Donald K. Emmerson, director of Shorenstein APARC's Southeast Asia Program and FSI senior fellow emeritus, offers insight on U.S. President Barack Obama's Asian tour. He says the trip most notably reinforces America's 'rebalance' efforts to upgrade security commitments and promote freer trade negotiation in that region.

When President Barack Obama this week began a high-profile visit to Asia, it called into question how effective the "Asian pivot" in America's foreign policy has been. A few years ago, Obama announced that a rebalancing of U.S. interests toward Asia would be a central tenet of his legacy. Now he is visiting Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines to reassert the message that America is truly focused on Asia – despite finding itself repeatedly pulled away by crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, and political battles in Washington, D.C.

Stanford political scientist Donald K. Emmerson, an expert on Asia, China-Southeast Asia relations, sovereignty disputes and the American "rebalance" toward Asia, sat down with the Stanford News Service to discuss Obama's trip. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

President Obama started his Asian pivot a few years ago. Have problems in Ukraine, Syria, Iran and at home detracted from this new approach?

The pivot as practiced continues unabated. The pivot as perceived has suffered from its displacement on various attention spans by superseding events and concerns, both foreign and domestic. President Obama's current trip to Asia is itself a reflection of these distractions. Originally planned for October, it was postponed by extreme political discord in Washington. But the chief elements of the pivot remain in place and in progress. They are most notably the upgrading of American security commitments and the effort to negotiate freer trade.

Why does this rebalancing in U.S. foreign policy make sense – or not?

The pivot certainly serves U.S. interests. Americans cannot afford to deny themselves, or be denied by others, the opportunities for trade and investment that Asia's most dynamic economies will continue to generate. The U.S. also needs to work with China and its neighbors to help ensure that China's rise serves the wider security interests of Americans, Chinese, Asians and the world, however dissonant the day-to-day advocacy of those interests may be. Ironically, by obliterating Obama's proposed reset of U.S.-Russia relations, Vladimir Putin has become an unintentional friend of the rebalance toward Asia. His aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has made all the more urgent the need for Washington to pursue mutually beneficial relations with Beijing and the rest of Asia that could moderate China's willingness and ability to force its ownfaits accomplis in the East and South China Seas.

Do Chinese leaders view Obama's Asian pivot as a de facto containment approach to a rising China?

China's leaders do question U.S. intentions. But one ought not ignore the dozens and dozens of venues and ways in which the two countries' governments continue to cooperate on multiple fronts. In domestic terms it is politically convenient for Chinese hardliners to disparage American motives. As with the pivot itself, however, perception and practice are not the same thing.

Are Asian countries more rattled than ever by China's behavior in places like the South and East China Seas?

Concerned, yes; rattled, no. There are six or seven different claimants to contested land features and/or sea space in the South China Sea, not to mention the territorial tensions that also bedevil interstate relations in Northeast Asia. East Asian leaders are not lined up in a united front against Beijing. They are themselves divided. The more assertive China becomes, the more pushback it can expect. But most of the states in Southeast Asia do not want to ally with the U.S. against China, or with China against the U.S.

The U.S. and the Philippines are poised to sign a treaty that will expand America's military presence in the island country. What's the significance of the treaty?

Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty commit Washington and Manila to "act to meet the common dangers" implied by "an armed attack in the Pacific Area" on the "metropolitan territory" of either party, or on the "island territories under its jurisdiction," or on "its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific," and to do so "in accordance with its constitutional processes." But these provisions are hardly self-implementing; they require interpretation. Even if China were to forcibly evict the Philippine marines who now occupy Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, the treaty would not automatically trigger an American military response. Applied to that scenario, the treaty would not instantly entrap the U.S. in a war with China. But the treaty would require some action or statement on the part of Washington. In Manila, Obama will try to reassure his Philippine host in this regard without enraging its Chinese neighbor.

Obama will be the first U.S. president in five decades to visit Malaysia. What does that visit mean for that country?

Of the four countries that Obama is visiting, it is in Malaysia that the pivot's third face after security and economy – namely democracy – will be most visible. Obama will be careful not to appear to enter into the domestic political turbulence Malaysia is experiencing, but his visits with civil society actors and university students in Kuala Lumpur will send the nonpartisan message that America remains committed to democratic values for itself and for Asians as well.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Relations between China, Japan and South Korea are at one of their worst points in recent history. Stanford scholars at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute have been sought for insight on why negative public sentiment toward each nation has grown – providing commentary to both local and international media.

The territorial disputes in the East China Sea and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine have added to the growing friction. Reconciliation now seems a far prospect, and there is a real chance of an accidental spark setting off conflict. At the heart of the matter are propaganda or global ‘PR’ wars that those countries are waging, associate director for research Daniel C. Sneider says.

Shorenstein APARC director Gi-Wook Shin and Sneider lead the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project, an ongoing research initiative, that attempts to understand how historical memory of the World War II period came to exist, and in turn, informs people’s perspectives in Northeast Asia.

Shin and Sneider write in Foreign Affairs that wartime narratives cannot and will not easily change. They highlight urgent issues such as compensation for victims of forced labor in wartime Japan, and the coordination of public apologies.

On the Asan Forum, Shin says that the perception gap continues to widen between the countries. Historical memories are not only rooted in the colonial and wartime injustices, but more complex historical, cultural and political relations.

The United States may play a pivotal role in facilitating diplomacy and breaking through the stalemate of the reconciliation process. As U.S. President Barack Obama travels to Asia later this week, now is the time to confront the questions of history. Sneider makes a similar suggestion in the Washington Post, saying the United States should abandon its position of neutrality and step forward.

Research findings from the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project have been incorporated into a textbook and two volumes, one of which was co-edited with Daniel Chirot of the University of Washington. Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies (University of Washington Press, April 2014) compares the lasting influence of World War II in Asia and Europe. Sneider was interviewed upon the release of the book, covered by the Stanford Report.

Shorenstein APARC’s Takeo Hoshi assesses the initial ‘arrow’ of Japan’s economic strategy implemented by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a recent Marketplace article.

In an interview with Sentaku Online, Stanford economist Takeo Hoshi spoke on challenges for Japan's economic recovery.

Shorenstein APARC postdoctoral fellowships offer a unique opportunity for recent graduates to reside at Stanford for a year to further their research and engage with scholars. The Center annually offers multiple Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowships in Contemporary Asia, and one Postdoctoral Fellowship in Asia Health Policy.

Fellows develop their dissertations for publication, present their research, and participate in Center activities related to and beyond their specialty. Most importantly, they establish valuable connections with professionals that continue long after they leave Stanford.

Postdoctoral fellows go on to pursue teaching positions and advisory roles at top universities and research organizations around the world. They often continue to contribute to Shorenstein APARC publications, and participate in conferences and related activities into the future.

Shorenstein APARC is delighted to welcome its latest group of exceptional postdoctoral fellows this autumn:

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellows

Jianzhi (Jason) Zhao is completing his PhD in international development and economic policy at the University of Maryland. His current research interests are focused on development economics and empirical and international corporate finance, particularly China. His dissertation focuses on how China’s financial system interacts with state-owned enterprises, and policy perspectives of China’s banking sector and macroeconomic stability. At Stanford, Zhao will continue his dissertation work and extend his research analyzing how a firm’s connection to government affects performance and investment behavior. Zhao holds BAs in finance and business administration from Jiangzi University of Science and Technology, and an MA in economics from Fudan University.

Paul Schuler is a political scientist whose current research focuses on liberalization under authoritarian rule and political change in Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. His dissertation focuses on how the Vietnam Communist Party has liberalized the legislature in order to gain information, co-opt opposition and stabilize power sharing. At Stanford, Schuler will develop his dissertation work into a book manuscript and pursue other projects related to governance under authoritarian rule. Schuler will receive his PhD in political science from the University of California, San Diego – Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in 2014. He holds a BA in journalism and government & politics from the University of Maryland, and an MA in Pacific international affairs from UC – San Diego. 

Developing Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellow 

Pham Ngoc Minh is a health researcher and administrator. His main interests are public health, disease prevention and the rural-urban divide in developing countries. At Stanford, Pham will be studying epidemiological trends and policy perspectives of diabetes in Vietnam, particularly those among adults in mountainous areas of that country. Pham has more than six years of experience working as a medical lecturer at the Thai Nguyen University of Medicine and Pharmacy in Vietnam, and spent two and a half years conducting postdoctoral research in Japan. He received a Bachelor of Medicine from the Thai Nguyen University of Medicine and Pharmacy, a BA in English from Hanoi University, an MPH from the University of Melbourne, and a PhD in medical science from Kyushu University.

From territorial disputes in the East China Sea to heated propaganda wars across the region, peace in northeast Asia seems increasingly tenuous. At the heart of rising tensions are unresolved historical issues related to World War II, which drive a wedge between the United States’ two main allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, and fuel a revived rivalry between Japan and China. As the main victor in World War II, the United States has some responsibility for these disputes. It constructed the postwar regional order and has been largely content since then to view the matter as settled, even though issues of territory, compensation, and historical justice were left unresolved. During the Cold War, when the region’s main players were cut off from each other, the United States’ approach worked well. But as the region democratizes and grows increasingly integrated, long-buried issues are coming to the surface. As U.S. President Barack Obama heads to Japan and South Korea this month, it is time for the United States to tackle wartime history in Asia head on.

American officials were confronted by the uncomfortable realities of wartime issues last year, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, without warning, made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including some who had been convicted and executed as Class-A war criminals. The Japanese leader certainly understood that his decision would irk China and South Korea, which see such visits as signals of Tokyo’s embrace of an unapologetic view of Japan’s wartime aggression. What was even more troubling was that the visit came only a few weeks after U.S. Vice President Joe Biden apparently received assurances from Abe that Tokyo would avoid any such provocations. Biden subsequently encouraged South Korean President Park Geun-hye to sit down with the Japanese leader, although Park questioned whether he could be trusted to hold his historical revisionism in check -- a concern that was clearly justified.

Japan and South Korea have made repeated efforts over the past two decades to resolve their wartime history issues, but progress has always proved short-lived. South Korean officials now openly plead for the United States to step in. That would be anathema to Japan, which fears being isolated. Obama managed to convene a brief meeting of the Japanese and South Korean leaders recently at the nuclear safety summit in Europe, but the agenda focused solely on North Korea. For its part, the United States simply urges restraint and dialogue, consistently refusing to intervene directly into disputes over the wartime past. American diplomats understandably argue that the subject is a minefield and that any U.S. involvement will be viewed with suspicion in China, Japan, and South Korea alike.

Even so, China’s bid for regional domination makes it nearly impossible for the United States to continue to stay out of the fray; Beijing has already started to position itself as sympathetic to South Korean fears about Japan and has embarked on a global propaganda campaign against Japanese “militarism,” pointing with undisguised glee at any evidence of Japanese nostalgia for its wartime past.  By taking a leading role in dealing with the wartime past, the United States could make it difficult for Beijing to use it for political gain.

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The first few paragraphs of this article have been reproduced with permission of Foreign Affairs. The complete version may be accessed on Foreign Affairs online.

Relations between China and Japan continue to fray and have no immediate chance of improving, according to one of the nation’s leading East Asian scholars.

“I think we all know that Sino-Japanese relations are about as bad as they have ever been,” said Harvard professor Ezra Vogel, who spoke to a filled room at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute on Thursday.

“I tend to be optimistic,” he said. “But I honestly don’t see any short-term solutions, I think we’re in for a period now where the issues are going to be very tough and the relations are going to be very tough.

“For any long-term solution, there is going to have to be some resolution of the history issue,” he added, referring to the disputes over the wartime past in Northeast Asia.

Vogel delivered the final lecture in a seminar series focused on the Sino-Japanese rivalry. The series brought various experts to Shorenstein APARC this spring to consider the historical contention between China and Japan, and its impact on that contemporary relationship. Professors Peter Duus of Stanford and Jessica Chen Weiss of Yale University were among the scholars who presented earlier this year, along with the Brookings Institution’s Richard Bush.

Professor Vogel is a renowned scholar of both China and Japan, the author of many books that have become classics in the study of both countries. A sociologist by training, he is the Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences, Emeritus, at Harvard University. Vogel described himself as a historian in practice, joking that he had become a historian “simply by living a long time.”

A shifting terrain of relations

In his April 3 lecture, Vogel traced the history of relations between Japan and China, particularly in the post-war era, and discussed how they have been impacted by disputes over history.

In the current atmosphere, under the influence of the media and political leaders highly responsive to public opinion, the image of Sino-Japanese relations is dominated by a sense of deep friction. But, Vogel said relations between the two great Asian powers were not always bad. 

After the early decades of the Cold War, when there were no formal ties between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, there was a relative blossoming in the relationship. Following the normalization of relations in 1972, and as Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping took over the reins of power, Sino-Japanese relations entered a period of closer ties and political thaw.

“The relationship was really moving in a very positive way,” Vogel said. Japanese aid and foreign investment was key to the opening up of China to the world economy and there was a flow of exchanges among youth and of popular culture between the two neighbors.

That “special era” remained through year 1992, even as the rest of the world distanced itself from China, both economically and politically, following the Tiananmen Square incident. The visit of the Japanese Emperor to China that year marked the peak of a “golden age” of positive relations between the two countries following the war.

‘Golden age’ fades

After 1992, the constructive relationship between China and Japan began to slip for several reasons.

By the mid-1990s, the Soviet Union no longer existed as a threat – a “broad strategic reason” that had united the countries. Taiwan’s growing independence movement was becoming a flashpoint of contention, with Chinese irritation over the close ties between pro-independence Taiwanese leaders and Japan.

Perhaps most important of all, China, in the wake of the student protests, embarked upon a “patriotic education” campaign designed to shore up the loyalty of youth by stressing broad themes of Chinese national pride. In that campaign, reminders of the wartime struggle against the Japanese invasion of the 1930s occupied a central part of the message, communicated in textbooks, movies and books that remain a staple of Chinese popular culture. The demonization of Japan has colored Chinese perceptions, Vogel said.

In Japan, the sense of anxiety about the rise of China is also reflected in a rise of conservative attacks on China and the promotion of a Japanese version of ‘patriotic education.’ The perception that Japanese leaders are increasingly unrepentant about the wartime past, symbolized by the visits of Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni shrine to Japan’s war dead, feeds these tensions over the past.

Vogel said biased education on that wartime era and misinformation in the media are key factors behind the publics’ formation of historical memory, and subsequently, encourage strong antagonism toward one another.

Guarded optimism

Disputes over history, particularly of the wartime period, must be addressed for any warming of the Japan-China relationship to occur.

“I think until we get some kind of deeper meaning of World War II, we’re not going to have much progress,” he said.

Vogel said the Japanese should try harder to give a fair representation of World War II to youth, who often only receive a few short details on that time period. The Chinese should “slow down” on anti-Japanese propaganda, he recommended.

Vogel said he is optimistic about an improvement in the bilateral relationship, but also emphasized that progress will be hard to achieve under current leadership. Even so, the two countries would be remiss to avoid dealing with issues of historical interpretation, especially as it continues to serve as a roadblock to an easing of tensions in the region.

The audio and transcript from the April 3 seminar, "The Shadow of History and Sino-Japanese Relations," are posted below.