Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

The Korean-American alliance has kept the peace on the Korean peninsula for forty-five years since its inception in 1953. Now that a gradual process for Korean unification has gotten under way as indicated by the beginning of the Four-Party Talks and North-South dialogues, it is important to reexamine the origins and evolution of this alliance in order that its future challenges in the changing strategic environment in the Asia Pacific region can be met.

In addressing this issue, we must examine the alliance’s origins in the Cold War and the Korean War, for the alliance was established to deter another war after the Korean War was halted in an armistice. In tracing its evolution, we must explain how the shifting strategic environment and the allies’ responses have affected its transformation by analyzing the impact of such important events as the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Nixon Doctrine, the Reagan and Bush years, the end of the Cold War and North Korea’s nuclear challenge, the prospects for unification, and regional rivalry between major powers. Finally, we should speculate on the future of the Korean-American alliance after the unification of Korea. It is difficult to ascertain the Korean perspective on these questions. Hence it should be made clear at the outset that what follows is only one Korean perspective as I see it in light of the available material.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

China’s attitude toward the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, particularly the former, has drawn a lot of attention in the post–Cold War era. How China views the utility and function of these two security alliances and reacts to them could well shape the dynamics of the alliances. From a historical perspective, however, this is not a new issue. China has lived with these alliances for almost half a century. To better understand China’s current concerns about the alliances and to predict its future posture, we might look for clues in what China has done in the past. This paper attempts to provide a broad survey of Chinese perceptions of the two security alliances in the Cold War period to elucidate Beijing’s post–Cold War policy orientation. By tracing the evolution of the Chinese calculus of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.- Korea alliances, it hopes to find answers to the following questions. What are some of the important variables or conditions that defined China’s attitudes and approaches to dealing with these two alliances? How do these variables or conditions interact with each other? Have they been constant or changing over time? Are they still relevant in the post–Cold War era, and to what extent?

The paper draws its findings mainly from the Chinese official media. While this may not be an ideal source, it nevertheless provides a systematic data basis for a historical analysis of continuity and change. There is no question that the official Chinese media, particularly before the 1980s, was full of rhetoric and propaganda. There has always been a gap between rhetoric and behavior in Chinese foreign policy, as in other countries. Nevertheless it is equally true that behind rhetoric always lie perceptions, self-serving or not, that provide “diagnostic propensities” and “choice propensities” of the Chinese leaders and elites, and thus have policy implications.

The findings of the paper suggest that China’s perceptions of the targets, internal structures, and functions of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean alliances have changed remark- ably over time, from extreme hostility to high tolerance. These changes resulted from the interactions of such factors as China’s assessment of the world balance of power, the well- being of its relationship with both indigenous and outside powers, and the priority of its national policy. The evolution of Chinese perceptions also illustrates that China need not view the two security alliances as inherently hostile to its interests. Under some circum- stances they can be considered useful or at least harmless. Beijing’s attitudes are often determined not by the two alliances per se but rather by its perception of the sources of threat to its security and whether these security alliances can alleviate or aggravate the threat. On the other hand, given the nature of China’s foreign policy, Beijing does not have intrinsic love for these alliances. Since the 1980s, China has not particularly endorsed any bilateral or multilateral military alliance in the region. Normatively China is also uneasy with the reality of the American military presence in the region and tends to see it as a short-term arrange- ment rather than a long-term phenomenon. During the Cold War, the Chinese perceived the two security alliances as either against China or with China. In the post–Cold War period, they have yet to be convinced that the function of the two alliances could be neither.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Reprint from Living with China: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (New York: W.W.Norton, 1997).

By almost any criterion of success—be it cost-effectiveness, risk-reward ratio, multiplier
effects, or sheer longevity, the Japan America Security Alliance (JASA) stands out as one of
the most successful alliances in twentieth century history. For the United States, chief
architect of a global network of military relationships, JASA is arguably the most important
of its many bilateral alliances. In terms of historic impact, JASA is comparable to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a multilateral alliance that restructured the European
security landscape in 1949. For nearly a half-century, JASA and NATO have functioned
as the bedrock on which the Cold War security systems of Asia and Europe have been
constructed.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

This study examines the likely security consequences of the continued growth in energy consumption in East Asia, and in particular:

security.

dependencies and insecurities.

The study concludes that:

1. Energy supplies for East Asian economic growth, as well as for other anticipated energy needs in the world, can be available at prices that will not set growth back provided that international markets for fuels, exports, technologies, and capital continue to operate.

2. The main source of insecurity connected with energy use will be the anticipation, on the part of countries partially or wholly dependent on imports of fuels and energy technologies, of political developments that would interfere with either energy-related imports or the exports needed to pay for them.

3. Economic and technical solutions to the problems posed by economic and energy consumption growth in East Asia and elsewhere, and by their regional and global environmental impacts, exist if the political framework is available to carry them out. Seeking out and implementing those solutions would serve U.S. leadership and prosperity. As a result, a principal goal of U.S. policies will be to make politically possible the combination of economic and security policies needed to provide that framework. These policies are highly interactive: failure of economic policies, or even misperception of the nature and impact of economic policies, can greatly heighten security problems.