The period from the arrest of the “gang of four” in October 1976 to the final step in the removal of Hua Guofeng in mid-1981 saw CCP rural policy go through a number of phases. The initial emphasis on a moderate version of the Dazhai model gave way to “traditional policies” (luoshi zhengce) by mid-1978; these policies were supplemented in 1979 by “responsibility systems,” the most radical of which, household contracting (baochan daohu), became a sharply divisive issue in 1980, but still not the main aspect of agricultural policy. The tide was moving strongly toward household contracting by mid-1981, but had not yet achieved unambiguous endorsement as the Party policy.
A number of inadequate approaches have dominated the literature, notably 1) a power/policy struggle between Hua Guofeng's neo-Maoists and Deng Xiaoping's reform coalition; 2) the power of the peasants; and 3) the leading role of provincial reformers. The first has no validity, the second and third must be viewed through more complex lenses. The talk will explicate the key factors and present an alternative explanation of the success of rural reform.
Frederick C. Teiwes is Emeritus Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney. He received his B.A. from Amherst College and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. He is the author of various books on Chinese elite politics including Politics and Purges in China (1979, 1993), Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China (1984), and Politics at Mao's Court (1990). Some of his most important work has been jointly authored with Warren Sun including The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the "High Tide" of 1955 (1993), The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1971 (1996), China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Emergence of the Great Leap Forward, 1955-1959 (1999), and The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976 (2007).
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd floor, East Wing
616 Serra St.
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
In the immediate postwar period, when very real limits on the power of the party-state remained and the population was still recovering from the dislocations of the war, the socialist promise of what in North Korea came to be known as the ‘new living’ became the subject of much ideological and material investment on the part of a wide spectrum of actors. Yet the construction of such ‘new living’ was certainly not straightforward. This paper analyzes political anxieties that emerged over worker dormitory life, tensions surrounding consumption in a growing economy, and worries about the comforts of family life offered by new fangled apartments.
RSVP required at http://ceas.stanford.edu/events/event_detail.php?id=3713
Philippines Conference Room
Debate upon the status of colonial buildings in South Korea today has swirled around the public buildings most symbolic of colonial authority. Yet the most prevalent remaining buildings are much smaller in scale; they are the houses abandoned by or appropriated from Japanese residents upon the defeat in war and a chaotic withdrawal from the colonies. This talk turns to the “enemy house” to ask how the homely figures in the domestication of colonial history.
RSVP required at http://ceas.stanford.edu/events/rsvp.php
Philippines Conference Room
Economists and business scholars have long tried to construct theoretical models that can explain economic growth and development in emerging economies, but Western models have not always been fully applicable to developing economies, particularly in Asia, due to differences in political, economic and social systems. Created to address this gap, the ABCD framework of K-Strategy is a more nearly universal approach showing how inherent disadvantages can be overcome and competitive advantages achieved. Using the ABCD framework, the lecturer will analyze Korea’s success at both national and corporate levels since the 1960s and discuss the framework’s implications for Korea’s future government policies and corporate strategies. He will also demonstrate the ABCD framework’s applicability to other countries. Hwy-Chang Moon, dean of Seoul National University’s graduate school of international studies, has done extensive research and theoretical work on the ABCD framework.
Hwy-Chang Moon received his PhD from the University of Washington and is currently a professor of international business and strategy in the graduate school of international studies at Seoul National University. Professor Moon has taught at the University of Washington, University of the Pacific, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Helsinki School of Economics, Kyushu University, Keio University, Hitotsubashi University, and other executive and special programs in various organizations. On topics such as international business strategy, foreign direct investment, corporate social responsibility, and cross-cultural management, Professor Moon has published numerous journal articles and books. He is currently the editor-in-chief of the Journal of International Business and Economy, an international academic journal. Professor Moon has conducted consulting and research projects for several multinational companies, international organizations (APEC, World Bank, and UNCTAD), and governments (Malaysia, Dubai, Azerbaijan, and Guangdong Province of China). For interviews and debates on international economy and business, he has been invited by international newspapers and media, including New York Times and NHK World TV.
This event is made possible through the generous support of the Koret Foundation.
Philippines Conference Room
Shorenstein APARC postdoctoral fellowships offer a unique opportunity for recent graduates to reside at Stanford for a year to further their research and engage with scholars. The Center annually offers multiple Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowships in Contemporary Asia, and one Postdoctoral Fellowship in Asia Health Policy.
Fellows develop their dissertations for publication, present their research, and participate in Center activities related to and beyond their specialty. Most importantly, they establish valuable connections with professionals that continue long after they leave Stanford.
Postdoctoral fellows go on to pursue teaching positions and advisory roles at top universities and research organizations around the world. They often continue to contribute to Shorenstein APARC publications, and participate in conferences and related activities into the future.
Shorenstein APARC is delighted to welcome its latest group of exceptional postdoctoral fellows this autumn:
Jianzhi (Jason) Zhao is completing his PhD in international development and economic policy at the University of Maryland. His current research interests are focused on development economics and empirical and international corporate finance, particularly China. His dissertation focuses on how China’s financial system interacts with state-owned enterprises, and policy perspectives of China’s banking sector and macroeconomic stability. At Stanford, Zhao will continue his dissertation work and extend his research analyzing how a firm’s connection to government affects performance and investment behavior. Zhao holds BAs in finance and business administration from Jiangzi University of Science and Technology, and an MA in economics from Fudan University.
Paul Schuler is a political scientist whose current research focuses on liberalization under authoritarian rule and political change in Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. His dissertation focuses on how the Vietnam Communist Party has liberalized the legislature in order to gain information, co-opt opposition and stabilize power sharing. At Stanford, Schuler will develop his dissertation work into a book manuscript and pursue other projects related to governance under authoritarian rule. Schuler will receive his PhD in political science from the University of California, San Diego – Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in 2014. He holds a BA in journalism and government & politics from the University of Maryland, and an MA in Pacific international affairs from UC – San Diego.
Pham Ngoc Minh is a health researcher and administrator. His main interests are public health, disease prevention and the rural-urban divide in developing countries. At Stanford, Pham will be studying epidemiological trends and policy perspectives of diabetes in Vietnam, particularly those among adults in mountainous areas of that country. Pham has more than six years of experience working as a medical lecturer at the Thai Nguyen University of Medicine and Pharmacy in Vietnam, and spent two and a half years conducting postdoctoral research in Japan. He received a Bachelor of Medicine from the Thai Nguyen University of Medicine and Pharmacy, a BA in English from Hanoi University, an MPH from the University of Melbourne, and a PhD in medical science from Kyushu University.
This event has moved to the Philippines Conference Room
Professor Paine will explore China’s outlook on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea within the larger settings of Chinese geography and history, including the lessons Chinese leaders continue to draw from Russia’s experience, and how these contexts shape China’s views of its East Asian neighbors. Earlier paradigms of foreign policy offered by Confucianism before 1911 and by Communism thereafter have undergone serious critiques. Which elements in these partly tarnished legacies will China’s leaders decide to affirm, alter, reject, or ignore as they fashion a foreign policy for the 21st century? The outcome will signally affect not only China, but most particularly its neighbors in Southeast and Northeast Asia.
Sarah Paine is a professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI. She is the author of two prize-winning books: The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949 (Cambridge, 2012) and Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (M. E. Sharpe,1996). Among her other publications are The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 (2003); Modern China, 1644 to the Present (co-auth., 2010); Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development (ed., 2010); and four co-edited naval books respectively on blockades, coalitions, expeditionary warfare, and commerce-raiding. She has degrees in in history (Columbia, PhD), Russian (Middlebury, MA), and Latin American studies (Harvard, BA).
Philippines Conference Room
The period from the arrest of the “gang of four” in October 1976 to the final step in the removal of Hua Guofeng in mid-1981 saw CCP rural policy go through a number of phases. The initial emphasis on a moderate version of the Dazhai model gave way to “traditional policies” (luoshi zhengce) by mid-1978; these policies were supplemented in 1979 by “responsibility systems,” the most radical of which, household contracting (baochan daohu), became a sharply divisive issue in 1980, but still not the main aspect of agricultural policy. The tide was moving strongly toward household contracting by mid-1981, but had not yet achieved unambiguous endorsement as the Party policy.
A number of inadequate approaches have dominated the literature, notably 1) a power/policy struggle between Hua Guofeng's neo-Maoists and Deng Xiaoping's reform coalition; 2) the power of the peasants; and 3) the leading role of provincial reformers. The first has no validity, the second and third must be viewed through more complex lenses. The talk will explicate the key factors and present an alternative explanation of the success of rural reform.
Frederick C. Teiwes is Emeritus Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney. He received his B.A. from Amherst College and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. He is the author of various books on Chinese elite politics including Politics and Purges in China (1979, 1993), Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China (1984), and Politics at Mao's Court (1990). Some of his most important work has been jointly authored with Warren Sun including The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the "High Tide" of 1955 (1993), The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1971 (1996), China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Emergence of the Great Leap Forward, 1955-1959 (1999), and The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976 (2007).
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
From territorial disputes in the East China Sea to heated propaganda wars across the region, peace in northeast Asia seems increasingly tenuous. At the heart of rising tensions are unresolved historical issues related to World War II, which drive a wedge between the United States’ two main allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, and fuel a revived rivalry between Japan and China. As the main victor in World War II, the United States has some responsibility for these disputes. It constructed the postwar regional order and has been largely content since then to view the matter as settled, even though issues of territory, compensation, and historical justice were left unresolved. During the Cold War, when the region’s main players were cut off from each other, the United States’ approach worked well. But as the region democratizes and grows increasingly integrated, long-buried issues are coming to the surface. As U.S. President Barack Obama heads to Japan and South Korea this month, it is time for the United States to tackle wartime history in Asia head on.
American officials were confronted by the uncomfortable realities of wartime issues last year, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, without warning, made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including some who had been convicted and executed as Class-A war criminals. The Japanese leader certainly understood that his decision would irk China and South Korea, which see such visits as signals of Tokyo’s embrace of an unapologetic view of Japan’s wartime aggression. What was even more troubling was that the visit came only a few weeks after U.S. Vice President Joe Biden apparently received assurances from Abe that Tokyo would avoid any such provocations. Biden subsequently encouraged South Korean President Park Geun-hye to sit down with the Japanese leader, although Park questioned whether he could be trusted to hold his historical revisionism in check -- a concern that was clearly justified.
Japan and South Korea have made repeated efforts over the past two decades to resolve their wartime history issues, but progress has always proved short-lived. South Korean officials now openly plead for the United States to step in. That would be anathema to Japan, which fears being isolated. Obama managed to convene a brief meeting of the Japanese and South Korean leaders recently at the nuclear safety summit in Europe, but the agenda focused solely on North Korea. For its part, the United States simply urges restraint and dialogue, consistently refusing to intervene directly into disputes over the wartime past. American diplomats understandably argue that the subject is a minefield and that any U.S. involvement will be viewed with suspicion in China, Japan, and South Korea alike.
Even so, China’s bid for regional domination makes it nearly impossible for the United States to continue to stay out of the fray; Beijing has already started to position itself as sympathetic to South Korean fears about Japan and has embarked on a global propaganda campaign against Japanese “militarism,” pointing with undisguised glee at any evidence of Japanese nostalgia for its wartime past. By taking a leading role in dealing with the wartime past, the United States could make it difficult for Beijing to use it for political gain.
[...]
The first few paragraphs of this article have been reproduced with permission of Foreign Affairs. The complete version may be accessed on Foreign Affairs online.
