FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.
Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions.
North Korea conducts third nuclear test
North Korea keeps its pledge to conduct nuclear test
North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on Tuesday, prompting President Barack Obama to call the detonation of a miniature nuclear device a “highly provocative act” that threatens U.S. security and international peace. It is the third nuclear test by Pyongyang since 2006 and is escalating concern that the isolated Stalinist state is now closer to building a bomb small enough to be fitted on a missile capable of striking the United States and its allies. The test was conducted hours before Obama’s annual State of the Union speech.
North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency said the test was conducted, “in a safe and perfect way … with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power.” The statement said the nuclear device did not impose “any negative impact” on the environment.
North Korea said the atomic test was merely its “first response” to what it called U.S. threats and said there would be unspecified “second and third measures of greater intensity” if the United States remains hostile to the North. Washington had led the call for more U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang after the North launched its first rocket and put a satellite into obit in December. While the North said the launch was for its civilian space program, the Obama administration believes it was part of a covert program to develop ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads.
We ask two Stanford experts on North Korea to weigh in: David Straub, the associate director of the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), and Nick Hansen, an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation who is an expert in foreign weapons systems.
Q. Why conduct the test now?
Straub: Since the two previous North Korean nuclear tests took place on American holidays and the North Korean themselves have announced that their moves are "targeted" at the United States, many observers have concluded that the this test was especially timed to coincide with President Obama's State of the Union address. It is also possible that, as others have speculated, the North Koreans also took into account that Feb. 16 is the birthday of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's father, Kim Jong Il, the man who is said to have instructed North Koreans to proceed with the nuclear weapons and missile programs. Others have speculated that the North Korean leadership wanted to test the device before the Feb. 25 transition in South Korea from the current president Lee Myung-bak, to the president-elect, Park Geun-hye. The timing could be intended to punish Lee, whom the North Koreans say they despise, while, the argument goes, making it a little easier for Park to reach out to the North before her inauguration.
Q. What message is North Korea’s young and relatively new president, Kim Jong Un, trying to send to the world with this test?
Hansen: Kim seems to be saying: I’m going to do what I say I’m going to do – and nobody is going to dissuade me. The North said they were going to launch a satellite, and by God they did. They said they were going to touch off a nuclear test after that, and by God they did. Now we have to wait and see what’s next.
Straub: The North Koreans themselves are saying that the test is a response to the military threat posed to it by the United States and to U.S.-led UN sanctions imposed on North Korea after its rocket test in December. The North Koreans have complex motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. Many North Koreans may actually believe that having nuclear weapons will defend them against the United States. But the fact of the matter is that the United States and South Korea have never attacked North Korea over the decades, while the North Koreans have repeatedly attacked South Korean and American targets, most recently killing 50 South Koreans in 2010. North Korea's top leaders see nuclear weapons and missiles as a panacea. Fearful of opening up to the outside world because of the lies they have told their people, Pyongyang wants to believe that it will eventually maneuver the United States and the international community as a whole into accepting its possession of nuclear weapons and forcing the removal of sanctions against it. That won't happen, but even if it did, it would not resolve Pyongyang's basic problems, which stem from the totalitarian nature and history of its regime.
Q. What concerns you most in the wake of this test?
Hansen: The thing I’m worried about now is that they also said they’re going to launch more satellites and long-range missiles. They displayed one in the military parade of 2010, an intermediate-range missile that can probably go 2,000 miles. When you think about that, 2,000 miles, or maybe a little bit longer, it puts just about every U.S. base in Asia under its threat, including Guam, Okinawa, Taiwan and everything in Japan. It’s a threat if they could put a warhead on it. The KN-08 is a bigger, three-stage rocket and is more of a threat, with the potential of hitting at least Alaska, Hawaii and maybe the U.S. West Coast. But remember, the North has tested neither.
Q. The test was in defiance of Pyongyang’s chief ally, Beijing, which had urged Kim not to risk confrontation and said the North would “pay a heavy price” if it proceeded with a test. How will China respond?
Straub: China is key in dealing with the North. China provides North Korea with most of its external support, including vital food and energy supplies. Chinese leaders are certainly not happy with their North Korean counterparts, as China would prefer peace and stability in the region, so it can focus on its own economic development. But Chinese leaders are fearful that putting a great deal of pressure on North Korea might result in chaos, with unpredictable and possibly very dangerous repercussions for China and the region. Thus, before North Korean nuclear and rocket tests, typically the Chinese press Pyongyang not to proceed. But immediately after a test, the Chinese begin to urge "all parties" to exercise restraint. In the United Nations, where China has a veto on the Security Council, it reluctantly agrees to the minimum condemnations of and sanctions against North Korea. After the dust settles, however, China doesn't seriously implement the sanctions. In fact, since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, Chinese trade with North Korea has dramatically increased as a result of a PRC government decision to support North Korea. China may agree to a stronger resolution this time, but ultimately this pattern will almost certainly repeat itself.
Q. The North Koreans have said the test poses no risks to the environment or its people. Is this accurate?
Hansen: It takes a while for the particles that are released from the test to get released from the cracks in the rock and get into the atmosphere. My guess is that because of this very hard rock, they probably don’t have much of a radiation release problem. It probably will just seep through naturally and should not be of any danger. Engineers seem to have done a good job from a security and safety standpoint; the way the tunnels make right-handle turns and then there are the blast doors and piles of dirt to soak up any release.
Symposium on Northeast Asia Security
The security of Northeast Asia has important global implications beyond the region. The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Yonhap News Agency co-sponsored a symposium in Seoul on Feb. 5 to address current security issues, looking also within the context of recent leadership changes.
- » Symposium website
- » Yonhap News release (Jan. 16, 2013)
- » Yonhap News article in Korean (Nuclear Threat, Feb. 5)
- » Yonhap News article in Korean (U.S.-China Relations, Feb. 5)
- » Yonhap News article in Korean (ROK-U.S. Policy, Feb. 5)
- » Yonhap News article in Korean (Inter-Korean Relations, Feb. 5)
- » Yonhap News article in Korean (Remarks, Feb. 5)
- » Yonhap News article in English (U.S. North Korea policy, Feb. 5)
- » Gi-Wook Shin discusses the North Korean nuclear issues (interview with Yonhap News, Feb. 10, 2013)
Seoul, Korea
Stanford law professor, security expert to lead FSI
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, a Stanford law professor and expert on administrative law and governance, public organizations, and transnational security, will lead the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
The announcement was made in Feb. 11 by Provost John Etchemendy and Ann Arvin, Stanford’s vice provost and dean of research.
“Professor Cuéllar brings a remarkable breadth of experience to his new role as FSI director, which is reflected in his many achievements as a legal scholar and his work on diverse federal policy initiatives over the past decade,” Arvin said. “He is deeply committed to enhancing FSI’s academic programs and ensuring that it remains an intellectually rich environment where faculty and students can pursue important interdisciplinary and policy-relevant research.”
Known to colleagues as “Tino,” Cuéllar starts his role as FSI director on July 1.
Cuéllar has been co-director of FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) since 2011, and has served in the Clinton and Obama administrations. In his role as FSI director, he’ll oversee 11 research centers and programs – including CISAC – along with a variety of undergraduate and graduate education initiatives on international affairs. His move to the institute's helm will be marked by a commitment to build on FSI’s interdisciplinary approach to solving some of the world’s biggest problems.
“I am deeply honored to have been asked to lead FSI. The institute is in a unique position to help address some of our most pressing international challenges, in areas such as governance and development, health, technology, and security,” Cuéllar said. “FSI’s culture embodies the best of Stanford – a commitment to rigorous research, training leaders and engaging with the world – and excels at bringing together accomplished scholars from different disciplines.”
Cuéllar, 40, is a senior fellow at FSI and the Stanley Morrison Professor of Law at the law school, where he will continue to teach and conduct research. He succeeds Gerhard Casper, Stanford’s ninth president and a senior fellow at FSI.
“We are deeply indebted to former President Casper for accomplishing so much as FSI director this year and for overseeing the transition to new leadership so effectively,” Arvin said.
Casper was appointed to direct the institute for one year following the departure of Coit D. Blacker, who led FSI from 2003 to 2012 and oversaw significant growth in faculty appointments and research.
Casper, who chaired the search for a new director, said Cuéllar has a “profound understanding of institutions and policy issues, both nationally and internationally.”
“Stanford is very fortunate to have persuaded Tino to become director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies,” Casper said. “He will not only be an outstanding fiduciary of the institute, but with his considerable imagination, energy, and tenacity will develop collaborative and multidisciplinary approaches to problem-solving.”
Cuéllar – who did undergraduate work at Harvard, earned his law degree from Yale and received his PhD in political science at Stanford in 2000 – has had an extensive public service record since he began teaching at Stanford Law School in 2001.
Taking a leave of absence from Stanford during 2009 and 2010, he worked as special assistant to the president for justice and regulatory policy at the White House, where his responsibilities included justice and public safety, public health policy, borders and immigration, and regulatory reform. Earlier, he co-chaired the presidential transition team responsible for immigration.
After returning to Stanford, he accepted a presidential appointment to the Council of the Administrative Conference of the United States, a nonpartisan agency charged with recommending improvements in the efficiency and fairness of federal regulatory programs.
Cuéllar also worked in the Treasury Department during the Clinton administration, focusing on fighting financial crime, improving border coordination and enhancing anti-corruption measures.
Since his appointment as co-director of CISAC, Cuéllar worked to expand the center’s agenda while continuing its strong focus on arms control, nuclear security and counterterrorism. During Cuéllar’s tenure, the center launched new projects on cybsersecurity, migration and refugees, as well as violence and governance in Latin America. CISAC also added six fellowships; recruited new faculty affiliates from engineering, medicine, and the social sciences; and forged ties with academic units across campus.
He said his focus as FSI’s director will be to strengthen the institute’s centers and programs and enhance its contributions to graduate education while fostering collaboration among faculty with varying academic backgrounds.
“FSI has much to contribute through its existing research centers and education programs,” he said. “But we will also need to forge new initiatives cutting across existing programs in order to understand more fully the complex risks and relationships shaping our world.”
In addition to Casper, the members of the search committee were Michael H. Armacost, Francis Fukuyama, Philip W. Halperin, David Holloway, Rosamond L. Naylor, Douglas K. Owens, and Elisabeth Paté-Cornell.
Drawing Lines in the Water: A Multimedia Presentation and Prognosis on the South China Sea
Gregory Poling will begin with a multimedia presentation highlighting the most important aspects of the South China Sea disputes, including the competing legal claims, recent clashes, and the oil, fisheries, and trade interests that help feed the conflict. He will then examine recent actions by the various claimants and the motivations behind them, including the Philippines' recent decision to take China's claims to a UN arbitration tribunal. He will show why commentators have been too quick to dismiss Manila's case. During the Q&A he will field questions on any aspect of the disputes, including what they imply for Asia and US-Asian relations.
Gregory Poling’s work at CSIS includes managing projects focused on US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia. In addition to the South China Sea, his research interests include democratization in Southeast Asia and Asian multilateralism. Before joining CSIS he lived and worked in China as an English language teacher. He has an MA in international affairs from American University, earned his BA in history and philosophy at Saint Mary's College of Maryland, and has studied at Fudan University in Shanghai.
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
The Impact of Migration on the Sending Country: Evidence from the Philippines
More than 215 million people—approximately 3% of the world’s population—now live outside their country of birth (United Nations, 2009). Migration of individuals across international borders has socio-economic consequences both to the receiving and sending countries. One of the most important economic impacts of international migration is the amount of remittances sent home by migrants. World Bank (2011) estimated that developing countries received about $372 billion of remittances. Remittances serve as the second largest source of foreign reserves, next to exports of goods and services, for these countries. In addition, remittances benefit the poor households whose average income falls below the amount necessary to meet their most basic and non-food needs for the year.
This study focuses on the roles of international migration and remittances in the Philippines, which was ranked fourth in total international remittances received in 2009, after India, China, and Mexico (World Bank, 2012). The Philippine government refers to the temporary international workers or Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) as bagong bayani or new heroes. This epithet stems from the important roles that these migrant workers play: they often serve as the primary income providers for their families left in the Philippines, and their transfers are a source of foreign reserves for the Philippine economy.
The colloquium presents evidence on three related research questions. The first is whether agricultural households in rural Philippines use remittances from OFWs, along with loans, and assets to mitigate the effect of negative shocks to their income. In particular, speaker Marjorie Pajaron will ask the question whether farmers depend on their network of family and friends when they encounter a natural disaster, like excessive rainfall or typhoon. The second is how migration affects the bargaining power within the household. Finally, she will discuss the remittance behavior of different types of migrants from the Philippines.
Marjorie Pajaron joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center during the 2012–13 academic year from the University of Hawai’i at Manoa Department of Economics where she served as a lecturer.
She took part for five years in the National Transfer Accounts project based in Honolulu. Her research focuses on the role of migrant remittances as a risk-coping mechanism, as well as the importance of bargaining power in the intra-household allocation of remittances in the Philippines. Pajaron received a PhD in economics from the University of Hawai’i at Manoa.
Her recent working papers include: “Remittances, Informal Loans, and Assets as Risk-Coping Mechanisms: Evidence from Agricultural Households in Rural Philippines,” October 2012, Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Development Economics; “The Roles of Gender and Education on the Intra-household Allocations of Remittances of Filipino Migrant Workers,” June 2012; and “Are Motivations to Remit Altruism, Exchange, or Insurance? Evidence from the Philippines,” December 2011.
Philippines Conference Room
Marjorie Pajaron
Marjorie Pajaron joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as Visiting Scholar for the spring and summer quarters of 2026 from the University of the Philippines Diliman (UPSE), where she serves as Associate Professor in the School of Economics. She was previously at APARC as Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellow during the 2012–13 academic year.
While at APARC, she will be conducting research on the migration of healthcare workers from the Philippines and the nexus with climate change.
Pajaron received a PhD in economics from the University of Hawai’i at Manoa.
Publications:
Ramel, R. C. D., Legaspi, J. D., & Pajaron, M. C. (2026). Illuminating the land: the effects of nighttime lights on land values in the Philippines. Remote Sensing Letters, 17(5), 465–477. https://doi.org/10.1080/2150704X.2026.2650396
Pajaron M, Vasquez GN. (2023). Weather, Lockdown, and the Pandemic: Evidence from the Philippines. Philipp J Sci 152(S1): 47–62. https://doi.org/10.56899/152.S1.04
Pajaron, M.C., Vasquez, G.N.A. (2020). Weathering the storm: weather shocks and international labor migration from the Philippines. Journal of Population Economics 33, 1419–1461. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-020-00779-1
Pajaron, M. (2017). “The Role of Remittances as a Risk-Coping Mechanism: Evidence from Agricultural Households in the Philippines.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 26 (1): 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1177/01171968166806
Pajaron, M. (2016). “Heterogeneity in the Intrahousehold Allocation of International Remittances: Evidence from Philippine Households.” Journal of Development Studies 52 (6): 854–875. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2015.1113261