The seminar will examine critically the current state of the art in global health crisis management with particular reference to HIV/AIDS, SARS, and Avian Influenza. Speakers include internationally recognized experts from various disciplines including public health and the social sciences.
Philippines Conference Room
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Stella Quah, (PhD, University of Singapore; M.Sc [sociology], Florida State University) is professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore. She was a Fulbright Hays scholar from 1969 to 1971. Since 1986 she has spent academic sabbaticals as research associate and visiting scholar at the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California Berkeley; the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the Department of Sociology at Harvard University; the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University; the Stanford Program in International Legal Studies, Stanford University; and the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University.
Professor Quah was elected vice president for research of the International Sociological Association (ISA); chairperson of the ISA Research Council for the session 1994-98; and served as associate editor of International Sociology (1998-2004).
Among her professional activities, Professor Quah serves on two institutional review boards; is member of the Society for Comparative Research; member of the International Advisory Board of the British Journal of Sociology; member of the Editorial Advisory Board of Health Sociology Review, the journal of the health section of the Australian Sociological Association; member of the editorial board of Marriage & Family Review; member of the International Advisory Board of Asian Population Studies; editor of the Sociology in Asia Series; and editor of the Health Systems Section, Encyclopedia of Public Health (Elsevier Inc).
Professor Quah's main areas of research are medical sociology, social policy, and family sociology. The complete list of her publications is at http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/socquahs.
Singapore's general elections in 2006 are unlikely to shake the country's legendary political stability. Despite repeated predictions over decades that the long-ruling People's Action Party (PAP) would falter, opposition parties and dissident groups have made little headway. Cherian George will offer a counter-intuitive reason for this situation: deliberate self-restraint in the use of violence by the state against its opponents. Since the 1980s, modes of repression in Singapore have grown increasingly subtle and sophisticated. Thanks to "calibrated coercion," the PAP has been able to neutralize opposition with minimum political cost. The study of authoritarian regimes would benefit from more nuanced attention to the methodology of coercion. It is time for analysts to stop treating coercion as if it were not problematic - a black box that need not be taken apart. Or so, based on Singapore's case, Prof. George will argue.
Cherian George is the author of Contentious Journalism and the Internet: Towards Democratic Discourse in Malaysia and Singapore (2006) and Singapore: The Air-Conditioned Nation: Essays on the Politics of Comfort and Control (2000). After completing his PhD in communication at Stanford in 2003, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Asia Research Institute, Singapore. He is now deputy head of the journalism program at Nanyang Technological University.
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
The fierce debate on immigration ignores a crucial reality -- what is happening to the United States is only one piece, although a big one, of a much larger global picture.
That hit me a couple of weeks ago when I was in Singapore. The Southeast Asian island nation has long been hailed as an economic model, the business capital for the entire region.
But it is an economy facing demographic peril. Its small population of 4 million is shrinking, thanks to a very low fertility rate. Prosperous Singaporean couples work hard, have fewer children and worry about how to take care of their aging parents. By 2050, Singapore will have a median age of over 52, one of the oldest in the world.
Singapore's answer is to import labor. A third of its workforce are migrants, from construction workers to maids. One out of seven households employs a domestic worker -- low-paid women mostly from neighboring Philippines and Indonesia.
Singapore tries to lure "talents'' -- highly skilled and affluent migrants -- to stay permanently. But the men hauling bricks and the maids washing laundry are in a separate class of temporary guest workers, with no chance to join Singaporean society. If a maid becomes pregnant, she is shipped out within seven days. Employers have to post bonds that must be paid should their servants break the rules and try to stay, putting them in the role of migrant police.
Problems of abuse of domestic workers, including physical and sexual violence and confinement, are serious enough to have prompted a report last December by Human Rights Watch.
Singapore's dependence on migrant labor and its guest-worker policy may be at the extreme end but it's very much on the global spectrum. Labor, like capital and goods before it, is part of a global market. The movement of people across borders in search of wages and work, most of it from developing countries to developed, is growing at a phenomenal pace.
The numbers are staggering. From 1980 to 2000, the number of migrants living in the developed world more than doubled from 48 million to 110 million. Migrants make up an average 12 percent of the workforce in high-income countries. About 4 million migrants cross borders illegally every year.
The demand for labor is driven in part by a demographic disaster -- the falling birth rates of developed countries. Almost all of those countries now have fertility rates that are well below 2.1, the level at which a population replaces itself. At the very low end are Hong Kong (0.94), Korea (1.22) and Singapore in Asia (1.24), along with much of Eastern Europe.
Low fertility means shrinking workforces and aging populations. Without migration, according to a recent study, Europe's population would have declined by 4.4 million from 1995 to 2000. Immigration accounted for 75 percent of U.S. population growth during the same period.
This movement of people cannot be stopped, certainly not by hundreds of miles of fences or even by tens of thousands of border guards. It is an issue that cries out for global cooperation, for common policies that cut across national boundaries. Already, we can benefit from looking at what has worked -- and not worked -- elsewhere.
A Global Commission on International Migration, formed in 2003 by the United Nations secretary-general, has taken an initial stab. Their report, issued last winter, supports the growth of guest-worker programs.
The Senate immigration bill now up for debate includes a provision for a guest-worker program. The bill is clearly preferable to the punitive and ineffective approach of the House version. But the Singapore experience -- and previous guest-worker programs like the German import of Turks -- should prompt second thoughts about going down this road.
One problem is that the guests don't leave. The United States has its own experience with this in the bracero program to import farmworkers, and more recently with the supposedly temporary H1-B visas used so extensively by the high-tech industry here in Silicon Valley.
Most troubling to me, these programs create an underclass of migrants who are never assimilated, as happened in Germany. It sets us on the Singapore road, encouraging inhumane policing mechanisms. And it is a gilded invitation to employers to depress the wages and incomes of American workers, and not just in the dirty jobs that are supposedly so hard to fill.
The United States has been rightfully proud of a tradition that treats all immigrants as citizens in the making. Rather than guest workers, isn't it more American to set realistic immigration quotas and enforce them fairly?
The rise of Asia is regarded in most of the world as primarily an economic phenomenon. Asian economies have rebounded robustly since the 1997 financial crisis, with growth rates in many countries greatly exceeding the global average. Yet corruption remains a problem throughout the region, significantly cramping the extent and potential of Asia's "rise."
In the 2005 "Corruption Perceptions Index" produced by the watchdog group Transparency International, most of the 22 Asian nations received low rankings and scores. Indonesia, for example, is ranked 137th among 159 nations. India and China fare only somewhat better, ranking 88th and 78th respectively. (The United States, by comparison, ranks 17th in the world.) Corruption -- defined by the United Nations Development Program as the abuse of public power for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, or embezzlement -- not only undermines investment and economic growth; it also aggravates poverty. In India, even the
poor have to bribe officials to obtain basic services.
Graft also undermines the effectiveness of states. The World Bank, for example, has estimated that the Philippines government between 1977 and 1997 "lost" a total of $48 billion to corruption. Why is graft a serious problem in Asian countries? Can their leaders minimize it and thereby further improve and sustain economic growth -- or is this task hopeless? My research suggests that curbing corruption in most Asian nations is difficult, mainly because of a lack of political will. However, it is not an impossible dream, as the examples of Singapore and Hong Kong demonstrate.
On the surface, President Bush's week-long swing through Northeast Asia has been a strong contrast with his recent stormy (and, some say, stumbling) excursion into Latin America.
There was little sign of overt anti-Americanism. And no Asian leader will openly oppose American leadership in the flamboyant manner of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. Even prickly China swallowed President Bush's barbs about lack of democratic freedom in China, quietly acknowledging the two powers' differences. In contrast to the meeting of leaders from the Americas, the annual summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Korea will embrace the principles of free trade.
Beneath the polite appearance, however, there is no less a challenge to American leadership in Asia. While Washington fiddled, a powerful momentum has been building up in Asia toward the formation of an East Asian Free Trade Area or, more ambitiously, an East Asian Community, modeled on the European community. Led by China, the East Asian grouping pointedly excludes the United States.
The APEC agenda focuses on an initiative to counter the spread of avian flu and to offer a common push at the WTO meeting in Hong Kong next month to revive the Doha Round of global trade talks. The Bush administration has its own agenda for the APEC meeting: to reposition itself as a leader of economic growth and integration in the region. For this, APEC has the virtue of being a more open organization than those behind the disappointment at the American summit. Its 21 members span the Pacific Rim, bringing together nations from Chile and Mexico to Russia, China and Southeast Asia. But this attention to APEC may be a case of too little, too late. The momentum to give the amorphous APEC an ongoing institutional role, beyond its annual summit meetings, has slowed in recent years. Its pledges for mutual tariff reduction exist almost entirely on paper.
Until this year, the Bush administration barely addressed regional economic issues at APEC. It preferred to use the meetings to promote a post-9/11 security agenda of anti-terrorism. U.S. trade policy has focused more on reaching free trade agreements with a few selected "friends" in that war, such as Singapore and Australia.
Meanwhile a Chinese-sponsored move to hold an East Asian summit offers the most visible expression of a trend of declining American influence in Asia. That meeting will take place in Malaysia in mid-December. The gathering groups the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Pointedly not invited is the United States.
This meeting is an outgrowth of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process - an annual dialogue of ASEAN with China, South Korea and Japan that began in December 1997 in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. The APT has grown into an elaborate mechanism for cooperation in a range of areas from finance and agriculture to information technology. This reflects an underlying economic reality - the growth of regional and bilateral trade agreements and the rapid rise of intra-Asian trade.
Until fairly recently, foreign trade in East Asia was dominated by trans-Pacific trade with the United States. But the share of Asian exports headed to the U.S. has dropped dramatically, while those destined for other Asian nations has risen. In the two decades from 1981 to 2001, according to economist Edward Lincoln, the share of intra-regional exports has risen from 32 percent to 40 percent, and intra-regional imports from 32 percent to 50 percent.
Much of the growth of regional integration is being driven by China, which is generating enormous demand for imports of raw materials as well as for semi-finished goods that are assembled for export. China has not been hesitant to use this role to expand its influence in the region. It has embraced the APT as a road towards creation of an East Asian community. At the ASEAN summit last year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared that such a community was a "long-term strategic choice in the interests of China's development." China has also outmatched the U.S. in negotiating free trade agreements, both bilateral and regional. The most impressive is an FTA deal between China and ASEAN set to take effect in 2010. Beijing even dreams of an Asian currency, based on the Chinese yuan, to rival the dollar and the euro.
China is not the first nation to try for such East Asian economic unity. Back in the days when Japan was riding high as an economic superpower, it too talked of leading an East Asian bloc, based on a yen currency zone. As late as 1997, in response to the Asian financial crisis, Japan proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund, a kind of alternate regional financial system. More recently, both South Korea and Japan offered their own visions of an East Asian community in 2001. And both countries tried to match China in the APT by offering to form free trade agreements with ASEAN.
Japan, however, was never as successful as China is likely to be. "It would seem that Japan is a natural counterweight to China, but Tokyo is generally perceived as reactive and incapable of outflanking Beijing," Brad Glosserman, director of research at the Pacific Forum of CSIS, wrote recently. "Its economic dynamism is no match for that of China."
The United States has never been friendly toward efforts to create an East Asian economic bloc, viewing them as chipping away at the global trading system and rivaling American leadership. But Asia is arguably only following in American footsteps -- witness the NAFTA deal with Canada and Mexico and the more recent trade pact with Central America.
Many American policymakers believe these developments are partly a product of the failure of the Bush administration to articulate - much less pursue - a strategy to engage East Asia.
"The United States has greater strategic interests in Asia now than it did in Europe before World War I or World War II,'' argued a recent report of the Grand Strategic Choices Working Group, co-chaired by John Hopkin's University's Francis Fukuyama and Princeton's G. John Ikenberry. "Thus," the report continued, "it is unfortunate that part of the problem, in East Asia in particular, is that America's relative lack of interest in tending to the region has caused some allies of the U.S. to doubt our resolve and question the value of resisting unfavorable developments alone."
The report echoes other policymakers in suggesting the U.S. form its own East Asian economic zone with Japan, South Korea and Australia."That's a non-starter,'' says Professor Vinod Aggarwal, director of Berkeley's APEC study center. "Nobody wants to be cut out of the China market."
Privately, Bush administration officials downplay the importance of the East Asian summit in December, pointing to the lack of any concrete agenda. The addition of India, Australia and New Zealand to the invitation list, along with Japan, should effectively counter any Chinese initiative, they believe.
But those countries also fear being left out of whatever may emerge from this process. They cannot afford to be left on the outside, looking in.
Ultimately, neither can the United States. The President's trip is a belated recognition of that fact. But to be more than a momentary gesture, the United States must give East Asia the consistent attention it deserves.
Open source software (OSS) is widely used as operating systems (Linux), web tools (Apache, JBoss), database platforms (MySQL) and a range of applications. Creating OSS is widely believed to be a relatively easy process compared with proprietary software. Its growing use and support from large firms such as IBM and HP have led many to believe that OSS will ultimately replace proprietary software. While this is hotly debated, there is little doubt that as its use increases, it will impact how software services will be delivered. In particular, low cost global delivery centers might benefit from ready access to OSS code. The panel will discuss these and other issues related to the globalization of software services caused by OSS.
Panelists:
Mike Balma is HP's Linux Business Strategist. Mike has helped drive HP's strategy for Linux and Open Source software across HP since 1999. Mike is a member of HP's Open Source Review Board that reviews HP open source projects. He was involved in the Linux port to Itanium. He also helped create an exchange for open source software development. And he helps drive HP's Linux strategy in the public sector including the security related technologies and certifications.
Mitchell Kertzman is a partner at Hummer Winblad Venture Partners. He has over 30 years of experience as a CEO of public and private software companies. Most recently, Mitchell was chairman and CEO of Liberate Technologies, a provider of platform software for the delivery of digital services by cable television companies.
Rajesh Setty chairman of CIGNEX Technologies, Inc., a company that he co-founded in late 2000. Setty has managed technology projects and practices over the last 14 years in several parts of the world (India, Singapore, Malayisa, Hong Kong, France and the United States.)
Philippines Conference Room
In Thailand in 1997 reformers drafted a new constitution. They hoped to trigger dramatic improvements in the country's political system. Analysts, activists, and politicians alike blamed many of Thailand's problems on shortcomings of a party system seen as dangerously weak and fragmented. Accordingly, the new charter was designed to strengthen political parties while reducing their number. These constitutional changes profoundly affected Thai politics, but not always in the ways or for the reasons that reformers had in mind. Have the changes improved or worsened the quality of democracy in Thailand? In addressing this question, Professor Hicken will highlight the unintended consequences of constitutional reform and the nature of governance under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party.
Allen Hicken studies political institutions and policy making in developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Countries he has worked in include Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Cambodia. Writing-in-progress includes a book manuscript, "Building Party Systems: Elections, Parties, and Coordination in Developing Democracies." He has published in the American Journal of Political Science and Electorial Studies, among other places. At Michigan he is affiliated with the university's Center for Southeast Asian Studies and Center for Political Studies. He earned his Ph.D in political science and Pacific studies from the University of California - San Diego.
Daniel I. Okimoto Conference Room
The Philippines suffers from an ominous systemic deficit: the incapacity of democratic institutions to respond to pent-up social demands. A scant four years after a second "peoople power revolution" in 2001 brought down President Joseph Estrada on charges of involvement in illegal gambling, the country again finds itself in crisis. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo struggles to retain power as she faces allegations that close relatives are also involved in gambling syndicates and still more damaging accusations of complicity in fixing the May 2004 elections. Unlike in 1986 and 2001, when changes in leadership nurtured new hopes, the crisis of 2005 reveals a system desperately struggling for legitimacy. Prof. Hutchcroft will argue for well-considered institutional reform designed to break the cycle of recurrent crisis and tackle the country's perilous democratic deficit.
Paul D. Hutchcroft has written widely on Philippine politics and political economy, including Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines (1998). His current writing includes a book on state formation and territorial politics in the Philippines from the early American colonial period through the enactment of the Local Government Code in the 1990s; and an edited volume on Philippine political reform stemming from a workshop he organized in Manila in July. He has been a visiting fellow at the Asia Research Institute in Singapore and is now the associate chair of UW-Madison's Political Science Department.
Daniel I. Okimoto Conference Room
Focus on Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Greater China
SPRIE is a multidisciplinary research program at Stanford University that focuses on innovation and entrepreneurship in leading high technology regions in the United States and Asia. SPRIE has an active community of scholars at Stanford as well as research affiliates in the United States, Mainland China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India. During 2005-2006, SPRIE is expanding a new initiative on the rise of leading high technology regions in Greater China and their impact on the global knowledge economy. Specific research topics include globalization of R&D, executive leadership, university-industry linkages, venture capital industry development and leading high technology clusters in Greater China. In addition, industries of ongoing research at SPRIE include semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, and software.
SPRIE Graduate Research Fellows: Research Assistantships & Support for International Field Research
As part of its new initiative on innovation and entrepreneurship in Greater China, SPRIE will select outstanding Stanford students as SPRIE Graduate Research Scholars. SPRIE Graduate Research Scholars will work with SPRIE faculty and senior researchers at Stanford for two (or more) academic quarters in 2005-2006 to gather and analyze data, conduct interviews in Silicon Valley, contribute to publications, and advance progress on the overall project agenda. During summer 2006, they will conduct SPRIE field research through interviews or surveys with business and government leaders in Beijing, Shanghai, or Hsinchu. As part of SPRIE's international research team, they will have the opportunity to interact closely with project leaders and visiting scholars at Stanford as well as partners in Asia, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, or Zhongguancun Science Park in Mainland China or the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan. They will also participate in SPRIE's public and invitation-only seminars and workshops with academic, business, and government leaders. The financial award will include RA support at 15-20 hours/week (or equivalent) plus summer stipend to cover travel, living expenses, and research.
How To Apply (limited to current Stanford graduate students)
Successful candidates will have demonstrated a track record of superior analytical ability, strong oral and written communication skills (including full fluency in English and Chinese), knowledge of high technology and entrepreneurship, high motivation, and willingness to be part of a dynamic international research team.
Applicants should submit:
Send applications to:
SPRIE
Encina Hall - East 301
Stanford University 94305-6055
or by email to George Krompacky. Questions? Please contact George Krompacky, Program Coordinator, by email or call 650.725.1885
Deadline for receipt of all materials: December 30, 2005
Applicants will be notified of decisions in January 2006
