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In the midst of leadership changes and rethinking of the Six-Party Talks, the time is ripe for reassessing how multilateralism can be advanced in Northeast Asia. The earlier stress on economic integration as the engine of regionalism has lost credibility, although the forces of interdependence continue to grow. The tendency to treat security in isolation also may be receding, as the Six-Party Talks and Sino-U.S. relations both reveal the multi-sided nature of building trust. At the same time, the pessimism associated with overemphasis on the history issue between Japan and its neighbors has receded in the face of renewed Sino-Japanese and South Korean-Japanese diplomacy. Yet, finding common ground in strategic thinking about the future of multilateralism demands a new approach that takes into account lessons from recent years.

As the building blocks of a new approach, this presentation will focus on four themes: 1) re-examination of ways to accelerate regionalism, with attention to leadership, energy cooperation, and the role of Russia; 2) development of a more comprehensive outlook on values, with attention to shared modernity, gradualism, and the role of Japan; 3) discussion of the next phase in managing North Korea, attentive to Sino-U.S. accord and the role of South Korea; and 4) evaluation of U.S. priorities and how a new president may view Northeast Asia within an overall agenda.   The objective of this talk will be to stimulate thinking on a region at a crossroads in order to capitalize on recent currents of change.

Gil Rozman attended Princeton's Critical Languages Program, returning to Carleton College as an independent major in Chinese and Russian studies. He received his PhD in sociology at Princeton with a field on Chinese, Japanese, and Russian societies and a plan to concentrate on historical comparisons first and on the domestic roots of international relations later. His books have appeared in clusters, including: four on comparative pre-modern urban development and stages of modernization; three on debates in the Soviet Union, China, and Japan over bilateral relations and changes in socialism; two on regionalism; and four on strategic thinking in Northeast Asia. Although he is still learning about Korea, many recent writings have looked at Korea within a regional context.

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Gil Rozman Professor of Sociology Speaker Princeton University
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Sometimes doing field research involves dodging cow pies in an actual field. At least, that was the case for a group of Jean C. Oi's students.

Oi discussed the importance of taking students beyond the classroom in a March 6 talk titled "Cow Pies and Democracy: Teaching in the Field," presented as part of the Center for Teaching and Learning's "Award-Winning Teachers on Teaching" lecture series.

Michele Marincovich, associate vice provost of undergraduate education and director of the Center for Teaching and Learning, introduced Oi, calling "Cow Pies and Democracy" the "most colorful title" in the lecture series.

Oi, the William Haas Professor in Chinese Politics, began her talk by laughingly apologizing for her word choice. "I still can't believe I chose that title, but I think it aptly describes what I do with my students," she said.

Oi teaches courses on political change in China, and much of her research has focused on village elections. Though China has been a single-party state since the Communist Party took control in 1949, the country has held direct elections for village officials since the 1980s, a move that has been greeted by some as a possible first step toward a more democratic state.

In 2001, Oi taught a course about village elections for Sophomore College, a three-week summer seminar for incoming sophomores.

Although the class was "very successful," her students kept saying, "I wish we could do this in China," Oi recalled. She agreed.

Without leaving Stanford's campus, "I think it's difficult to convey the different world [the Chinese] are living in," Oi added.

The year after she first taught Sophomore College, Oi had the chance to take students abroad for a class as part of the Overseas Seminar Program.

They spent two weeks at Peking University learning about village elections and China's political situation. They heard guest speakers from the country's Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the students designed research projects requiring them to interview villagers and village officials.

In the third week of the program, Oi and her students took a bus to Heilonjiang, a northeastern province on China's border with Russia. As the bus approached the village, the road became blocked by a long line of carts delivering corn to the local dairy farm. Oi had all the students get off the bus, and they walked through fields and pastures to get the rest of the way to the village.

"This is where we had to dodge the cow pies," Oi explained.

Oi characterized what she did with her students as "demystifying" the process of doing research. Students learned how to interview people in the field.

"When we got to the village, I said, 'OK! Go!' and they all just scattered," Oi said. "If you set your expectations high, students are going to produce."

Oi's students got to witness a village election. Villagers lined up to mark paper ballots to elect a village committee head. The votes were tallied on a chalkboard, and the winner got 509 votes, just a few more than the runner-up.

Many of the villagers that greeted the students had never seen Americans before, Oi said. "Russians were the only foreigners they had ever seen," she said.

One student was a 6-foot-7-inch Olympic gymnast who drew crowds wherever he went.

"I've seen them on TV, but I'd never seen a real one," one awestruck observer said, marveling at the tall athlete.

Oi said her students felt like they had earned "bragging rights" after their trip to China. "They felt like they had done something none of their peers had done," she said.

One even changed her career plans after the seminar.

"Her parents were very worried about what would happen to her in China, and maybe they should have been," Oi quipped. The student had been planning to go to medical school, but she instead decided to declare a major in political science and study rural China.

"I think I did change some student lives," Oi said.

Oi is also a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the director of the Stanford China Program.

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This chapter is part of a yearly publication that compiles the edited and revised versions of papers presented at the Korea Economic Institute's (KEI) most recent Academic Symposium.

The chaper considers the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as the foundation for the architecture of strategic stability in Northeast Asia that has endured for more than a half century. Along with the U.S. alliance with Japan, this security architecture has maintained the balance of power despite vast geopolitical changes, not least the end of the global Cold War. It provided an environment that fostered spectacular economic growth and the institutionalization of democratic governance.

The stability created under this strategic architecture is now challenged by a unique combination of three developments—the rise of China, North Korea’s bid to become a nuclear power, and the weakening of the United States in the wake of the Iraq War. These events disturb the carefully crafted balance of power that was created during the Cold War era. China’s growth as an economic and military power, combined with its aspirations for regional leadership, creates an alternative pole of power to the United States. The defiant decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to test a nuclear device threatens the security of Korea and Japan and opens the door to further proliferation in the region.

These two developments have been widely discussed among policymakers and experts in the region and in the United States. But there has been little examination of the dangerous dynamic between these events and the Iraq War. The deteriorating military and political situation in Iraq and in the Middle East more broadly has significantly weakened the United States in East Asia. It has swung public opinion against the United States and, as collateral damage, undermined support for the alliances. The focus of U.S. attention and resources on the Middle East feeds a perception that U.S. interest in East Asia is declining. More profoundly, it encourages powers such as China and Russia to assert more frequently and more boldly their desire for a more multipolar power structure.

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Some people said North Korea would not survive the end of the USSR and dissolution of the Soviet bloc. Some people said Kim Jong Il's likely tenure could be measured in months. Some people said that North Korea was on the verge of collapse in 1997; some people, in fact, proclaimed that the economy had already collapsed.

What sorts of myths and misperceptions do we entertain and perpetuate that make it difficult for us to deal with North Korea coherently?

Robert Carlin is a 2007 Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and has been a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University since 2005. After receiving an A.M degree from Harvard University's East Asian Regional Studies program, he joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1971. From 1974 to 1988, he was a senior North Korea media analyst in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), where he received the director of the CIA's Exceptional Analyst Award. From 1989 to 2002, he was the chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Concurrently, from 1993 to 2002, Mr. Carlin served as senior policy advisor to the U.S. special envoy for talks with North Korea, taking part in every significant set of U.S.-DPRK negotiations of which there were many--during those years. He was on the delegation accompanying Secretary of State Madeline Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000. From 2003 to 2005, Mr. Carlin was senior political advisor to the executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), leading numerous KEDO negotiating teams to the DPRK. Altogether, he has made 25 trips to North Korea.

Much of Mr. Carlin's analysis on North Korea from his years at FBIS has been declassified and is available either in the "Trends in Communist Propaganda" or "Trends in Communist Media". Over the years, he has written chapters for several books on the Korean issue including, most recently, "Talk to Me, Later," appearing in North Korea: 2005 and Beyond. In 2006, he co-authored an IISS Adelphi paper "North Korean Reform: Politics, Economics and Security." His essay on negotiating with North Korea will appear in Korea 2007 - Politics, Economy, Society. Over his career, Mr. Carlin has lectured at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, foreign ministries and intelligence organizations abroad, and numerous universities.

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Robert Carlin Pantech Fellow Speaker Shorenstein APARC
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We are pleased to announce the first article of the new academic year in our series of Shorenstein APARC Dispatches. This month's piece comes from Dr. John D. Ciorciari, one of this year's Shorenstein Fellows. Dr. Ciorciari's current research centers on the alignment policies of small states and middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He also has interests in international human rights law and international finance. In this piece, Dr. Ciorciari shares some comments on "Myanmar After the Saffron Revolution."

In late September, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks took to the streets of Myanmar, leading the largest uprising against the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) since 1988. A sharp and sudden hike in fuel prices sparked the protests, but to the regime's many critics, the revolt displayed the depth of popular discontent with economic mismanagement, corruption, and political repression in Myanmar. Images of unarmed monks confronting the feared tatmadaw (armed forces) won the protesters considerable moral support from abroad, as did a public appearance by Aung San Suu Kyi. Some observers anticipated that the "saffron revolution" would lead to the overthrow of the regime, as occurred during the "rose," "orange," and "tulip" revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

The tatmadaw responded swiftly and brutally, however. Troops imposed tight curfews, raided pagodas, and used clubs and tear gas to disperse protesters. In a matter of days, the armed forces killed numerous demonstrators, arrested or detained thousands more, and re-imposed control. The saffron revolution thus appears to have subsided, and the outlook is not promising for advocates of regime change or dramatic policy shifts in Myanmar.

The episode did reveal some minor cracks in the SPDC edifice. Colonel Hla Win, a longtime senior member of the junta, reportedly defected into an ethnic Karen rebel-controlled area and is seeking political asylum after defying an order to massacre a group of monks. At least one senior army official has leaked incriminating evidence to the press, and a foreign ministry official resigned at the government's "appalling" response to the protests. Prime Minister Soe Win has been hospitalized with leukemia for months. Rumors even swirled of a coup. Nevertheless, SPDC chairman Than Shwe, his deputy Maung Aye, and other cabinet members appear to have closed ranks, and the SPDC looks quite firmly entrenched.

International responses to the uprising and military response have been mixed. Western governments and activist groups quickly condemned the SPDC and pushed the regime to open dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition National League for Democracy. U.S. President George W. Bush announced tighter sanctions shortly after the crackdown began. Japan--which has favored engagement in the past--is now considering sanctions and has demanded an explanation and an apology for the shooting of a Japanese journalist.

To dampen international pressure, the SPDC allowed Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari to enter the country as a UN special envoy. Gambari has met with both Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi to convey the UN's concerns about the crackdown. The SPDC has also appointed retired general U Aung Kyi as an official interlocutor with Aung San Suu Kyi and has made gestures of conciliation to the clergy. However, the Myanmar leadership has rebuffed demands for more serious political dialogue or far-reaching policy reforms.

A degree of Chinese and Russian protection has helped shield the SPDC from international pressure. China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution demanding that the SPDC free all political prisoners. Officials in Beijing and Moscow argued that the unrest was an "internal matter" unsuited for Security Council action. Their defense of a strong norm of sovereignty--rooted largely in their fear of similar Western attacks--provides political cover for the SPDC. Their objection to isolating Myanmar economically also makes it unlikely that a program of enhanced U.S. and European sanctions will bring the junta to its knees. As long as Myanmar's neighbors do business with the SPDC, it will probably survive.

To date, divergent foreign policy priorities have conspired against a genuinely multilateral policy to drive reform in Myanmar. For China, Myanmar is a strategic gateway to the East Indian Ocean and a source of prized raw materials, as well as a political ally on issues of state sovereignty. India and Thailand have also been loath to cut off or alienate their troublesome neighbor. India has little ideological affection for the SPDC but rejects sanctions and has responded quietly to recent events in Myanmar. Indian officials view Myanmar as an important regional pivot with China and a source of natural resources. Thai policymakers, worried about refugees and instability in ethnic minority enclaves along the border, have tended to prioritize stability over reform in relations with the SPDC. Both India and Thailand derive considerable economic benefits--both legal and illicit--from an open border. In addition, they fear that using their limited leverage to attack the junta will drive it further into China's embrace.

The governments of other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have split on the issue. Indochinese states defend Myanmar's sovereignty, while the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been more openly critical. With a bit of diplomatic legerdemain, Singapore expressed ASEAN's grave concern to Myanmar, speaking as the Association's chair. Discourse in regional think tanks suggests that a growing number of Southeast Asian officials advocate Myanmar's suspension from ASEAN. Although suspension would push Myanmar even further into the margins of international society, it would be unlikely to unseat the SPDC. Isolation also bears obvious risks; cloning North Korea is not in any ASEAN government's interest.

Most analysts agree that China holds the key to improving the prospects for reform, development, and democracy in Myanmar. Indeed, a change in Chinese policy would increase the likelihood of tougher Indian and ASEAN stances, since a fear of encouraging close Sino-Myanmar ties helps justify their existing approaches. The possibility of embarrassment at the upcoming Olympic games provides a short-term incentive for China to press the SPDC for better governance. A longer-term incentive will be to secure the countries' shared border, which is plagued by narco-trafficking, illegal migration, and ethnic conflict. Finally, China has an incentive to build its credibility as a constructive force in Southeast Asia and beyond. Chinese officials have led a well-documented "charm offensive" in the region, both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, to build influence. To the extent that ASEAN governments make reform in Myanmar a priority, China can show itself to be a responsible stakeholder in Southeast Asia's future.

In the near term, a coalescence of the policies of regional powers is unlikely. Moreover, strong regional pressure does not guarantee seismic policy shifts in Myanmar. The SPDC's harsh response to the protests--like its 2006 decision to move the national capital to a remote area--testifies to considerable paranoia. Still, the outside world has economic, security, and moral reasons to hold Myanmar to higher standards of governance. The pace and direction of change will depend only marginally on the severity of Western sanctions, which bite but do not cripple the regime. Western governments' ability to identify common objectives and forge cooperation with Asian partners will be more determinative. Ultimately, the development of concerted action by relevant Asian states is likely to be the rate-limiting step in the equation. The saffron revolution suggests that many domestic actors are prepared to assume risks to promote reform if Myanmar's neighbors take a tougher stand and help provide the enabling conditions for change.

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Shorenstein APARC Dispatches are regular bulletins designed exclusively for our friends and supporters. Written by center faculty and scholars, Shorenstein APARC Dispatches deliver timely, succinct analysis on current events and trends in Asia, often discussing their potential implications for business.

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The PC business is one of the most aggressive in the world, with operating efficiency a critical factor for success. At the time of the HP/Compaq merger in 2000, both PC businesses were losing money. Now, seven years later, HP has reported a record first quarter for PCs, generating $8.7B in revenue, a 17% year over year growth and delivering 4.7% in operating profit, representing 0.8pt improvement year over year. So, what operating model has HP used to accomplish this turnaround and be ranked #1 in the world today? How are resource deployment decisions made? What are the key supply chain considerations? How does the company manage P&L and balance sheet tensions? How will HP continue to stay ahead?

As Vice President and General Manager for HP's Consumer Desktop PC Business Unit, Richard Walker is responsible for a global business that provides desktop PCs and digital entertainment centers to consumer markets. Immediately prior to his current assignment, Richard was Vice President of Emerging Markets, responsible for developing long term strategic growth plans for HP's targeted list of emerging countries, with an initial focus on Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). Richard received his bachelor's degree in business from Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, England. He also serves on the advisory boards for R&D Logic, a San Mateo based life sciences company; Pacific Peninsula Group, a Menlo Park property development company, and SPRIE at Stanford University.

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Richard Walker Vice-President & General Manager, Consumer Desktop PCs Speaker Hewlett-Packard
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