Stanford University

Environment

FSI scholars approach their research on the environment from regulatory, economic and societal angles. The Center on Food Security and the Environment weighs the connection between climate change and agriculture; the impact of biofuel expansion on land and food supply; how to increase crop yields without expanding agricultural lands; and the trends in aquaculture. FSE’s research spans the globe – from the potential of smallholder irrigation to reduce hunger and improve development in sub-Saharan Africa to the devastation of drought on Iowa farms. David Lobell, a senior fellow at FSI and a recipient of a MacArthur “genius” grant, has looked at the impacts of increasing wheat and corn crops in Africa, South Asia, Mexico and the United States; and has studied the effects of extreme heat on the world’s staple crops.

Patterns of Corporate Restructuring in China: Political Constraints on Privatization

Paragraphs

This article examines the logic of China's corporate restructuring. It argues that there is a political logic that mediates the pattern of corporate restructuring that has occurred in China since the 1990s. Even though China's officials need not worry about being voted out of office, they must worry about the political fallout from restructuring. Privatization cannot be allowed to proceed unless provisions are made to placate workers who will be affected by the enterprise restructuring. The mixing of political and economic agendas has implications for the sequencing of restructuring and privatization. It affects not only the speed and the nature of the reforms, but also which enterprises can be declared bankrupt or sold. Such constraints explain why some forms of corporate restructuring are preferred over others, why ailing and already dead firms that have stopped production remain open, and why some firms for which there are takers are not privatized. Political constraints in China have resulted in significant restructuring but relatively little genuine privatization. Restructuring and privatization are distinct and separate processes that do not necessarily lead from one to the other. This paper is based on extensive interviewing and supplemented by a survey of over 400 enterprises, with time series information from 1994 to 2000.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
China Journal
Authors
Jean C. Oi

Blood, Sweat, (Oil), and Tears: Corporate Responsibility, Human Rights, and Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region

-

Bennett Freeman is a managing director in the Washington, DC office of Burson-Marsteller, where he leads the firm's Global Corporate Responsibility practice advising multinational corporations on issues ranging from human rights and labor practices to the environment and sustainable development. Prior to joining Burson-Marsteller in May 2003, Freeman advised companies, international institutions and NGOs on corporate responsibility and human rights as Principal of Sustainable Investment Strategies. In 2002, he co-authored an independent Human Rights Impact Assessment of the BP Tangguh project in Papua, Indonesia, the first such assessment undertaken in advance of a major energy project in the world.

Freeman served as a presidential appointee in three positions in the State Department across the full span of the Clinton Administration. As U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from 1999 to early 2001, Freeman led the State Department's bilateral human rights diplomacy around the world under Assistant Secretary Harold Koh. In that capacity, he was the principal architect of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the first human rights standard forged by governments, companies and NGOs for the oil and mining industries. Previously he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and chief speechwriter for Secretary of State Warren Christopher from early 1993 to early 1997.

A buffet lunch will be available to those who reserve with Debbie Warren dawarren@stanford.edu by Friday, November 12.

Oksenberg Conference Room

Bennett Freeman former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Lectures
Walter H. Shorenstein Forum for Asia Pacific Studies

America's savings shortfall is hurting its workers, McKinnon asserts in op-ed

Authors
Ronald I. McKinnon
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Are federal fiscal deficits accelerating deindustrialisation in the United States? APARC's Ronald McKinnon considers the problem.

Are federal fiscal deficits accelerating deindustrialisation in the United States? For four decades, employment in U.S. manufacturing as a share of the labour force has fallen further and faster than in other industrial countries. In the mid-1960s, manufacturing output was 27 per cent of gross national product and manufacturing's share of employment was 24 percent. By 2003, these numbers had fallen to about 13.8 percent and 10.5 percent respectively. Employment in manufacturing remains weak, with an absolute decline of 18,000 jobs in September shown in the Labor Department's payroll survey.

At the same time, the orgy of tax-cutting, with big revenue losses, continues unabated. On October 6, House and Senate negotiators approved an expansive tax bill that showers businesses and farmers with about $145bn in rate cuts and new loopholes -- on top of what were already unprecedented fiscal deficits. These are principally financed by foreign central banks, which hold more than half the outstanding stock of US Treasury bonds. Moreover, meagre saving by American households is forcing US companies also to borrow heavily abroad.

The upshot is a current account deficit of more than $600 billion a year. America's cumulative net foreign indebtedness is about 30 percent of gross domestic product and rising fast. How will this affect manufacturing? The transfer of foreign savings to the US is embodied more in goods than in services. Outsourcing to India aside, most services are not so easily traded internationally. Thus when U.S. spending rises above output (income), the net absorption of foreign goods -- largely raw materials and manufactures -- increases. True, in this year and last the high price of oil has also boosted the current account deficit. However, since the early 1980s, the trade deficit in manufactures alone has been about as big as the current account deficit -- that is, as big as America's saving shortfall (for more detail, see http://siepr.stanford.edu).

If U.S. households' and companies' spending on manufactures is more or less independent of whether the goods are produced at home or abroad, domestic production shrinks by the amount of the trade deficit in manufactures. The consequent job loss depends on labor productivity in manufacturing, which rises strongly through time. If the trade deficit in manufactures is added back to domestic production to get "adjusted manufactured output", and labor productivity (output per person) in manufacturing stays constant, we get projected manufacturing employment. In 2003, actual manufacturing employment was just 10.5 percent of the US labor force, but it would have been 13.9 percent without a trade deficit in manufactures: the difference is 4.7m lost jobs.

In the 1980s, employment in manufacturing began to shrink substantially because of the then large current account deficit attributed to the then large fiscal deficit: Ronald Reagan's infamous twin deficits. With fiscal consolidation under Bill Clinton, the savings gap narrowed but was not closed because personal saving weakened. Now under George W. Bush, the fiscal deficit has exploded while private saving is still weak. The result is heavy borrowing from foreigners and all-time highs in the current account deficit. The main component remains the trade deficit in manufactures, intensifying the shrinkage in manufacturing jobs.

Is there cause for concern? Note that I do not suggest that the trend in overall employment has decreased, but only that its composition has tilted away from tradable goods -- largely manufactures. In the long run, growth in service employment will largely offset the decline in manufacturing. However, the rate of technical change in manufacturing is higher than in other sectors. It is hard to imagine the US sustaining its technological leadership with no manufacturing sector at all.

More uncomfortably, more Congressmen, pundits and voters feel justified in claiming that foreigners use unfair trade practices to steal U.S. jobs, particularly in manufacturing, and hence in urging protectionism. The irony is that, if imports were somehow greatly reduced, this would prevent the transfer of foreign saving to the United States and lead to a credit crunch, with a possibly even greater loss of US jobs.

The answer is not tariffs, exchange rate changes or subsidies to manufacturing that further increase the fiscal deficit. The proper way of reducing protectionist pressure and relieving anxiety about U.S. manufacturing is for the government to consolidate its finances and move deliberately towards running surpluses -- in short, to eliminate the U.S. economy's saving deficiency.

All News button
1

America's Alliances in Northeast Asia

Wednesday, January 14

Welcoming Remarks

2:00 Michael Armacost, Shorenstein APARC

Security Dimension of the Alliances

2:10-4:00

Chair: Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

The Changes in the US's Strategic Doctrine

Kurt Campbell, Senior Vice President & Director, International Security Program, Center for Security and International Studies

What key elements of change in American strategic doctrine have been introduced by the Bush Administration? What implications do they have for US alliances in Northeast Asia?

The China Dimension

Michael Lampton, Director, China Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University

What implications would improved Sino-US relations have on America's alliances in Asia?

Jing Huang, Associate Professor of Political Science, Utah State University

How have Chinese attitudes and policies toward America's Northeast Asian alliances changed over the past five years or so? What accounts for those changes? What implications have they for the future of these alliances?

Discussant: William Perry, Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor, School of Engineering, Stanford University and the 19th Secretary of Defense for the United States

4:30-6:00 The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia

Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, US Pacific Command

Keynote and Public Address

Introduction to be made by William Perry

Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, first floor

Thursday, January 15

Changing View of the Regional Security Environment and the Alliances

8:00-10:15

Chair: Michael Armacost, Shorenstein APARC

The Japanese Government's Views on the Alliance

Kuriyama Takakazu, Ambassador, retired

How have the views of the Japanese government changed in recent years with respect to the regional security environment and the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance? How have they changed with respect to the security responsibilities? Should Japan be prepared to shoulder on these responsibilities on its own outside the contours of the alliance?

The View of the Republic of Korea's Government of the Alliance

Kim Won-soo, Visiting Scholar, Shorenstein APARC & former Secretary to the President of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office of the President, Republic of Korea

How have South Korean government perception and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the regional security environment and the mission and strategic focus of the US-ROK alliance? How have they changed with respect to the security responsibilities that South Korea is expected to shoulder on its own, outside the contours of the alliance?

The US Government's Views on the US-Japan Alliance

Rust Deming, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, National Defense University & Ambassador, retired

How have American government perceptions and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance?

The US Government's View on the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance

Victor Cha, D.S. Song Associate Professor of Government and Asian Studies, Georgetown University

How have American government perceptions and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance?

Discussant: Christopher LaFleur, Cyrus Vance Fellow in Diplomatic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

The Changing Domestic Politics of the Alliance

10:30-12:15

Chair: Gi-Wook Shin, Director, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC

Japanese Domestic Views of the Alliance

Nakanishi Hiroshi, Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University

Since the mid-1990s, what noteworthy changes have surfaced in domestic support or opposition to the US-Japan alliance? What changes in support or opposition to the bilateral cooperation on security issues in Asia and elsewhere?

The Changes in South Korean Domestic Views of the Alliance

Lee Chung-min, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University

How have domestic political dynamics and public attitudes toward the US-ROK alliance and bilateral cooperation on security issues changed in recent years? What accounts for those changes? What implications do they have for US alliances in Northeast Asia?

American Domestic Views of the US-Republic of Korea Alliance

Donald Gregg, President, The Korea Society

How have American public attitudes (as reflected in public opinion polls, press reporting, and Congressional actions) evolved toward the US-ROK alliance and bilateral defense cooperation in recent years? What accounts for these changes? What are their implications for the future of the alliance?

Discussant: Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

Adjustments in the Operational Arrangement for Defense Cooperation

1:30-3:45

Chair & Discussant: Henry Rowen, Senior Fellow Emeritus, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

Japanese Adjustments in US-Japan Defense Cooperation

Yamaguchi Noboru, Major General, Japan Ground Self Defense Force

What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What further changes would the Japanese Government like to promote?

US-Japan Defense Cooperation

Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies

What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What additional changes is the Bush Administration likely to promote?

US-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation

William Drennan, Deputy Director, United States Institute of Peace

What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What additional changes is the Bush Administration likely to promote?

US-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation

Kim Jae chang, General, Joint Korea-US Command, (retired) and Co-Chairman, Council on ROK-US Security Studies

What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-ROK defense cooperation? What further changes would the Republic of Korea like to promote?

Where Do We Go From Here? Conclusions

4:00-5:00

Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow & Ambassador, retired

Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

Henry Rowen, Senior Fellow Emeritus, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

Robert Scalapino, Robson Research Professor of Government, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley

Download pdf

Oksenberg Conference Room

Conferences
Walter H. Shorenstein Forum for Asia Pacific Studies

Markets, Specialization and China's Smallholder Agriculture

Paragraphs

As seen in the previous sections, China's reformers, more than anything, have followed a
strategy based on providing incentives through property rights reforms, even though in China the shift to private ownership is today far from complete. The reforms started with the Household Responsibility System (HRS), a policy of radical decollectivization that allowed farmers to keep the residual output of their farms after paying their agricultural taxes and completing their mandatory delivery quotas. Farmers also began to exercise control over much of the production process (although in the initial years, the local state shared some control rights and in some places still do today). In this way the first reforms in the agricultural sector reshuffled property rights in an attempt to increase work incentives and exploit the specific knowledge of individuals about the production process (Perkins, 1994). In executing the property rights reforms, leaders also fundamentally restructured farms in China. Within a few years, for example, reformers completely broke up the larger collective farms into small household farms. In China today there are more than 200 million farms, the legacy of an HRS policy that gave the primary responsibilities for farming to the individual household. McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989), Fan (1991), Lin (1992) and Huang and Rozelle (1996) have all documented the strong, positive impact that property rights reforms had on output and productivity. 

In addition to property rights reform and transforming incentives, the other major
task of reformers is to create more efficient institutions of exchange. Markets-whether
classic competitive ones or some workable substitute-increase efficiency by facilitating
transactions among agents to allow specialization and trade and by providing information
through a pricing mechanism to producers and consumers about the relative scarcity of
resources. But markets, in order to function efficiently, require supporting institutions to
ensure competition, define and enforce property rights and contracts, ensure access to
credit and finance and provide information (John McMillan, 1997; World Bank 2002).
These institutions were either absent in the Communist countries or, if they existed, were
inappropriate for a market system. Somewhat surprisingly, despite their importance in
the reform process there is much less work on the success that China has had in building
markets and the effect that the markets has had on the economy.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Food and Agricultural Organization
Authors
Scott Rozelle

Power Sector Reforms in India: Issues Relating to Agriculture

Paragraphs

Excerpt:

Q (T L Sankar): Why do utilities charge different rates to different consumers?

A (Rafiq Dossani): Firstly, the cost-to-serve for each category of consumer varies depending on several factors. There are technical reasons such as power factor, voltage of supply and so on which are set out in the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. There are also commercial reasons. In some situations, the total quantity of power available could not be sold, unless some categories of consumers we are charged a lower tariff. There are also considerations of equity or the need to meet the merit wants of the poorer population, which prompted differential pricing.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
IIMB Management Review
Authors
Rafiq Dossani

From Cost to Quality and Innovation -- The Process of Offshoring

-

Daniel Scheinman is the senior vice president of Corporate Development at Cisco Systems. He is responsible for business development, strategic alliances, strategic technology policy, and corporate public relations. As head of corporate development, his role has grown to include responsibility for mergers and acquisitions, strategy, major partnerships and alliances, and advanced Internet projects. Dan, who joined Cisco in 1992, was a founder of the company's legal and government affairs departments. Dan is responsible for leading the company's acquisition and strategic partnership strategies. Cisco's acquisition strategy is among the most acclaimed in the industry and has resulted in the company's successful entry into several new arenas. Over the past ten years with Cisco, Dan has worked with organizations around the world to help redefine the way public and private sectors work together. He has helped facilitate an ongoing dialogue between government and private sector leaders about the Internet economy. A thought leader in the use of media within the corporate environment, Dan pioneered a Web-based multimedia news room called News@Cisco. In addition to his responsibilities at Cisco, Dan is a founding member of TechNet. TechNet's mission is to build bipartisan support for policies that strengthen America's leadership of the New Economy. The National Law Journal has named him one of the 100 most influential lawyers in the United States, and he is on the board of visitors at Duke University Law School. Dan holds a Juris Doctorate degree from Duke University Law School and a political science degree from Brandeis University.

Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall

Dan Scheinman Senior VP, Corporate Development Cisco Systems
Seminars
Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE)

Sino-Japanese tensions obscure growing cooperation

Authors
Michael H. Armacost
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Michael H. Armacost observes that economic and political ties are now displacing a deep-seated and longstanding rivalry between China and Japan.

China's government has sentenced two of its citizens to life in prison for their role in securing prostitutes for hundreds of male Japanese visitors in the southern city of Zhuhai last autumn. The Chinese government is also pressuring Tokyo to turn over the Japanese businessmen who allegedly requested the prostitutes. This story made headlines around the world, and fits well with how the world press typically covers Sino-Japanese relations. Regrettably, such incidents recur with enough regularity to feed the media machine that continues to stir a nationalism rooted in conflicting historical memories. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine -- which is widely viewed as a symbol of Japan's former militarism -- is a conspicuous example of this. The publicity that the press gives to these visits has helped impede an invitation to Koizumi from China's leaders for a state visit. Recently, the discovery of mustard gas canisters left behind by Japanese forces during World War II has also served to keep memories of the Imperial Japanese Army's wartime conduct alive among older Chinese. Moreover, rival Sino-Japanese claims to the Senkaku (or Diao Yutai) Islands resurfaced last year when the Japanese government leased three islets in the chain from private parties. The action, purportedly undertaken to reduce the prospect of landings and demonstrations by Japanese right-wingers, set off a brief, though frenzied, reaction in China, as well as in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Meanwhile, differences over Taiwan also foster tensions periodically, such as when former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui sought to visit Japan for medical treatment. But this is not the whole story. Although such incidents reveal a troubling level of mistrust between the Chinese and Japanese that is not merely a product of media coverage, it is noteworthy that both governments have worked consistently, diligently, and with considerable success to resolve such problems and contain their political fallout. Of course, official relations between the two countries are marked by much political and economic competition -- some of it healthy, some of it a possible harbinger of future strategic rivalry. The competitive strain in Sino-Japanese relations is especially visible in energy politics. Demand for oil in Asia is growing rapidly, and with China and Japan increasingly dependent upon imports, each has naturally sought to improve its energy security by diversifying sources of supply. Both countries covet access to Russian reserves, especially those located in the Angarsk fields of Siberia. Last spring, China appeared to have locked up a Russian commitment to build a pipeline to service the China market at Daqing. Japan, however, raised the ante with new offers of financial incentives. Its bid for an alternative pipeline to Nakhodka to serve Japanese, Korean and other markets remains alive, creating another point of competitive friction. In their rivalry for leadership in promoting Asian regional cooperation, meanwhile, China has taken an early lead. Nearly two years ago, China trumped Japan by offering a Free Trade Agreement to the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while front-loading its own tariff concessions. But this backdrop of contention and competition masks emerging collaborative aspects of Sino-Japanese relations that are profoundly important. For example, trade and investment flows continue to expand rapidly. Bilateral trade topped $100 billion in 2003, as Japan's exports to China increased by more than 10 percent, fueled by semiconductors, electrical equipment and automobiles. Meanwhile, China replaced the United States as Japan's biggest source of imports, and is now one of the few non-members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries with which Japan runs a trade deficit. Similarly, direct investment by Japanese firms is increasing as they relocate production facilities to China to capitalize on lower labor costs and high-quality engineering talent. Of course, there is no assurance that today's expanded commerce will preclude eventual strategic rivalry, or succeed in erasing lingering wartime animosity. But both countries now place a premium on extending their economic interdependence. Ultimately, the historical wounds that have long divided China and Japan, and the more current diplomatic flash points that the global media inevitably trumpet, tell only part of the Sino-Japanese story. There are economic and geopolitical rivalries between China and Japan that dwarf in importance the high-profile insults to national pride that make headlines. But there are also compelling economic and political inducements toward cooperation that prevent these rivalries from developing into full-blown crises.

All News button
1

India Goes to Vote

-

India?s national elections for its 14th parliament must take place by October 2004, and will probably happen by April. They will be held in the context of a new environment for the country: recognition of its nuclear capability, a new global order post 9/11, and its rising economic power. Yet many parts of the country still have very low levels of social development. Social divisiveness also continues to threaten civic stability. In the context of these opportunities and challenges, this seminar will discuss the electoral strategies of the main political parties and likely outcomes. Professor Pradeep Chhibber studies party systems, party aggregation, and the politics of India. His research examines the relationship between social divisions and party competition and the conditions that lead to the emergence of national or regional parties in a nation-state. Professor Chhibber received an M.A. and an M.Phil. from the University of Delhi and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles. He is currently the Indo-American Community Chair in India Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Tea and samosas will be served.

Philippines Conference Room

Pradeep Chhibber Associate Professor of Political Science University of California, Berkeley
Seminars
Subscribe to Environment