Former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried Hecker assesses North Korea’s claim to have detonated a hydrogen bomb in an underground nuclear test this week. Hecker is one of the world’s top experts on the North Korean nuclear program. He has visited North Korea seven times since 2004, and is the only Western scientist known to have ever been inside a North Korean uranium enrichment facility. He is currently a senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a research professor of Management Science and Engineering.

Do you believe that North Korea actually detonated a hydrogen bomb in its latest nuclear test?

I don’t believe it was a real hydrogen bomb, but my greatest concern is not so much whether or not they actually tested a hydrogen bomb, but rather that they tested at all. Since this test worked, they will have achieved greater sophistication in their bomb design – that is the most worrisome aspect. This is their fourth test – with each test they can learn a lot.

What makes a hydrogen bomb a more threatening weapon than a conventional atomic bomb?

A hydrogen bomb can be a hundred or a thousand-fold more powerful than a fission bomb. Certainly a blast of a megaton will be much more destructive than the Hiroshima bomb, but the more important part is the ability to deliver at long range and to do it accurately. That is what would threaten the United States and its allies most; even with the size of nuclear blasts they have already demonstrated.

White House officials say that initial data from nearby monitoring stations are not consistent with a hydrogen bomb test. How will we know for sure whether it was a hydrogen bomb or not?

The short answer is that we may never know. The telltale signs of a hydrogen bomb are very difficult to pick up in a deeply buried test. Typically hydrogen bombs have greater explosive power or yield. This test is currently believed to have resulted in a seismic tremor of 5.1 on the Richter earthquake scale. That would make it roughly equivalent to the third nuclear test in February 2013. At that time, North Korea claimed it tested a miniaturized atomic bomb – there was no mention of a hydrogen bomb. My estimate of the yield for the 2013 test is roughly 7 to 16 kilotons – which is in the range of the 13-kiloton Hiroshima blast. As far as destructiveness, a Hiroshima-scale explosion is bad enough. Detonated in Manhattan, it may kill as many as a quarter million people. The power of the 2013 and the current explosion is more consistent with fission bombs than hydrogen bombs.

Can you rule out the possibility that it was a hydrogen bomb?

I find it highly unlikely that the North tested a real hydrogen fusion bomb, but we know so little about North Korea’s nuclear weapons design and test results that we cannot completely rule it out. A modern hydrogen bomb is a two-stage device that uses a fission bomb to drive the second stage fusion device. A two-stage device is very difficult to design and construct, and is likely still beyond the reach of North Korea today. However, by comparison, China’s early nuclear weapon program progressed rapidly. It tested its first fission bomb in 1964 and less than three years later demonstrated a hydrogen bomb – and that was 50 years ago. North Korea has now been in the nuclear testing business for almost 10 years, so we can’t rule anything out for certain.

If it wasn’t a hydrogen bomb, what kind of bomb might it have been?

What may be more likely than a two-stage hydrogen bomb is that they took an intermediate step that utilizes hydrogen (actually hydrogen isotopes) fuel to boost the explosive yield of the fission bomb, a sort of turbocharging. Such a device has a fusion or “hydrogen” component, but is not a real hydrogen bomb. It allows miniaturization – that is making the bomb smaller and lighter. Moreover, it would be the first step toward eventually mastering a two-stage hydrogen bomb.

The most important aspect then is to miniaturize, whether it is a fission bomb, a boosted fission bomb, or a hydrogen bomb. The Nagasaki bomb weighed 5,000 kilograms. It was delivered in a specially equipped B-29 bomber. North Korea wants to demonstrate it has a deterrent. To do so, it needs to be able to credibly threaten the U.S. mainland or our overseas assets. For that, you have to make the bomb (more correctly, the warhead) small enough to mount on a missile. The smaller and lighter, the greater the reach. At this point, what makes their nuclear arsenal more dangerous is not so much explosive power of the bomb, but its size, weight and the ability to deliver it with missiles.

How close is North Korea to being able to credibly threaten a nuclear strike against the mainland United States?

North Korea is still a long way off from being able to strike the US mainland. It has only had one successful space launch. It needs a lot more, but it has a large effort in that direction.

Do you think North Korea conducted this test for political or technical reasons?

North Korea had very strong technical and military drivers for this test, as well as follow-on tests. The political environment is mostly what has constrained it from testing earlier and more often. However, this test demonstrates that Pyongyang is willing to weather the political storm this test will bring. It has done so for all previous tests.

What are your current estimates on the size of North Korea's stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials?

Much like in the area of sophistication of the bomb, we have little information of what North Korea actually possesses. The best we can do is to estimate how much bomb fuel, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, they may have produced and estimate how many bombs they can produce from that stockpile. My best estimate at this time is that they may have enough bomb fuel for 18 bombs with a capacity to make 6 to 7 more annually. That, combined with the increased sophistication they surely achieved with this test, paints a troublesome picture.

How should the U.S. respond?

I am concerned about we haven’t done to date. Washington has lost many opportunities we have had since North Korea began its nuclear weapon production in earnest in 2003. One thing that’s clear is that doing what we and the rest of the world have done so far – half-hearted diplomacy, ultimatums, and sanctions – have failed, so these are not the answer. I have previously argued that we should focus on three “No’s” for three “Yes’s” – that is no more bombs, no better bombs (meaning no testing) and no export – in return for addressing the North’s security concerns, its energy shortage and its economic woes. This could have worked when I first proposed it 2008 after one of my seven visits to North Korea. It will be more difficult now.

David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, says that the recent "Comfort Women" agreement vindicates the victims and should be good for overall Korea-Japan relations.

China announced plans to discontinue its “one-child policy” in October, relaxing over three decades of controversial family planning policies and changing to a universal two-child policy. This new policy is a step forward, but China’s population aging and gender imbalance will create challenges for decades, according to a leading Stanford health researcher.

“China has reached a certain level of social and economic development where low fertility and population aging have become norms,” said Karen Eggleston, a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) and director of the Asia Health Policy Program. “Similar trends are seen in Japan and South Korea, and governments are struggling to catch up.”

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The policy change comes amid concerns of potential labor shortages and a burgeoning aging population that could pressure the Chinese economy for years to come. 

The country has had record growth – China’s GDP growth rate averaged 8.6 percent over the past five years – which is now slowing. That trend coupled with China’s rising life expectancy reinforces the need for a healthy, economically productive population to support the elderly, experts say.

“Demographers who study China knew a policy change was coming, but not when,” said Eggleston. “The policy was strategically announced with the Five Year Plan – a sort of developmental roadmap for the country.”

A forthcoming book, Policy Challenges from Demographic Change in China and India, edited by Eggleston examines the policy challenges posed by demographic change in China and India, from family planning to social pensions systems that support the elderly. One chapter looks exclusively at population policy, sex ratio and fertility in China.

A spur to action?

A shift to a consistent, nationwide two-child policy is a step in the right direction, Eggleston said, and it is unlikely to translate to a boom in the birthrate.

Some areas of the country and specific couples already enjoyed a two-child policy due to local policy differences and an earlier national policy easing. In 2013, the Chinese government allowed couples with a husband or wife from a single-child family to have a second child.

Chinese cities that never had a one-child policy to begin with, like Hong Kong and Macau, have very low fertility. A recent article in China Journal noted that, despite the ubiquity of the one-child policy campaign, China’s rapid economic development since 1980 deserves the “lion’s share of credit” for reduced births as the country’s total fertility rate has declined.

“The real question is how responsive the Chinese will be,” Eggleston said. “It’s not clear that there will be a noticeable response in the short or medium-term.”

Implementation of the policy will take time, but China will work “quite expeditiously” to apply such policies so that people’s expectations are met. Alongside legal change of China’s varying local policies, it’s expected that China will employ several public education campaigns and its cadre of family planning staff as conduits for disseminating the new national policy, Eggleston said.

Image

A 1986 poster highlights China's one-child policy.

Credit: Flickr/Collection Stefan R. Landsberger, International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam).

But other factors are at play, too, such as urbanization and changes in labor force participation.

“Young and middle-aged couples will be thinking twice about having another child because of education expense, job demands and the need to support aging parents,” Eggleston said.

A paper published by Eggleston and three other scholars in the Journal of Labor & Development analyzed how employment of females from rural areas affected fertility, using data from a survey of 2,355 married women in China. The survey examined “off-farm” employment, which was defined as travel to another village, town or city for work.

The researchers found that off-farm employment for those women reduced the probability of having more than one child by 54.8 percent and the probability of preferring more than one child by 49.6 percent. An earlier blog piece on VoxEU highlighted those research outcomes.

Another aspect of China’s demographic change is gender imbalance. Male preference has long been a cultural factor in China and, with the pressures of the one-child policy, a cause behind its skewed population.

That reality will not dramatically change soon, Eggleston said. Even if the end to the one-child policy brought the sex ratio at birth back to normal levels, the existing imbalance of the younger population will create millions of “forced bachelors” among poorer men who cannot find brides, as well as a whole set of related issues.

Choice restored

What the policy assuredly does, though, is remove a barrier. Many Chinese women who before did not have the opportunity to give birth to a second child, now have that opportunity.

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“This is a crucial arena of choice restored to the Chinese,” Eggleston wrote of the 2013 policy relaxation in a brief presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Previously, the absence of such a freedom led some couples to face substantial fines from the government, depending on the local variation of the one-child policy.

“Regardless of the new policy, demographic trends point to the importance of investing in child education, nutrition and skill development,” Eggleston said.

A similar message is carried in a chapter in Policy Challenges, co-authored by Sanghyop Lee and Qiulin Chen, who suggest that putting resources toward human capital development – education and health – can offset the destabilizing effects of demographic transition.

Research being done by FSI’s Rural Education Action Program led by Stanford professor Scott Rozelle works to directly inform education, health and nutrition policy in China.

Spending more on education – particularly for women and girls – is win-win. It complements pro-employment policies, and boosts productivity for women and the economy as a whole, Eggleston said.

South Korea and the United States are “completely aligned” on North Korea strategy, the chief American diplomat in South Korea said to a Stanford audience on Monday.

Mark Lippert, who assumed the role of U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea in 2014, delivered remarks at a public seminar, “Perspectives on the U.S.-Korea Alliance,” organized by the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Arriving from the Washington summit of President Obama and Korean President Park Geun-hye, Lippert spoke of the success of the state visit. The U.S.-Korea relationship is in “as good a shape as it’s ever been,” and that secure foundation is allowing the two countries to forge ahead on shared challenges, including North Korea, trade and global health.

Mark Lippert expressed optimism about the U.S.-ROK alliance at a Stanford talk on Oct. 19, 2015.

He said the United States and South Korea are invested in getting to a place where the North Koreans will “come back to the table” for discussions on ending their nuclear program, noting the continuing viability of the Six Party Talks mechanism which has been stalled for more than five years.

Lippert also cited U.S.-Korea strategic cooperation on sanctions against North Korea, and defense capabilities aimed to deter the threat of a North Korea with nuclear and long-range missile capacity.

Looking ahead, “The United States strongly supports calls for reunification of the Korean Peninsula,” he said. Human rights, a free economy and a democratically elected government in the North would be a priority in that pursuit.

Lippert said the United States is supportive of inter-Korean talks and reunions for families separated by the Korean War, both announced earlier this year. On Tuesday, hundreds of South Koreans crossed the border to meet with North Korean relatives, who have been separated for more than six decades.

Partnering on the economic level was another key aspect of the summit, Lippert said, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was among items discussed. The United States, as one of 12 TPP member nations, would welcome an application from South Korea should they choose to pursue it, he said.

Lippert acknowledged that South Korea already has bilateral trade agreements with 10 out of the 12 TPP member nations, including one with the United States. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) came into force in 2012 and is moving toward full implementation, he said. The United States’ sixth largest trading partner is South Korea.

Following his formal remarks, Lippert took questions from the audience.

Michael Armacost, a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow, asked Lippert how Japan and China figured into the summit discussions following recent developments. In September, President Park attended a military parade in Beijing that marked the 70^th anniversary of the end of World War II. She was the only leader from a democratic country at the event.

Responding on China, Lippert said the United States is supportive of South Korea engaging with China. “We don’t view this as a zero-sum game,” he said, likening South Korea’s regional relationships to a situation where “all boats rise” together.

Dafna Zur, a professor of Korean culture and literature, asked Lippert to talk about how his education informed his career in public service.

Lippert attended Stanford and studied political science and international policy studies.

His education, he said, was invaluable in preparing him for the diverse situations and people that a diplomatic career brings.

Lippert encouraged students to savor conversation and debate in the classroom. Participating in that kind of forum not only “makes you a more informed person” but also “sharpens your analytic skills,” he said.

Prior to becoming ambassador, Lippert held senior positions in the Department of Defense and the White House and served in the U.S. Navy.

Following the event, Lippert met with faculty members of Shorenstein APARC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies for a roundtable discussion, chaired by Kathleen Stephens, a distinguished fellow at Shorenstein APARC and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2008-11).

Embedded photo: Mark Lippert speaks at Stanford on Oct. 19, 2015. Photo credit: Heather Ahn.

In a recent interview with Voice of America, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, said that "Washington and Seoul will press China and Russia harder to use their influence to bring North Korea to genuine denuclearization talks."

The full article is available by clicking here.

In a new book, David Straub explains why massive anti-American protests erupted across South Korea in 2002 and considers whether it could happen again.

South Korea is often seen as a pro-American ally, a model country that went from a poor, postwar nation into a maturing democracy in just four short decades.

But despite a historic alliance between South Korea and the United States, anti-Americanism flared throughout the Asian nation between 1999-2002 when a series of events and longstanding tensions aligned, according to Stanford researcher David Straub.

“It was a sort of venting of steam,” said Straub, an associate director at Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

“Many Koreans at the time were grossly overinterpreting issues and incidents involving the United States. And this was because they were viewing the U.S.-Korea relationship through a lens of historic victimization by other nations, including the United States,” he added.

Straub, who held a thirty-year diplomatic career in the State Department, headed the political section of the American embassy in Seoul during those years and was deeply involved in managing problems in the bilateral relationship.

Boiling point

Since the end of the Korean War, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) has been stationed in Seoul – now about 28,500 uniformed personnel.

In June 2002, a USFK vehicle struck two Korean students in a tragic accident. In December of that same year, after a U.S. court martial found the drivers of the vehicle not guilty of wrongdoing, hundreds of thousands of people protested in Seoul and other major Korean cities. Not only did activists partake but ordinary citizens too, he said.

Straub said the South Korean public had been “unintentionally primed” for such a reaction to the USFK traffic accident; it was the “spark that lit the firestorm” after years of escalation. A series of events led-up to the mass protests, they included:

• A few months before the USFK traffic accident, a Korean athlete was disqualified at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City during a speed skating competition. American athlete Apolo Anton Ohno instead won gold after a disputed call.
• A non-governmental organization in May 2000 revealed that USFK personnel dumped formaldehyde into a drain that ran into the Han River in Seoul.
• In Sept. 1999, the Associated Press published its first investigative story examining the Nogun-ri incident of 1950, when hundreds of Korean refugees were killed in an alleged massacre by U.S. service members.

Asymmetry of attention

Straub said the shaping of Koreans’ views of Americans and fanning of tensions could be attributed in part to an “asymmetry of attention” on the part of the Korean and American publics to the U.S.-Korean relationship.

While the Korean public put tremendous focus on U.S.-Korean relations and the presence of U.S. military personnel in Korea, the American public was unaware of Korean attitudes and feelings, he said.

Similarly during the 1999-2002 period, Korean media reported hypercritical views of the United States and USFK, while the American media paid far less attention.

In negotiating with U.S. officials, South Korean officials would often allude to strong Korean public opinion and demand U.S. concessions. With no American public opinion on Korea issues to point to, U.S. officials were at a major disadvantage, Straub said.

U.S. officials would sometimes note opinions shared by members of Congress, he said, “however, for Korean officials, those claims weren’t as powerful as having a social movement literally on the front doorstep.”

In plain terms, the United States is much larger than South Korea. This very imbalance – which translates to military and economic power – added to Koreans’ assumption that they were “getting the worse end of the bargain,” he added.

“Most Koreans saw Korea as a victim of great powers,” Straub said. “It’s not just the media. It’s more than that, it was – and still is – a shared national narrative.”

Koreans’ sense of national vulnerability is magnified by their historic victimization to neighbors. South Koreans do not want to become a de facto tributary state of China or a colony of Japan again, he said.

Will anti-Americanism return?

USFK incidents were a main focus of Korean attention during the 1999-2002 period, and while there is always a possibility of problems arising, the intensity is gone now, Straub said.

“Some steam is under the lid again,” Straub said. “But I don’t think it’s nearly at the level like it was back then. I’m doubtful that we’d see an exact repeat.”

The media landscape in South Korea has improved and shifted away from its earlier position of “criticize the United States first and ask questions later,” Straub said.

Today, South Korea and the United States are in good standing at the government-level and among the people. President Obama and Korean President Park Geun-hye have an established rapport.   

What troubles Koreans now is North Korea, a Japan focused on collective defense, and the strategic rivalry between the United States and China and its possible implications for Korea, he said.

“South Korea being sandwiched between the United States and China – based on a perception that China is going to be the world’s dominant power – is a real worry for many Koreans,” Straub said, and a large number of Koreans – albeit still a minority – feel that their country must find a more equidistant ground between the two.

Most Koreans, however, still believe in the need for the continued presence of USFK personnel, at least for the time being, said Straub, and must be reassured of their strategic alliance with the United States.

Obama and Park are expected to meet in Washington in mid-October, and Straub said it will be used as an opportunity for both sides to reinforce the importance they attach to the alliance and to pressing North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs.

Links to related articles

NK News: South Korean anti-Americanism dwindles, but roots remain: diplomat

NK News: South Korean anti-Americanism: a thing of the past?

Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea, July 2015

Asia Times: American faces Seoul court over infamous unsolved murder

The Christian Science Monitor: South Korea: 20 years later, Californian son faces trial for Seoul murder

JoongAng Ilbo: Is anti-Americanism dead?

JoongAng Ilbo (Korean): 한미동맹은 빈틈없이 튼실한가 전 미국 국무부 한국과장의 진단