Shorenstein APARC's Korean Studies Program, begun in September 2000 and led by Gi-Wook Shin, features weekly luncheon seminars on Korea-related issues, from war reporting to health care to democracy. Heavily attended by students and faculty alike, the series is often standing-room-only.
August was a bloody month. There was barely time to mourn between the exploding bombs: first at the Marriott hotel in Jakarta on Aug. 5, at U.N. headquarters in Baghdad and on a bus in Jerusalem on Aug. 19, then the two in Bombay on Monday. These were the latest sites in a chronology of carnage running from Casablanca through Riyadh and Bali to Manhattan's crumbling towers.
Each atrocity involved local actors and local motives. Each was perceived differently by the local populace, and the local repercussions of each terrorist act varied widely. Yet all were attributed to a single global menace: jihad. For three years now, acts of violence done in Allah's name have made terrorism and Islam almost synonymous, not just in Westerners' vocabularies but around the world.
From this blight, who will rescue Islam?
The nearly reflexive association of Islam and terrorism is not simply the creation of rush-to-judgment pundits and politicians. Not when the terrorists proudly proclaim religious inspiration for their acts. Both Jerry Falwell and Osama bin Laden have maligned Islam. But it is, above all, the jihadists who have distilled their faith to sacred hatred - of Americans, Christians, Jews and the millions upon millions of moderate or secular Muslims who disdain this perversion from within.
Muslims respond in different ways to Islamist violence. In Jakarta a few days after 11 Indonesians and a Dutchman were killed in the blast at the Marriott, I met up with two Muslim friends. They were brimming with conspiracy theories. Why, they asked, had 20 Americans reportedly canceled their reservations before the bomb went off? Could these no-shows have known in advance of the attack? Why was the severed head of the alleged perpetrator later found on the hotel's fifth floor? Had the CIA planted it there? Why were arrests made so soon? Could the U.S., or perhaps the Indonesian military, have staged the event?
Behind their questions lay an unspoken one: How could Muslims have done such a thing?
It would be convenient if my two friends despised Americans and were products of Islamist schools. But both men hold advanced degrees from top universities in the U.S. and exhibit no obvious animosity toward Americans. That two such people could give voice to such dark misgivings about U.S. intentions shows that Islam is not alone in its association with violence.
The flip side of denial is demonization. For some in the West, the enemy is not jihadists but all Islamists. Never mind that the vast majority of Muslims who promote their faith do so peacefully. The PowerPoint charts of counter-terrorism experts that ignore Muslim diversity and feature the evil genius Bin Laden reinforce a distorted, top-down view of Islam.
Al Qaeda's responsibility is all too real. But local context matters. For jihad to succeed, an outside agitator needs inside sympathizers, and their receptivity to recruitment will depend on local circumstances. Recognizing that Muslim societies are autonomous and heterogeneous is a necessary first step to realizing that Bin Laden and his version of Islam aren't absolute control.
Defenders of Islam in the West stress the fact that most of its billion-plus adherents are moderates who reject violence. Such reassurance is far preferable to demonization. But understanding is not served by exaggerations - that Islam or Muslims are always peaceful, or that jihadists entirely lack sympathy in the Muslim world. In Muslim communities, extremist and mainstream views intersect in many places, including schools, mosques and organizations. It is in these myriad local settings that Islam's connection to violence will or won't be broken.
Regrettably, reassurance sometimes lapses into denial. In Indonesia recently, several leading Muslim figures urged journalists to stop using the words "Islam" and "Muslim" in their coverage of the Marriott bombing. I've even heard Muslims object to the phrase "moderate Muslims" because it implies the existence of immoderate ones. Islam will never be rescued by language inspectors who would substitute deflection for introspection.
Can reform rescue Islam? In principle, yes, but in practice, not necessarily. There are at least a few individuals and groups in every Muslim society striving to make the practice of their faith more tolerant of difference and dissent, less restrictive toward women, more compatible with secular democracy and less preoccupied with imposing Islamic law. Liberal American observers tend to celebrate these reformers as rescuers of Islam.
Yet the sheer diversity of Muslim societies suggests that efforts to liberalize Islamic doctrine will face varying prospects of success. Before assuming that liberals and jihadists have nothing in common, one should remember that both advocate far-reaching changes that threaten the conservative views and habits of many mainstream Muslims. Reformers deserve American support. But preventing the status quo from getting worse may be a more realistic goal of such help than winning "hearts and minds" for humanism, let alone making the Muslim world look as secular and democratic as, say, Turkey.
Is America responsible for Islam's predicament? Some U.S. actions have fueled jihad. The American presence in Iraq could become a magnet for holy warriors comparable to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Muslims pressed by Washington to oppose the hijacking of Islam by jihadists may instead decry the hijacking of U.S. foreign policy by hard- liners around President Bush.
But jihadists were fighting enemies long before the United States was born. The drive to create Islamist states is more than an attempt to check American hegemony. Different U.S. policies might shrink Muslim hostility toward U.S. actions. But intransigent theocrats will not be assuaged by the compromises necessary to resolve the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Nor will either the failure or success of U.S.-led reconstruction of Iraq remove the reasons for Islamist violence in other Muslim societies.
Also shaky is the notion that "they hate us for our values." The democracy Americans espouse remains popular in the Muslim world. American notions of equal treatment for women are less welcome. But a woman's opportunities vary among Muslim-majority countries, including those in Asia that preceded the U.S. in having female heads of state.
Americans are disproportionally responsible for a modern world most Muslims feel they never made. Extremists have used such alienation to justify jihad. But it is not up to Americans to rescue Islam.
Non-Muslims can avoid unnecessary provocations and false reassurances. They can facilitate liberal reform. But it is Muslims, acting in diverse local circumstances, who will or won't break the cycle of jihadist demonization and naive denial that is ruining the image of their religion. Whether to rescue their faith is a choice only they can make.
About the Talk: In Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, initial reactions to the American war in Iraq were overwhelmingly negative. Nor could support for American action be found among Muslim minorities in the Philippines, Singapore, or Thailand. But Southeast Asian Muslims were not equally or uniformly outraged. Complex and distinctive local contexts and agendas shaped Muslim anger and the responses to it. Dr. Emmerson will highlight these Southeast Asian settings and analyze the politics of anti-American backlash along a critical periphery of the Muslim world. Donald Emmerson is director of the Southeast Asia Forum at the Asia/Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He teaches courses in international relations and comparative politics. His research interests focus on Islamism, regionalism, democratization, and US policy regarding Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Emmerson has testified before Congress in 1998, 1999, and 2001 on East Timor, Indonesia, and Southeast Asian topics. He assisted the Carter Center in monitoring Indonesia's national election and the UN vote on autonomy in East Timor. Members of the World Affairs Council: $5.00 Non-members: $8.00 Students with ID: Free To make a reservation, please contact the World Affairs Council at 415-293-4600. Cosponsored by the Asia/Pacific Research Center and Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation at Stanford University and the World Affairs Council of Northern California.
Stanford Law School, Alvarado and Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford University
At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”
Emmerson’s research interests include Southeast Asia-China-US relations, the South China Sea, and the future of ASEAN. His publications, authored or edited, span more than a dozen books and monographs and some 200 articles, chapters, and shorter pieces. Recent writings include The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020); “‘No Sole Control’ in the South China Sea,” in Asia Policy (2019); ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done? (ed., 2018); “Singapore and Goliath?,” in Journal of Democracy (2018); “Mapping ASEAN’s Futures,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2017); and “ASEAN Between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?,” in Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia (2017).
Earlier work includes “Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea,” in YaleGlobal (2016); “The Spectrum of Comparisons: A Discussion,” in Pacific Affairs (2014); “Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia” in Indonesian Studies: The State of the Field (2013); “Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends” in Indonesia Rising (2012); “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” in Journal of Democracy (April 2012); “The Problem and Promise of Focality in World Affairs,” in Strategic Review (August 2011); An American Place at an Asian Table? Regionalism and Its Reasons (2011); Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010); “The Useful Diversity of ‘Islamism’” and “Islamism: Pros, Cons, and Contexts” in Islamism: Conflicting Perspectives on Political Islam (2009); “Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN in a New Global Context” in Refreshing U.S.-Thai Relations (2009); and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (edited, 2008).
Prior to moving to Stanford in 1999, Emmerson was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he won a campus-wide teaching award. That same year he helped monitor voting in Indonesia and East Timor for the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. In the course of his career, he has taken part in numerous policy-related working groups focused on topics related to Southeast Asia; has testified before House and Senate committees on Asian affairs; and been a regular at gatherings such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable (Kuala Lumpur), the Bali Democracy Forum (Nusa Dua), and the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore). Places where he has held various visiting fellowships, including the Institute for Advanced Study and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Emmerson has a Ph.D. in political science from Yale and a BA in international affairs from Princeton. He is fluent in Indonesian, was fluent in French, and has lectured and written in both languages. He has lesser competence in Dutch, Javanese, and Russian. A former slam poet in English, he enjoys the spoken word and reads occasionally under a nom de plume with the Not Yet Dead Poets Society in Redwood City, CA. He and his wife Carolyn met in high school in Lebanon. They have two children. He was born in Tokyo, the son of U.S. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, who wrote the Japanese Thread among other books.
Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central Wing
Philippines Conference Room
Is unipolarity--American primacy--good or bad for the world? For Southeast Asia? For Indonesia? How dangerous or constructive is the Bush doctrine of preemption? Should the U.S. try to spread democracy abroad? If not, why not? If so, why and how--by example, persuasion, force? Has the war in Iraq squandered American "soft power"? How has that conflict affected the campaign against terrorism in Southeast Asia? Has the U.S. been ignoring the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? Or has ASEAN become so irrelevant that it deserves to be ignored? In the run-up to Indonesia's presidential election in April 2004, should the U.S. support the incumbent, Megawati Sukarnoputri? Or would that only strengthen her Islamist opponents by enabling them to portray her as an American pawn? What grade does the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea deserve? These are among the questions to be addressed in a wide-ranging evaluation of what the United States is doing, should be doing, and should not be doing in Asia.
Jusuf Wanandi has long been Indonesia's best-known analyst of Southeast Asian regionalism and the politics and foreign policies of Indonesia and the United States. He holds leadership positions in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, the Prasetiya Mulya Graduate School of Management in Jakarta, and the Foundation of Panca Bhakti University in Pontianak (West Kalimantan). He heads the company that publishes Indonesia's leading English-language daily, The Jakarta Post. He co-founded Indonesia's most successful foreign-affairs think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. He has co-authored or co-edited more than a dozen books, including Europe and the Asia Pacific (1998), Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (1993), and Asia and the Major Powers (1988).
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
How is the American-led war in Iraq affecting Asian countries and their relations with the United States? Is a clash of civilizations underway? Will Islamist rage in Southeast Asia spawn terrorist attacks on Americans there? Will Islamist parties in Indonesia be able to ride this wave of anger into power in the elections to be held in April 2004? Will the regime in North Korea take advantage of American preoccupations in Iraq and Afghanistan to escalate tensions in Northeast Asia? How will the economies of Southeast and Northeast Asia be affected by the conflict in Iraq? Will Washington's priority on ousting Saddam Hussein undermine its effort to stabilize Afghanistan? And what will the repercussions in Asia be if, against the expectation of many observers, the Iraq war turns out to be short and the seeds of Iraqi democracy are successfully sown?
Founders Room, 5th floor
Public Policy Institute of California
500 Washington Street, San Francisco
Does the World Trade Organization promote democracy? A large part of the heated and pro-tracted debate over China?s application for WTO membership revolved around this question. Prior to China?s WTO accession in December 2001, this debate had dragged on for nearly fifteen years. While one side argued that WTO membership would promote democratization in China, others argued that the wealth generated through economic integration would provide the resources to maintain authoritarian rule. Only time will tell whether WTO accession will contribute to pressures for democratization in China. In the meantime, however, this paper examines the empirical basis for these competing claims about the effects of GATT/WTO memberships on domestic political systems. Based on statistical analysis of a global data set, this paper concludes that members of the international trade regime are more likely than nonmembers to be democracies. However, there is little evidence that WTO membership in itself can promote democratic transition. Instead, it appears to be the case that democratic countries are more likely to seek to join the WTO.
Does the World Trade Organization promote democracy? A large part of the heated and pro-tracted debate over China's application for WTO membership revolved around this question. Prior to China's WTO accession in December 2001, this debate had dragged on for nearly fifteen years. While one side argued that WTO membership would promote democratization in China, others argued that the wealth generated through economic integration would provide the resources to maintain authoritarian rule. Only time will tell whether WTO accession will contribute to pressures for democratization in China. In the meantime, however, this paper examines the empirical basis for these competing claims about the effects of GATT/WTO memberships on domestic political systems. Based on statistical analysis of a global data set, this paper concludes that members of the international trade regime are more likely than nonmembers to be democracies. However, there is little evidence that WTO membership in itself can promote democratic transition. Instead, it appears to be the case that democratic countries are more likely to seek to join the WTO.
C. Richard D'Amato is the vice chairman of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission, a commission established by Congress to review the national security implications of U.S. trade relations with China. Formerly a delegate to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, he is the president of a consulting firm that represents American corporations on strategic planning and international trade matters. He is also a retired captain in the United States Navy Reserve, a position that brought him a variety of assignments, including attache duty at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, China, on proliferation issues and military-to-military initiatives in March 1997; service in the Battle Group Command Staff of the USS Eisenhower in the Red Sea during Operation Desert Shield; serving as an operations officer directing air drops into Bosnia and Sarajevo; and service on the planning staff of the newly created Asia-Pacific Center, which is a conference and study center under the commander of U.S. Forces for the Pacific, in Honolulu, Hawaii. Recently, Mr. D'Amato served as a member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission, a congressionally created commission charged with studying the nature, causes and consequences of the United States merchandise trade and current account deficits.
For ten years, beginning in 1988, Mr. D'Amato was the Democratic counsel for the Committee on Appropriations of the United States Senate. He was responsible for coordinating and managing the annual appropriations bills and other legislation on policy and funding of U.S. international operations and programs, including trade and defense and the full range of foreign activities of the U.S. government.
Mr. D'Amato has also served as senior foreign policy counsel for Senator Robert C. Byrd. In this capacity, Mr. D'Amato drafted the resolution that set Senate standards for international global climate change treaty negotiations. He also worked on a wide array of issues affecting U.S. international economic and political interests, including U.S.-Japan auto trade talks; World Trade Organization review legislation; U.S. involvement and funding of operations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda; and burden-sharing agreements during the Gulf War. Between 1980 and 1987, Mr. D'Amato served as the policy director for the Majority Leader, Senator Robert C. Byrd, for political, economic, and security policies. In this position, Mr. D'Amato supervised all work on a number of important legislative initiatives, including the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill and the "Super 301" provision. Mr. D'Amato also wrote key legislation dealing with U.S.-Japan economic relations. During his career on Capitol Hill, Mr. D'Amato also served as the co-director of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group.
Mr. D'Amato began his career first as the legislative director for Congressman James Jeffords (R-VT) between 1975 and 1978, and beginning in 1978, as the legislative assistant and then chief of staff for Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT) until 1980.
Mr. D'Amato has been very active in other aspects of public service, including an appointment as an assistant professor of government for the United States Naval Academy between 1968 and 1971, during which he was assistant varsity basketball coach and the sailing coach. He was responsible for the creation of an annual scholarship with the YWCA for college bound African American women and was the chairman of a local charitable hunger relief action organization in 1996, 1997, and 1998, which was a part of the nationwide "Share Our Strength" organization, the most successful hunger relief effort in the United States. In addition, he is active in the boating community in Annapolis, where he and his wife, Dorothy, have lived for thirty years.
Mr. D'Amato received his B.A. from Cornell University in 1964, graduating cum laude in government. He serves now on the Board of Trustees' Council for Cornell University. Mr. D'Amato received his M.A. and M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston in 1967, and received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center in 1980.
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
