Stanford University

Science and Technology

Indian Politics and International Relations Since the End of the Cold War

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About the speaker: Achin Vanaik, fellow and board member of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam is one of the most important analysts of contemporary Indian politics. The author of The Painful Transition: Bourgeois Democracy in India (1990), The Furies of Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity and Secularization (1997) and Globalization and South Asia (2004.)

Vanaik has served on the board of directors of GreenPeace (India), and as an assistant editor for The Times of India. He writes regularly for the Economic and Political Weekly, The Times and The Telegraph and has written extensively on the nuclear question in south Asia.

Dr. Vanaik's lecture is co-sponsored with the Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford University.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Achin Vanaik Professor of International Relations and Global Politics, Political Science Department Speaker Delhi University
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Explaining Policy Outcomes in the Philippines: Is the President Too Strong, or Is Congress?

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Who influences policy outcomes in the Philippines? While most analysts agree that the quality of policymaking has been poor, they offer two very different explanations. Some blame a too-strong presidency: Presidents keep personal control over policy, so policies change when one president succeeds another. Discontinuity undermines performance. Other observers blame the power of congress: Legislators have stymied presidential agendas for reform, while presidents have been powerless to stop congress from failing to act or from acting to undermine reform. Takeshi Kawanaka takes a different approach. He argues that while presidents have control of fiscal policy, congress is dominant when it comes to ordinary legislation. It is the allocation not the concentration of power that facilitates short-sighted pork-barrel politics and inhibits the growth of cohesive and disciplined political parties.

Takeshi Kawanaka, a visiting scholar in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, has written mainly on Philippine politics. After two years of field work on local governance and political machines, he wrote Power in a Philippine City (2002). More recently he edited The Philippines in the Post EDSA Period (2005, in Japanese), which deals with the interaction between democratic consolidation and economic liberalization. His current research is on the role of political institutions in shaping policy outcomes in new democracies. He received his PhD in political science from Kobe University, and his MA and BA from Waseda University.

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Takeshi Kawanaka

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9741 (650) 723-6530
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Visiting Scholar
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Takeshi Kawanaka is a 2005-06 visiting scholar at Shorenstein APARC, and a senior research fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), Japan. He was a visiting research associate at the University of the Philippines from 1996 to 1998.

Since Kawanaka joined IDE in 1993, he has been working on politics in developing countries. He did field research mainly in the Philippines. He wrote a book on local politics, Power in a Philippine City (Chiba: IDE) and edited a book on post-democratization politics, The Philippines in the Post EDSA Period (in Japanese, Chiba: IDE). Now, he works on political institutions and policy outcomes in new democracies.

Kawanaka received BA and MA in Law from Waseda University and a PhD in political science from Kobe University. He taught courses on Southeast Asian Politics at Komazawa University and Seijo University. Aside from Japanese and English, he speaks Tagalog.

Takeshi Kawanaka Speaker
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Southeast Asia Program

US-Korean Relations: The Myth of a Golden Age

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In the view of many policy-makers, as well as the popular media, the alliance between the United States and South Korea is suffering from an unprecedented crisis of confidence. Anti-American views, particularly among the young, are widespread in South Korea. On an official level, there are constant tensions over the role of U.S. troops based in Korea and resistance to demands to open the Korean economy to foreign investment. Most seriously, there is a stark divergence in the approach of both countries toward North Korea.

This portrait of an alliance in crisis is often contrasted to a previous golden age in U.S.-Korean relations. According to this view, the alliance enjoyed a long period of harmony during much of the Cold War, when anti-Americanism was not a problem. The military alliance was secure and Korea's economic development was in harmony with the global policies of the United States. The two countries enjoyed a strategic convergence in their response to the threat of North Korea.

This view of the Cold War past has some elements of truth. But it is largely a myth that obscures a history of constant tension and even severe crisis in the alliance relationship. The clash between Korean nationalism and American strategic policy goals has been present from the beginning of the Cold War. Differences over the response to North Korea have been repeatedly an issue in the relationship. And anti-Americanism has been a feature of Korean life for decades.

Daniel Sneider will explore the myth of this golden age. He will focus on what may have been the most dangerous decade in US-Korean relations, from 1969-79, a period ranging from the Guam Doctrine to the assassination of President Park Chung Hee. It is a time when South Korean doubts about the durability of the alliance prompted the serious pursuit of nuclear weapons and the two countries clashed over North Korea policy, economic goals, human rights and democracy. Finally, he will look at how the myth of a golden age creates a distorted view of the current tensions in the alliance.

Daniel Sneider is a 2005-06 Pantech Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the foreign affairs columnist of the San Jose Mercury News. He is currently writing a book on the U.S. management of its alliances with South Korea and Japan. His column on foreign affairs, looking at international issues and national security from a West Coast perspective, is syndicated nationally on the Knight Ridder Tribune wire service, reaching about 400 newspapers in North America. Previously, Sneider served as national/foreign editor of the San Jose Mercury News, responsible for coverage of national and international news until the spring of 2003. He has had a long career as a foreign correspondent. From 1990-94, he was the Moscow Bureau Chief of the Christian Science Monitor, covering the end of Soviet Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1985-90, he was Tokyo Correspondent for the Monitor, covering Japan and Korea. Previously he served in India and at the United Nations.

Philippines Conference Room

Daniel C. Sneider Speaker
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The Sun Finally Rises

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After a decade of gloom, the sun seems at last to be shining brightly on Japan. Its economy has now grown at a respectable pace for four years and the clouds of deflation seem finally to have broken. International factors were the proximate cause of this improvement, but below the surface fundamental changes have also started to occur in the structure of the domestic economy. These changes are largely benign in nature, though they do raise questions about Japan's fiscal health, its ability to fund the twin US deficits, and the trajectory of its relations with its neighbors. The purpose of this speech is to explain how these dynamices will unfold and what they mean for Japan, East Asia, and the United States.

Robert Madsen is a Senior Fellow at MIT's Center for International Studies. He also advises such private equity firms as Unison Capital and the Robert M. Bass Group and was Asia Strategist at Soros Private Funds Management, which undertook leveraged buyouts and corporate restructuring in Europe and East Asia. From time to time he consults for several government agencies, including in the past year an economics ministry, a foreign ministry, an intelligence agency, and a central bank. Madsen graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Harvard University's Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations and then attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, where he earned a Masters Degree, with Distinction, and a Doctorate in International Relations. He additionally holds a J.D., with Distinction, from Stanford Law School and is a member of the California State Bar.

Philippines Conference Room

Robert Madsen Senior Fellow Speaker Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Creating the Political Forest in Southeast Asia: Law, Violence, and Institutional Practices

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Nancy Peluso will discuss how "political forests" originated in colonial-era Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and how they have been maintained over at least a century and a half of broader political-economic change. She will argue that forests were produced and normalized in Southeast Asia through political categories embedded in the law, scientific and public practice, colonial and post-colonial empires of forestry, and the insurgencies and emergencies of the Cold War era. This required the sometimes violent separation of the components of agrarian environments. From the fact that forests can be shown to be not only biological but also historical and political in nature she will draw important implications for conservation, development, and "green governance."

Nancy Lee Peluso is program director of the Berkeley Workshop in Environmental Politics at UC - Berkeley, where she teaches courses in political ecology and studies forest politics and agrarian change in Southeast Asia. She is the co-editor of Violent Environments (2001) and Borneo in Transition: People, Forests, Conservation and Development (1996) and the author of Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java (1992) and many journal articles and book chapters. She is presently finishing a book manuscript whose working title is "Ways of Seeing Borneo: Territoriality, Violence, and the Production of Landscape History". She is an associate editor of Global Environmental Politics and the Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Her PhD is from Cornell University.

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Nancy Lee Peluso Professor, Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management Speaker University of California-Berkeley
Seminars
Southeast Asia Program

Partitioning the Philippines - Is It Desirable? Is It Realistic? A Scholarly Conversation

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Poverty, inequality, and corruption plague the Philippines six decades after independence. Of the past five presidents, only one took office and left it without military intervention, and he was a general. In his controversial book, A Country of Our Own (2004), David Martinez describes the Philippines as a failed state. The country in his eyes comprises five regions ("nations"): Cordillera, Luzon, The Visayas, Mindanao, and Bangsamoro. He proposes holding legally binding referenda in each of these places to determine whether those who live there wish to remain inside the Philippines or form their own independent country. In a conversation moderated by Stanford's Don Emmerson, Martinez and the Filipinist scholar Lela Noble will examine arguments and evidence relevant to a crucial question: Is the nation-state project still valid for the Philippines?

David C. Martinez was born in the Philippines. At law school in Silliman University he was a medal-winning debater. He became an activist lawyer, was briefly detained when then-President Marcos declared martial law, fled the Philippines, and eventually reached the US, where he now resides. His essays have appeared in the Philippines Free Press among other publications, and he is a prize-winning author of fiction and poetry as well.

Lela Noble has written extensively on the Philippines. Her authored or edited books include Organizing for Democracy: NGOs, Civil Society, and the Philippine State (1998); Philippine Policy toward Sabah: A Claim to Independence (1977), and her articles have appeared in such journals as Asian Survey and Solidarity. From 1996 to 2002, she was dean of the College of Social Sciences at San Jose State. Her PhD is from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

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David C. Martinez author, activist, and independent scholar Speaker
Lela Noble professor of political science (emerita) Speaker San Jose State University

Donald K. Emmerson

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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Affiliated Faculty, CDDRL
Affiliated Scholar, Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
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At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”

Emmerson’s research interests include Southeast Asia-China-US relations, the South China Sea, and the future of ASEAN. His publications, authored or edited, span more than a dozen books and monographs and some 200 articles, chapters, and shorter pieces.  Recent writings include The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020); “‘No Sole Control’ in the South China Sea,” in Asia Policy  (2019); ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done? (ed., 2018); “Singapore and Goliath?,” in Journal of Democracy (2018); “Mapping ASEAN’s Futures,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2017); and “ASEAN Between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?,” in Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia (2017).

Earlier work includes “Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea,” in YaleGlobal (2016); “The Spectrum of Comparisons: A Discussion,” in Pacific Affairs (2014); “Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia” in Indonesian Studies: The State of the Field (2013); “Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends” in Indonesia Rising (2012); “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” in Journal of Democracy (April 2012); “The Problem and Promise of Focality in World Affairs,” in Strategic Review (August 2011); An American Place at an Asian Table? Regionalism and Its Reasons (2011); Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010); “The Useful Diversity of ‘Islamism’” and “Islamism: Pros, Cons, and Contexts” in Islamism: Conflicting Perspectives on Political Islam (2009); “Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN in a New Global Context” in Refreshing U.S.-Thai Relations (2009); and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (edited, 2008).

Prior to moving to Stanford in 1999, Emmerson was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he won a campus-wide teaching award. That same year he helped monitor voting in Indonesia and East Timor for the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. In the course of his career, he has taken part in numerous policy-related working groups focused on topics related to Southeast Asia; has testified before House and Senate committees on Asian affairs; and been a regular at gatherings such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable (Kuala Lumpur), the Bali Democracy Forum (Nusa Dua), and the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore). Places where he has held various visiting fellowships, including the Institute for Advanced Study and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 



Emmerson has a Ph.D. in political science from Yale and a BA in international affairs from Princeton. He is fluent in Indonesian, was fluent in French, and has lectured and written in both languages. He has lesser competence in Dutch, Javanese, and Russian. A former slam poet in English, he enjoys the spoken word and reads occasionally under a nom de plume with the Not Yet Dead Poets Society in Redwood City, CA. He and his wife Carolyn met in high school in Lebanon. They have two children. He was born in Tokyo, the son of U.S. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, who wrote the Japanese Thread among other books.

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Douglas Fuller on complacency toward China's challenge to U.S. science and technology lead

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SPRIE Fellow Doug Fuller takes issue with a recent Duke University report downplaying concerns about the low number of U.S. science and engineering graduates compared to those produced in China and India. Fuller explains what is behind the numbers and cautions that "it would be a grave mistake to drop our concerns about China's competitive challenge."

A recent report from Duke University that critiques the supposed gap between the number of American science and engineering (S&E) graduates and those of merging economies -- especially China's -- has led to false reassurance that the U.S. lead in science and technology is not under threat from China. It would be a grave mistake to drop our concerns about China's competitive challenge.

First, the Duke report simply claimed that China's true number of science and engineering bachelor degrees was 351,000, rather than the widely reported 600,000. Coupling this with an upward adjustment for American graduates still left China producing 214,000 more such degrees than the United States.

Moreover, undergraduates are only part of the concern. China's production of those with doctorates has increased rapidly. By 2003, China's homegrown science and engineering doctorates numbered almost half of the U.S. total.

Chinese were also earning large numbers of doctorates abroad. In 2001, the number of Chinese S&E doctorates earned in Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States equaled 72 percent of the total of S&E doctorates earned by American citizens and permanent residents.

Since 1975, China has increased its global share of S&E doctorates from zero (courtesy of the Cultural Revolution) to 11 percent, not counting doctorates earned overseas. During the same three decades, the U.S. global share has fallen from half to roughly 22 percent.

More worrisome than the aggregate numbers is American universities' reliance on foreigners who earn doctorates. In engineering, foreigners account for over half of America's doctorates, and in computer science just under half.

If foreign-born holders of doctorates continued to stay in the United States, we wouldn't have to worry. Unfortunately, there are many signs that it is becoming much harder to retain them.

One need only look at the flow from Taiwan, one of the former main sources of American S&E doctoral degrees, to see what could happen. Up until 1994, Taiwanese earned more science and engineering doctorates in the United States than members of any other foreign nationality. By 2000, their numbers had plummeted because economic and educational opportunities at home were more appealing.

The Taiwanese didn't just stop coming to America. They also began to leave. As Taiwan's tech sector boomed in the 1990s, huge numbers of Taiwanese technologists (estimates range as high as 100,000) left America for home and took their technical skills with them.

Our two current biggest foreign sources of technologists, China and India, appear to be following Taiwan's path. China has begun to lure back large numbers of technologists. China's central and local governments offer free office space and other benefits to attract technologists home. These inducements are working. A 2005 survey of the Chinese American Semiconductor Professionals Association's members showed that the vast majority regard China as the most likely future work destination, and they rated Shanghai higher than even Silicon Valley on career potential. India's recruitment efforts have also started to bear fruit.

The challenge is not simply keeping up the numbers of technologists in America. China by many measures has improved its technological capabilities. On the Georgia Institute of Technology's Index of Technological Capability, China has more than doubled its index score over the past decade. China now ranks fourth behind the United States, Japan and Germany.

This rapid ascent is not surprising given China's increasing investments. China's research and development spending as a percentage of gross domestic product has tripled to 1.3 percent in the last decade, even while its GDP has ballooned. Few emerging economies spend even 1 percent of their GDP on research.

U.S. patents invented in China are also on the rise. Information-technology patents from corporations' Chinese technologists have risen from 134 in 1997-2001 to 482 during 2002-04. As a first step to meet this challenge, we should increase federal spending on basic and exploratory research. Our R&D spending has been flat at 2.6 percent of GDP for four decades, but the share of federal spending has declined from two-thirds to one-quarter.

Given that corporations now de-emphasize basic scientific research, the federal government should further support the basic research that could maintain our lead at the cutting edge of technology.

Increased federal funding would also address the issue of the falling share of investment in certain disciplines. With spending flat, the rising share commanded by biomedicine has meant a falling share spent on engineering and physics.

Federal support may also play a direct role in increasing interest in pursuing a science education. Since the 1950s, the number of undergraduate S&E majors in America has risen and fallen in line with federal research funding, as Professor Henry Rowen of Stanford University has pointed out.

Before meeting China's challenge, we first must recognize it. Complacency in reaction to "good'' news that China is producing fewer S&E graduates than commonly thought is not the answer.

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Daniel Sneider on global lessons for U.S. immigration policies

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Shorenstein APARC Pantech Fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs columnist Daniel C. Sneider compares the effects of dual-class immigration policies in Singapore with those of the United States. "Rather than guest workers," he asks, "isn't it more American to set realistic immigration quotas and enforce them fairly?"

The fierce debate on immigration ignores a crucial reality -- what is happening to the United States is only one piece, although a big one, of a much larger global picture.

That hit me a couple of weeks ago when I was in Singapore. The Southeast Asian island nation has long been hailed as an economic model, the business capital for the entire region.

But it is an economy facing demographic peril. Its small population of 4 million is shrinking, thanks to a very low fertility rate. Prosperous Singaporean couples work hard, have fewer children and worry about how to take care of their aging parents. By 2050, Singapore will have a median age of over 52, one of the oldest in the world.

Singapore's answer is to import labor. A third of its workforce are migrants, from construction workers to maids. One out of seven households employs a domestic worker -- low-paid women mostly from neighboring Philippines and Indonesia.

Singapore tries to lure "talents'' -- highly skilled and affluent migrants -- to stay permanently. But the men hauling bricks and the maids washing laundry are in a separate class of temporary guest workers, with no chance to join Singaporean society. If a maid becomes pregnant, she is shipped out within seven days. Employers have to post bonds that must be paid should their servants break the rules and try to stay, putting them in the role of migrant police.

Problems of abuse of domestic workers, including physical and sexual violence and confinement, are serious enough to have prompted a report last December by Human Rights Watch.

Singapore's dependence on migrant labor and its guest-worker policy may be at the extreme end but it's very much on the global spectrum. Labor, like capital and goods before it, is part of a global market. The movement of people across borders in search of wages and work, most of it from developing countries to developed, is growing at a phenomenal pace.

The numbers are staggering. From 1980 to 2000, the number of migrants living in the developed world more than doubled from 48 million to 110 million. Migrants make up an average 12 percent of the workforce in high-income countries. About 4 million migrants cross borders illegally every year.

The demand for labor is driven in part by a demographic disaster -- the falling birth rates of developed countries. Almost all of those countries now have fertility rates that are well below 2.1, the level at which a population replaces itself. At the very low end are Hong Kong (0.94), Korea (1.22) and Singapore in Asia (1.24), along with much of Eastern Europe.

Low fertility means shrinking workforces and aging populations. Without migration, according to a recent study, Europe's population would have declined by 4.4 million from 1995 to 2000. Immigration accounted for 75 percent of U.S. population growth during the same period.

This movement of people cannot be stopped, certainly not by hundreds of miles of fences or even by tens of thousands of border guards. It is an issue that cries out for global cooperation, for common policies that cut across national boundaries. Already, we can benefit from looking at what has worked -- and not worked -- elsewhere.

A Global Commission on International Migration, formed in 2003 by the United Nations secretary-general, has taken an initial stab. Their report, issued last winter, supports the growth of guest-worker programs.

The Senate immigration bill now up for debate includes a provision for a guest-worker program. The bill is clearly preferable to the punitive and ineffective approach of the House version. But the Singapore experience -- and previous guest-worker programs like the German import of Turks -- should prompt second thoughts about going down this road.

One problem is that the guests don't leave. The United States has its own experience with this in the bracero program to import farmworkers, and more recently with the supposedly temporary H1-B visas used so extensively by the high-tech industry here in Silicon Valley.

Most troubling to me, these programs create an underclass of migrants who are never assimilated, as happened in Germany. It sets us on the Singapore road, encouraging inhumane policing mechanisms. And it is a gilded invitation to employers to depress the wages and incomes of American workers, and not just in the dirty jobs that are supposedly so hard to fill.

The United States has been rightfully proud of a tradition that treats all immigrants as citizens in the making. Rather than guest workers, isn't it more American to set realistic immigration quotas and enforce them fairly?

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Daniel Sneider says China's embrace of KMT leader sends message to Taiwan

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Shorenstein APARC Pantech Fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs columnist Daniel C. Sneider, warning that a growing rift between China and Taiwan could inadvertently force a conflict that might drag in the United States, discusses his interview with Kuomintang party chairman Ma Ying-jeou.

The Middle East seems to occupy all the attention of our foreign-policymakers these days. But there are other parts of this globe that are probably more important, and potentially no less dangerous.

One of these is the Taiwan Strait. That narrow passage of water separates China from Taiwan, in Chinese minds a renegade province that must eventually be returned to its control.

The Chinese communist leadership dreads the prospect that Taiwan's democratically elected government might make the island's de facto independence a legal reality. China's heated military buildup in recent years is largely focused on creating the muscle to intimidate Taiwan and to seize the island if that fails.

A war across the Taiwan Strait makes the American top-five list of security dangers. The U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan is ambiguous, but it is not hard to imagine us being drawn into a conflict. And a war in the strait could easily expand to include Japan.

That is why the mayor of Taipei, Taiwan's capital city, got such a rousing welcome last week in Washington. Ma Ying-Jeou, or Mayor Ma as he is popularly known, does not threaten to upset the apple cart of cross-strait relations by pushing Chinese buttons with talk of independence, as the Taiwanese government loves to do.

Sitting down with Ma for breakfast as he made his way home to Taiwan, I could see why he was received with open arms at senior levels of the Bush administration. Ma, the leader of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party, is the front-runner in polls to win the 2008 presidential elections. He is articulate, a Harvard Law School graduate with movie-star looks and a reassuring message for Americans.

"We support maintenance of the status quo, which is also U.S. policy,'' he told me.

A KMT-led government would not waver from the "Five Nos,'' a pledge made by President Chen Shui-bian not to take steps toward a declaration of independence. He offers in addition a program of ``Five Dos'' should it return to power.

First, the KMT hopes to resume negotiations with the mainland, based on a 1992 agreement that while there is one China, there are different interpretations of what that means. Second, it will try to reach a peace agreement, lasting from 30 to 50 years. Third, the KMT would expand the already massive economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland into a possible cross-strait common market. Fourth, the KMT would try to create a formula to allow Taiwan to participate in international affairs, including global organizations, short of being an independent state. Last, it would expand cross-strait cultural and education exchanges.

Ma downplays the threat from Beijing these days. "Their goal is no trouble,'' he told me. "They are not interested in unification right now.'' But, he said, the Chinese do worry about "the further drifting away of Taiwan.'' That drift, he fears, could inadvertently force a conflict that might drag in the United States.

That charge is aimed at the government in Taipei. And it is a concern shared by U.S. officials who are visibly unhappy these days with Chen. The warm reception for Ma was intended to send that message to Taipei -- and also to Beijing, ahead of the visit next month of Chinese leader Hu Jintao.

Reassuring as Ma's words may be, there are reasons to be cautious about his message and his prospects.

Taiwanese nationalism may rattle the status quo, but so does China's military buildup. As does the failure of Taiwan to adopt a significant U.S. defense package, offered five years ago, to counter that buildup. The KMT blames the current government for this impasse but the party, which now controls the legislature, has blocked passage of the budget.

Deepening economic ties with China are a market reality, as Taiwan's electronics industry shifts production to low-wage China. But ultimately that could make them another Hong Kong, a satellite of Beijing that must bend to its political will.

Taiwanese are deeply divided. The KMT, the party of mainlanders who fled to the island after the communist victory in 1949, ruled Taiwan for decades as the exiled government of China. But democracy, which came in the 1990s, brought to power native Taiwanese who want to preserve their separate identity.

Ma may prove to be a political leader who plays better in Washington than back home. But if Taiwanese embrace his vision of the status quo at the ballot box, all the better. Ultimately, his mandate must come from Taiwanese, not Americans.

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