On the eve of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the aid of border policies, China was the second largest corn exporter in the world. During the time prior to accession, China's corn prices were estimated to be more than 30 percent above world market prices (Huang, Rozelle and Chang, 2003). China's government explicitly admitted to providing subsidies for corn exports of up to $US35 per metric, which accounted for almost all of the protection that corn producers in China were receiving. During the late 1990s and through 2001, with such high subsidies the nation's exporters were able to sell around 5 million metric tons (mmts) annually into world markets (Gale, 2003). Most of the shipments, especially in the 2000 and 2001, were sent to Korea and Malaysia. With such large shipments, the exports of other nations in the world (especially those from the US that traditionally was Korea's main supplier of feed grains) were displaced.

The most important policy measures are those that improve the quality of rural Chinas human and physical resources and infrastructure that will provide the skills and abilities to rural residents that seek to integrate themselves into the nations industrializing and commercializing cities. Successful development policy, however, must also recognize that modernization is a long process that will depend on maintaining a healthy agriculture and rural economy.

While a rural development plan has many components, we restrict our attention to three broad issues: (a) the nature of Chinas new economic landscape and measures to enhance it; (b) changes that are needed to improve rural government and its partnerships with the rural population; and (c) reforms and investments that can improve Chinas resources: labor, land, capital, water, forests and the environment of the poor.

In this report, we will attempt to answer the following three main questions: What economic

and trade policy reforms have been introduced? What have been the impacts of these

reforms on agricultural production and trade? How has domestic food security at the

national and householdlevels been affected by the reform process?

This paper considers two questions. First, why did the Chinese government establish stock markets? Second, how have political interests shaped the key features of these markets? Based on both interviews and statistical analysis, the paper argues that China?s top Party-State leaders attempted to create stock market institutions that allow the state to maintain control over listed companies, and over ?the market? as a whole.

This paper examines a key aspect of the politics of stock markets in ChinaÑthe distinct differences in interests between central government leaders and local governments. Central government leaders have a powerful incentive to promote macroeconomic stability and good performance of the stock market. Local leaders, for their part, are less concerned with the overall performance of the stock market than with gaining access to the stock market for companies under their own jurisdiction. The paper demonstrates that company listing brings tangible economic benefits to municipalities. Listed companies are associated with higher levels of gross domestic product (GDP), budgetary revenue, and industrial and commercial tax revenue. Therefore, it is not surprising that local officials put substantial effort into lobbying for the right to list additional companies on the national stock exchanges.

Does the World Trade Organization promote democracy? A large part of the heated and pro-tracted debate over China?s application for WTO membership revolved around this question. Prior to China?s WTO accession in December 2001, this debate had dragged on for nearly fifteen years. While one side argued that WTO membership would promote democratization in China, others argued that the wealth generated through economic integration would provide the resources to maintain authoritarian rule. Only time will tell whether WTO accession will contribute to pressures for democratization in China. In the meantime, however, this paper examines the empirical basis for these competing claims about the effects of GATT/WTO memberships on domestic political systems. Based on statistical analysis of a global data set, this paper concludes that members of the international trade regime are more likely than nonmembers to be democracies. However, there is little evidence that WTO membership in itself can promote democratic transition. Instead, it appears to be the case that democratic countries are more likely to seek to join the WTO.