April 2009 Dispatch - Late Democratizers? Authoritarian Developmentalism and Political Change in Pacific Asia
Some theorists of modernization have influentially claimed that successful “late industrialization” led by developmental states creates economies too complex, social structures too differentiated, and (middle-class-dominated) civil societies too politically conscious to sustain nondemocratic rule. Nowhere is this argument—that economic growth drives democratic transitions—more evident than in Northeast and Southeast Asia (hereafter Pacific Asia).
South Korea and Taiwan, having democratized only after substantial industrialization, seem to fit this narrative well. But “late democratizers” have been the exception rather than the rule. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand democratized before high per capita incomes were achieved. Malaysia, and especially Singapore are more wealthy than they are democratic. The communist “converts” to developmentalism, China and Vietnam, are aiming for authoritarian versions of modernity. Table 1* shows that there is no clear pattern in Pacific Asia. Indeed, according to the nongovernmental organization Freedom House (and using the World Bank categories of low, lower middle, upper middle, or high income), poor and rich countries alike in Pacific Asia are rated “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.”
What key factors have influenced the different timing of democratization in Pacific Asia? Democratization has occurred early in the developmental process when authoritarian states have failed to create sustainable economic growth, which in turn has led to mounting debt. Many reasons explain this phenomenon, but a primary cause is the so-called failure to “deepen”—that is, certain countries’ inability to become major manufacturers of high-tech and heavy industrial goods. For example, when economic crises rocked the Philippines in the mid-1980s and Indonesia in the late 1990s, both nations lacked the economic maturity and breadth to rebound, prompting abrupt financial collapse. These nations’ political systems were too ossified to channel popular unrest, and mass mobilization resulted. Ideologically, the Marcos and Suharto regimes faced accusations of cronyism, as favored business leaders stepped in to rescue failing conglomerates, sidelining once-influential technocrats in the process. In the end, these countries’ limited economic development actually broke down their authoritarian systems.
“Late industrializers,” by contrast, do succeed in industrial “deepening.” But they are often less successful in terms of “widening”—the perception that the benefits of development are being fairly shared in society. Statistics show that South Korea and Taiwan are relatively equal societies. Nevertheless, neither of these technocratically oriented authoritarian regimes was able to blunt criticisms that growth was unjustly distributed. South Korean workers and native Taiwanese felt particularly disadvantaged. In Malaysia, too, tensions are now mounting about distribution along ethnic lines. Electoral authoritarianism helped to defuse earlier crises in South Korea and Taiwan, but beginning in the mid-1980s, opposition forces in both nations launched successful challenges through the ballot box to bring about democratization. In Malaysia, the opposition scored major gains in the 2008 elections. Ideologically, all three authoritarian regimes were weakened by activist campaigns for social justice, which mobilized middle class professionals.
One can only speculate about whether Singapore will one day democratize. Its economy has continually deepened, most recently through a major drive to grow a biotech industry. At the same time, it has widened through a series of welfare-related measures focused on housing and pensions. The Singaporean government has also perfected a system of electoral authoritarianism, allowing some competition and participation without threatening the ruling party’s hold on power. Ideologically, the government has long determined the political agenda through its collectivist campaigns (including the once high-profile “Asian values” discourse). However, when Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, eventually passes away, the nation’s technocratic elite may be tempted to democratize. Democratization would give the government greater legitimacy to reform welfare provision, which many believe is currently limiting Singapore’s competitiveness. The main arguments are summarized in table two.*
It is evident that China and Vietnam are trying to imitate the Singaporean model. Though each faces many obstacles, both countries have already made great strides in industrial deepening and widening through an elaborate postcommunist welfare system. Ideologically, these countries will rely not just on growth—which will inevitably slow during the current economic crisis—but also on appeals to a collectivist identity that is simultaneously both nationalist and neo-Confucianist in character. Whether China and Vietnam eventually democratize or remain authoritarian despite modernization is one of the most important political questions in the world today.
* Please contact the Manager of Corporate Relations for a full PDF copy of this dispatch, including tables.
The Global Economic Crisis and U.S.-Japan Relations
Japan has been hit unexpectedly hard by the global economic recession. Although Japanese financial institutions were not seriously damaged by the initial financial crisis in the United States, the economy has been staggered by an unprecedented drop in exports. With the economy likely to shrink by five to six percent in 2009, Japan faces the worst economic downturn in over a half century. Policy responses to this situation have been complicated by the uncertain political situation, with an unpopular prime minister and a looming election for the lower house of the national Diet.
What does all this mean for relations with the United States? There are several important developments. First, one impact of the crisis is a shrinkage of Japan's current-account surplus, implying that (at least in 2009) Japan will be a much smaller net supplier of capital to the United States and the rest of the world. Second, the government appears to be willing to respond to the crisis with strong fiscal stimulus, which should please the Obama administration. Third, even with stimulus in Japan, economic recovery will lag behind that of the United States because real recovery will depend on an upturn in exports. Fourth, it is China, not Japan, that will be the key among Asian countries. China will continue to grow, and is also applying fiscal stimulus, so it will likely play a significant global role in enabling an end to the recession.
All of these factors will play into bilateral relations, complicated by the political uncertainty in Japan. Bilateral relations are close, and will remain so in the Obama administration. But the administration is likely to view Japan as playing only a limited role in the global effort to cope with the consequences of the financial and economic crisis.
About the Speaker:
Edward J. Lincoln joined NYU in 2006 to be director of the Center for Japan-U.S. Business and Economic Studies and clinical professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business. Professor Lincoln teaches courses on the global economy.
Professor Lincoln’s research interests include contemporary structure and change in the Japanese economy, East Asian economic integration, and U.S. economic policy toward Japan and East Asia. His latest book, on the underappreciated importance of economic issues in international relations and American foreign policy, is Winners Without Losers: Why Americans Should Care More About Global Economic Policy, published in 2007. He is the author of eight other books and monographs, including East Asian Economic Regionalism (The Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, 2004), Arthritic Japan: The Slow Pace of Economic Reform (Brookings, 2001), and Troubled Times: U.S.-Japan Economic Relations in the 1990s (Brookings, 1998). An earlier book, Japan Facing Economic Maturity (Brookings, 1988) received the Masayoshi Ohira Award for outstanding books on the Asia-Pacific region.
Before joining NYU, Professor Lincoln was a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and earlier a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. In the mid-1990s, he served as Special Economic Advisor to Ambassador Walter Mondale at the American Embassy in Tokyo. He has also been a professorial lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
Professor Lincoln received his Bachelor’s degree from Amherst College, his M.A. in both economics and East Asian Studies at Yale University, and his Ph.D. in economics also at Yale University.
Philippines Conference Room
Japan's Search for Strategy
Is Japan Adrift?
The political drift in Japanese politics and the meteoric rise of China have led many analysts to begin discounting Japan as a major player in the international system. However, beneath the frustration caused by Prime Minister Taro Aso's abysmal poll ratings and opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa's campaign finance scandal, Japan continues moving steadily forwrd in pursuit of a more active national security strategy. While Japanese poliics are in structural paralysis, Japanese political thought is not. Indeed, a consensus is apparent in a series of unofficial strategic documents issued by scholars and politicians this last year. Meanwhile, the Japan Self Defense Forces have recently stood up their first fully independent and joint operational commands to deal with the North Korean missile launch and Somali pirates.
Japan has always been a conservative society, slow to change well established institutions and patterns of behavior in the face of new strategic circumstances. But Japan has also historically been finely attuned to three strategic coordinates:the power of the world's leading hegemon, the power of China, and the threat from the Korean peninsula. All three are in flux, and so too is Japan's future strategic trajectory
About the Speaker
Michael Green is a senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at CSIS, as well as being an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) from January 2004 to December 2005. He joined the NSC in April 2001 as director of Asian affairs with responsibility for Japan, Korea, and Australia/New Zealand. From 1997 to 2000, he was senior fellow for Asian security at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he directed the Independent Task Force on Korea and study groups on Japan and security policy in Asia. He served as senior adviser in the Office of Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of Defense in 1997 and as consultant to the same office until 2000. From 1995 to 1997, he was a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and from 1994 to 1995, he was an assistant professor of Asian studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he remained a professorial lecturer until 2001.
Green speaks fluent Japanese and spent over five years in Japan working as a staff member of the National Diet, as a journalist for Japanese and American newspapers, and as a consultant for U.S. business. He graduated from Kenyon College with highest honors in history in 1983 and received his M.A. from Johns Hopkins SAIS in 1987 and his Ph.D. in 1994. He also did graduate work at Tokyo University as a Fulbright fellow and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a research associate of the MIT-Japan Program. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Aspen Strategy Group and is vice chair of the congressionally mandated Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission. He serves on the advisory boards of the Center for a New American Security and Australian American Leadership Dialogue.
Philippines Conference Room
"New Beginnings" experts offer recommendations to Obama administration for strengthening U.S.-South Korean alliance
WASHINGTON, D.C.-On the eve of President Obama's first meeting with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, former Ambassadors Michael H. Armacost, Thomas C. Hubbard, and Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard, and other top U.S. experts today presented recommendations to the Obama administration for revitalizing and expanding the United States' alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea).
"New Beginnings," a nonpartisan group of ten former senior U.S. government officials, scholars, and experts on U.S.-Korean relations co-sponsored by The Korea Society and Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, praised the Obama administration for getting off to a good start in its relations with South Korea. They said that the election of new leaders in Seoul and Washington provided an opportunity to transform the vitally important alliance into a broader and deeper regional and global partnership. They noted that South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is committed to this goal and they urged the two presidents to take steps toward making that vision concrete at their upcoming meeting.
After briefing Obama administration officials, the group today released the report ''New Beginnings'' in the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration at a forum sponsored by the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Following is a summary of the group's observations and recommendations on key U.S.-ROK issues:
North Korea: The regime appears increasingly unlikely to give up its nuclear capabilities. While Six Party Talks should be continued, the United States should consider bilateral talks with North Korea to explore whether a new mix of inducements and pressures might achieve U.S. and South Korean goals. Close coordination with the ROK and Japan is essential. China and Russia will apply only limited pressure to North Korea. The Obama administration should stress that the United States will never "accept" a North Korea with nuclear weapons. The United States must have a consistent, long-term strategy to encourage North Korea's "transformation." The United States, ROK, and Japan should seek a high-level understanding on how to deal with possible future instability in the North and offer to include China in such consultations.
Military Cooperation: The United States should fully implement the Bush administration initiatives to realign U.S. Forces Korea and transfer wartime operational control of South Korean forces to the ROK as scheduled in 2012.
Economic Cooperation: Congress needs to approve in a timely manner the bilateral free trade agreement with South Korea (KORUS FTA). This is especially important in light of the ROK's impending conclusion of a similar agreement with the European Union. Such approval will demonstrate the United States' commitment to free trade as a generator of growth, particularly during times of financial crisis and economic recession.
Crisis, Crackdown, and Credibility in Malaysia
In 2009, buffeted by the global economic slowdown, Malaysia’s economy is predicted to shrink. Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak is expected to replace unpopular Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi as Malaysia’s top leader early in April. On 23 March the government banned the two main opposition newspapers, Suara Keadilan and Harakah. Earlier in March an opposition lawmaker was forced out of the national parliament after demanding that Najib answer allegations of involvement in the gruesome murder of a Mongolian model, Altantuya Shaaribuu, in 2006. The killing has been linked to a 110-million-euro “commission” paid to a close confidante of Najib by a French firm for the sale of submarines to Malaysia. In February Najib used local parliamentary defections to take over Perak, one of the five states won in March 2008 by the opposition in elections whose results embarrassed the government. An independent poll shows that Najib is even less popular than Badawi. Prof. Chin will address the implications of these and other aspects of current political turbulence in Malaysia.
James Chin has written widely on Malaysian politics and the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, among other topics. Minority rights, ethnic politics, and good governance are among his current interests. Before his Monash appointment he headed a business school. Before that he worked as a financial journalist. He has a doctorate from Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand.
Philippines Conference Room
Smoking Is Good For Me: The Uphill Battle to Break China's Tobacco Addiction
Susan V. Lawrence is Head of China Programs at the Campaign for Tobacco-free Kids, a Washington, DC-based non-governmental organization that works to reduce tobacco use and its devastating health and economic consequences in the United States and around the world. She divides her time between Washington, DC and China.
The Campaign is a partner organization in the Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use, launched in 2005 with funding from New York Mayor and philanthropist Michael Bloomberg. The initiative’s work is focused on low- and medium-income countries that together account for two thirds of the world’s smokers. Other partners in the initiative are the Centers for Disease Control Foundation, the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, the International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, the World Health Organization, and the World Lung Foundation.
Before joining the Campaign for Tobacco-free Kids, Ms. Lawrence worked for 16 years as a journalist, including a cumulative 11 years between 1990 and 2003 as a staff correspondent in China. She served as China bureau chief and later Washington correspondent for the Hong Kong-based newsweekly Far Eastern Economic Review, as a Beijing-based staff correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, and as China bureau chief for the newsmagazine US News & World Report. A fluent Mandarin Chinese speaker, she holds Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in East Asian Studies from Harvard University and was a Harvard-Yenching Institute Scholar in the History Department at Peking University from 1985-87.
Her talk is the third in the colloquium series on tobacco control in East Asia, sponsored by the Asia Health Policy Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in coordination with FSI’s Global Tobacco Prevention Research Initiative.
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
China's New Role in a Turbulent World
A Workshop in honor of Professor Michel Oksenberg
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Stanford China Program
We continue to honor the legacy of Professor Michel Oksenberg (1938-2001), a core faculty member of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and one of the country's leading authorities on China and on U.S.-China relations. Professor Oksenberg was one of the most powerful voices advocating a consistent and thoughtful policy of American engagement with China, and with Asia more broadly. The annual Shorenstein APARC Oksenberg Lecture has recognized distinguished individuals who have carried on this legacy of advancing understanding between the United States and China, and the nations of the Asia-Pacific region.
This year, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Peoples Republic of China and a time of global economic crisis, Shorenstein APARC is broadening the Oksenberg Lecture to a full afternoon workshop to examine the future of US-China relations and China's new role in this turbulent world. Invited speakers are experts who have had deep experience in the academic, business, and policy worlds.
Agenda:
| 1:00 | Welcoming remarks from Ambassador Michael Armacost, Acting Director, Shorenstein APARC |
| 1:15-3:30 | Can China Save the Global Economy? Moderator: Jean Oi - William Haas Professor in Chinese Politics, Stanford University
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| 3:45-5:45 | The Group of Two: The Future of U.S.-China Relations
Moderator: John Lewis - William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus; CISAC Faculty Member; FSI Senior Fellow, by courtesy Panelists:
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Bechtel Conference Center
Carl Walter
Carl Walter joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as visiting scholar with the China Program for the 2021-2022 academic year. Prior to coming to APARC, he served as independent, non-executive Director at the China Construction Bank. He was also previously a visiting scholar with APARC during the winter and spring terms of the 2012–13 academic year after a career in banking spent largely in China.
His research interests focus on China's financial system and its impact on financial and political organizations. During his time at Shorenstein APARC Walter will continue his book project on how fiscal reforms in China have impacted the banking system, the overall economy and the prospect for financial reform going forward.
Walter has contributed articles to publications including Caijing, the Wall Street Journal and the China Quarterly. He is also the co-author of Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundations of China's Extraordinary Rise (2012) and Privatizing China: Inside China's Stock Markets (2005).
Walter lived and worked in Beijing from 1991 to 2011, first as an investment banker involved in the earliest SOE restructurings and overseas public listings, then as chief operation officer of China's first joint venture investment bank, China International Capital Corporation. Over the last ten years he was JPMorgan's China chief operating officer as well as chief executive officer of its China banking subsidiary.
Walter holds a PhD in political science from Stanford University, a certificate of advanced study from Peking University and a BA in Russian Studies from Princeton University.
Jean C. Oi
Department of Political Science
Stanford University
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-26044
Jean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the department of political science and a Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She is the founding director of the Stanford China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Professor Oi is also the founding Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University.
A PhD in political science from the University of Michigan, Oi first taught at Lehigh University and later in the Department of Government at Harvard University before joining the Stanford faculty in 1997.
Her work focuses on comparative politics, with special expertise on political economy and the process of reform in transitional systems. Oi has written extensively on China's rural politics and political economy. Her State and Peasant in Contemporary China (University of California Press, 1989) examined the core of rural politics in the Mao period—the struggle over the distribution of the grain harvest—and the clientelistic politics that ensued. Her Rural China Takes Off (University of California Press, 1999 and Choice Outstanding Academic Title, 1999) examines the property rights necessary for growth and coined the term “local state corporatism" to describe local-state-led growth that has been the cornerstone of China’s development model.
She has edited a number of conference volumes on key issues in China’s reforms. The first was Growing Pains: Tensions and Opportunity in China's Transformation (Brookings Institution Press, 2010), co-edited with Scott Rozelle and Xueguang Zhou, which examined the earlier phases of reform. Most recently, she co-edited with Thomas Fingar, Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China’s Future (Stanford University Press, 2020). The volume examines the difficult choices and tradeoffs that China leaders face after forty years of reform, when the economy has slowed and the population is aging, and with increasing demand for and costs of education, healthcare, elder care, and other social benefits.
Oi also works on the politics of corporate restructuring, with a focus on the incentives and institutional constraints of state actors. She has published three edited volumes related to this topic: one on China, Going Private in China: The Politics of Corporate Restructuring and System Reform (Shorenstein APARC, 2011); one on Korea, co-edited with Byung-Kook Kim and Eun Mee Kim, Adapt, Fragment, Transform: Corporate Restructuring and System Reform in Korea (Shorenstein APARC, 2012); and a third on Japan, Syncretism: The Politics of Economic Restructuring and System Reform in Japan, co-edited with Kenji E. Kushida and Kay Shimizu (Brookings Institution, 2013). Other more recent articles include “Creating Corporate Groups to Strengthen China’s State-Owned Enterprises,” with Zhang Xiaowen, in Kjeld Erik Brodsgard, ed., Globalization and Public Sector Reform in China (Routledge, 2014) and "Unpacking the Patterns of Corporate Restructuring during China's SOE Reform," co-authored with Xiaojun Li, Economic and Political Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2018.
Oi continues her research on rural finance and local governance in China. She has done collaborative work with scholars in China, including conducting fieldwork on the organization of rural communities, the provision of public goods, and the fiscal pressures of rapid urbanization. This research is brought together in a co-edited volume, Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization (Brookings Institution Shorenstein APARC Series, 2017), with Karen Eggleston and Wang Yiming. Included in this volume is her “Institutional Challenges in Providing Affordable Housing in the People’s Republic of China,” with Niny Khor.
As a member of the research team who began studying in the late 1980s one county in China, Oi with Steven Goldstein provides a window on China’s dramatic change over the decades in Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County (Stanford University Press, 2018). This volume assesses the later phases of reform and asks how this rural county has been able to manage governance with seemingly unchanged political institutions when the economy and society have transformed beyond recognition. The findings reveal a process of adaptive governance and institutional agility in the way that institutions actually operate, even as their outward appearances remain seemingly unchanged.