The increasing sectarian conflict in Iraq and the rise of Islamist parties like Hamas and Hezbollah have put American efforts to democratize the Middle East on hold and raised doubts among experts and policy makers about whether democracy is compatible with the Muslim faith. But in a campus appearance yesterday afternoon, former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim offered an ardent defense of democracy in the Muslim world, telling a standing-room-only crowd in Bechtel Conference Center that "men and women are born free, even in the Islamic construct."

Alternating between serious and sporting through his two-hour speech, Ibrahim broached many of the issues aggravating relations between Islam and the West, including gender relations, American foreign policy, cultural assimilation in Europe and Pope Benedict XVI's recent comments about Islam. However, he was most outspoken regarding his home country - he was a political prisoner in Malaysia for over four years - and rejected the race - and religious-based affirmative action policies that benefit the Malay majority there.

Returning repeatedly to the topic of Muslim democracy, Ibrahim drew from historical references and personal experiences, citing the democratic regimes of Indonesia and Iran of 1950s.

"There was no debate then whether democracy was compatible with Islam," he said. "Fifty years later, we have our leaders in the Muslim world telling us we're not ready."

The fundamental nature of democracy and human rights is universal, Ibrahim emphasized, adding that problems begin with cultural miscommunication.

"We have to debunk and reject the notion, held by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, that to support democracy and freedom is to support America, "he said. "And it is important for Americans to realize democracy is a value cherished as much by Muslims as it is by Americans."

"Misperceptions are unfortunate," he added, elaborating on his impressions of American culture. "This is a country full of contradictions. The level of sophistication and intellectual flavor is unparalleled. So why must people be so prejudiced? Why is misunderstanding so pervasive? To say that Muslims are entirely anti-America is wrong."

Ibrahim offered scathing criticism of his fellow Muslims for violent reactions to both the publication of caricatures of Mohammad in a Danish newspaper in 2005 and to the more recent comment by Pope Benedict XVI referring to elements of Islam as "evil and inhuman." The cartoon spawned riots killing 139 in Nigeria, Libya, Pakistan and Afghanistan, while the Pope's remarks fueled a maelstrom of controversy, including the firebombing of Catholic churches throughout the Middle East and the shooting death of a nun in Somalia.

"There is a right to disagree but no one has the right to cause destruction or destroy life," he said. "No one has the right to call for the banning of newspapers."

Acknowledging that his comments were not necessarily indicative of Islamic public opinion, he said, "This view may not be shared by all Muslims, but I am prepared to confront them."

Ibrahim's penchant for speaking his mind and sticking to his principles has dogged the leader through a career of controversy. As a young Malaysian activist in the 1970s, he was arrested during a student protest and spent 20 months in a detention camp. Following a meteoric political ascent, he was named Deputy Prime Minister in 1993, and many expected that he was Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammad's chosen successor.

But their relationship turned sour, and in Sept. 1998 Ibrahim was stripped of party membership and incarcerated under charges of corruption and sodomy. The charges were eventually overturned and he was released in Sept. 2004.

Regarding Malaysian politics today, Ibrahim expressed distaste toward his nation's system of bumiputera - a system of economic and social policies designed to favor ethnic Malays.

"I reject affirmative action based on race," he said. "Our policies should benefit the poor and the marginalized."

Finally, he described the need for engagement between the Islamic world and the West, criticizing the "extreme" foreign policy of the United States and its refusal to negotiate with regimes like Hamas.

"That policy is flawed," he said, adding that "to refuse to engage is a recipe for disaster."

GWS (Gi-Wook Shin): Dr. Hecker, could you please briefly explain the technical dimensions of what has happened? North Korea is claiming great success, but there are some questions about whether this presumed nuclear test was really successful or meaningful.

SH (Siegried Hecker): At this point, as I understand it, the North Koreans have conducted what they call a nuclear test.

South Korea has said seismic signals appear to indicate a 0.5 kiloton, or sub-kiloton, explosion. From reports I have seen, the Australians and the French believe the blast was about 1 kiloton. Thus, three countries have given assessments on the power of the underground explosion, ranging between 0.5 kilotons and 1 kiloton, or 500 and 1000 tons. This likely indicates a nuclear explosion of a relatively low yield, compared to what one would typically expect. Although the Russian defense minister has apparently commented that the explosion was between 5 and 15 kilotons, I have not heard any other nation estimate in this range.

By comparison, the Nagasaki bomb was approximately 20 kilotons, and the initial tests of the five major nuclear powers were all quite large, on this order. Also, when both India and Pakistan tested multiple devices in 1998, some of these tests were of a substantial yield, at least 20 kilotons. But each country also tested three devices that were said to result in explosions of less than a kiloton. Whether these devices did not work or were experimental in nature is still unknown. So, a test on the order of that conducted by North Korea is not unheard of, but it is apparent that the North Korean device produced an explosion considerably smaller than most countries' first nuclear tests.

Regarding the technical dimensions of this event, I would offer two provisos: first, we must give scientists more time to analyze the seismic signals, and second, we must allow more time for analysis of how those seismic signals translate to the yield of the device. This latter task involves a thorough understanding of relevant geology - scientists make models to predict this, but there is always some uncertainty.

GWS: Given the relatively low yield of the test, is it possible that what North Korea has "tested" is not a nuclear device but very powerful conventional weaponry?

SH: It is most likely that this was indeed a nuclear device. There are two plausible explanations for why this test resulted in a relatively low yield. One possibility is that the North Koreans attempted to test a relatively simple nuclear device that was meant to be large, but it did not work quite right. There are two reasons the test of such a device might not have gone as planned. First, the detonators might not have exploded at exactly the right time or the explosive might not have been of the right quality, thus producing a lower yield. Second, if the timing of the "initiator" (additional neutrons that are introduced) was not quite right, this could also decrease the expected yield of the device.

Another possibility is that North Korea was actually trying to test a smaller, much more sophisticated nuclear device, one with a lot of instrumentation to monitor implosion. North Korea could have learned a great deal from such a test, but I would be surprised if the country had really designed the device to be that small.

GWS: This test marks the failure of the disparate policy approaches of South Korea and the United States - neither nation was successful in arresting DPRK nuclear development. But just how advanced North Korea's nuclear program is remains unclear. In the Korean media, there has been debate over whether North Korea's nuclear test was a success or a failure. What do you think?

SH: I would not say that the test failed. It is simply too early to judge, and we do not know exactly what North Korea had hoped to achieve. If North Korea wanted to use this test as a demonstration, then perhaps it was not very successful. It may be the case that the test did not work as well as anticipated if the device in question was a simple nuclear device. If North Korea was testing an advanced designed that was very well instrumented and monitored, it may have learned a great deal from this test.

It is important to wait to see an accurate yield for this test and then to look at the range of possibilities for why it might have been executed. From a scientific perspective, it is important not to overreact and not to go beyond what is actually known.

GWS: You said previously that when India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998, they both set off multiple explosions. Is it correct that North Korea has set off a single explosion?

SH: From what we have learned so far, it appears that North Korea has tested one device. This is what the North Koreans announced they would do. Scientists will have to carefully analyze the seismic signals to be sure, however, as for example, when India tested, it set off two devices simultaneously. We have not yet seen all the seismic evidence.

GWS: If North Korea were to use such a "low yield" device as a weapon in a major metropolis like Seoul, what kind of impact would it have?

SH: A 1 kiloton bomb in a major metropolis, though a relatively "low-yield" nuclear device, would still be devastating and catastrophic. Many thousands would experience instant death, and due to radioactivity, there would also be many delayed deaths. A device of this size would not wipe out the entire city, as was largely the case in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it would cause major, significant damage.

GWS: Based on the scale of the explosion, was this device something that even terrorists could assemble?

SH: One kiloton in terrorist hands would indeed be catastrophic. I am very concerned that North Korea's nuclear material might fall into terrorist hands.

GWS: The possible marriage of this demonstrated nuclear capability and North Korean missiles is extremely dangerous. With reference to the North's nuclear and missile capabilities, is testing useful for making smaller nuclear devices - devices small enough to be placed on a missile?

SH: If North Korea is intent on making a nuclear warhead, this test could be a step in that direction. Making smaller nuclear devices by nature means making more complex nuclear devices. For much of the Cold War, this was a major goal for both the Soviets and the Americans. For North Korea, at this point we cannot say that the test was successful in terms of this aim of miniaturization, though again, North Korean scientists may have learned a lot in this regard. It is extremely difficult to say how soon North Korea could achieve miniaturization with the limited information we have about this test.

Miniaturization is a very big step, and it cannot be accomplished without nuclear testing. This could have been one of the most important reasons that North Korea undertook this test. It must be noted that their missiles are the other part of this equation, and there is not great confidence in the reliability of these missiles, especially those that performed poorly during the July test.

GWS: North Korea has certainly made a political statement with its nuclear test, but from a technical perspective, do you expect additional testing? What is your assessment of North Korea's technical capabilities, in light of your recent visits to the nation?

SH: At this point, North Korea could want another test for two technical reasons. First, if this was a simple device, they will want to fix the problem and demonstrate an explosion of a higher yield. If this was a more advanced design, they may have learned a lot but would still desire another test in order to gain an appropriate level of confidence in the device.

In January 2004, I visited the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and in August 2005, I visited Pyongyang. On the basis of those visits, I would estimate that North Korea has enough plutonium for 6 to 8 nuclear devices, though there is some degree of uncertainty in that estimate. Overall, I estimate the North has 40-50 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, and generally 6-8 kilograms are required for each weapon. I also estimate that North Korea could gain one additional weapon per year, given the current rate of reprocessing.

In terms of skilled people and facilities, North Korea has very good capabilities, up to the point of and including reprocessing plutonium. However, to go from reprocessing plutonium to building the device itself takes a whole new set of engineering and physics skills.

GWS: Given North Korea's limited amount of weapons-grade material, its government would presumably want to conserve as much as possible, right?

SH: Yes, and this is probably one of the reasons North Korea did not set off multiple explosions like India and Pakistan did. North Korea has very limited material, and therefore it will want to be judicious. With this conservation imperative, North Korea will want to fully assess what has been learned from this first test before it attempts a second test.

GWS: From a technical perspective, is it difficult to say how long it may be until North Korea conducts a second test?

SH: Yes, it is very difficult to say, because it depends on factors related to this test about which we are still uncertain. If North Korea was satisfied with this test and all preparations have already been made, a second test could take place within a few days. Yet if the findings from this test surprised North Korea, the device may have to be rebuilt, and that could take weeks or months. One thing we know for sure is that they do not have a lot of weapons-grade material, and they will have to carefully judge how to use it.

GWS: You have said that a major danger from the North Korean nuclear program is the possibility of plutonium transfer. How serious is this possibility? Are you also concerned about transfer of nuclear technology?

SH: Well, a test does mean that there is now less material that could possibly be transferred.

I feel strongly that the principal danger from the North Korean program is the plutonium itself, and the possibility it would find its way to a third party, perhaps into terrorist hands or into the hands of other nations. The reason I believe this is the biggest danger is that North Korea could be restrained by its neighbors from ever actually using a nuclear device, but a third party, especially a non-state actor, may not be "restrainable."

The nuclear test will not have an impact on how marketable the plutonium is. Yet, for the export of nuclear technical know-how, a successful test could make a big difference in the appeal of North Korean technology, especially to a nation like Iran.

GWS: The current nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when U.S. officials confronted North Korea about its possession of a uranium enrichment, or HEU, program. North Korea has thus far denied having such a program. I understand this type of program is much more difficult to detect. Would a uranium-based device require testing?

SH: North Korea has stated that it does not have an HEU program. My own opinion is they have some type of enrichment program, owing to Pakistani President Musharraf's statements that his nation provided Pyongyang with some of the required technology and equipment. We simply do not know how far North Korea has progressed in this program.

The HEU program is very difficult to detect - there are fewer signatures than for a nuclear reactor and this type of program is easier to conceal, given the smaller size of the facilities required. However, if we assume statements made by A.Q. Khan and President Musharraf are accurate, it may be some time before North Korea can produce significant quantities of HEU.

Once North Korea has accomplished this, a uranium bomb will be easier to make, and North Korean scientists will have more confidence in this type of device without testing.

GWS: All indications are that North Korea will be further isolated after this test. Will this increased isolation impact the country's continued nuclear development?

SH: At this point, from what I saw at Yongbyon, current North Korean operations do not depend on external help or supplies. Thus, isolation makes little difference in this regard. For the uranium program, technical isolation would probably cause a slowdown, because North Korea would benefit from additional technical purchases from the outside world. But the uranium program does not appear to be a centerpiece of North Korea's nuclear efforts.

GWS: After this nuclear test, is the situation more dangerous?

SH: I believe the major threat came around 2003 when North Korea reprocessed a major amount of plutonium, thus crossing the threshold to become a major threat. I have always taken the North Korean threat very seriously, and I believe all the governments and peoples involved should take it very seriously as well. First and foremost, the imperative should be to make sure that nuclear materials stay in North Korea and are not transferred to third parties.

Transcript prepared by Kristin Burke, Shorenstein APARC Research Associate

North Korea's announcement this week of plans to test a nuclear weapon is hardly surprising. The six-party talks to negotiate an end to its nuclear program are dead, and the North faces escalating financial and economic sanctions by the United States and its allies.

Experts have long debated the real motivations of the North in developing nuclear weapons. Some contend that the nuclear program, even the latest pronouncement, is simply a bargaining chip to gain security guarantees and economic aid. Others see a long determination to become a nuclear state.

The North Korean leaders may have begun the nuclear program as leverage. But the U.S. invasion of Iraq seems to have hardened their conviction that the only way to protect their nation and their regime is to join the nuclear club. The North Koreans want to become a Pakistan rather than an Iraq.

Still, officials in Pyongyang hesitated to cross the provocative line of visibly demonstrating their capability. Pressure is being mounted to get them to back down from their pledge. But for a variety of reasons, they apparently believe the timing for a test is now optimal.

First of all, they hope to blame the Bush administration for their decision. In the statement issued this week, the North Korean government argued that alleged American war plans justify a nuclear test, a position that reflects the views of the North Korean military.

Second, the North anticipates the test will be successful. Although a plutonium weapon is more complicated than a uranium bomb, it is quite likely that the North now has sufficient confidence in a Nagasaki-style primitive bomb. This success would be an object of pride for an otherwise failing state, and bolster its claim to the status of a world-class military power.

Third, the North Koreans see their potential enemies tied down and unable to respond effectively. The Bush administration is locked into a disastrous war in Iraq, and about to be weakened even more if the Republicans lose the upcoming midterm elections. In South Korea, the government of President Roh Moo Hyun is already a lame duck and politically paralyzed.

Fourth, Pyongyang may bet that China and South Korea, the two principal sources of trade and economic aid, would not join the United States and Japan in any real sanctions against the North. The July missile tests by North Korea provoked international uproar and led to a U.N. resolution. But the real impact has been minimal.

Finally, the North may calculate that testing will facilitate Japan's efforts to become a "normal'' nation with a broader military role in the region. That prospect could increase tensions in Northeast Asia, especially between Japan and China, and that, the North may believe, is not necessarily bad for it.

The United States, South Korea and China must act together to show that these calculations are misguided and that the North will pay a painful price if it goes ahead. Certainly this severely tests the troubled American alliance with South Korea and the emergent partnership with China. But Pyongyang's miscalculations also offer an opportunity to repair the strained alliance and create a new structure of security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

It is no secret that Seoul and Washington have been at odds over how to deal with North Korea. But the test announcement has already accelerated a shift in South Korean opinion. Rather than holding the United States responsible for the current impasse, most Koreans now see North Korea as the instigator of crisis.

South Korean officials understand that without reinforcing the alliance now, no policy toward the North can be effective. The United States and South Korea should urgently agree on common action plans -- including a shutdown of investment and economic assistance from the South to the North -- and make those consequences clear to Pyongyang.

The planned visits of newly installed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Beijing and Seoul next week offer a similar opening to turn threat into opportunity. Abe intends to repair tattered ties to those Asian neighbors. Now the three Northeast Asian powers can demonstrate that a nuclear test will not lead to increased tensions but to the complete isolation of the North.

The danger of escalating actions that could lead, again, to war on the Korean peninsula is grave. The North Koreans should be assured that the door to a diplomatic solution remains open to them. But they must also understand that by profoundly misreading this moment, the North Korean leadership now stands completely alone in Northeast Asia.

Reprinted by permission.

The U.S. visit this week by South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun offers yet another opportunity to bemoan the crisis of confidence in our alliance. Anti-American views, particularly among the young, remain widespread in South Korea. On an official level, there are strains over the role of U.S. troops based in Korea and a stark divergence in approaches toward North Korea.

This portrait of a troubled alliance is often contrasted with a supposed golden age in U.S.-Korean relations during the Cold War. But that view obscures a history of sharp disagreement between the two allies. It is a mythical past that stands in the way of repairing our alliance today. In reality, Korean nationalism and American strategic policy goals have often clashed. Differences over North Korea have arisen repeatedly. And anti-Americanism has been a feature of Korean life for decades.

This was true from the earliest postwar days, in a relationship born out of a fateful and poorly considered decision to divide Korea, after decades of Japanese colonial rule, into American and Soviet zones of occupation. Syngman Rhee, South Korea's first leader, was often at odds with his American backers. Washington feared Rhee would provoke a war with the communist North, even after the end of the Korean War.

Relations with Park Chung Hee, who came to power in a military coup in 1961, were even thornier. Park was a fierce Korean nationalist and, according to a close former aide, uncomfortable with Americans. The two countries collided over North Korea policy, economic goals, human rights and democracy.

In the 1970s, South Koreans developed deep doubts about the durability of the alliance, an uneasiness fed by the Vietnam debacle and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Park defied U.S. pressure in declaring martial law in 1972, junking the constitution and jailing leading opposition figures. He launched a secret campaign of influence-peddling and bribery of American congressmen to counter U.S. criticism of his policies.

While Park feared abandonment by the United States, North Korea's Kim Il Sung worried that China, after developing ties to Washington, might sell him out. Thus Park, even though he had been the victim of two assassination attempts by North Korea, reached out to Pyongyang. During high-level talks in 1972, there was a remarkable shared belief that the major powers were the obstacle to Korean reunification.

The most alarming sign of an alliance in crisis was Park's dangerous decision to develop nuclear weapons, made in secret in 1971 after Richard Nixon's withdrawal of one of the two American infantry divisions. According to my research, American officials became alarmed over the seriousness of this effort when a young CIA agent provided evidence of a crude design for a nuclear warhead.

In the spring of 1975, my father, the late ambassador Richard Sneider, sent a top-secret cable to Washington calling for an urgent review of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Korea was "no longer a client state," he wrote, but was "well on its way to middle power status with ambitions for full self-reliance including its own nuclear potential."

Sneider recommended creation of a new partnership, one more akin to our alliances with NATO or Japan. He also pushed for quiet but tough diplomacy to dissuade Park from heading down the nuclear road. That campaign succeeded finally, but not before my father warned Park that the entire security alliance was jeopardized.

Park was assassinated in 1979 by his own intelligence chief, who claimed to have acted at American instigation. The charge was false, but it remains widely believed in Korea. The perilous state of our alliance reached a peak with the Kwangju uprising against military rule the following year, when hundreds of Koreans were killed by troops deployed with the alleged acquiescence of the United States.

Dispelling the myth of the previous golden era in U.S.-Korean relations does not mean that our relations lacked a foundation of shared interest or that the difficulties we face today are not serious. The gap over how to handle the threat from the North is certainly wider and more evident than in the past. And the democratization of South Korea makes our differences visible and harder to manage.

As policymakers from both countries meet this week, they need to take a deep breath and remember that our alliance survived tremendous stresses in the past. The task before us is not to focus on our divergence but to pick up the challenge left unmet 30 years ago -- to define the basis for a long-term relationship that is durable and reciprocal and that finally sheds the shackles of dependency.