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North Korea's announcement this week of plans to test a nuclear weapon is hardly surprising. The six-party talks to negotiate an end to its nuclear program are dead, and the North faces escalating financial and economic sanctions by the United States and its allies.

Experts have long debated the real motivations of the North in developing nuclear weapons. Some contend that the nuclear program, even the latest pronouncement, is simply a bargaining chip to gain security guarantees and economic aid. Others see a long determination to become a nuclear state.

The North Korean leaders may have begun the nuclear program as leverage. But the U.S. invasion of Iraq seems to have hardened their conviction that the only way to protect their nation and their regime is to join the nuclear club. The North Koreans want to become a Pakistan rather than an Iraq.

Still, officials in Pyongyang hesitated to cross the provocative line of visibly demonstrating their capability. Pressure is being mounted to get them to back down from their pledge. But for a variety of reasons, they apparently believe the timing for a test is now optimal.

First of all, they hope to blame the Bush administration for their decision. In the statement issued this week, the North Korean government argued that alleged American war plans justify a nuclear test, a position that reflects the views of the North Korean military.

Second, the North anticipates the test will be successful. Although a plutonium weapon is more complicated than a uranium bomb, it is quite likely that the North now has sufficient confidence in a Nagasaki-style primitive bomb. This success would be an object of pride for an otherwise failing state, and bolster its claim to the status of a world-class military power.

Third, the North Koreans see their potential enemies tied down and unable to respond effectively. The Bush administration is locked into a disastrous war in Iraq, and about to be weakened even more if the Republicans lose the upcoming midterm elections. In South Korea, the government of President Roh Moo Hyun is already a lame duck and politically paralyzed.

Fourth, Pyongyang may bet that China and South Korea, the two principal sources of trade and economic aid, would not join the United States and Japan in any real sanctions against the North. The July missile tests by North Korea provoked international uproar and led to a U.N. resolution. But the real impact has been minimal.

Finally, the North may calculate that testing will facilitate Japan's efforts to become a "normal'' nation with a broader military role in the region. That prospect could increase tensions in Northeast Asia, especially between Japan and China, and that, the North may believe, is not necessarily bad for it.

The United States, South Korea and China must act together to show that these calculations are misguided and that the North will pay a painful price if it goes ahead. Certainly this severely tests the troubled American alliance with South Korea and the emergent partnership with China. But Pyongyang's miscalculations also offer an opportunity to repair the strained alliance and create a new structure of security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

It is no secret that Seoul and Washington have been at odds over how to deal with North Korea. But the test announcement has already accelerated a shift in South Korean opinion. Rather than holding the United States responsible for the current impasse, most Koreans now see North Korea as the instigator of crisis.

South Korean officials understand that without reinforcing the alliance now, no policy toward the North can be effective. The United States and South Korea should urgently agree on common action plans -- including a shutdown of investment and economic assistance from the South to the North -- and make those consequences clear to Pyongyang.

The planned visits of newly installed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Beijing and Seoul next week offer a similar opening to turn threat into opportunity. Abe intends to repair tattered ties to those Asian neighbors. Now the three Northeast Asian powers can demonstrate that a nuclear test will not lead to increased tensions but to the complete isolation of the North.

The danger of escalating actions that could lead, again, to war on the Korean peninsula is grave. The North Koreans should be assured that the door to a diplomatic solution remains open to them. But they must also understand that by profoundly misreading this moment, the North Korean leadership now stands completely alone in Northeast Asia.

Reprinted by permission.

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Using his personal recollections of his life in the Peace Corps, Michael Robinson will discuss the issues of an evolution of Korean national identity and reflect as well on how political attitudes, perceptions of the U.S., ROK strategic policy, U.S. Cold War posturing, and Peace Corps idealism coexisted and produced its own baffling mix of political, cultural, and social cleavages.

His discussion will continue on how the disconnection of Korean youth from their parents' experience in the ambiguous political culture fostered by Cold War ideology during the late 1960s frees them to be a new kind of patriot and global citizen.

Michael Robinson earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Washington in 1979. He taught at the University of Southern California for sixteen years after which he moved to Indiana University where he is Professor of East Asian Languages and Cultures and an adjunct Professor of History. He has written extensively on the origins and evolution of Korean nationalism. His first book, "Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea" focused on nationalist ideology formation during the 1920s. More recently he has become interested in popular culture and the origins and development of modernity in Korea. With Gi-Wook Shin his "Colonial Modernity in Korea" examined a number of nodes of modernity appearing during the period of Japanese occupation. He has just finished a new book, "Korea's Twentieth Century Odyssey: a Short History" that will be published by the University of Hawaii Press in spring 2007.

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Michael E. Robinson Professor Speaker Indiana University
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Shorenstein APARC's Daniel Sneider takes the occasion of South Korean President Roh's visit to the United States to remind policy makers in both Washington and Seoul that they should keep in mind that the current challenges to the alliance are no more difficult than those faced and survived in the past.

The U.S. visit this week by South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun offers yet another opportunity to bemoan the crisis of confidence in our alliance. Anti-American views, particularly among the young, remain widespread in South Korea. On an official level, there are strains over the role of U.S. troops based in Korea and a stark divergence in approaches toward North Korea.

This portrait of a troubled alliance is often contrasted with a supposed golden age in U.S.-Korean relations during the Cold War. But that view obscures a history of sharp disagreement between the two allies. It is a mythical past that stands in the way of repairing our alliance today. In reality, Korean nationalism and American strategic policy goals have often clashed. Differences over North Korea have arisen repeatedly. And anti-Americanism has been a feature of Korean life for decades.

This was true from the earliest postwar days, in a relationship born out of a fateful and poorly considered decision to divide Korea, after decades of Japanese colonial rule, into American and Soviet zones of occupation. Syngman Rhee, South Korea's first leader, was often at odds with his American backers. Washington feared Rhee would provoke a war with the communist North, even after the end of the Korean War.

Relations with Park Chung Hee, who came to power in a military coup in 1961, were even thornier. Park was a fierce Korean nationalist and, according to a close former aide, uncomfortable with Americans. The two countries collided over North Korea policy, economic goals, human rights and democracy.

In the 1970s, South Koreans developed deep doubts about the durability of the alliance, an uneasiness fed by the Vietnam debacle and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Park defied U.S. pressure in declaring martial law in 1972, junking the constitution and jailing leading opposition figures. He launched a secret campaign of influence-peddling and bribery of American congressmen to counter U.S. criticism of his policies.

While Park feared abandonment by the United States, North Korea's Kim Il Sung worried that China, after developing ties to Washington, might sell him out. Thus Park, even though he had been the victim of two assassination attempts by North Korea, reached out to Pyongyang. During high-level talks in 1972, there was a remarkable shared belief that the major powers were the obstacle to Korean reunification.

The most alarming sign of an alliance in crisis was Park's dangerous decision to develop nuclear weapons, made in secret in 1971 after Richard Nixon's withdrawal of one of the two American infantry divisions. According to my research, American officials became alarmed over the seriousness of this effort when a young CIA agent provided evidence of a crude design for a nuclear warhead.

In the spring of 1975, my father, the late ambassador Richard Sneider, sent a top-secret cable to Washington calling for an urgent review of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Korea was "no longer a client state," he wrote, but was "well on its way to middle power status with ambitions for full self-reliance including its own nuclear potential."

Sneider recommended creation of a new partnership, one more akin to our alliances with NATO or Japan. He also pushed for quiet but tough diplomacy to dissuade Park from heading down the nuclear road. That campaign succeeded finally, but not before my father warned Park that the entire security alliance was jeopardized.

Park was assassinated in 1979 by his own intelligence chief, who claimed to have acted at American instigation. The charge was false, but it remains widely believed in Korea. The perilous state of our alliance reached a peak with the Kwangju uprising against military rule the following year, when hundreds of Koreans were killed by troops deployed with the alleged acquiescence of the United States.

Dispelling the myth of the previous golden era in U.S.-Korean relations does not mean that our relations lacked a foundation of shared interest or that the difficulties we face today are not serious. The gap over how to handle the threat from the North is certainly wider and more evident than in the past. And the democratization of South Korea makes our differences visible and harder to manage.

As policymakers from both countries meet this week, they need to take a deep breath and remember that our alliance survived tremendous stresses in the past. The task before us is not to focus on our divergence but to pick up the challenge left unmet 30 years ago -- to define the basis for a long-term relationship that is durable and reciprocal and that finally sheds the shackles of dependency.

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Japanese soldiers and sailors were indoctrinated to chose death before the dishonor of surrender, but 35,000 had been taken prisoner before Japan surrendered. Thanks to the language skills and cultural understanding of Japanese-Americans as well as trained Caucasian intelligence personnel, we gained valuable intelligence that shortened the war. POWs had expected to be executed after repatriation, but once the war ended, as many Japanese said, "We had all become prisoners." For the most part, the Allies treated Japanese prisoners decently, a fact that contributed to the successful occupation of Japan that followed.

Rick Straus was born in Germany and lived seven years in prewar Japan. After the war ended he became a Japanese Language Officer and served in the Occupation at GHQ, Tokyo. This included selecting and translating German documents into English and Japanese for the Prosecution Staff at the Tokyo Trial.

While on a Fulbright grant at Keio University, Straus passed the Foreign Service examination. Half of his 30-year career was in Japan (Embassy Tokyo and Consul General on Okinawa). His last assignment was faculty member at the National War College. After "retiring", Straus taught adult education courses on Japan at Washington area universities and ran the Japanese Language Program at the Foreign Service Institute.

Since moving to northern Michigan a decade ago, Straus wrote The Anguish of Surrender (University of Washington Press, February 2004) based on U.S. and Japanese sources. A Japanese language version appeared last fall. He is on the board of the World Affairs Council of Traverse City, responsible for securing most of the speakers. He also does two commentaries a month on international affairs for the local PBS radio station. Straus' undergraduate and graduate training was at the University of Michigan.

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Ulrich Straus U.S Foreign Service Officer (retired) Speaker the U.S. Department of State
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The end of the Koizumi era has come, bringing to a close one of the longest-serving premierships in modern Japanese history and a period of intense change in Japanese domestic and foreign policy. At the dawn of the post-Koizumi era there many questions: How much of this change will endure? Will economic reform move ahead or stagnate? Can the ruling party hold on to power without the popularity of Koizumi? What is the future of Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors? Will Japan continue to expand its security role?

The Japan Society of Northern California and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford have assembled a panel of experts for two Bay Area events to address these questions.

Speakers' Bios:

Peter Ennis, Editor, The Oriental Economist Report

As editor of The Oriental Economist Report (TOE), Ennis is responsible for overall news coverage, but focuses mostly on Japanese political and security developments. He is also US correspondent for the Weekly Toyo Keizai, with responsibility for coordinating coverage of economic and political developments in the United States that impact on US-Japan relations. For the past ten years, Mr. Ennis has written the "Inside America" column for the Weekly Toyo Keizai.

Mr. Ennis has been reporting and writing about Japan and US-Japan relations for 25 years. He began working for Toyo Keizai in 1985, first on a freelance basis, and then full time when the company opened its New York office in 1987. He became bureau chief in 1996.

Takao Toshikawa, Editor, Tokyo Insideline and Chief Correspondent, The Oriental Economist Report

Mr. Toshikawa began his career as a journalist in 1970 as a staff writer for the Weekly Post and became a senior writer in 1976. From 1970 to 1983, he served as special correspondent based in the United States covering American presidential elections and other political affairs.

In April 1983, he joined Insider Inc., and became chief editor for Tokyo Insider, an English language newsletter of Japanese political and economic affairs. He also established his own newsletter "Tokyo Insideline", a bi-weekly publication for the intelligence community. In 1997 he was appointed to the position of chief correspondent at The Oriental Economist.

Daniel Sneider, Associate Director for Research, Shorenstein APARC, Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University.

Sneider was a 2005-06 Pantech Fellow at the Center, and the former foreign affairs columnist of the San Jose Mercury News. His twice-weekly column on foreign affairs, looking at international issues and national security from a West Coast perspective, was syndicated nationally on the Knight Ridder Tribune wire service, reaching about 400 newspapers in North America. He has appeared as a foreign affairs commentator on the "Lehrer News Hour" and on "National Public Radio."

Sneider has had a long career as a foreign correspondent. He served as national/foreign editor of the San Jose Mercury News, responsible for coverage of national and international news until the spring of 2003. From 1990-94, he was the Moscow bureau chief of the Christian Science Monitor, and 1985-90, he was Tokyo correspondent for the Monitor, covering Japan and Korea.

Sneider's writings have appeared in many publications, including the New Republic, National Review, the Far Eastern Economic Review, Time, the International Herald Tribune, the Financial Times, the Dallas Morning News, and the Sacramento Bee.

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Peter Ennis Editor Speaker The Oriental Economist Report
Daniel C. Sneider Speaker
Takao Toshikawa Editor, Tokyo Insideline and Chief Correspondent Speaker The Oriental Economist Report
Robert Weiner Shorenstein Fellow Moderator Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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The end of the Koizumi era has come, bringing to a close one of the longest-serving premierships in modern Japanese history and a period of intense change in Japanese domestic and foreign policy. At the dawn of the post-Koizumi era there many questions: How much of this change will endure? Will economic reform move ahead or stagnate? Can the ruling party hold on to power without the popularity of Koizumi? What is the future of Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors? Will Japan continue to expand its security role?

The Japan Society of Northern California and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford have assembled a panel of experts for two Bay Area events to address these questions.

Speakers' Bios:

Peter Ennis, Editor, The Oriental Economist Report

As editor of The Oriental Economist Report (TOE), Ennis is responsible for overall news coverage, but focuses mostly on Japanese political and security developments. He is also US correspondent for the Weekly Toyo Keizai, with responsibility for coordinating coverage of economic and political developments in the United States that impact on US-Japan relations. For the past ten years, Mr. Ennis has written the "Inside America" column for the Weekly Toyo Keizai.

Mr. Ennis has been reporting and writing about Japan and US-Japan relations for 25 years. He began working for Toyo Keizai in 1985, first on a freelance basis, and then full time when the company opened its New York office in 1987. He became bureau chief in 1996.

Takao Toshikawa, Editor, Tokyo Insideline and Chief Correspondent, The Oriental Economist Report

Mr. Toshikawa began his career as a journalist in 1970 as a staff writer for the Weekly Post and became a senior writer in 1976. From 1970 to 1983, he served as special correspondent based in the United States covering American presidential elections and other political affairs.

In April 1983, he joined Insider Inc., and became chief editor for Tokyo Insider, an English language newsletter of Japanese political and economic affairs. He also established his own newsletter "Tokyo Insideline", a bi-weekly publication for the intelligence community. In 1997 he was appointed to the position of chief correspondent at The Oriental Economist.

Daniel Sneider, Associate Director for Research, Shorenstein APARC, Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University.

Sneider was a 2005-06 Pantech Fellow at the Center, and the former foreign affairs columnist of the San Jose Mercury News. His twice-weekly column on foreign affairs, looking at international issues and national security from a West Coast perspective, was syndicated nationally on the Knight Ridder Tribune wire service, reaching about 400 newspapers in North America. He has appeared as a foreign affairs commentator on the "Lehrer News Hour" and on "National Public Radio."

Sneider has had a long career as a foreign correspondent. He served as national/foreign editor of the San Jose Mercury News, responsible for coverage of national and international news until the spring of 2003. From 1990-94, he was the Moscow bureau chief of the Christian Science Monitor, and 1985-90, he was Tokyo correspondent for the Monitor, covering Japan and Korea.

Sneider's writings have appeared in many publications, including the New Republic, National Review, the Far Eastern Economic Review, Time, the International Herald Tribune, the Financial Times, the Dallas Morning News, and the Sacramento Bee.

Steven K. Vogel, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

Vogel specializes in the potlicial economy of the advanced indistrialized nations, especially Japan. He has recently completed a book entitled Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry are Reforming Japanese Capitalism (Cornell, 2006.) His earlier book Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Cornell University Press, 1996) won the 1998 Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize. He has also edited a volume entitled U.S.-Japan Relations in a Changing World (Brookings Institution Press, 2002.)

Vogel has written extensively on comparative political economy and Japanese politics, industrial policy, trade, and defense policy. He has worked as a reporter for the Japan Times in Tokyo and as a freelance journalist in France. He has taught previously at the University of California, Irving, and Harvard University.

The Japan Society of Northern California
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Peter Ennis Editor Speaker The Oriental Economist Report
Takao Toshikawa Editor, Tokyo Insideline and Chief Correspondent Speaker The Oriental Economist Report
Steven Vogel Associate Professor, Political Science Speaker University of California, Berkeley
Daniel C. Sneider Moderator
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Xiyu Yang has, as a career diplomat, engaged in issues relating to the Korean Peninsula for more than ten years. He was Counselor in Department of Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China in 2005. In January 2004, Mr. Yang was named as its inaugural Director of the Ministry's Office for Korean Peninsula Issues an office whose establishment he led. In that role, he dealt with nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, as well as affairs relating to the Six-Party Talks among China, the two Koreas, Japan, Russia, and the United States.

Xiyu was heavily involved in planning, drafting, and negotiating the Joint Statement, an important milestone for the talks process that was passed by the six nations in September 2005.

Besides the Korean issues, Xiyu has worked on policy planning and analysis in Chinese Foreign Ministry, and Development Research Center of the State Council of China. He achieved the China National Award for Outstanding Contributions to Social Science Studies in 1999, and was awarded the Honorable Subsidies for National Distinguished Experts by the State Council of China.

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Corporate Affiliate Visiting Fellow

Kumiko Yoshioka is a corporate affiliate visiting fellow at Shorenstein APARC for 2006-07. Prior to joining Shorenstein APARC, she has worked for the Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper company. She has belonged to the electronic media and broadcasting division and engaged in editing the news website, "asahi.com", and managing news services via internet to cell phones. Yoshioka completed her undergraduate study at Hosei University in Tokyo where she majored in business administration.

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Takashi Yamada is a corporate affiliate visiting fellow at Shorenstein APARC for 2006-07. Prior to joining Shorenstein APARC, he held positions at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), government of Japan, for about ten years, where he took charge of policymaking. His latest position at METI was as deputy directory in the public relations office, MInister's Secretariat. He did his undergraduate study at Osaka University, in the faculty of Engineering Science.

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