Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea are often regarded as virtually indistinguishable from China’s. On paper, Taiwan and China appear to be making substantially the same claims and the controversial U-shaped dashed line may be found on ROC and PRC maps alike. Neither government has officially clarified the dashed line’s meaning or assigned its coordinates.

Dr Kuok, however, argues that Taiwan has in the past year taken small but significant steps toward clarifying its claims. It has also adopted a more conciliatory approach best illustrated by President Ma’s official launch of a South China Sea Peace Initiative in May 2015. These moves imply possible daylight between Taiwan and China regarding the South China Sea. Dr. Kuok will examine these developments, as well as the costs, benefits, and chances of widening or narrowing that daylight in the larger context of Taipei-Beijing relations, domestic considerations including the January 2016 election in Taiwan, and the responses of other actors in the region.

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Lynn Kuok’s latest publication is Tides of Change: Taiwan’s Evolving Position in the South China Sea (2015). She was recently a senior visiting fellow at the Centre for International Law (Singapore), and has held fellowships at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her research interests include ethnic and religious relations and nationalism in Southeast Asia and the politics and security of the Asia-Pacific region. She has served as editor-in-chief of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs and the Singapore Law Review. She holds degrees from the University of Cambridge (PhD), the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (MALD), and the National University of Singapore (LLB).

Lynn Kuok Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings Institution
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Denise Masumoto
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As the new academic year gets underway, the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center’s Corporate Affiliates Program is excited to welcome its new class of fellows to Stanford University:

  • Yuta AikawaMinistry of Economy, Trade & Industry, Japan
  • Wataru FukudaShizuoka Prefectural Government
  • Huang (Catherine) HuangBeijing Shanghe Shiji Investment Company
  • Avni JethwaReliance Life Sciences
  • Satoshi Koyanagi, Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry, Japan
  • An Ma, PetroChina
  • Huaxiang Ma, Peking University
  • Yuichiro Muramatsu, Mitsubishi Electric
  • Tsuzuri Sakamaki, Ministry of Finance, Japan
  • Tsuneo SasaiThe Asahi Shimbun
  • Ravishankar Shivani, Reliance Life Sciences
  • Aki Takahashi, Nissoken
  • Mariko Takeuchi, Sumitomo Corporation
  • Hideaki Tamori, The Asahi Shimbun
  • Ryo Washizaki, Japan Patent Office
  • Hung-Jen (Fred) Yang, MissionCare

During their stay at Stanford University, the fellows will audit classes, work on English skills, and conduct individual research projects; at the end of the year they will make a formal presentation on the findings from their research. During their stay at the center, they will have the opportunity to consult with Shorenstein APARC's scholars and attend events featuring visiting experts from around the world. The fellows will also participate in special events and site visits to gain a firsthand understanding of business, society and culture in the United States.

 

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Political life in most democratic systems centers on the presidency or the parliament.  In countries that have begun to shift from authoritarian to democratic rule, American and Western aid programs typically place a high priority on strengthening the capacities of parliaments.  Superficial evidence in Myanmar and Indonesia suggests that these efforts by democratic donors have contributed to the emergence of legislatures that are more of an obstacle to economic progress than a driver of it.  Lex Rieffel will offer his perspective on this phenomenon in Myanmar and Indonesia with particular attention to Myanmar in the run-up to its November 8 election.  The two countries will also be compared with regard to geography, ethnic conflict, and communal tension, and their implications for the political process.

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Lex Rieffel has written widely on the political economies of Myanmar and Indonesia.  His latest publication is "Improving the Performance of the State Economic Enterprise Sector in Myanmar" (ISEAS Perspective #36, 2015).  Notable among his many other writings are:  Too Much Too Soon? The Dilemma of Foreign Aid to Myanmar/Burma (co-authored, 2013); Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests (edited, 2010); and Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia (co-authored, 2007).  His career prior to joining Brookings in 2002 included positions with the Institute of International Finance, the U.S. Treasury Department, and USAID.  Universities where he has taught courses in economics and finance include Johns Hopkins (SAIS), George Washington (Elliott School), and the University of Yangon.  His MA in law and diplomacy and his BA in economics are respectively from Tufts (Fletcher School) and Princeton.

Do Parliaments Help or Hurt Economic Progress in Democratizing Countries? The Case of Myanmar, with Notes on Indonesia Primary tabs View Edit(active tab) Revisions Nodequeue
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Lex Rieffel Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
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Indonesian President Joko (“Jokowi”) Widodo was inaugurated in October 2014.  He is the country’s seventh president, but only its second to be directly elected and its first from both a non-elite and non-military background.  He won the election by a narrow margin over a hard-line ex-general accused of violating human rights.

Human rights abuses have long marred Indonesian rule in western Papua.  Candidate Jokowi promised to improve conditions there.  He traveled to the area twice during the election campaign.  His predecessor visited Papua only three times during his entire ten-year presidency.  Jokowi also promised to protect religious minorities from violence, intolerance, and discrimination, and to help reconcile survivors of the mass bloodletting in 1965-66.  Has he kept these and other commitments to improve human rights conditions in Indonesia?  Or not?  And why?

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Andreas Harsono has covered Indonesia for Human Rights Watch since 2008. Organizations that he has helped to establish include a journalist-training organization, the Pantau Foundation (Jakarta, 2003); the South East Asia Press Alliance (Bangkok, 1998); and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (Jakarta, 1994).  He began his career as a reporter for The Nation (Bangkok) and the Star newspapers (Kuala Lumpur), and has edited a monthly magazine on media and journalism, Pantau (Jakarta).  He was a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University in 2000.

Andreas Harsono Indonesia Researcher, Human Rights Watch
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Prof. Pavin will explain the concept of “neo-royalism” that Thai royalists have promoted; relate it to the present twilight of King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s long reign; and use it to forecast the future of the royal institution in Thailand. Pavin will assess the prospects of the king-in-waiting, Vajiralongkorn, and imagine the position of a new monarch in a new political environment. He will portray “neo-royalism” as a dangerous entrapment for Bhumibol’s successor and for the monarchy itself. The undemocratic nature of royal power is incompatible with the country’s changing political landscape. If Vajiralongkorn inherits the throne, he may try to consolidate top-down power, risking failure and rejection. Alternatively, he could reform the monarchy by placing it clearly within constitutional bounds. Recent evidence suggests that he may play an activist role.

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Pavin Chachavalpongpun is an associate professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies in Kyoto University. His many publications include Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy (2010) and A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations (2005), and he is chief editor of the multilingual on-line Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia.  His PhD is from the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies.

Following Pavin’s fierce criticism of the May 2014 military coup in Thailand, the junta twice summoned him to Bangkok. He did not comply; instead, he reaffirmed his opposition to the coup. A warrant was eventually issued for his arrest, his Thai passport was revoked, and he was obliged to apply for refugee status in Japan.

Philippines Conference Room

Encina Hall, 3rd Floor central

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

Pavin Chachavalpongpun 2015-16 Lee Kong Chian National University of Singapore-Stanford University Distinguished Fellow on Southeast Asia
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The United States faces a formidable set of international challenges, from emboldened terrorist organizations, weakening democratic norms, and continued uncertainty within the global financial system. However, there is some light coming out of South Asia.  The deepening ties between the United States and India can have a profound and positive impact on global security and prosperity. The relationship is developing in the context of a growing global debate on the ability of constitutional democracies to address 21st century security and development challenges—maritime security, territorial disputes, economic inclusivity, and climate change. And it is developing in the context of an Indian debate about whether and how India will assume its natural place as a leading power in the world. A successful U.S.-India strategic partnership can deliver a decisive response to these questions. If two countries with very different economic, cultural, and geographic situations can achieve a level of strategic collaboration that safeguards prosperity, peace, and stability both within and beyond their own borders, it will demonstrate that principles of participatory governance remain relevant and vital to the global good.

 

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Richard Verma serves as the 25th United States Ambassador to India. He was nominated by President Obama on September 18th, 2014, and was confirmed by the U.S. Senate and sworn in by Secretary of State John Kerry in December 2014. Ambassador Verma oversees one of the largest U.S. Missions in the world, including four consulates across India and nearly every agency of the U.S. government.

As a former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs in the Obama Administration, he led the State Department’s efforts on Capitol Hill and served as a senior member of Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton’s team.

Ambassador Verma previously worked in the Senate as the Senior National Security Advisor to the Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid. He also worked in the House of Representatives for longtime Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Committee, Jack Murtha. He is veteran of the U.S. Air Force, where he served on active duty as a Judge Advocate. Rich was also a country director for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Eastern Europe.

Richard Verma 25th U.S. Ambassador to India
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The fourteenth session of the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, held Stanford University on June 25, 2015, convened senior South Korean and American policymakers, scholars and regional experts to discuss North Korea policy and recent developments on the Korean Peninsula. Hosted by the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, the Forum is also supported by the Korea National Diplomatic Academy.

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Myoung-kyu Park is a professor of sociology and director of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University. Professor Park is one of South Korea's leading scholars of the North Korea problem, Korean identity and nationalism, and popular attitudes toward Korean unification. He is an FSI-Humanities Center International Visitor at Stanford for the fall 2015.

In this talk, Professor Park will examine South Koreans' perception of North Korea-related issues: denuclearization, human rights, security, cooperation, and unification. Based on data from annual surveys conducted by IPUS during 2007-2015, Professor Park will discuss South Korean psychological attitudes, the generational gap, and general trends and policy orientation regarding North Korea.
Myoung-kyu Park Professor of Sociology, Seoul National University
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North Korea today threatened military action against South Korea if it did not end its propaganda broadcasts along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) within 48 hours. The broadcasts against the North are being systematically blared by loudspeakers over the border.   

South Korea resumed the broadcasts earlier this week after an 11-year hiatus, in retaliation for North Korea’s planting landmines just outside a South Korean DMZ guard post that crippled two South Korean soldiers on Aug. 4.

David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former Korean affairs director at the U.S. Department of State, offers insights on the situation. Straub also spoke on PRI's "The World" radioshow on Aug. 20, the audioclip and summary can be accessed by clicking here.

What’s behind the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula?

Fundamentally, the current situation is just another symptom of the underlying problem, which is the division of Korea into two competing states, with one of them—North Korea—having a Stalinist totalitarian system and a Maoist-style cult of personality. Since North Korea can’t compete with the South economically and diplomatically, it uses the threat of force or the actual use of it to try to intimidate South Korea. The North Koreans know that South Korea tends to “blink first” and step back because it is democratic and its leaders are concerned about civilian casualties.

The current situation is also related to the leadership transition in North Korea, with leader Kim Jong Un succeeding his father Kim Jong Il three years ago. Kim Jong Un still feels insecure, which is clearly evidenced by his execution of his powerful uncle Jang Seong-taek in 2013 and many other leaders there as well. To solidify support for his rule, he also manufactures a South Korean threat to rally his people behind him.

What does North Korea want?

North Korea’s immediate demand is that South Korea stop its propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. The South Korean broadcasts criticize the North Korean system and its leaders, which is something that the North, with its cult of personality, can’t accept. But the South resumed the broadcasts only because the North Koreans recently snuck into the South Korean side of the DMZ and viciously planted landmines just outside a South Korean guard post. These were clearly intended to maim South Korean soldiers. They did just that, blowing the legs off two young men.

The North Korean regime’s long-term aim is not just to survive but also to get the upper hand on South Korea, and eventually try again to reunify the peninsula on its own terms. That explains why North Korea behaves as it does, rather than reform its system and reconcile with the South.

The North also demands an end to all U.S. and South Korean military exercises on the peninsula—even though the North has a much larger military than the South and U.S. forces there combined and is developing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the North wants to end the U.S.-South Korean alliance and see U.S. forces withdrawn from the peninsula, in the belief that it will open the way to eventual victory over the South.

Why did the South resume the broadcasts? Was it a good idea?

South Korea resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts in retaliation for the maiming of two of its soldiers on August 4th. Rather than retaliate by attacking militarily, the South resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts because the South Korean military knows that North Korean leaders hate them.

The South Korean military believes that North Korean leaders hate the broadcasts because they are effective in educating young North Korean soldiers and civilians in earshot about the nature of the regime and its leaders. The South Korean military seems to assume that the broadcasts are effective in that regard because they anger the North Korean leaders so much. But I think the reason the broadcasts anger the North Korean leaders is due to the cult of personality. The North Korean system can’t accept the idea of its leaders being criticized.

So I don’t think it was necessarily a wise step on the part of the South Korean military to resume the broadcasts. On the other hand, politically, by crippling two South Korean soldiers, the North Koreans had left South Korea with no option but to respond in some way. After the North Koreans killed fifty South Koreans in two separate sneak attacks five years ago, the South Korean government warned that it was not going to sit back the next time. The resumption of the broadcasts has further raised tensions but, frankly, given the danger of war on the peninsula, the South doesn’t have a lot of good ways to respond to North Korean provocations.

How serious is the situation?

North Korea has now threatened military action in 48 hours if South Korea doesn’t end the propaganda broadcasts. The North often makes threats. Usually, it doesn’t carry them out, but sometimes it does.

The United States and South Korea are conducting an annual military exercise together in the South until the end of August—something else that the North Koreans are demanding an end to. Most experts feel that the North is unlikely to launch a major provocation while the American presence is bolstered and the U.S. and South Korean militaries are paying full attention. The North Korean leaders know they are weaker than our side, so they usually avoid frontal assaults and instead engage in sneak attacks, at times and places and in ways of their own choosing.

There is more uncertainty in recent years because of the aggressive and threatening behavior thus far of Kim Jong Un, who is young and inexperienced. He seems anxious about his position in the North and prepared to take risks to bolster it, including rallying the people behind him by raising tensions with the South. We also don’t know if the North feels freer to engage in major provocations because it has developed at least a handful of nuclear devices since its first nuclear test in 2006.

So I myself wouldn’t be afraid to visit Seoul now but the situation bears even closer watching than usual.

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North Korean soldiers stand guard at the Demilitarized Zone, 2008.
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A version of this paper, "Security Challenges in a Turbulent World: Fewer Enemies, More Challenges, and Greater Anxiety," delivered at the International Areas Studies Symposium at the University of Okalhoma, on Feb. 26, 2015, is also available in English by clicking here.

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Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University
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Thomas Fingar
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