Why do some countries in the developing world achieve growth with equity, while others do not? If democracy is the supposed panacea for the developing world, why have Southeast Asian democracies had such uneven results? In exploring these questions, political scientist Erik Martinez Kuhonta argues that the realization of equitable development hinges heavily on strong institutions, particularly institutionalized political parties and cohesive interventionist states, and on moderate policy and ideology.

"This boldly comparative book will be widely read, widely assigned, and widely debated in the field. There are few comparable works out there. Kuhonta's book should be required reading for those interested in development, political institutions, state building, social welfare policies, and Southeast Asia."

—Allen Hicken, University of Michigan

The Institutional Imperative is framed as a structured and focused comparative-historical analysis of the politics of inequality in Malaysia and Thailand, but also includes comparisons with the Philippines and Vietnam. It shows how Malaysia and Vietnam have had the requisite institutional capacity and power to advance equitable development, while Thailand and the Philippines, because of weaker institutions, have not achieved the same levels of success. At its core, the book makes a forceful claim for the need for institutional power and institutional capacity to alleviate structural inequalities.

This book is part of a the Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center series at Stanford University Press.

This paper adopts a unified approach to an understanding of the development processes of the East Asian economies, Chinese, Japanese and South Korean, in terms of common five phases starting with Malthusian equilibria and extended to forthcoming post-demographic transitions characterized by the shrinkage of the working-age group share in the population. Notwithstanding of the basic commonality, however, there are also marked differences among the East Asian economies in the timing of turning points, durations, and substantive forms of the phases. The paper claims that those differences need to be co-explained by accompanying variations in institutional trajectories. It identifies the Malthusian origins of contrasting political-economic and social-norm characteristics in Chinese and Japanese institutional arrangements and discusses their transformations over successive phases. By delineating institutional characteristics of China and Japan from a game-theoretic perspective, it implicitly challenges prevailing views that contrast the East and the West in such general terms as kinship vs. the third party enforcement of contracts, Confucianism vs. Protestantism, collectivism vs. individualism, authoritarianism vs. liberal democracy, and the like. These dichotomies are too simplistic for explaining the uniqueness, commonality and variations of institutional arrangements in East Asia and their impacts on development processes of respective economies.

The economic benefits attributed by the literature to ethnic networks include helping their members cope with social exclusion, mainstreaming, facilitating entrepreneurship, and providing access to transnational opportunities. In this article, the authors explore the benefits provided by participation in ethnic professional associations formed by Indian and Chinese engineers in Silicon Valley. We find that the ethnic professional associations offer several of these economic benefits. These benefits are complementary to the benefits from other ethnic ties and from nonethnic ties.