Korea's leading companies, Pantech Co., Ltd., and Curitel Communications, Inc. (known as the Pantech Group) have awarded a $2 million gift to support the Korean Studies Program at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), within the Stanford Institute for International Studies.

The Pantech gift will create the Stanford Korea Forum, led by Professor Gi-Wook Shin, which will convene a conference every year on different aspects of the U.S.-Korea relationship. Three fellowships will also be established: one for mid-career professionals in public service, journalism, and business who will spend three to nine months at Stanford as Pantech Fellows; one for invited Korean scholars to come to Stanford during the summer; and a third for undergraduate and graduate students interested in Korean studies. In addition, the gift will help to sustain critical activities of the Korean Studies Program in APARC, such as public lectures, ongoing research, and policy briefs.

Under the leadership of Byeong Yeop Park, the Founder and Chairman, the Pantech Group had combined sales of 14 million sets worldwide, with a total gross revenue of U.S. $1.7 billion in 2003, placing them in the top three mobile handset manufacturers in Korea, and the eighth largest in the global market.

The Korean government has recognized Mr. Park's achievements with numerous awards. His strong investment in R&D and his recruitment of top technological talent have led to steady and sustainable profits for Pantech, and the company has a record of supporting broad social programs in local communities.

Regarding the company's commitment to Stanford, Mr. Park said, "I am extremely pleased to be part of this outstanding and unique program on Korean Studies. I recognize Stanford's contribution to promoting mutual understanding between Korea and the U.S. by bringing together prominent scholars, policymakers, and business leaders of both countries. I'm so proud that Pantech Group will be contributing to developing the next generation of leaders in building the relationship between Korea and the United States. I hope that our pledge will help attract to Stanford some of the brightest young minds of our two countries."

Professor Shin was delighted about the generous Pantech gift. Korean Studies have blossomed at Stanford over the past three years under Shin's leadership, and he notes that this new commitment will "facilitate American understanding of Korea and elevate Stanford's Korean studies program to the next level of excellence." Shin also underscored the importance of the timing of this gift, "as the United States is now entering a new era in its relations with both North and South Korea."

The Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is a unique Stanford University institution focused on the study of contemporary Asia. APARC's mission is to produce and publish Asia Pacific-focused interdisciplinary research; to educate students, scholars, and corporate and governmental affiliates about the importance of U.S.-Asian relations; to promote constructive interaction to understand and resolve the region's challenges; to influence U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific; and to guide Asian nations on key foreign relations, government, political economy, technology, and social issues. APARC is part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies.

Perhaps no other country has more to lose from North Korea's acquisition of a sizeable nuclear arsenal than China. The existence of such weapons would not only endanger the city of Beijing but also provoke a regional arms race in which Japan, South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan would eventually develop their own strategic deterrents. Given these facts, it is surprising that China has not acted more forcefully to persuade Pyongyang to terminate its nuclear program.

The explanation for this reluctance is the importance Beijing attaches to regional stability. If the North Korean regime were to collapse, a refugee crisis would ensue as starving people flooded across the border into northeastern China, and the way would be opened for South Korean and American troops to advance up the peninsula towards Beijing.

If the Bush administration wants to enlist Chinese help against Pyongyang, therefore, it must first assuage these very reasonable concerns.

China's importance to the United States stems from the absence of other sources of leverage over Pyongyang. Military action against North Korea is an unattractive option because Kim Jong Il and his generals could retaliate massively. Promises of long-term economic aid in exchange for Pyongyang's renouncing its nuclear aspirations also offers little hope. Kim has a long record of consenting to such deals and then surreptitiously reviving his armament efforts.

What is needed is an intermediate form of suasion. China is the only power that possesses this sort of leverage. According to South Korean analysts, in 2002 China supplied 31 percent of North Korea's imports and accounted for 37 percent of its exports. In addition, each year Beijing gives several hundred thousand tons of food aid to its troublesome neighbor, and, now that the United States and Japan have suspended their oil shipments, provides the preponderance of its fuel.

Beijing has occasionally used its influence to express discontent with North Korean behavior, and, by all accounts, the diplomatic dialogue between the two states has also become more acrimonious of late.

However, Beijing will presumably not press Pyongyang much further unless it is assured of the Bush administration's goodwill. In practice, this means that Washington must identify and alleviate China's specific geopolitical concerns. If Beijing fears a refugee crisis, then the United States and its allies must promise to help finance the care of the displaced and perhaps to absorb some significant number of North Korean emigrants. If Beijing fears the approach of American military forces, Washington should consider promising to limit U.S. activities north of the demilitarized zone.

While demonstrating that the United States is willing to accommodate China's needs, the Bush administration must also prove that Pyongyang's policies represent an immediate threat to East Asian stability. To do this, Washington needs to engage more frequently and more conciliatorily in diplomatic talks with Kim and his representatives. For with each abortive discussion, each rejection of reasonable American gestures, the North Koreans push Beijing closer to the conclusion that they pose an unacceptable danger to China's national security interests.

The effect of this policy of dual engagement with China and North Korea would almost certainly be positive. As Beijing's attitude towards Pyongyang hardened, the world might see a sharp reduction in its oil shipments, the deployment of more troops to the North Korean border, or overt discussions with the United States about the future of the peninsula. This would be the strongest possible signal to Pyongyang, short of war, that the world will not tolerate its emergence as a major nuclear power. If, on the other hand, he remained intransigent until the intensified pressure caused North Korea to collapse, Washington and Beijing would still be relatively well situated to deal with the ensuing challenges.

It is through the joint resolution of serious challenges that potential rivals like the United States and China learn to trust each other. If there is a silver lining to the North Korean cloud, it is this opportunity to improve bilateral communications in anticipation of future exigencies.

The writer is a fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford Institute for International Studies.