Reprint from China's Political Economy (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. and Singapore UP Pte. Ltd., 1998).

This collection of papers stems from a recent World Bank project focused upon the contentious issue of whether government has played any positive role in the success of the so-called "high-performing" Asian economies. It goes beyond the influential World Bank volume The East Asian Miracle to chart a middle ground that recognizes diversity among the different East Asian economies, as well as the evolutionary nature of government intervention.

Zouping offers important general lessons for the study of China's rural transformation. The authors in this volume, all participants in a unique field research project undertaken from 1988 to 1992, address questions that are far from simple and about which there is some controversy.

The questions are grouped around two issues. The first is the role of local governments as economic actors. What is this role, how have they played it, and how can we explain their behavior? Have they dominated rural economies through public ownership of industry and local planning, or has the role of local governments diminished with the rise of market transactions and private ownership? The second issue is market reform and inequality. Have rural cadres enjoyed income advantages in the new market environment? Has the provision of such collective services as education and health care declined, leading to new forms of inequality?

The chapters on the role of local government all point to a single conclusion: one cannot explain the rapid development of Zouping without reference to the role of local governments and of local government officials as economic actors. Scholarly writings about the "transitional economies" have often ignored or distorted this aspect of China's reform experience. On the second issue, changes in inequality owing to market reform, the authors present mixed findings but contribute rich new data to the research on this issue.

Published as part of the "Urban Dynamics of East Asia" Research Project.

Just like many other crises, the Korean currency crisis came suddenly. In mid-November 1997, headlines in the Korean press consisted mostly of presidential election stories. At that time the presidential race was very close; the Grand National Party candidate, Lee HoiChang, was making a dramatic comeback, while the National Congress for New Politics candidate, Kim Dae-jung, was making his best effort to maintain his narrow lead. Thus, when President Kim Young Sam announced on November 19 his decision to fire key economic policy-makers on the grounds of mismanaging the economy, most Koreans were surprised at the news and questioned the president’s motivation. Two days later they were completely shocked to learn that the Korean government was asking the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency standby loans because the Korean foreign reserve level was very low at $7.3 billion and most foreign financial institutions were unwilling to roll over their short-term loans to Korea.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Alliances are organizations between or among independent entities that concert to produce “collective goods” for the mutual benefit of alliance members. The statement applies whether the alliances are between or among countries, corporations, universities, research centers, or other institutions. Of course, the nature of the collective goods, as well as the membership in the collectivity, differs across these cases. That the goods (or benefits) are“collective” means that their availability to one alliance member (or their production by any member) implies their availability to the other members of the alliance.

Because the beneficiaries of collective goods cannot readily be excluded from access to
them, the so-called “free rider” problem arises. As a result, “Let George do it” becomes the
prevalent incentive structure. The more George does, the less is the burden (i.e., “cost”) on
other alliance members, while the benefits are collectively available to all members.

Several corollaries follow with respect to the formation, functioning, and prospects of
alliances in general, and those in Northeast Asia in particular:

First, while the benefits of an alliance are available to all its members, their respective
valuations of these collective benefits may differ. It is also worth noting that non-alliance members—for example, China—may appraise the putative alliance products as representing
not benefits, but “dis-benefits” (threats or risks) for themselves.

Second, devising an appropriate formula for sharing the costs of producing the collective
alliance benefits is complicated by the aforementioned differences in valuations among
alliance members, as well as differences in their capacity and willingness to pay.

This paper addresses the general question of the collective burdens (costs) and benefits of
the U.S. alliances with Japan and Korea, as well as the respective capacities and willingness
of the alliance members to bear these burdens. The economics of these issues are inextricably linked with their politics, and so crisscrossing between these two domains occurs frequently in the paper.

The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 addresses the economic capacities of the
alliance members to bear alliance costs. Section 3 deals with the costs—both economic and
non-economic—of each of the alliances. Section 4 assesses the security and other benefits of the alliances. Section 5 considers the politically dominated “willingness” of the alliance
members to bear alliance burdens. And Section 6 provides a concluding assessment of the
balance between the burdens and benefits of the two alliances, the interdependencies
between the two alliances, and ways of enhancing the alliances while mitigating the
drawbacks associated with what we refer to as the “China–Japan conundrum.”

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Reprint from NBR Analysis volume 7, number 4.

Reprint from Journal of Far Eastern Business originally printed Autumn, 1994.

The first book available devoted exclusively to China's rural organizational change and the subsequent implications for rural societies and politics. Following China's successful decollectivization, diverse new organizational forms arose in response to different local situations. Yet the collective tradition did not die. The contributors dissect the closely structured relationships among the newly emerging class of rural entrepreneurs, local officials, and their family members and associates.