“Teaching doesn’t stop after class—it shapes and develops into many different avenues.”

Perhaps this is a guiding belief behind Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) at Stanford.

Known for his directorship at Shorenstein APARC, Shin is also recognized as a professor of sociology and in the leading role of the Korea Program that he founded more than a decade ago. In this inaugural Faculty Spotlight Q&A, Shin talks courses, research and administration—and perhaps most poignantly—about the ongoing collaboration with students far beyond their time at Stanford.

What are you looking forward to with the Center in year 2014?

As you may know, Shorenstein APARC is entering its thirty-first year and we have much to be pleased with. Our six well-established programs are strong in their approach to interdisciplinary research and policy-oriented outcomes. As director, my goal is to support the success of these programs in broaching questions and guiding purposeful interaction between the United States and Asia.

Political transition, demographic change, and economic development are being seen at varying levels across Asia. At the same time, regional tensions continue to rise and shifting internal dynamics signal unrest. The need for dialogue and new perspectives is essential. We must ask the question: how can we constructively engage?

In February, for example, the Koret Conference will examine opportunities for the outside world to engage with North Korea. Given the current security situation, this dialogue is not incredibly easy, but it is essential. This conference will bring experts to Stanford’s campus who will create a strong policy report and offer insight into the foreign policy debate. The year ahead at Shorenstein APARC presents many opportunities for students, affiliates, and the surrounding community to become involved.

This quarter, you are teaching the course “Nations & Nationalism” and often teach a variety of comparative courses on politics and sociology – what do you find most challenging about teaching?

Shin: For me, a challenging aspect of teaching is finding a balance between teaching theory and equipping students with the tools to approach real-world problems. I do not wish for students to leave with purely theoretical and scholarly arguments; my aim is to give students the means to ask questions and prepare them to sort out today’s complex challenges.

Nationalism remains an important challenge. As we can see in Northeast Asia today, the tension among China, Japan and the Koreas speaks to the interdisciplinary relationship between nation and society—political ramifications caused in part by long-standing historical narratives. In my course, students survey major works and consider a wide range of regional and domestic factors that contribute to political identity. 

Having been at Stanford since 2001 as a senior fellow at FSI and a professor of sociology, what do you most enjoy about working here?

Shin: Stanford provides constant opportunities to learn and engage with new people. Fellows and corporate affiliates join us at Shorenstein APARC each year. It is a pleasure to meet, work and engage in conversation with such a wide variety of scholars and professionals. This is what I have enjoyed most about the Stanford community—meeting very good people in my 13 years here.

It’s especially rewarding to see my students succeed after their time at Stanford. Even after leaving campus, many of my former students continue to work in collaboration with me. For instance, I worked with Paul Chang, an assistant professor of sociology at Harvard University, on a research project on social movements in Korea, which produced articles and a book. Currently, I am working on two collaborative projects with doctorate students I previously taught—one on global talent in Korea and the other on cultural diversity in Asian higher education and corporations.

Can you tell us about your research collaboration and upcoming work?

At present, I am working on three major research projects. My first project is a collaborative one with my former student, Joon Nak Choi, who is now an assistant professor at the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology. Our book, which is currently under review by a major academic press, examines the spread of global talent from the viewpoint of social capital instead of human capital. While the “brain drain” perspective permeates most literature on global talent recruitment, we claim that the spread of global talent generates social capital, creates transnational bridges, and transfers positive returns back to the home country. As a Korean who has lived and worked in the United States for more than 30 years, this inquiry is especially salient to me.

A second project with another former student, Rennie Moon, an assistant professor at Yonsei University in Seoul, examines cultural diversity issues and challenges in Korea and Asia. We review current programs and policies in universities and corporations and investigate how promoting diversity in ethnically homogenous societies like Korea and Japan can contribute to innovation and creativity. Through this project, we seek to stimulate a much-needed conversation about the value of diversity in Korea and across Asia and what embracing diversity can mean and do for these societies. 

Similarly, I have been working on the final installment of the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project with Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC. Through in-depth interviews with over 50 opinion leaders in Japan, Korea, South Korea and the United States, we have gathered and analyzed opinions on memories of the Pacific wars, which have become even more relevant as they manifest in current geopolitics. We are currently writing a book based on the interviews and this will conclude a multi-year research project on the Divided Memories that will have produced four books when this gets published.

All of these projects are based on rigorous academic research but also seek to draw policy implications and suggestions to solve real world issues and problems.

The Faculty Spotlight Q&A series highlights a different faculty member at Shorenstein APARC each month giving a personal look at his or her teaching approaches and outlook on related topics and upcoming activities.

Stephen W. Bosworth, a former diplomat and expert on Korea, will spend the winter quarter at Stanford as a visiting lecturer.

Bosworth was a United States ambassador to three countries: South Korea (from 1997 to 2001); the Philippines (from 1984 to 1987); and Tunisia (from 1979 to 1981).

He was the President Barack Obama’s Special Representative for North Korea Policy between 2009 and 2011 and held several other senior positions at the State Department. He was a dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and is currently a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

At Stanford, he will be a Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, in residence at FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Prior to his arrival at Stanford University, Bosworth also served as the Director of Policy Planning, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, among other senior level positions at the State Department. Bosworth co-authored Chasing the Sun, Rethinking East Asian Policy in 2006, and focuses on U.S.-Asia foreign policy, energy security and inter-governmental relations.

The Payne lectureship, named after Frank and Arthur Payne, presents prominent speakers chosen for their international reputation as leaders who emphasize visionary thinking, a broad grasp of a given field, and the capacity to engage the larger community in important issues. Former FBI Director Robert Mueller is also spending this academic year as a Payne lecturer.

Bosworth will deliver three public lectures at Stanford. His first talk will focus on his extensive experience in the diplomatic service. The public lecture and reception will take place in the Bechtel Conference Center in Encina Hall on Feb. 3. The two other lectures will address negotiations and relations between North Korea and the U.S. management of its alliance with Japan and South Korea.

Gi-Wook Shin and David Straub analyze North Korea’s execution of Jang Song-taek and its implications on nuclear negotiation channels. They point out how Kim Jong Un’s leadership purge may prompt China to align more closely with the U.S. and South Korea on their likely push for heightened sanctions in the coming months.

In eliminating his uncle Jang Song-taek, North Korea’s young leader Kim Jong Un acted like a character out of a Shakespearian drama with Stalinist characteristics. Whether Jang’s show trial and summary execution will help to consolidate or undermine Kim’s power remains to be seen. But the statement on Jang’s indictment confirms—apparently unwittingly—the enormous economic, political, and social problems facing his regime. This stunning contradiction by North Korea itself of decades of official bravado about the unity of the leadership and people and its narrative of steady progress on all fronts may or may not have serious consequences in North Korea, but it certainly will abroad.

In attempting to transfer blame for all the country’s economic troubles to Jang, the statement reports that his alleged confession referred to “the present regime … not tak[ing] any measures despite the fact that the economy and the country and people’s living are driven into catastrophe” and that “the [standard of] living of the people and service personnel may further deteriorate [italics added] in the future.” The statement also implicitly acknowledges that the botched currency re-denomination in 2009 was responsible for “sparking off serious economic chaos and disturbing the people’s mind-set.” Jang is accused of undermining Kim’s pet project of dressing up the capital of Pyongyang through massive apartment and other construction projects for the elite there at the expense of ordinary people in the rest of the country. Without citing China by name, the statement blasts Jang for making cozy deals with that country for the sale of North Korean minerals and for Chinese investment in North Korea’s special economic zones.

The regime’s leaders may have felt that releasing this statement and punctuating it with Jang’s execution were necessary for their purposes at home, but they clearly must not have understood the consequences it will have abroad. For example, whether or not it signals that the regime itself plans to backtrack on economic deals with China, PRC leaders will be further angered by the regime’s disrespect of Chinese interests. They will be more cautious about economic engagement with Pyongyang, and they will be more amenable to increasing sanctions against North Korea when it engages in its next provocation. North Korea leaders apparently are uneasy about their extreme reliance on China for economic support and hope to diversify their economic engagement. But for the rest of the world, too, Jang’s execution and this statement will only underline for a long time to come the extremely high political risk of economic dealings with Pyongyang.

U.S. and South Korean officials will look closely at the assertion that Jang intended to “grab the supreme power of the party and state by employing all the most cunning and sinister means and methods, pursuant to the ‘strategic patience’ policy and ‘waiting strategy’ of the U.S. and the south Korean puppet group of traitors [italics added].” Already determined to maintain sanctions pressure on Pyongyang to force it to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, U.S. and South Korean officials will take this as an acknowledgement by the North Koreans themselves of the efficacy of their policy and double down on it.

In the wake of Jang’s execution, Pyongyang, predictably, is trying to send signals to the outside world that all is well. A North Korean ambassador reiterated that North Korea is open for all kinds of talks with foreign countries to reduce tensions, and the regime has invited South Korea to talks about their joint industrial park in North Korea. Kim Jong Un may now seek to increase economic exchanges with Seoul to reduce his dependence on Beijing. South Korea is not opposed to economic engagement with North Korea, but President Park Geun-hye will insist on international standards and transparency, something that Kim Jong Un will find very hard to swallow.  

Earlier this year, Kim declared his fundamental policy to be byeongjin, that is, “parallel progress” in developing nuclear weapons and growing the economy. Jang’s execution and especially Kim’s explanation for it will make it that much harder for Kim to accomplish either goal. The North Koreans do not seem to understand that Jang’s execution alone would likely not have had a large lasting impact abroad but that issuing this kind of a statement will. It has underlined the brutal and anachronistic nature of the North Korean regime to governments and peoples throughout the world, which will now view the regime with even more skepticism for a long time to come. Moreover, Washington and Seoul must now prepare for an increased possibility that Kim will stage another sneak attack on South Korea to rally support at home.

It’s hard to find reasons for optimism at this point, but if there is any glint of a silver lining, it is that the regime itself has unintentionally revealed its desperate need to find remedies for its domestic political and economic troubles. Working together, the United States, South Korea, and China should take this as an opportunity to induce the young and inexperienced North Korea leader to give up nuclear weapons and join the international community by increasing both the pressure on his regime and the credibility of their offer of incentives for finally taking the right course. 

Gi-Wook Shin is director of Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. David Straub is associate director of Stanford’s Korean Studies Program and a former State Department Korean affairs director.

A later version of this article was published by the Christian Science Monitor, a joint initiative of two academic research networks, the East Asia Bureau of Economic Research and the South Asian Bureau of Economic Research.

Shin was interviewed in NK News on Jang’s removal from power, the article is available in Korean only. Straub analyzed the execution with three other experts in an article in East Asia Forum, a news agency at the forefront of North Korean news coverage. Straub was also quoted in the CBC News and the MK News.