Income inequalities between urban and rural areas remain high in China, but the gap has begun to narrow. Peasant incomes have increased dramatically since the post-Mao reforms. Rural areas have new power, but this is a consequence not a cause of the reforms. The improvement in rural conditions reflects a change in the central state's development strategy and ideology, and the local response to incentives embedded in China's reforms.

The case study approach is always a refreshing antidote to the frequently superficial approach of a narrative textbook. This is particularly the case in an area as complex as the study of Asia. In an increasingly interdisciplinary world, Asia: Case Studies in the Social Sciences could be an invaluable supplement to a teacher well versed in the general principles but needing the depth and perspective of specialized knowledge of particular topics. I recommend this approach for both college instructors and for advanced study at the pre-collegiate level.

Reprint of a National Research Council Report, 1992.

This book reviews the evolution of strategic alliances involving U.S. and Japanese companies in the semiconductor industry and analyzes whether alliances can contribute to the renewal of an industry faced with stiff competition from Japan. It includes case studies, alternative future scenarios, and suggestions for government and industry.

In the 1980s fiscal reform in China provided localities with strong incentives and a heightened capacity to pursue industrial growth. As a result, local governments have responded vigorously to economic reform, managing rural collective-owned enterprises as diversified corporations, with local officials performing the role of a board of directors. This article analyzes the incentives that have led to the development of this form of local state corporatism and rapid rural industrialization, and it describes the ways in which local governments coordinate economic activity and reallocate revenues from industrial production. These developments are important for two reasons: they show that local government involvement in the economy does not necessarily decline with the expansion of market coordination; and they offer a successful model of reform that serves as a counterpoint to privatization proposals.

'Local corporatism' has been identified as a major factor in the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. The institutional environment, ownership, political and social factors operate along with economic factors in explaining local cor poratism and differences in the degree of corporatism of collective and private enterprises with local governments. The differences lead to the distinction between collective and private enterprises in terms of organizational character istics. This is confirmed by data from 132 rural enterprises in China.