and the containment of the leftist or opposition parties were the primary causes of regulation under the soft and hard authoritarian regimes of South Korea and Taiwan. The key difference was that the main opposition party as well as the ruling party in South Korea enjoyed the incumbency advantage but that opposition forces in Taiwan did not. As a result, the opposition in Taiwan fought for liberalization of campaign regulations, but that in South Korea did not. Democratization in Taiwan was accompanied by successive liberalizations in campaign regulation, but in South Korea the incumbent legislators affiliated with the ruling and opposition parties were both interested in limiting campaigning opportunities for electoral challengers.

 

Bio:

Dr. Jong-sung You is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University. His research interests include comparative politics and the political economy of inequality, corruption, social trust, and freedom of expression. He conducts both cross-national quantitative studies and qualitative case studies, focusing on Korea and East Asia. He recently published a book entitled Democracy, Inequality and Corruption: Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines Compared with Cambridge University Press. His publications have appeared at American Sociological Review, Political Psychology, Journal of East Asian Studies, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Asian Perspective, Trends and Prospects, and Korean Journal of International Studies. He obtained his Ph.D. in Public Policy from Harvard University and taught at UC San Diego. Before pursuing an academic career, he fought for democracy and social justice in South Korea.

 

 

Jong-sung You Senior Lecturer College of Asia and the Pacific, Australia National University
Seminars
Encina Hall E301616 Serra StreetStanford, CA94305-6055
(650) 724-5595 (650) 723-6530
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Pavin_Chachavalpongpun.png Ph.D.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2015-2016 academic year from the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University, where he serves as associate professor.

His research interests include Thailand's domestic political and international relations, particularly the role of the Thai monarchy in the political domain in the past decades; politics of Myanmar and Indochinese states; politics of ASEAN; and the concept of nationalism and its relevance to domestic and foreign policy. During his time at Shorenstein APARC, Pavin will work on the concept of neo-royalism and the future of the Thai monarchy--an issue which is important at this critical juncture of the royal succession in Thailand.  Pavin is the author of two books: "A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations" and "Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy". He is also a chief editor of the online journal Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. After the coup of 2014, Pavin was twice summoned by the Thai military for his critical comments on its political intervention. Denying the legitimacy of the coup, Pavin rejected the summons. Shortly afterwards, a warrant was issued for his arrest and his passport was revoked. This situation forced him to apply for a refugee status with Japan. Pavin received his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He earned his BA from the Department of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand.
2015-16 Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Distinguished Fellow on Contemporary Southeast Asia
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The fourteenth session of the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, held Stanford University on June 25, 2015, convened senior South Korean and American policymakers, scholars and regional experts to discuss North Korea policy and recent developments on the Korean Peninsula. Hosted by the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, the Forum is also supported by the Korea National Diplomatic Academy.

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Writing for the National Bureau of Asian Research, Daniel Sneider examines Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent attempts to revise Japan’s defense guidelines. He considers how these attempts may affect the Japanese domestic political landscape and the implications that Abe’s actions may have for key issues in the U.S.-Japan alliance, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership and U.S. military interests in Okinawa.

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North Korea today threatened military action against South Korea if it did not end its propaganda broadcasts along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) within 48 hours. The broadcasts against the North are being systematically blared by loudspeakers over the border.   

South Korea resumed the broadcasts earlier this week after an 11-year hiatus, in retaliation for North Korea’s planting landmines just outside a South Korean DMZ guard post that crippled two South Korean soldiers on Aug. 4.

David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former Korean affairs director at the U.S. Department of State, offers insights on the situation. Straub also spoke on PRI's "The World" radioshow on Aug. 20, the audioclip and summary can be accessed by clicking here.

What’s behind the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula?

Fundamentally, the current situation is just another symptom of the underlying problem, which is the division of Korea into two competing states, with one of them—North Korea—having a Stalinist totalitarian system and a Maoist-style cult of personality. Since North Korea can’t compete with the South economically and diplomatically, it uses the threat of force or the actual use of it to try to intimidate South Korea. The North Koreans know that South Korea tends to “blink first” and step back because it is democratic and its leaders are concerned about civilian casualties.

The current situation is also related to the leadership transition in North Korea, with leader Kim Jong Un succeeding his father Kim Jong Il three years ago. Kim Jong Un still feels insecure, which is clearly evidenced by his execution of his powerful uncle Jang Seong-taek in 2013 and many other leaders there as well. To solidify support for his rule, he also manufactures a South Korean threat to rally his people behind him.

What does North Korea want?

North Korea’s immediate demand is that South Korea stop its propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. The South Korean broadcasts criticize the North Korean system and its leaders, which is something that the North, with its cult of personality, can’t accept. But the South resumed the broadcasts only because the North Koreans recently snuck into the South Korean side of the DMZ and viciously planted landmines just outside a South Korean guard post. These were clearly intended to maim South Korean soldiers. They did just that, blowing the legs off two young men.

The North Korean regime’s long-term aim is not just to survive but also to get the upper hand on South Korea, and eventually try again to reunify the peninsula on its own terms. That explains why North Korea behaves as it does, rather than reform its system and reconcile with the South.

The North also demands an end to all U.S. and South Korean military exercises on the peninsula—even though the North has a much larger military than the South and U.S. forces there combined and is developing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the North wants to end the U.S.-South Korean alliance and see U.S. forces withdrawn from the peninsula, in the belief that it will open the way to eventual victory over the South.

Why did the South resume the broadcasts? Was it a good idea?

South Korea resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts in retaliation for the maiming of two of its soldiers on August 4th. Rather than retaliate by attacking militarily, the South resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts because the South Korean military knows that North Korean leaders hate them.

The South Korean military believes that North Korean leaders hate the broadcasts because they are effective in educating young North Korean soldiers and civilians in earshot about the nature of the regime and its leaders. The South Korean military seems to assume that the broadcasts are effective in that regard because they anger the North Korean leaders so much. But I think the reason the broadcasts anger the North Korean leaders is due to the cult of personality. The North Korean system can’t accept the idea of its leaders being criticized.

So I don’t think it was necessarily a wise step on the part of the South Korean military to resume the broadcasts. On the other hand, politically, by crippling two South Korean soldiers, the North Koreans had left South Korea with no option but to respond in some way. After the North Koreans killed fifty South Koreans in two separate sneak attacks five years ago, the South Korean government warned that it was not going to sit back the next time. The resumption of the broadcasts has further raised tensions but, frankly, given the danger of war on the peninsula, the South doesn’t have a lot of good ways to respond to North Korean provocations.

How serious is the situation?

North Korea has now threatened military action in 48 hours if South Korea doesn’t end the propaganda broadcasts. The North often makes threats. Usually, it doesn’t carry them out, but sometimes it does.

The United States and South Korea are conducting an annual military exercise together in the South until the end of August—something else that the North Koreans are demanding an end to. Most experts feel that the North is unlikely to launch a major provocation while the American presence is bolstered and the U.S. and South Korean militaries are paying full attention. The North Korean leaders know they are weaker than our side, so they usually avoid frontal assaults and instead engage in sneak attacks, at times and places and in ways of their own choosing.

There is more uncertainty in recent years because of the aggressive and threatening behavior thus far of Kim Jong Un, who is young and inexperienced. He seems anxious about his position in the North and prepared to take risks to bolster it, including rallying the people behind him by raising tensions with the South. We also don’t know if the North feels freer to engage in major provocations because it has developed at least a handful of nuclear devices since its first nuclear test in 2006.

So I myself wouldn’t be afraid to visit Seoul now but the situation bears even closer watching than usual.

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North Korean soldiers stand guard at the Demilitarized Zone, 2008.
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A version of this paper, "Security Challenges in a Turbulent World: Fewer Enemies, More Challenges, and Greater Anxiety," delivered at the International Areas Studies Symposium at the University of Okalhoma, on Feb. 26, 2015, is also available in English by clicking here.

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Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University
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Thomas Fingar
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