For two years after the summer of 1966, Beijing University was racked by factional conflict and escalating violence. Despite the intensity of the struggle the factions did not express didfferences in political doctrine or orientation towards the status quo. Nie Yuanzi, the veteran Party cadre who advanced rapidly in the municipal hierarchy after denouncing both the old Beida Party Committee and the work team, fiercely defended her growing power against opponents led by several former allies. Compromise proved impossible as mutual accusations intensified, and interventions by national politicians served only to entrench the divisions. The conflicts were bitter and personal not because they expressed differences between status groups, but because the rivals knew one another so well, had so much in common, and because the consequences of losing in this struggle were so dire.

Despite successful economic reforms over the past two decades, China's health care system for the nearly one billion people that live and work in rural areas is broken. Having admitted that there is a crisis, the government is now committed to looking for solutions. In this proposal, we have two overall goals to help provide insights on part of the solution. Our first objective is to collect an updated wave of highly informative data in Year 1 to build on an existing set of data already collected by our study team (from 2004) to analyze the effects of key health policies and institutions that have emerged over the past several years, including the government's rural health insurance system, the privatization of rural clinics, and new investments into township hospitals. Our second, more forward-looking goal for Years 2 and 3 is to set up and introduce an initial experiment on incentives to study one of the most serious flaws in China's health system: the practice in which doctors both prescribe and derive significant profit from drugs. The main hypothesis to be tested is whether realigning doctors' financial incentives embedded in the current organization of China's rural health system influence: a) the way doctors treat and manage their patients; b) the time and effort doctors put into patient care; and c) patient satisfaction.

Public services provision in the developing world, including China, is crucial for rural development and poverty reduction. Although there has been much effort focused on public goods investment in China in recent years, there are still great differences among villages in the level of public goods investment. This study seeks to explain these differences by focusing on the effect of community governance on public goods provision at the village level, including investment into roads, water control and schools. During the recent past several years, village governance in rural China has undergone a series of fundamental reforms. Arguably, the advent of direct elections for village leaders and the rural Tax for Fee Reforms are two of the most important shifts in the ways that communities manage themselves. Using a nearly nationally representative sample of communities from survey data that includes information from more than 2400 villages in rural China, we find that the direct election of a villages leader leads to increased public goods investment in the village. The paper also demonstrates that the rural Tax for Fee Reforms, ceteris paribus, has a negative effect on public goods, especially on investment by the village itself.

The goals of this paper are to help build a clear picture of the role of women in China's agriculture, to assess whether or not agricultural feminization has been occurring, and if so, to measure its impact on labor use, productivity, and welfare. To meet this goal, we rely on two high quality data sets that allow us to explore who is working on China's farms, and the effects of these decisions on labor use, productivity and welfare. The paper makes three main contributions. First, we establish a conceptual framework that we believe commences an effort to try to more carefully define the different dimensions of agricultural feminization and its expected consequences. Second, we make a contribution to the China literature. Perhaps surprisingly, we believe we have mostly debunked the myth that China's agriculture is becoming feminized. We also find that even if women were taking over the farm, the consequences in China would be mostly positive, from a labor supply, productivity and income point of view. Finally, there may be some lessons for the rest of the world on what policies and institutions help make women productive when they work on and manage in a nation's agricultural sector. Policies that ensure equal access to land, regulations that dictate open access to credit, and economic development strategies that encourage competitive and efficient markets all contribute to an environment in which women farmers can succeed.

China is experiencing urbanization at an unprecedented rate over the last two decades. The overall goal of this paper is to understand the extent of and the factors driving urban expansion in China from the late-1980s to 2000. We use a unique three-period panel data set of high-resolution satellite imagery data and socioeconomic data for entire area of coterminous China. Consistent with a number of the key hypotheses generated by the monocentric model, our results demonstrate the powerful role that the growth of income has played in China's urban expansion. In some empirical models, the other key variables in the monocentric model, population, the value of agricultural land and transportation costs, also matter. Adapting the basic empirical model to account for the environment in developing countries, we also find that industrialization and the rise of the service sector appear to have affected the growth of the urban core, but their role was relatively small when compared to the direct effects of economic growth. We also make a methodological contribution, demonstrating the potential importance of accounting for unobserved fixed effects.