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Iran has climbed to No. 1 on the Washington crisis hit parade. The question of how to stop Iran's nuclear program has unleashed a torrent of punditry. Advocates of diplomacy and a military strike spar on television and in op-ed pages.

Iran's nuclear ambitions deserve our attention. But even by the most alarmist estimates, Iran is years away from being able to build a nuclear warhead.

Meanwhile, over in Northeast Asia, North Korea now has enough fissile material for five to seven weapons and is quietly churning out enough plutonium to build at least one warhead a year, according to rough intelligence estimates. More ominously, work is moving ahead on a new reactor that could potentially produce enough separated plutonium for up to 10 weapons a year.

Somehow this danger prompts no sense of urgency in Washington. After a promising breakthrough last September, the six-party talks to halt the program have lapsed into a stalemate that is close to total collapse.

The Bush administration seems unconcerned. Diplomacy has ground to a halt. The North Koreans refuse to return to the six-party talks. The White House has barred its chief negotiator from talking directly with them, despite Pyongyang's desire to meet and the urging of our six-party partners.

Administration officials have recently floated a report that they are considering a new initiative to negotiate a peace treaty with North Korea. This is a smoke-screen to conceal an empty North Korea policy. According to administration officials, the peace treaty idea has been kicking around for months without going anywhere. South Korean officials tell me that they have been waiting, so far in vain, for any serious detailed discussion of this proposal.

It is the president himself who opposes direct negotiations with Pyongyang, over anything, including a peace treaty. He sees direct talks with North Korea or Iran as an act of weakness. "Somehow,'' he said last month, "the world ends up turning the tables on us.''

In reality, the administration is content to pursue a strategy of going after North Korean counterfeit currency and production of amphetamines and cigarettes, hoping to cut off the flow of funds from these activities. According to administration officials, Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph, the driving force behind this policy, gleefully talks about ``turning out the lights'' in Pyongyang.

Administration officials claim they are drying up slush funds that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il uses to buy the loyalty of his subordinates. Some even suggest this could trigger a coup against Kim, with the Chinese pulling the strings.

But American intelligence experts who monitor North Korea closely see little evidence to support the conclusion that North Korea is being brought to its knees. Even if the measures are drawing blood, it is self-delusional to believe that this will bring down a regime that has already proven it is willing to starve its own population to stay in power.

The administration seems intent as well on pressing China and South Korea to curb their trade and investment with the North. The administration's special envoy on human rights in North Korea, Jay Lefkowitz, seems to spend most of his time attacking the South for setting up an industrial park in Kaesong in the North. He portrays it as exploiting slave labor. The South Koreans defend it as a vehicle to bring capitalism into the communist North.

The Bush administration's combination of attempted coercion and diplomatic freeze has only two visible effects so far.

First, it lends credence to North Korean claims that the United States, contrary to the joint statement issued last September, is still intent on overthrowing their regime.

Second, it undermines gains made by allowing chief envoy Christopher Hill to hold direct talks with his North Korean counterparts. That demonstrated a flexibility and confidence that disarmed critics, particularly in South Korea, and isolated the North. It strengthened coordination with China and South Korea, the two players with the most leverage over the North.

Now officials in both those capitals again question American readiness to seriously negotiate. Beijing and Seoul are even more convinced that pushing market reforms is the only route to bring the North to give up its nuclear option. Next month former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung will revisit his historic summit with the North Korean leader in 2000.

This growing gap with our allies and partners is deadly. Even if we wanted to opt for coercion, the United States can't do so alone. For that reason, it is urgent that the United States regains the diplomatic upper hand.

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Professor Li Shian is a Professor of History and Director of American and European Studies at Beijing's Renmin University. He is the Chief Editor of the journal World History and is a Council Member of the China Society for Human Rights Studies, which he has represented at several international human rights conferences. A former Chairman of the History Department at Renmin University, Dr. Li was awarded his doctorate at the University of Birmingham in 1989, and did post-graduate work at Stanford University from July 1990 to October 1992. He is the author of several books, including A Study of American Human Rights History and A History of the Development of Western Capitalism.

Professor Li will deliver remarks on the role human rights plays in US-China relations, from a Chinese perspective. He will begin with an exposition of human rights in traditional and post-1949 China, and drawing on this, review US-China exchanges on human rights post-June 4, 1989. He will discuss different approaches for addressing what Chinese and Americans both recognize as a central if contentious issue in their relations: respect for international laws as they protect both individual and collective freedoms.

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Li Shian Professor of History and Director of American and European Studies Speaker Beijing's Renmin University
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Ambassador Ton-Nu-Thi Ninh is a member of Viet Nam's law-making body, the National Assembly, representing the southern coastal province of Ba Ria Vung Tau. In her position as Vice-Chair of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, her mission has been to develop and enhance Viet Nam's relations with the countries of North America (particularly, the United States) and Western Europe. She travels frequently to the United States and Europe and regularly interacts with senior government and business leaders both abroad and in Viet Nam. She has also represented Viet Nam in international conferences among world leaders to discuss issues with global implications. She is widely recognized as an effective spokesperson for Viet Nam.

Prior to holding her current position, Mme Ninh served, for over two decades, as a diplomat in Viet Nam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specializing in multilateral institutions (the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, Francophonie, The Association of South East Asian Nations) and global issues (international peace and security, development, environment, governance, human rights, etc.) As advisor to Viet Nam's Minister of Foreign Affairs, she was responsible for key international efforts on behalf of Viet Nam, such as the holding of the Summit of French-Speaking Countries in 1997 in Ha Noi. From 2000 to 2003, she was Viet Nam's Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and Head of the Mission to the European Union in Brussels.

Mme Ninh grew up in France, was educated at Sorbonne University and Cambridge University and started her career as an academic. She taught English and English literature at Paris University in the late 1960s and later at Saigon University until 1975.

Born in Hue, Central Viet Nam, into a traditional family, she developed her political commitment to the National Liberation Front for South Viet Nam early on during her student days in Paris. Since then, she has been consistently active in social issues, with a special interest on gender. She served a term on the Central Executive on the Viet Nam Women's Union.

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Ton-Nu-Thi Ninh Vice-Chair of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Speaker
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When the first President Bush swiftly crushed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, he stated that America had "kicked the Vietnam syndrome." The strategic and regional context of the second President Bush's invasion and occupation of Iraq appeared so far removed from the Cold War era and the specifics of the Vietnam War that there seemed to be little point in harking back to that decades-old conflict. Yet starting with the growth of the insurgency in Iraq and the resultant revival of concern with "counter insurgency," the focus on "Iraqification" (with echoes of "Vietnamization"), and even a possible revival of the Kissingerian concept of a "decent interval" before disengaging from Iraq, the parallels between Iraq and Vietnam have reemerged in public discussion. Can we derive any benefit from invoking these parallels, either in better understanding the Vietnam War or in clarifying contemporary challenges in Iraq? Or is the real "lesson of Vietnam" the idea that "lessons" themselves are dangerous and misleading?

David Elliott spent seven years in Vietnam, from 1963 to 1973, in the US Army and with the Rand Corporation. The experience ultimately led to his best-known work: a two-volume, 1500-page book, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta (2002). The New York Review of Books called it "the most comprehensive and enlightening book on that war since June 1971, when The New York Times published the Pentagon Papers." An abridged paperback edition will be published this year. Elliott's PhD is from Cornell, his BA from Yale. His current research is on Vietnam's adaptation to the post-Cold War world.

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David Elliott H. Russell Smith Professor of Government and International Relations Speaker Pomona College
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In the view of many policy-makers, as well as the popular media, the alliance between the United States and South Korea is suffering from an unprecedented crisis of confidence. Anti-American views, particularly among the young, are widespread in South Korea. On an official level, there are constant tensions over the role of U.S. troops based in Korea and resistance to demands to open the Korean economy to foreign investment. Most seriously, there is a stark divergence in the approach of both countries toward North Korea.

This portrait of an alliance in crisis is often contrasted to a previous golden age in U.S.-Korean relations. According to this view, the alliance enjoyed a long period of harmony during much of the Cold War, when anti-Americanism was not a problem. The military alliance was secure and Korea's economic development was in harmony with the global policies of the United States. The two countries enjoyed a strategic convergence in their response to the threat of North Korea.

This view of the Cold War past has some elements of truth. But it is largely a myth that obscures a history of constant tension and even severe crisis in the alliance relationship. The clash between Korean nationalism and American strategic policy goals has been present from the beginning of the Cold War. Differences over the response to North Korea have been repeatedly an issue in the relationship. And anti-Americanism has been a feature of Korean life for decades.

Daniel Sneider will explore the myth of this golden age. He will focus on what may have been the most dangerous decade in US-Korean relations, from 1969-79, a period ranging from the Guam Doctrine to the assassination of President Park Chung Hee. It is a time when South Korean doubts about the durability of the alliance prompted the serious pursuit of nuclear weapons and the two countries clashed over North Korea policy, economic goals, human rights and democracy. Finally, he will look at how the myth of a golden age creates a distorted view of the current tensions in the alliance.

Daniel Sneider is a 2005-06 Pantech Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the foreign affairs columnist of the San Jose Mercury News. He is currently writing a book on the U.S. management of its alliances with South Korea and Japan. His column on foreign affairs, looking at international issues and national security from a West Coast perspective, is syndicated nationally on the Knight Ridder Tribune wire service, reaching about 400 newspapers in North America. Previously, Sneider served as national/foreign editor of the San Jose Mercury News, responsible for coverage of national and international news until the spring of 2003. He has had a long career as a foreign correspondent. From 1990-94, he was the Moscow Bureau Chief of the Christian Science Monitor, covering the end of Soviet Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1985-90, he was Tokyo Correspondent for the Monitor, covering Japan and Korea. Previously he served in India and at the United Nations.

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Daniel C. Sneider Speaker
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After a decade of gloom, the sun seems at last to be shining brightly on Japan. Its economy has now grown at a respectable pace for four years and the clouds of deflation seem finally to have broken. International factors were the proximate cause of this improvement, but below the surface fundamental changes have also started to occur in the structure of the domestic economy. These changes are largely benign in nature, though they do raise questions about Japan's fiscal health, its ability to fund the twin US deficits, and the trajectory of its relations with its neighbors. The purpose of this speech is to explain how these dynamices will unfold and what they mean for Japan, East Asia, and the United States.

Robert Madsen is a Senior Fellow at MIT's Center for International Studies. He also advises such private equity firms as Unison Capital and the Robert M. Bass Group and was Asia Strategist at Soros Private Funds Management, which undertook leveraged buyouts and corporate restructuring in Europe and East Asia. From time to time he consults for several government agencies, including in the past year an economics ministry, a foreign ministry, an intelligence agency, and a central bank. Madsen graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Harvard University's Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations and then attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, where he earned a Masters Degree, with Distinction, and a Doctorate in International Relations. He additionally holds a J.D., with Distinction, from Stanford Law School and is a member of the California State Bar.

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Robert Madsen Senior Fellow Speaker Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Visting Professor David Kang comments in the Christian Science Monitor on the ongoing spat between Korea and Japan over disputed isles, just as the United States hopes to renew progress on the North Korean nuclear problem.

President Bush could hardly have picked a more critical time to host China's President Hu Jintao at the White House.

A flare-up in troubled waters between South Korea and Japan, faltering trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea, and the failure to persuade North Korea to come close to terms on its nuclear-weapons program all make China a pivotal player -- while raising questions about US strength and influence in the region.

"The United States can play a more profound role in stabilizing the region," says Moon Jung In, international relations professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. "China may be happy to see what's happening."

While the United States tries to persuade China both to reduce its yawning trade surplus with the US and get North Korea to return to six-party talks, a potentially explosive quarrel between South Korea and Japan is frustrating Washington's efforts to join its two northeast Asian allies in common cause on the nuclear issue.

"High-ranking officials of the South Korean government have been talking about Korean-US cooperation rather than trilateral cooperation," says Kim Sung Han, director of North American studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, affiliated with South Korea's Foreign Ministry.

"Trilateral cooperation is vital to resolving the North Korean problem," he says.

The tendency in Korea is to blame Japan for somehow wishing to assert its own role in the region, reminding both Koreans and Chinese of the history of Japanese imperialism in Asia, culminating in the conquest of much of the Chinese mainland and 35 years of colonial rule over the Korean peninsula.

Who lays claim to islands?

Memories of that history have leaped into the headlines as a result of a stand-off midway between Korea and Japan in what Koreans call the East Sea and the much of the rest of the world knows as the Sea of Japan.

The focal point is a cluster of 34 islets, basically uninhabitable, that both Korea and Japan claim as part of their national territory.

Korea calls the cluster "Dokdo," or "Solitary Island," while Japan calls it "Takeshima," or "Bamboo Island," and Japan also wants to give Japanese names to undersea rock formations surrounding the islands, basically volcanic rock thrust up from the sea.

The issue, simmering for years, reached a boiling point this week when Japan said it was sending two survey vessels to chart the waters around the islands, held by a garrison of Korean troops seen on Korean television manning anti-aircraft weapons and machine-guns as if to stave off enemy invasion.

Eager to prove his fearlessness in the face of the Japanese, South Korea's President Roh Moo-Hyun has ordered 18 patrol boats to form a blockade against the survey vessels.

"Some people are claiming territorial rights to former colonies that were once acquired through war and aggression," he told Christian leaders at a breakfast Thursday. Not just "good will," he said, as if preparing for war, but "wisdom and courage" were needed in such a crisis.

Shinzo Abe, Japanese government spokes-man, says the vessels are going there in defiance of a pledge of "stern action" by Korea's foreign minister, Ban Ki Moon, against any "provocation" by Japan.

Mr. Kim, of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, accuses Mr. Abe, an outspoken conservative who aspires to succeed Junichiro Koizumi as Japan's prime minister, of playing to the right-wing in refusing to address Korean sensitivities.

"Shinzo Abe has his own agenda," says Kim. "The Japanese are trying to increase their own role in the area of security. This is sending conflicting messages."

The sense here is that the US could rein in Japan but is reluctant to do so while cooperating closely with Japan on North Korea.

"The United States has been rather silent on these issues," says Kim Tae Hwan, research professor at Yonsei University. "Koreans have been very uncomfortable with the Japanese posture of aligning with the United States. Japan seems to disregard expectations from Korea."

While playing into the hands of China, the standoff over the islands also comes at an opportune moment in terms of South Korea's policy of rapprochement with North Korea.

Ministerial talks between North and South

South Korea's unification minister, Lee Jong Seok, goes to Pyongyang Friday for the first ministerial-level talks between North and South Korea in five months. He and his North Korean opposite number will have no trouble agreeing on the need to fend off what North Korea has already denounced as a "shameless" attempt at expansion.

It's a "very clear win-win" for both North and South Korea, says David Kang, a professor at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. In the process, he says, the ruckus at sea "makes it look a lot as if Korea and China are cooperating more since they're both upset by Japan's moves."

Mr. Kang sees the standoff as "a distraction" that probably will not have "a fundamental effect on North-South Korean relations," but adds to the sense that six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons are not likely to go anywhere.

"The US doesn't expect to make any progress on six-party talks," says Kang. "Nobody has a face-saving way out."

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