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Somewhere on the long list of problems that President Barack Obama will inherit next January will be the ongoing negotiations to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The announcement on October 11, removing North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for a verification mechanism, has the virtue of keeping the diplomatic
avenue open. But if we look carefully at what it took even to get to this interim point,
there should be no illusions about the difficulties of finishing the job.

The latest deal merely closes the second phase of an agreement that was originally signed in February 2007. This phase was supposed to be completed in 60 days. Instead it has taken 19 months. This 19-month saga of negotiation over what may be the easiest step in the process—freezing the status quo—should caution against any expectation that the next administration can easily step in and pick up the negotiating reins.

There are three options it can reasonably consider come January. One would be to try to regain what has been given away in these talks—the inclusion of undeclared sites and proliferation activities—by returning to tactics of international sanctions and Chinese pressure. Japan, which is unhappy with the deal, may be ready for this but there is no evidence that Beijing or even the conservative Lee Myung-Bak government in South Korea is interested in returning to confrontation. At the other end of the spectrum would be an effort to leapfrog the drawn-out phases by offering Pyongyang most of what they claim to want—normalization of relations, economic aid, security assurances, a formal peace treaty to end the Korean war—in a "grand bargain."

Finally, there is the least attractive but most likely course: to lock in the gains of plutonium containment and to continue the diplomatic slog into the dismantling phase, albeit with a more rigorous approach. The U.S. could also try to encourage regime transformation in the North through both engagement and pressure. Given the uncertainties over the health of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, this may be the only viable path to ending the North Korean nuclear threat.

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The Oriental Economist
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Will China come to dominate global high-tech innovation?

In the future, perhaps. Today, however, Greater China—Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong—is focused on the quest for innovation. The dominant paradigm on the Mainland is one of execution, not innovation. Beijing now aims to turn China—historically an adopter of technologies from elsewhere—into a major technology creator. Self-reliance has become the government’s watchword and its ultimate goal.

The talents and resources available are impressive. More Chinese young people are well-educated, international patents and research and development (R&D) spending are on the rise, and China boasts a growing presence in world scientific literature.

Still, negatives remain. China must overcome the legacies of a top-down, state-run research system that is largely disconnected from commerce, and an academic system not always supportive of independent scholarly inquiry. The government is working to change these outdated institutions, but such shifts do not occur overnight.

Taiwan and Hong Kong have followed different paths to high-tech innovation. Taiwan’s route has been dominated by government but implemented by mostly small- and medium-sized firms, with help from its Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), a model for moving concepts to commerce. Significantly, Taiwan’s companies maintain strong links to multinational firms both in the United States and in Mainland China. Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science-based Park is seen as a model high-tech cluster throughout Asia and beyond.

Hong Kong has taken another road. While its formal R&D activity is small, it innovates in business models, particularly in logistics chains that reach into the Mainland and globally. It is a (largely unheralded) story of great success.

The big question is: When will Greater China’s high-tech innovation have a major impact on the world economy?

Examination copies: Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

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Henry S. Rowen
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Shorenstein APARC
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Lisa Lee received an MA in human resources management from Hawai'i Pacific University in Honolulu and a BA in civil law (Sarjana Hukum) from Tarumanagara University in Jakarta. Prior to joining the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, she held managerial and administrative positions at ISS International School in Singapore; Bank of Japan and Panasonic Finance America in New York City; and at Media Indonesia in Jakarta. She worked at APARC through March 2025.

Program Coordinator, Asia Health Policy Program, Southeast Asia Program, and Taiwan Program
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This event - the final in a series of 4 film screening which will be followed by a discussion with director Clint Eastwood - is part of the second phase of a three year research effort to compare the formation of the divided memories in Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States. We will conduct a comparative study of popular cinema dealing with historical subjects focusing roughly on the period from 1931-1951.

Letters From Iwo Jima Synopsis

Sixty-one years ago, US and Japanese armies met on Iwo Jima. Decades later, several hundred letters are unearthed from that stark island's soil. The letters give faces and voices to the men who fought there, as well as the extraordinary general who led them.

The Japanese soldiers are sent to Iwo Jima knowing that in all probability they will not come back. Among them are Saigo (Kazunari Ninomiya), a baker who wants only to live to see the face of his newborn daughter; Baron Nishi (Tsuyoshi Ihara), an Olympic equestrian champion known around the world for his skill and his honor; Shimizu (Ryo Kase), a young former military policeman whose idealism has not yet been tested by war; and Lieutenant Ito (Shidou Nakamura), a strict military man who would rather accept suicide than surrender.

Leading the defense is Lt. General Tadamichi Kuribayashi (Ken Watanabe), whose travels in America have revealed to him the hopeless nature of the war but also given him strategic insight into how to take on the vast American armada streaming in from across the Pacific.

With little defense other than sheer will and the volcanic rock of the island itself, Gen. Kuribayashi's unprecedented tactics transform what was predicted to be a quick and bloody defeat into nearly 40 days of heroic and resourceful combat.

Almost 7,000 American soldiers were killed on Iwo Jima; more than 20,000 Japanese troops perished. The black sands of Iwo Jima are stained with their blood, but their sacrifices, their struggles, their courage and their compassion live on in the letters they sent home.

Cubberley Auditorium
485 Lasuen Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305

Clint Eastwood Director Speaker
Seminars
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This is the second phase of a three year research effort to compare the formation of the divided memories in Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.  We will conduct a comparative study of popular cinema dealing with historical subjects focusing roughly on the period from 1931-1951.

This is the third in a series of 4 film screening which will be followed by a discussion of the audience.

Yamato Synopsis

During late World War II, the Japanese army starts loosing the battle.  Special junior officers including Kamio (Kenichi Matsuyama) board Yamato and meet officer Moriwaki (Takashi Sorimachi) and Uchia (Shidou Nakamura).  However, this battle marks the virtual end of the combined fleet of the ikmperial Japanese Navy.  Then in April 1945. Yamato is ordered to carry out a suicide mission and sets out tot he waters of Okinawa...

Philippines Conference Room

Seminars
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This is the second phase of a three year research effort to compare the formation of the divided memories in Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.  We will conduct a comparative study of popular cinema dealing with historical subjects focusing roughly on the period from 1931-1951.

This is the first in a series of 4 film screening which will be followed by a discussion of the audience.

Devils on the Doorstep synopsis

Renowned actor Jiang Wen directs this sweeping look at a small Chinese village located near the Great Wall during the closing days of WWII. As Japanese soldiers march up and down the village's main thoroughfare, Ma Dasan (Wen) is making love with his widowed lover Yu'er (Jiang Hongbo). Suddenly, there is a knock at the door and a gun at Ma's head. He is informed that for the next week he is to house two gagged and bound prisoners, one a fanatical Japanese soldier, the other a Chinese translator -- and to interrogate the pair. The village elders uneasily question the two, while the translator intentionally mistranslates the epithets and insults from the soldier. When the Chinese resistance fighters do not return to pick up the prisoners, the villagers panic and order Ma to execute them. Ma, in turn, panics and tries to hide the cantankerous duo in the Great Wall -- that is until the villagers discover his ruse and almost lynch him, despite a strongly worded defense by Yu'er. Six months later, the villagers become increasingly worried about boarding these prisoners, lest they all be branded collaborators. This film won the prestigious Grand Prix at the 2000 Cannes Film Festival.

Philippines Conference Room

Seminars
-

This is the second phase of a three year research effort to compare the formation of the divided memories in Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.  We will conduct a comparative study of popular cinema dealing with historical subjects focusing roughly on the period from 1931-1951.

This is the second in a series of 4 film screening which will be followed by a discussion of the audience.

Blue Swallow synopsis

An aspiring Japanese aviator longing to take flight from Japanese-occupied Korea enrolls in Tachikawa Flight Academy in director Yoon Jong-chan's lavish look at the life of pre-World War II aviatrix Park Gyeong-weon. Raised in the Korean countryside but longing to embrace her Korean heritage, Park Gyeong-weon (Jang Jin-yeong) longs to take to the sky "like a swallow." Park is convinced that she has what it takes to soar through the clouds, and in 1925 she begins to pursue her dreams by enrolling in the Tachikawa Flight Academy. An amiable cab driver by day, the tomboyish aeronaut eventually strikes up a close friendship with fellow Koreans Kang Se-gi (Kim Tae-hyeok) and Lee Jeong-heui (Han ji-men) while entering into a tenuous romance with handsome student Han Ji-hyeok (Kim Ju-hyeok). High up in the sky Park attempt to hold her own against airborne Nipponese nemesis Masako Gibe (Yuko Fueki), and as tensions begin to heat up between Japan and Korea the skillful pilot plans a high-profile "friendship" flight to Manchuria in hopes of encouraging peaceful relations between the two countries. - Jason Buchanan,

Philippines Conference Room

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On October 2, 2008, Dr. Marcus Feldman of Stanford's Biology department delivered the first colloquium in the series on "The Implications of Demographic Change in China," co-sponsored by the Asia Health Policy Program and the Stanford China Program. Dr. Feldman discussed the sex-ratio imbalance and gender studies in China.

As Dr. Feldman noted, the total fertility rate in China has dropped dramatically in recent years, due in large part to the Chinese government's One Child Policy, which was introduced in 1979. In the early 1970s, the fertility rate averaged almost 6 births per woman, dropping to about 1.6 after the year 2000. China's sex ratio of males to females at birth (SRB), meanwhile, has risen. In 1975, the SRB was about 106 male births per 100 female births, and in 2005 had climbed to over 120 male births per 100 female births. When parity (birth order) is taken into account, the ratio becomes even more startling; for the first birth, the ratio is close to even (about 108 in the year 2005), but exceeded 145 in 2005 for the second birth and even higher for the third birth (almost163 in 2005). Research indicates that the imbalanced SRB is largely concentrated in the lower coastal regions of mainland China, where the population is predominantly Han. Shaanxi, Anhui and Jiangxi Province have the highest ratio of male to female births.

Evidence of gender imbalance is not merely limited to the ratio at birth; high ratios of male to female children are seen through ages 0-4, indicating that son preference affects not only which children survive birth, but also the survival rate of females in early childhood. In fact, research indicates that while excess girl child mortality (EGCM) has decreased for infants less than a year old in the period between 1973 and 2000, it has become increasingly pronounced for children between the ages of 0-4 and 5-9, with EGCM rates increasing every year.

Two Studies

Two studies were carried out in 1997 and 2000 by the Institute for Population and Development Studies of Xi'an Jiaotong University to investigate the causes of gender imbalance. The 1997 study focused on the cultural transmission of son preference, and the 2000 study on marriage form and old age support.

Three counties were chosen as sites, and the studies were a combination of surveys, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The first county, Sanyuan () in Shaanxi province, is a medium-developed region whose principal agricultural product is wheat. Fertility is high in Sanyuan, which is characterized by the dominance of virilocal marriage (in which the bride joins the family of her husband) and strict patrilineal family systems. The second county, Lueyang () in Shaanxi province is an underdeveloped mountainous region in which the patrilineal family system is more relaxed, fertility is lower than in Sanyuan, and there are diversified forms of marriage. The third site, Songzi () in Hubei province, is a well-developed rice- and cotton-producing plains region, with low fertility, relaxed family systems and diversified marriage. The results of household surveys showed a strong preference among parents in both Sanyuan and Lueyang to live with their sons in old age, which was not surprising, but a surprising result was found when parents were asked about the primary benefits of having a son. The most-reported reason was for carrying on the family name, which shows that traditional (Confucian) values played a bigger role in son preference than practical considerations such as labor or old age support. Overall, Lueyang was shown to have a much higher rate for transmitting no son-preference than Sanyuan, with older women slightly more likely to transmit no son-preference.

The marriage study found that rates of uxorilocal marriage (in which the groom joins the family of his wife) have, for the most part, been dropping in both Lueyang and Songzi since the 1970's. In Sanyuan, where uxorilocal marriage has been traditionally uncommon, the rates have remained steady at around 5 percent since the 1950's. The researchers calculated children's odds ratios of providing financial help to parents based on marriage form, and found the net ratios highest for women in virilocal marriages and sons in uxorilocal marriages.

Mechanisms of gender imbalance

There are several likely factors for the imbalanced sex ratio at birth in China. Underreporting of female births, infanticide, and sex-selective abortion (post-pre-natal gender testing) all contribute to this syndrome. Furthermore, poor nutritional and medical care for girls in their younger years can further skew the gender balance by exacerbating excess female child mortality. At the basic source of this issue, however, remains a fundamental gender bias that dates back historically and philosophically through Confucian culture and traditional patriarchal structures.

If the SRB, EFCM, TFR (total fertility rate) were all to remain at their early 2000s levels, then by 2030 the total population of China would be 84.2% of what would normally be expected at the current fertility rate (potentially causing economic welfare issues for the elderly, along with a work force deficiency). Moreover, there would be an excess in the male population of 20-21% (relative to females), essentially making it mathematically impossible for this proportion of the male population to marry. Needless to say, the possibility of such a severe "marriage squeeze", and the general top-heavy ratio of aging population to young working population are very problematic prospects for China's population and for the government's endeavors to promote both economic growth and social stability.

Examples of government efforts

The government is considering several policy options to try to avert this potential crisis. Stronger punishments were suggested at the 2008 National People's Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) for non-medical sex identification and sex-selection abortions (both of which can be obtained for relatively cheap rates within the country, despite being illegal). More proactively, an experimental program called "Care For Girls" was implemented in 2000 in Chaohu (a city in Anhui province). This program includes: financial help for 1- and 2-daughter families; sponsoring of girls' educational fees and increased pensions to families with daughters; and the promotion of uxorilocal marital structures. Since the introduction of the program, the local SRB went from 125 in 1999 to 114 in 2002. In response to this apparent success, the government expanded the "Care For Girls" program to 24 counties with high SRB rates in 2003-2004, and saw the average SRB in those counties drop from 133.8 in 2000 to 119.6 in 2005. Stipulation and initiation of a national "Care For Girls" campaign occurred in January 2006 - July 2006, with the goal of bringing the national SRB average to normal levels within 15 years. In January 2008, the government expanded on this effort by launching the "Care For Girls Youth Volunteer Action", beginning with more than 1000 students (mostly at the university level) directed at engaging in promotional activities and data collection (under the Chinese Communist Youth League). These policies are part of a comprehensive aspiration on the part of the PRC government towards the "construction of a new reproductive culture."

Son preference among migrant workers in Shenzhen

With the Chinese economic reform of the early 1980s, millions of laborers have been migrating from rural to urban areas. After migration, rural-urban laborers have to familiarize themselves with the rules and customs of their new locations, rebuilding their social networks in the process of adapting to their new occupations and habitation. But how do individual characteristics (i.e. gender, education level and the time of residency), restructured social networks, and the experiences of migration influence migrants' attitudes and behaviors regarding son preference? These questions were examined in a 2005 study conducted in Shenzhen.

Shenzhen is the first Special Economic Zone in China to implement economic reform and has since developed from a small fishing village into a modern coastal city. According to the 2000 Population Census, the total population of Shenzhen is 7,008,800, and the ratio of migrants to permanent urban residents is 4.77:1.

The Shenzhen study seemed to indicate initially that only a small minority of migrants (7% of total respondents) expressed a strong attitude towards son preference. However, the actual childbearing behavior of rural-urban migrants was remarkably different compared to their reported attitudes. The sex ratio of migrant children is as high as 163 male births per 100 female births, and the later in the birth order, the higher the sex ratio for the child, i.e., the sex ratio is 1.52 for the first birth and rises steeply to 1.80 for the second birth, peaking at 1.94 for the third and above birth. Thus the results suggest that migrants' childbearing behaviors actually suggest a strong son preference.

The Shenzhen study also found that three major determinants, namely social networks, migration history, and individual factors, all have significant effects on son preference among rural-urban migrants.

First, weak ties (formed by friends, bosses, and fellow workers) in social networks affect the attitude of son preference among rural-urban migrants. That is, the risk of having son-preference tends to decrease when the overall influence of network members is positive (without son preference). Moreover, increasing social contacts with network members will reduce the dependence upon strong ties (formed by family members and kin) and thus decrease the traditional culture of "rearing a son to support parents in their old age" and familial pressures to have more children.

Second, the duraction of residency in an urban area has a significant effect on the attitude of son preference among rural-urban migrations. The longer the migrants live in an urban area, the more likely that their attitudes of son-preference will adapt to urban reproductive norms. For example, the data indicated that ratio of male and female birth is more balanced among those living in urban areas for 8 years or longer. However, rural-urban migrants still exhibit a strong overall behavior of son preference. In other words, the change in childbearing behavior in terms of birth patterns still lags far behind the apparent change of attitudes.

Age and education are identified as factors affecting son preference among rural-urban migrants. For instance, an increase in age relative to initial migration will often decrease the imbalance in the sex ratio.

An additional study on rural-urban migrants examined the relationship between the gender of married migrants and their provision of financial support to parents and parents-in-law post-migration. The results showed, in fact, that female migrants are more likely to give financial support to their parents-in-law after migration.

Even today, the patrilineal conception of support for elderly family members is still very prevalent in rural China. Sons are expected to provide fundamental support to their parents, while daughters tend to provide supplementary and emotional support. This traditional old-age support pattern of reliance on sons can often intensify the syndrome of son bias among rural or traditional Chinese. However, the results here proved that if aging parents are more likely to receive sustenance from married daughters compared to married sons, the dominant son-preference in rural China could be logically undercut and eventually the traditional patrilineal conception of old-age support, and resulting gender bias, could be ameliorated and even eliminated.

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