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"One Nation under God?" is a chapter in Religion and Religiosity in the Philippines and Indonesia: Essays on State, Society, and Public Creeds, edited by Theodore Friend and published by the Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS.

This comparative exploration looks at religion and politics in the social dynamics of Southeast Asia's two most populous nations. The Philippines and Indonesia are treated as one vast "Phil-Indo" archipelago. Eight leading scholars contribute interwoven and contending essays. The authors find that while neither country promotes a state religion, both lack partitions between church and state. Social dynamics of faith in each elude constitutional restrictions. In the Philippines, a Spanish tradition of an ecclesiastical state exists in tension with a Jeffersonian notion of separation of realms. In Indonesia, pre-Islamic concepts of a god-king fuse state and society, as modern initiatives surge from the premise of a prevailing Islamic community. Official religiosity pervades Indonesian national life, while Filipinos act out their private religiosity en masse, trying to overcome deficiencies in state and church. The book includes 38 photographs, in color and black and white, with commentaries that further illustrate the themes of each chapter.

Other contributors include Azyumardi Azra (University Islam Negeri, Indonesia), Jose M. Cruz (Ateneo de Manila University, The Philippines), Theodore Friend (Foreign Policy Research Institute), Robert W. Hefner (Institute for the Study of Economic Culture, Boston University), Vicente Leuterio Rafael (University of Washington), Jose Eliseao Rocamora (Institute for Popular Democracy, The Philippines), and David Joel Steinberg (Long Island University).

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History, Faith, and Identity in Indonesia

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Donald K. Emmerson
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One of the few ways to get a taste of North Korea, short of leaping through numerous hoops to get a visa to visit the country, is to eat cold noodles (naengmyen). Most South Korean cities and even a few American ones offer several types of North Korean-style noodle restaurants. The version often prepared in Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, is mul naengmyen, or cold noodles in broth. It is served in a large metal bowl and looks like a flowering mountain rising up from the sea. Artfully balanced atop the mound of noodles made from buckwheat flour are julienned cucumbers, several slices of beef, half a hardboiled egg, and a few pieces of crisp Korean pear. When prepared Hamhung-style -- named after the industrial city on North Korea's east coast -- noodles are made from sweet potato flour and often topped with raw skate, which has a slightly ammoniac flavor.

The signs in the South advertising Northern-style cold noodles are a reminder of the Korean War and the division of the peninsula. After the Korean War, refugees from the conflict set up stalls in the markets of Seoul to sell the "taste of the north" to those who could no longer travel there. The recipes they brought with them to the south were sometimes the only valuables they carried. In the 1990s, a new wave of North Koreans came to the South and established naengmyen restaurants. Hailing from the North lends a certain authenticity to the preparation of the dish. Whether prepared by the refugees of the 1950s and their descendents, the defectors of the 1990s, or North Koreans themselves in Pyongyang or Hamhung, cold noodles are something that North Koreans are widely credited with doing better than South Koreans.

But the way naengmyen is "consumed" in the South reveals the great disparity between the two countries. There are many jokes in South Korea about the number of North Korean defectors who have only this one marketable skill. Since cooking in Korea is largely a woman's job, the close association of North Koreans with the production and sale of cold noodles subtly feminizes and, according to patriarchal Korean values, devalues them. North Koreans are thus second-class citizens, both those who are unemployed (the majority) and those who are employed only to provide service to the real "breadwinners" of the country. Anthropologist Roy Richard Grinker relates how South Korean textbooks and popular culture often depict North Korea as the younger brother of the more advanced South Korean older brother. Given the cultural associations of naengmyen, wife to husband might be the more appropriate analogy. A recent Joongang Ilbo Photoshop cartoon reinforces this sexist gloss on inter-Korean relations by depicting South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun dressed as a Choson-era husband with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as his bride.

In a divided country, cold noodles serve as an important reminder of a common culture. They also represent a unique contribution that the economically weaker North Korea can bring to the reunification process. But however tasty Pyongyang-style mul naengmyen may be, cold noodles ensure neither a sustainable livelihood for every North Korean defector nor an equal place at the reunification table for North Korea.

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A delegation from the China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA) headed by its president, Mr. Zhongyu Yu, visited Stanford University on November 5, 2005. As part of its visit on campus, the delegation was invited to speak at SPRIE's seminar series on the rise of China's innovation competence. Mr. Yu and his colleagues shared with the audience the latest developments in China's integrated circuit (IC) industry as well as their understanding of the underlying driving forces, the level of competency, the role of the government and China's integration into the global innovation system.

Phenomenal growth of China's IC industry

Mr. Yu first shared with the audience some striking data that clearly illustrated the growth of China's IC industry since 2000. In 2000-2004, the industry grew with a CAGR of 31% from $2.2 billion to $6.7 billion. In 2004, there were 670 IC companies employing a workforce of 130,000, of which 40,000 were engineers. The growth is pronounced throughout the value chain from IC design to IC manufacturing and IC packaging and assembly. In 2004, there were 476 IC design companies and their revenue reached $1 billion, an 81.5% increase from 2003. Domestic companies have made impressive inroads into the development and commercialization of a few specific IC products such as second generation ID cards, audio decode chips, third generation cell phone base band chips and MP3 chips. In IC manufacturing, there were a total of 39 fabrication plants by the end of 2004: one 12-inch plant, nine 8-inch plants and 29 4-inch to 6-inch plants. These plants generated a revenue of $2.24 billion in 2004, a 90% increase from 2003. Meanwhile, three more 12-inch plants are under consideration by SMIC, HHNEC and Hynix. IC packaging and assembly reached $3.49 billion in revenue in 2004.

Multiple forces drive the growth

What has been behind such phenomenal growth? Mr. Yu identified three major driving forces. First is the continuing growth of the domestic market that has provided new demand for outputs from the industry. China has become the largest manufacturing base for most consumer electronics products such as televisions, DVDs, personal computers and mobile phones. For example, in the year of 2004, China manufactured 74 million television sets and 230 million mobile phones. These consumer electronics products are fueling the growth of the China's domestic IC market. In 2004, the market reached $40 billion, making China the second largest IC market in the world with a global share of 22%. The second driving force has resulted from the reform of the financial system, which has substantially improved the investment environment--especially for foreign investment. Foreign investment now accounts for 80% of total investment in the IC industry, even when domestic bank loans are taken into account. Venture capital has become a considerable source of capital. $424 million was invested in 2004. The third driving force is the global recession of the IC industry after 2000. The recession exerted tremendous economic pressure for multinational corporations to relocate their manufacturing and R&D activities to China to take advantage of China's cost advantage.

China still weak in innovation in IC

While the growth of China's IC industry has been impressive, Mr. Yu also pointed out some noticeable weaknesses of the industry. The industry is dominated by low value-added IC packaging and assembly, which accounts for half of the industry's revenue. High value-added IC design work only generated 15% of the total revenue in 2004. Most of the 476 IC design companies are very small. In 2004, only 17 companies had revenues over 100 million RMB (which was about 12 million USD). Among them, only two had revenues over 500 million RMB (about 60 million USD). The technical competence of IC design companies is still very weak. Except for the few aforementioned emerging niches, IC design is very much lagging behind the cutting edge. Most domestic demand for IC is still met by import. As Mr. Yu pointed out, "all the micro components and memory [of domestically manufactured consumer electronics products] are imported."

Government policy

The government is well aware of these shortfalls and policies have been put in place to support the next-phase growth of the industry. Factor inputs need to be boosted. In terms of capital, Mr. Yu estimated that a total of $30 billion investment will be needed in the coming five years to fuel the growth of the industry. Yet, the government will cede its role as a director investor in any IC programs while promoting investments from other sources, being it bank loans, domestic private investment, foreign direct investment or venture capital investment. Human resource is another prime area for improvement since there is a serious shortage of experienced IC engineers. The government has put in plans to "cultivate 40,000 IC designers and 10,000 IC processing technologists" over the coming 6-8 years. More importantly, however, indigenous competence needs to be built. "Independent innovation" has been identified as a priority for public policy in China's 11th five-year development plan. Mr. Yu declared, "our goal is not to copy others' chips but instead to have our own."

China's integration into the global innovation system

Looking into the future, as China's IC industry and market continue to grow, Mr. Yu articulated for the audience the importance of China being integrated into the global innovation system. In the coming five years, there will be plenty of opportunities for Chinese companies and universities to collaborate with innovators from abroad, whether it is to shape next-generation technologies and technical standards, for multinational corporations to set up research and development centers in China, or for universities to collaborate on cutting-edge research. As Mr. Yu declared, "China welcomes mutually beneficial cooperation with American industry and academia in the area of [IC] manufacturing and the innovative work of R&D."

Biography of Zhongyu Yu

Mr. Yu Zhongyu has been engaged in semiconductor research and management for many years and is one of the leaders of China's integrated circuit industry. He has engaged in research and design of IC products and was honored with the National Science and Technology Award. Having joined the government in 1988, he was responsible for organizing and leading the IC project during "7th five-year plan" and "8th five-year plan"; he acted as a member of the leading group for the National "908" project and headed the construction leading group of the Huahong factory in the "909" project. These projects made important contributions to China's IC industry development. Mr. Yu has been the President of the China Semiconductor Industry Association since 2001.

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On November 1, 2005, SPRIE invited Jimmy Lee, Vice President and General Manager, Timing Solutions, Integrated Device Technology (IDT) to speak at SPRIE's seminar series on the rise of China in innovation. Lee shared his experience in running a full-blown integrated circuit (IC) product development center in China together with an informative account of China's rise in the IC industry.

The globalization of the IC industry and the rise of China

The commoditization of semiconductor technology is marked by the encapsulation of previously proprietary technologies into commercially available equipment and software design tools. This has substantially lowered the entry barrier for IC design. It has enabled the emergence of a new generation of companies in the Far East in backend assembly and testing as well as IC design. The process is further helped by advances in communication technology that eases access to and sharing of information across geographies. Meanwhile, the IC industry is shifting from being technology-driven to application/market driven. The integration of product development and market has become an important differentiator in global competition. These industry changes are coupled with changes in the worldwide market, mostly noticeably the rise of Asia as a significant market.

China is rising quickly as a significant player in IC. It has a huge pool of talent and many "returnees" - those who grew up in China, were educated in the West and have returned to China to work; they are essential in transferring competence from the West to China. China also enjoys substantial cost advantage while having fairly decent productivity. Starting from the 1990s, the government has invested heavily, and issued extensive regulatory incentives, to promote the semiconductor industry. As a result, according to Lee, in 2004, there were 102 IC test and assembly companies, 50 foundries and 457 IC design companies operating in China. They generated a total revenue of $4.4 billion.

IDT's product development venture in China

IDT is a major IC design company. Its workforce of 3,700 (1,500 in U.S.) has designed 1,300 IC products in 15,000 configurations. In fiscal year 2005, the company garnered a revenue of $645 million, 25% of which went into R&D. In the late-1990s, frustrated by the high turnover and the shortage of talent in Silicon Valley, it opened up an operation in

China. China's abundant and low-cost talent pool provided an opportunity. The company was also attracted to its budding telecommunication market, an area IDT had wanted to get into.

Luckily for IDT, "it just so happened that Newave Technology Corporation was available." Newave was the first IC design start-up in China. Founded by several Chinese returnees in 1996, the company had 100 some engineers developing telecommunication IC for the China market. In 2001, IDT acquired Newave for $85 million. At the time of acquisition, Newave was working on two products but its revenue was very small. Since then, Lee built it into a successful product development center.

Challenges for setting up a product development center in China

Setting up and operating a product development center in China is full of challenges. Lee grouped them into two areas.

The first is organizational challenges, from defining the mission of the organization to every aspect of human resource management: recruiting, training, retention, etc. From the beginning, the mission was to be a self-sufficient, whole product development center. "They basically have the responsibility to develop the entire product from the specification to the manufacturing transfer and they also have the entire infrastructure such as HR, finance and legal to be self-sufficient to support the local needs." Such positioning is crucial in China because the competition for talent is extremely intense and this generation of young engineers is very ambitious, many wanting to start their own business sometime in their life. They are often impatient with long-term strategy. Therefore, "if you want to have top-notch talent working for you, you have to challenge them constantly in technical areas." Picking the right leader is also a key. IDT decided that this person had to be born in China, grew up in China, be western trained and have worked in western companies. Such a combination is ideal because there are a lot of subtleties that are culture specific and one has to be born and grow up in China to get it. In the technical area, IDT hired a few long-term expatriates from headquarters. They are the real masters in their respective fields in IC design. This is where the leverage comes from: "You use one super high power master technical guy to leverage the intellectual labors of the local engineers," said Lee.

The second challenge stems from social-cultural differences. A few examples: communications is a big issue, not so much because of language barriers but because of differences in culture and the level of professionalism. As Lee stated, "...it's more of the mindset. It's very difficult at the beginning to teach them how to communicate, when to communicate and what to communicate." Secondly, social-culture norms shape a different level of standard in decision-making and judgment call. Lee needs to put a lot of effort into teaching the local engineers how to think from the customer's perspective. Thirdly, employees are loyal to individuals rather than the corporation. These social-cultural differences are an area where there is no shortcut. They have to be overcome with training. Training means taking every opportunity to educate the local workforce: formal training programs, informal one-on-one coaching, ongoing training-by-doing, training over hundreds of conference calls over the past 4-5 years, you name it. "To some extent, this is sort of the brainwashing process," commented Lee. "There is no shortcut. You just have to put in a lot of TLC - tender, loving care. This is very challenging."

IDT's positive experience in China

While IDT "did run into many, many of those challenges," its overall effort in China has been extremely positive. The local team now manages a dozen of products, which involves some original work. The headquarter team is using some of the intellectual property generated by the folks in China. The local team even presented a paper in this year's IEEE ISSC Conference. It is the first paper coming out of China presented at such a prestigious conference. Productivity and cost advantage are also evident. Lee estimated that "for the team here in the United States to develop the same number of products will probably take them twice as long in time and probably cost 4-5 times more. This is really a good deal for the company."

Future outlook

Looking ahead, Lee highlighted a few issues that will shape China's IC industry. Overall, it will be a fertile ground for IC product development because of the talent pool. The job market will remain red hot with rapid increase of wages and high turnover rates. There will be hundreds of start-ups because of the low entry barrier. However, many will lack management experience and business acumen. Duplication of investment and engineering effort for the same market will result in the industry consolidating into dozens of medium size companies. In ten years time, these survivors will become significant suppliers to domestic IC demand in emerging applications such as wireless communication and digital TV. All in all, as Lee pointed out, "one needs to marry the best of the East and the West to create a world-class company."

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The arrogance of the Bush administration would be barely tolerable if it were not paired with a stunning incompetence, on display from Kabul to Katrina. That deadly combination has weakened American strength in the world, argues Pantech fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs columnist Daniel Sneider.

Despite its attempt to soften criticism of the war, there is no evidence the Bush administration is capable of self-correction.

That came home to me the other day while listening to a senior administration official deliver an off-the-record tour d'horizon of American foreign policy. He is among the best minds in this administration, counted among the ranks of the realists, rather than the neoconservatives.

The United States stands alone as the most powerful nation in the world, the official began. In no previous moment of human history has a single state enjoyed such a dominant position.

When it comes to managing its relations with other would-be powers -- Europe, China, Japan and India -- the United States has done "extraordinarily well,'' he said.

The tensions generated by the war in Iraq have eased, the senior foreign policy official confidently asserted. The Europeans are content to gaze intently inward, he observed, while America strides the globe.

Japan is embracing the United States in a very close relationship that shows no sign of unraveling. Meanwhile the Bush administration has forged a growing partnership with India.

When it comes to China, the administration has chosen the path of accommodation and integration rather than containment of the rising power. He expressed confidence that American power and the prospect of democracy in China will secure the peace.

The only remaining challenge for the United States is to combat the threat of a radical Islamist movement that seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction. For that, there is the promotion of democracy and American values around the world. After all, the official said with not even a nod to humility, "the U.S. is the most successful country that has ever existed.''

A year or two ago, the American people embraced this vision of a confident colossus, a Gulliver among the Lilliputians. That was before they watched the giant tied down in its attempt to export those American values by force of arms in Iraq.

The arrogance of this administration would be barely tolerable if it were not paired with a stunning incompetence, on display from Kabul to Katrina. That deadly combination has weakened American strength in the world. It has emboldened far more serious challengers in Iran and North Korea, who see the United States as too bogged down in Iraq to credibly threaten them with the use of force.

The war rated barely a mention in the sweeping view offered by the senior administration official, except indirectly. He offered a realist defense of the administration's democracy crusade.

World War II was fought with democratic goals, the official pointed out. And the Cold War -- the model for the current struggle against Islamic extremism -- was not just about balancing the power of the Soviet Union. The wars in Korea and Vietnam were really about determining which system those countries chose, he argued.

Those are curious examples to cite as a defense of the decision to go to war in Iraq. The United States shored up authoritarian regimes in Korea and Vietnam to counter the communist threat. Vietnam was a strategic mistake that took decades to overcome. And democracy came to Korea more than 35 years later, after a long period of economic development.

President Bush cited the democratic transformation of Korea -- along with Taiwan and Japan -- in a recent speech during his trip to Asia. But these are examples of the "conventional story in which you become rich and then you become democrats,'' as the senior official put it so well.

The administration proposes however to skip this long, but necessary, path to democratic capitalism when it comes to the Middle East. The policies of security and stability have failed there and a quicker route to democratic change is called for. But there is no historical evidence to suggest that this is any more than another manifestation of a blind belief in American power.

Democratic values have always been essential to American foreign policy. In practice, however, American administrations have often made painful choices between stability and the promotion of democracy. We saw that too often during the Cold War -- in Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968 or Tibet in 1959.

The administration might do well to recall the words of candidate Bush, uttered Oct. 11, 2000.

"It really depends on how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation they'll resent us,'' Bush said. "But if we are a humble nation, they'll respect us.''

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The problems in this alliance are not a result of emotion, naivete or ingratitude. Indeed, even if none of those emotional and cultural issues existed, the alliance would still be in dire need of revision. To find the best path forward for both the United States and South Korea, we need to focus on the real issues.

One of the less publicized but perhaps most important matters before President Bush on his recent trip to South Korea for the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit was that of relations between the United States and the host country. Although South Korea has long been a close ally of the United States, relations between the two have cooled in recent years, and the alliance has come under great strain. Bush's trip did not set a new direction for the alliance, which has been drifting for the past few years.

There is a way to reverse this cooling in relations, I believe -- to promote U.S. strategic interests in the region, including denuclearization of North Korea; to retain U.S. influence there; and to strengthen a long-standing alliance. What is needed is an effort to widen the "North Korea problem" from one of nuclear weapons to one of unification.

Controversy over the fraying U.S.-South Korea alliance focuses almost exclusively on cultural or emotional issues. In the United States there are some who feel that South Koreans are insufficiently grateful for the steadfast U.S. support to South Korea, particularly for the American lives lost in defense of the South during the Korean War of 1950-53 and for the extensive economic and military aid since. Others feel that rising anti-American sentiment in South Korea reveals the naivete of a younger generation of Koreans who are insufficiently worried about the North Korean threat.

But the problems in the alliance are not a result of emotion, naivete or ingratitude. Indeed, even if none of those emotional and cultural issues existed, the alliance would still be in dire need of revision. To find the best path forward for both the United States and South Korea, we need to focus on the real issues.

The main factor straining the alliance is the unresolved Korean War and the continued division of the peninsula. This has created differing long-term strategic concerns for the United States and South Korea.

For South Korea, the key issue is not North Korean nuclear weapons -- it never was. South Korea's overriding concern is how to resolve the issue of national unification and integrate North Korea back into the world's most dynamic region, whether or not there are nuclear weapons. All other South Korean foreign policy issues take second place.

In contrast to Korea's regional issues, U.S. concerns are global and military. For at least the next several years, the United States will be mainly concerned with countering potential terrorist threats. Distracted by the overwhelming focus on anti-terrorism, homeland security and other issues, the United States has viewed its Korea policy as a narrow extension of its anti-terrorism policy, focusing almost exclusively on denuclearizing the North. These different strategic priorities have led to severe strains between the two allies, despite the desire of both to maintain a close relationship.

The United States can improve its position in East Asia, as well as solidify its alliance with South Korea, by widening its focus beyond North Korean denuclearization and coming out strongly and enthusiastically in favor of Korean unification. Although the United States rhetorically supports unification, it has been noticeably passive in pursuing policy to that end.

Such a policy shift would achieve many U.S. goals and would strengthen our alliance with South Korea in the process.

First and foremost, denuclearization is far more likely to occur with a change in North Korea's regime and a resolution to the Korean War than it is without resolving that larger issue. Until now the United States has put denuclearization first, without making much progress. Folding the nuclear issue into the larger issue would provide far more leverage on both questions and potentially create new or broader areas for progress.

Second, such a policy would provide grounds for agreement between U.S. and South Korean policymakers from which they could cooperate and work together, rather than against each other. Exploring the best path toward unification will require both economic and military changes in the North -- changes that will provide the United States with more flexibility to rebalance its own forces in the region.

Finally, it would put the United States in a solid position to retain goodwill and influence in Korea after unification -- something that is far from ensured today, when many South Koreans are skeptical about U.S. attitudes and policies toward the region. If the United States is seen as a major source of help for unification, it is far more likely that the post-unification orientation of Korea will be favorable to Washington.

This would be a major policy change for the United States, but given the importance of the region and of the Korean Peninsula, it is the best path to follow.

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Open source software (OSS) is widely used as operating systems (Linux), web tools (Apache, JBoss), database platforms (MySQL) and a range of applications. Creating OSS is widely believed to be a relatively easy process compared with proprietary software. Its growing use and support from large firms such as IBM and HP have led many to believe that OSS will ultimately replace proprietary software. While this is hotly debated, there is little doubt that as its use increases, it will impact how software services will be delivered. In particular, low cost global delivery centers might benefit from ready access to OSS code. The panel will discuss these and other issues related to the globalization of software services caused by OSS.

Panelists:

Mike Balma is HP's Linux Business Strategist. Mike has helped drive HP's strategy for Linux and Open Source software across HP since 1999. Mike is a member of HP's Open Source Review Board that reviews HP open source projects. He was involved in the Linux port to Itanium. He also helped create an exchange for open source software development. And he helps drive HP's Linux strategy in the public sector including the security related technologies and certifications.

Mitchell Kertzman is a partner at Hummer Winblad Venture Partners. He has over 30 years of experience as a CEO of public and private software companies. Most recently, Mitchell was chairman and CEO of Liberate Technologies, a provider of platform software for the delivery of digital services by cable television companies.

Rajesh Setty chairman of CIGNEX Technologies, Inc., a company that he co-founded in late 2000. Setty has managed technology projects and practices over the last 14 years in several parts of the world (India, Singapore, Malayisa, Hong Kong, France and the United States.)

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Mike Balma Linux Business Strategist Panelist Hewlett Packard
Mitchell Kertzman Partner Panelist Hummer Winblad Venture Partners
Rajesh Setty chairman of CIGNEX Technologies, Inc. Panelist
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In Thailand in 1997 reformers drafted a new constitution. They hoped to trigger dramatic improvements in the country's political system. Analysts, activists, and politicians alike blamed many of Thailand's problems on shortcomings of a party system seen as dangerously weak and fragmented. Accordingly, the new charter was designed to strengthen political parties while reducing their number. These constitutional changes profoundly affected Thai politics, but not always in the ways or for the reasons that reformers had in mind. Have the changes improved or worsened the quality of democracy in Thailand? In addressing this question, Professor Hicken will highlight the unintended consequences of constitutional reform and the nature of governance under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party.

Allen Hicken studies political institutions and policy making in developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Countries he has worked in include Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Cambodia. Writing-in-progress includes a book manuscript, "Building Party Systems: Elections, Parties, and Coordination in Developing Democracies." He has published in the American Journal of Political Science and Electorial Studies, among other places. At Michigan he is affiliated with the university's Center for Southeast Asian Studies and Center for Political Studies. He earned his Ph.D in political science and Pacific studies from the University of California - San Diego.

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Allen Hicken Assistant Professor of Political Science Speaker University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
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On October 18, 2005, SPRIE presented the next seminar in its 2005-2006 series on "Greater China and the Globalization of R&D" with speaker Dr. Doug Fuller, current SPRIE Fellow. Dr. Fuller, speaking on "From California Dreaming to Silicon Success: The Rise of China's Semiconductor Industry," presented both industry-wide data and case studies of individual firms to explain how the politics of finance in China shape which Chinese chip firms become fast learners able to compete in world markets and which ones remain technological laggards.

Over the last several decades, there has been a strenuous debate about policies for economic development between the Washington Consensus promoted by the major international financial institutions and the revisionist political economists . Followers of the former view advocate free and unfettered markets buttressed by institutions to protect property rights. The revisionists argue that development involves social and political processes not adequately captured by the narrow prescriptive focus of the Washington Consensus.

In confronting globalization, there is also a new split among the revisionists themselves. Whereas the Washington Consensus welcomes globalization as a boon to developing countries through expanding the scope of market forces, the revisionists divide over the prospects for developing countries under globalization. The optimists, such as Ernst and Saxenian, see transnational networks as providing opportunities for developing countries to continue to learn the skills and competencies necessary to further their progress. The pessimists of the revisionist camp, such as Stiglitz and Strange, see globalization eroding the capabilities of the state or state-societal alliances necessary for development.

Using the case of technological upgrading (one aspect of economic development) in China's information technology (IT) industry, I demonstrate that opportunities for development exist under globalization. These paths to development are not simply the result of picking the right international networks to join nor are they due to the continued efficacy of state action. They also do not arise from well-developed market institutions within China. China's development success in spite of low levels of state industrial policymaking capacity and very incomplete market institutions tells us that other developing countries similarly unequipped can develop even in this globalized world.

In China's IT industry, two local institutional variables, firm operational strategies and state-firm relations, have interacted with the technology flows present in global networks to create opportunities for certain types of firms to upgrade. A firm's operational strategy (OS) determines its motivation to upgrade in China as opposed to doing so elsewhere. The relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance i.e. whether or not they can access functioning financial institutions.

The relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance and these sources of finance in turn impact their ability to upgrade. Sources of finance that provide credit with hard budget constraints give firms incentives to upgrade. Firms have hard budget constraints when they do not receive free help in covering their own financial obligations. With hard budget constraints forcing firms to meet their financial obligations, firms have to remain competitive to survive. For technology firms, a critical part of their competitiveness is their technology so they have every incentive to improve their technologies to keep pace with competitors. Finance that provides credit with soft budget constraints deprives firms of the incentives and even the capabilities to upgrade. Firms have soft budget constraints when they do not have to pay for some or all of their financial obligations themselves. These firms can rationally expect to survive even if not competitive because others are willing to bail them out. A third possibility is no source of finance. Firms without financing will not be able to invest in technological development.

 

There are four types of firms in China: the favored domestic firms, the neglected domestic firms, the hybrid foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and the regular FIEs. Financing and motivation have varied across firm categories. Due to different state-firm relations, FIEs rely on foreign finance and domestic firms do not. Hybrid FIEs differ from regular FIEs because the hybrids have a China-based operational strategy. This operational strategy (OS) is a mix of interests and ideational factors that causes these firms to perceive China either as the vital center of their operations (the China-based OS) or as just another location among many (the non-China-based OS). Thus, variation in firm-state relations (finance) and operational strategy (motivation) determine the variation in technological upgrading.

This thesis finds that the two types of FIEs are more likely to contribute to upgrading in China than the two types of domestic firms. Among the FIEs, the hybrid FIEs are more likely to contribute than the regular FIEs though the discrepancy is not as large as it is between the FIEs and domestic firms.

The hybrids are the most successful upgraders because they have both disciplined finance (i.e. credit with relatively hard budget constraints) from foreign financial institutions and the motivation to upgrade in China due to their China-based OS. The unsuccessful domestic upgraders lack finance (neglected domestic firms) or financial discipline (the favored domestic firms) due to their particular relationships to the state. The regular FIEs have the capabilities to upgrade due to their financial discipline and access to transnational technology networks, but undertake less upgrading in China than the hybrids because they lack the China-based operational strategy.

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In today's global economy, access to resources around the world has never been easier. The high tech industry has always been in the forefront of globalization in lowering costs, acquiring talent as well as serving markets. For instance, Asian countries have long been known for their vast manufacturing bases for western high tech industry.

In recent years, thanks to Y2K, India has become the leader in software outsourcing. China, given its expanding economy as well as its open market direction, has rapidly become the emerging location for multi-national semiconductor companies to outsource their product development amidst China's own burgeoning integrated circuit (IC) industry. Mr. Lee has first-hand experience in building and managing an IC product development center in Shanghai, China. He will discuss the challenges of operating a R&D organization in an environment of different languages and cultures. He will also share his vision of the future of the IC industry in China.

Mr. Lee is Group Vice President and general manager of Timing Solutions Products at Integrated Device Technology, Inc.(IDT), a public semiconductor company of $650 million annual sales, focusing on valued-added solutions for communication, consumer and computing markets. He has been with IDT for the last 22 years and has served various management roles. In 2001, he architected the acquisition of Newave Semiconductor Corporation in China and established the Shanghai Product Development Center for IDT. Before joining IDT in 1984, Mr. Lee spent 5 years at Intel Corporation as a technologist for the early development of flash memory technology. Mr. Lee earned his B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from National Taiwan University in 1975 and M.S. degree from Case Western Reserve University in 1979.

Philippines Conference Room

Jimmy Lee Group Vice President & General Manager of Timing Solutions Products Speaker Integrated Device Technology, Inc.
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