As the U.S. presidential election race heats up, taking a tough stance on China's trade and economic policies has become part of the campaign rhetoric. Daniel C. Sneider speaks with Bloomberg and Medill News Service about Mitt Romney's focus on China.

During the annual China-Japan-Korea summit, held mid-May in Beijing, Premier Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and President Lee Myung-bak announced their intention to begin negotiating a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA).

The news closely followed the implementation of the Korea-U.S. FTA and negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA championed by the Obama administration, both taking place in March. It potentially places Japan and Korea on awkward footing as they balance relations with China, an important regional leader, and the United States, an ally of many decades’ standing.

What could this proposed East Asia FTA mean for the United States, for the three countries pursuing it, and for global economics and security?

Joseph L. C. Cheng, a visiting professor at Shorenstein APARC and a professor of international business at the University of Illinois where he also serves as director of the CIC Center for Advanced Study in International Competitiveness, suggests the FTA could have a far greater impact beyond boosting economic growth in East Asia. Possible outcomes range from reducing resources for strengthening the U.S. domestic infrastructure to providing leverage for negotiating with North Korea over its nuclear program.

In a recent interview, Cheng spoke in-depth about the nuances of the trilateral East Asia FTA.

If the proposed China-Japan-Korea FTA is realized, what could the impact be on the U.S. economy and economic policy?

These three countries are currently ranked the second (China), third (Japan), and fifteenth (Korea) largest economies in the world. With a combined population of 1.5 billion, they account for about 20 percent of the world’s GDP and total exports. In 2011, their three-way trade reached $690 billion, and the United States sold them a total of $213.6 billion worth of merchandise (over 14 percent of U.S. total world exports in 2011).

If realized, the proposed FTA could have both negative and positive effects on the U.S. economy. On the negative side:

• First, cross-border trade and investment would most likely increase among China, Japan, and Korea, but not with the United States. Whether the FTA would result in decreased U.S. trade and investment with these countries and by how much will depend on the range of industries and product categories covered by the FTA and how rigorously it will be enforced. Most of this negative impact from the FTA would be with China. This is because the United States already has an FTA with Korea, and Japan (along with Canada and Mexico) is likely to join the U.S.-led TPP FTA which is currently under negotiation.

• Second, if the FTA did cover the industries and product categories that disadvantage the United States, small-and-medium sized export firms (SMEs) would be the most negatively affected by the decline in U.S. exports to the three member countries. This is because over 90 percent of U.S. SMEs do not conduct manufacturing overseas (and thus cannot produce and sell in these three countries to benefit from the FTA), and their market access is dependent on the U.S. government’s trade initiatives. The SMEs account for about one-third of total U.S. exports and provide most of the domestic job growth.

• Third, not only would the three member countries import less from the United States, they would also invest less in the United States (but invest more in one another). When announcing the FTA talks, China’s Premier Wen expressed hope that Japan and Korea will be the primary destination for China’s outward investment. This decline in foreign investment from the three member countries in the United States could have a negative impact on domestic job growth and funding for business expansion and public revitalization projects (e.g., infrastructure replacement and modernization).

• Fourth, because FTAs disadvantage trade from non-member countries, U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) could be forced to produce and sell goods from their plants in the three member countries (instead of those in the United States) in order to stay competitive. This would mean moving jobs overseas. Also, because these member countries have bilateral FTAs with many other countries in Asia (e.g., the China-ASEAN FTA introduced in January 2010), U.S. MNCs might find it beneficial to increase production there (China, Japan, and Korea) for export to the region. Again, this would result in transfers of jobs overseas and also reduced investment by U.S. MNCs at home (which could help create jobs and grow the domestic economy).

On the positive side, the proposed FTA could result in fewer imports from the member countries into the United States. This would provide an opportunity for U.S. manufacturers, particularly the SMEs, to increase their domestic production to fill the demand-gap and recapture the market-share that has been lost to imports. If U.S. manufacturers could produce unique, high-quality products at an affordable price, they would be able to not only attract new domestic customers and keep them but also open new export markets in other countries, including China, Japan, and Korea.

As for potential impact on U.S. economic policy, the Obama administration might feel the need to speed up the TPP negotiations (which might require making the final FTA less comprehensive and less rigorous than originally proposed) and put the agreement in place ahead of the proposed China-Japan-Korea FTA. Also, the administration might be pressured by the business community to start FTA talks with China, as has been suggested by Maurice Greenberg, chairman of Starr International Company Inc. and former AIG chief. These FTA talks will take years to conclude and implement. In the meantime, the United States should introduce new economic policies to revitalize the domestic manufacturing sector and help position it for enhanced international competitiveness.

Could there be an impact on the struggling economies of Europe?

The proposed FTA would most likely have a similar impact on Europe, namely decreased trade and investment with the three member countries of China, Japan, and Korea (assuming the agreement included industries and product categories that disadvantage Europe). Because of Europe’s worsening debt crisis, the negative impact there would likely be greater than it would be on the United States. Currently, the European Union (EU) has an FTA with Korea, but not with China or Japan. Also, with the exception of Norway, none of the European countries is in FTA talks with China. Switzerland is the only European country with an FTA with Japan. This is not good news for Europe if it wishes to benefit from increased trade and investment with China, Japan, and Korea.

Is there a potential upside for the global economy?

Most of the expected economic benefits resulting from the proposed FTA will go to the three member countries of China, Japan, and Korea. The Chinese government estimates that the FTA could raise China’s GDP by up to 2.0 percent, Japan by 0.5 percent, and Korea by 3.1 percent. The Korean finance ministry estimates that the FTA could boost the nation’s economic growth by up to 3.0 percent and create as many as 330,000 jobs over a decade. This is consistent with the experience of the introduction of the China-ASEAN FTA in January 2010, which caused trade in the region to increase by about 50 percent in that year.

The expected economic growth in the three member countries (and the Asia-Pacific region) could, in the longer term, lead to increased imports from the United States and other Western countries for goods and services that they cannot produce or do not produce enough of. This might result from increased spending by individual consumers on luxury and unique goods and/or government purchase of advanced technologies for infrastructure projects. The increased imports would certainly help lift the global economy by creating more jobs and generating greater incomes in the exporting countries.

When announcing the proposed FTA in Beijing, the three leaders from the member countries made it a point that they will work together to ease regional disputes and tensions, particularly on the Korean Peninsula. They also expect the FTA to help provide a comprehensive and institutional framework in which a wide range of bilateral and trilateral cooperation would evolve, with the goal of maintaining the Asia-Pacific region as the growth center of the world economy. (Currently over 50 percent of the world’s economic growth is taking place in Asia.) To the extent that this can be accomplished, the proposed FTA will have farther-reaching consequences than being just a regional trade agreement.

What is driving the announcement about the intended FTA at this specific point in time?

It is not clear if the announcement was purposefully timed to meet certain strategic objectives. However, a number of factors and recent developments suggest that the timing is quite beneficial to the member countries.

First, the three countries had been in discussion about the proposed FTA for over ten years prior to the announcement. Two of the three principals, China’s Premier Wen and Korea’s President Lee will be leaving office by year’s end and would certainly like to be remembered as architects of this important treaty by participating in its announcement. 

Second, the deteriorating economic crisis in the EU and the slow recovery of the U.S. economy make it very clear to the three leaders that they need to stimulate internal consumption and investment to maintain economic growth in their respective countries. Announcing the proposed FTA now helps ease concerns about the global economy and signal to international investors that the Asia-Pacific region will remain the center of the world’s economic growth for many years to come.

Third, from China’s standpoint, the recent scandals of Bo Xilai and the blind civil rights activist Chen Guangcheng brought negative attention to the country for the entire month of April. The mid-May announcement of the proposed FTA helps redirect the world’s attention to the economic success of China and its influential role in shaping the future of the global economy.

Finally, the recent threat of a third nuclear test from North Korea might have been another contributing factor to having the announcement made sooner rather than later. China might have thought about the proposed FTA as a message to North Korea that China is now working closely with South Korea and Japan to maintain the Asia-Pacific region as the world’s center of economic growth, and thus any new nuclear provocation from North Korea would be considered an unfriendly act.

What could be the biggest challenges to the ratification of the FTA? Can they be overcome?

Historical animosity and territorial disputes between the three member countries will be the greatest challenges to both the FTA negotiation and its final ratification. Korea has recently suspended the signing of agreements on military cooperation with Japan because of public opposition, particularly from the older generations who have bitter memories of Japan’s colonial rule. Japan and China have long been in dispute over territorial claims in the East China Sea. Both Japan and Korea have also been calling for China to put more pressure on North Korea to stop further nuclear provocations. 

In addition to these historical and political obstacles, there will be opposition from interest groups within each country against the proposed FTA for fear of negative economic consequences. For example, Chinese manufacturers might not want increased imports from Japan and Korea to reduce their market share. Japan currently has a big surplus from trade with Korea; thus Korea might not want to have more imports from Japan. Also, the three member countries are quite unbalanced in terms of the liberalization steps that they have already taken and they also have different visions for their economic future.

It will take great diplomatic skills on the part of the negotiators to overcome these challenges. The FTA talks will be difficult and take many years to produce an agreement. Alternatively, the three member countries might choose to smooth the negotiations by avoiding sensitive issues and making the agreement far less comprehensive and rigorous. This would, however, also make the FTA less economically important and consequential. 

On May 18, 2012, the Pentagon released its annual report about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) recent military developments. The PRC Ministry of Defense has sharply criticized the report, saying it portrays China as rapidly building up its military for non-defense purposes.

Military strength is only one part of the national security strategies of both countries and stable U.S.-China relations are an important factor for the overall peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, said Karl Eikenberry during the annual Oksenberg lecture, held May 14 at Stanford.Eikenberry, FSI’s Payne Distinguished Lecturer and a Shorenstein APARC affiliate, discussed key factors shaping China’s national security strategy and corresponding developments in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); constraints on China’s military capabilities; and implications of China’s economic and political growth for U.S. defense strategy.

In his opening remarks, Eikenberry, who served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011 and whose distinguished military career included three decades of significant China experience, described Shorenstein APARC senior fellow Michel Oksenberg’s passionate commitment to teaching Stanford students about China. The annual lecture, established by Shorenstein APARC in 2002, honors the memory of Oksenberg’s academic career and the major role he played in normalizing and strengthening U.S.-China relations.

The key drivers behind the PRC’s current national security strategy, Eikenberry said, include preserving the legitimacy and power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), resolving territorial and sovereignty issues, and maintaining China’s rapid economic growth. The PLA, which has watched its budget grow at an annual rate of 10 percent nearly every single year since 1989, exists to support the goals of the CCP. Its own tasks are, in turn, driven by the most urgent needs of the CCP, including protecting China’s economic and territorial interests in the Asia-Pacific region, bringing it into potential conflict with the United States. A major goal of the PLA at present, Eikenberry said, is to develop its technological capabilities, in areas such as space and naval defense, to prevail in regional conflicts if peaceful resolution is not possible. He said China’s immediate motive, however, is less about driving the United States out of the Asia-Pacific as it is about reconfiguring the region’s—and the overall U.S.—power paradigm, which has remained unchanged since World War Two.

China’s defense budget is second in the world only to the United States—approximately 1.3 percent of the country’s GDP—but it faces several potential challenges to its continued rapid expansion and operational capabilities, Eikenberry said. Maintaining economic growth and social stability are likely to tax the CCP in the coming years, he said, and domestic security concerns could constrain the pace of Chinese defense modernization. In addition, issues within the PLA itself, such as corruption and the over-centralization of its command, could hold China’s military capabilities back. 

Eikenberry concluded his remarks with thoughts on how the United States should respond to China’s “rise” and increasing military strength. An important first step, he said, is to address U.S. domestic issues, including balancing the national budget while still allowing significant resources for military R&D and personnel training. Eikenberry also advocated supporting regional and global institutions, both economic and security oriented, in which China can participate as a responsible stakeholder. He further stressed the importance of improved engagement with U.S. regional allies. Finally, he emphasized the significance of developing processes of dialogue for avoiding and managing future conflicts between the United States and China.

Eikenberry’s remarks were followed by a lively question-and-answer session with the audience, which included numerous China experts from the Stanford community, students, and members of the general public.

In an article for Foreign Policy, Karl Eikenberry argues that the drifting Taiwan-U.S. relationship puts the stability of the Asia-Pacific region at risk. He observes that other regional allies are hedging their bets against a rising military power in China because of skepticism that the United States can keep its commitments, and outlines key weaknesses that Washington must overcome with Taipei.

Scarborough Shoal, a tiny rocky outcropping and lagoon off the west coast of the Philippines, sits at the center of the latest South China Sea tug-of-war. Protesters took to the streets in Manila on May 11 to criticize China’s support of fishermen who entered the disputed territory a month ago and sparked a yet unresolved naval standoff between the Philippines and China. On May 9, while ships from both sides maneuvered in the area, Manila's secretary of defense assured Filipinos that if Beijing attacked, Washington would come to the country’s defense.  

That expectation had been strengthened in Manila in November 2011 when the visiting American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” Clinton’s slip of the tongue was not a major diplomatic incident. But some Flipinos saw it as a sign of U.S. support for their government's maritime claims.

Washington’s refusal to side with any of the claimant states had not changed. What had changed was the level of American concern. In the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy Clinton had defended the idea of a “pivot” toward Asia, meaning a renewed U.S. focus on Asia after a decade of intense military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The term “pivot” has fallen out of favor in Washington, but the Obama administration’s heightened interest in Asia is real and ongoing, says Donald K. Emmerson, director of Stanford’s Southeast Asia Forum. He recently discussed the nuances of what he describes as an important but “lopsided pivot.”

How does the pivot fit into the larger global picture?

In the continuing debate as to whether the United States is in decline, the key question is: relative to what? Certainly, if we compare the situation now with the period immediately after World War II, the United States is less powerful relative to the power of other states. But 1945 ushered in a uniquely unipolar moment in American history. Americans had escaped the physical devastation wreaked on Europe and much of Asia. Germany and Japan lay in ruins. Twenty million Russians were dead. China’s long-running civil war would soon resume. Suddenly America had no credible competitors for global power.

Today? Conventional wisdom holds that Asia has become the center of gravity in the global economy. Yet even if we use purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates to measure the American share of world GDP, that share has only modestly decreased. Meanwhile, China’s remarkable rise may be leveling off. The evidence is less that the United States is in secular decline than that the world is changing in ways to which Americans need to adapt if they are to regain economic health. If the pivot facilitates that adaptation, it will have been a success.

Do you interpret the pivot to the Asia-Pacific as more hype or reality?

The pivot is definitely a reality, but the reality is partly about symbolism and atmospherics. The pivot conveys reassurance, particularly to Southeast Asia, that the United States cares about the Asia-Pacific region and that it is willing to cooperate more than before with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Part of that is simply “showing up”—a willingness to attend ASEAN regional meetings. Another part of the pivot, however, involves raising the American security profile in the region, which has so far strengthened ASEAN’s diplomatic hand in dealing with China’s sweeping claim to the South China Sea.

How has the pivot been received and interpreted in Asia?

Generally speaking, the pivot has been welcomed in Southeast Asia, despite worries that if it becomes an effort to contain China, a Sino-American cold war could result. The specific responses of Southeast Asian governments have differed, however, on a spectrum from passive acquiescence to active support.

In Japan, the rotation of prime ministers in and out of office has understandably focused that country’s politics more on domestic concerns, and the still not fully resolved disposition of U.S. forces on Okinawa has drawn energy from the bilateral relationship.

As a “middle power,” South Korea has been supportive of multilateral frameworks and solutions. Seoul is pleased to see a renewed American interest in working with Asians in multilateral settings such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.

China’s response has varied between cool and hostile. The foreign ministry has treated the pivot with some equanimity compared with the hostility of those in the People’s Liberation Army who view increased American involvement in Asia as a threat to Chinese aims and claims, especially regarding the South China Sea. China’s foreign policy is the outcome of contestation between various groups inside the country that do not necessarily see eye to eye on how best to handle the United States.

What do you see as the main implications, repercussions, and complications of the pivot?

The pivot, as Hillary Clinton advertised it in her Foreign Policy article, signals a shift in U.S. priorities away from Iraq and Afghanistan. For a time following the 9/11 attacks on America in 2001, the United States tended either to neglect Southeast Asia or to treat it as a second front in the “war on terror.” Economically, the pivot implies an acknowledgment that if America is to prosper in this century it will have to pay closer attention to Asia as an engine of global economic growth. Diplomatically, the pivot implies that with regard to Asian states, Washington cannot merely manage its relations bilaterally as the hub where their spokes meet, but must cultivate multilateral diplomacy as well. Militarily, the pivot implies that even while the American global force posture is drawn down in some parts of the world, it needs to be upgraded in Asia in response to Asian and American concerns over the terms on which China’s rise will take place.

A major constructive repercussion of the pivot has been the evolution of China’s own diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Previously China had disavowed multilateral diplomacy with Southeast Asians over claims to the South China Sea—a bilateralist strategy that in Southeast Asian eyes resembled an effort to “divide and rule.” America’s willingness to reach out to ASEAN and take part in ASEAN events has helped diplomats in any one Southeast Asian country to resist having to face China alone. Multilateral discussions, involving China and meant to prepare the way toward an eventual Code of Conduct, are now underway.

But as we saw recently during Hillary Clinton’s visit to the Philippines, it is important for Washington to maintain its independence and impartiality while facilitating peace in the region.

Complications? Yes, there is a danger that Washington could be dragged into supporting, or appearing to support, the claims of one of the Southeast Asian parties to the dispute. The Obama administration is aware of this risk, however, and I strongly doubt that an American official will again refer to the “West Philippine Sea.” 

A more serious complication in the longer run may arise from the pivot’s emphasis to date on Asian-Pacific security, and its relative lack of attention to creating and cultivating American economic opportunities in Asia.

China’s economic footprint in Asia is large and growing. It has moved up to become the main trading partner of many countries that used to trade proportionally more with the United States. An unbalanced relationship in which China saves and lends what Americans borrow and spend is unhealthy for both countries, and it cannot last. The pivot should forestall an invidious division of labor whereby Washington through the Seventh Fleet subsidizes the regional peace that enables Asians to prosper doing business with China. A higher priority needs to be placed on promoting American trade and investment in Asia, including China.

The Obama administration is hoping to persuade more Asian economies to join an arrangement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), but the bar that it sets is high. The TPP’s strict protections for the environment, labor, and intellectual property rights and its comprehensive cuts in both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have raised its quality but lowered its appeal, especially to the region’s larger economies. Meanwhile, anticipated cuts in American budgets for defense will only intensify the need to refocus the pivot on economic as well as military access to Asia.

Related Resources

Foreign Policy: “America’s Pacific Century”
November 2011 article by Hillary Clinton introducing the concept of the "Asia pivot."

Stanford Daily: "Obama pivots policy toward Asia"
Summary of Donald K. Emmerson's May 1, 2012 talk.

LinkAsia: "Treat Scarborough Shoal Incident as a 'Wake Up Call'"