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Although China and the United States are the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China’s emissions on a per capita basis are significantly lower than those of the U.S.: in 2005, per capita emissions in China were 5.5 metric tons—much less than the U.S. (23.5 metric tons per capita), and also lower than the world average of 7.03 metric tons. China’s total GHG emissions were 7,234.3 million tons of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) in 2005, 15.4 percent of which came from the agricultural sector. By comparison, total U.S. emissions were 6,931.4 million tCO2e, 6.4 percent of which were from agriculture. Within China’s agriculture sector, 54.5 percent of emissions come from nitrous oxide, and 45.5 percent come from methane, which is the opposite of the composition of global GHG emissions from agriculture.

Economic studies show that climate change will affect not only agricultural production, but also agricultural prices, trade and food self-sufficiency. The research presented here indicates that producer responses to these climate- induced shocks will lessen the impacts of climate change on agricultural production compared to the effects predicted by many natural scientists. This study projects the impacts of climate change on China’s agricultural sector under the A2 scenario developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which assumes a heterogeneous world with continuous population growth and regionally-oriented economic growth. Depending on the assumptions used related to CO2 fertilization, in 2030 the projected impacts of climate change on grain production range from -4 percent to +6 percent, and the effects on crop prices range from -12 percent to +18 percent. The change in relative prices in domestic and international markets will in turn impact trade flows of all commodities. The magnitude of the impact on grain trade in China will equal about 2 to 3 percent of domestic consumption. According to our analysis, trade can and should be used to help China mitigate the impacts of climate change; however, the overall impact on China’s grain self-sufficiency is moderate because the changes in trade account for only a small share of China’s total demand.

The effect of climate change on rural incomes in China is complicated. The analysis shows that the average impact of higher temperatures on crop net revenue is negative, but this can be partially offset by income gains resulting from an expected increase in precipitation. Moreover, the effects of climate change on farmers will vary depending on the production methods used. Rain-fed farmers will be more vulnerable to temperature increases than irrigated farmers, and the impact of climate change on crop net revenue varies by season and by region.

In recent years, China has made tangible progress on the implementation of adaptation strategies in the agricultural sector. Efforts have been made to increase public investment in climate change research, and special funding has been allocated to adaptation issues. An experiment with insurance policies and increased public investment in research are just two examples of climate adaptation measures. Beyond government initiatives, farmers have implemented their own adaptation strategies, such as changing cropping patterns, increasing investment in irrigation infrastructure, using water saving technologies and planting new crop varieties to increase resistance to climatic shocks.

China faces several challenges, however, as it seeks to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change. Fertilizers are a major component of nitrous oxide emissions, and recent studies indicate that overuse of fertilizer has become a significant contributor to water pollution. Application rates in China are well above world averages for many crops; fields are so saturated with fertilizer that nutrients are lost because crops cannot absorb any more. Changing fertilizer application practices will be no easy task. Many farmers also work outside of agriculture to supplement their income and opt for current methods because they are less time intensive.

In addition, the expansion of irrigated cropland has contributed to the depletion of China’s water table and rivers, particularly in areas of northern China. Water scarcity is increasing and will constrain climate change mitigation strategies for some farmers. One of the main policy/research issues—as well as challenges for farm households—will be to determine how to increase water use efficiency.

Despite the sizeable amount of greenhouse gases emitted by and the environmental impact of China’s agriculture sector, it also offers important and efficient mitigation opportunities. To combat low fertilizer use efficiency in China, the government in recent years has begun promoting technology aimed at calibrating fertilizer dosages according to the characteristics of soil. In addition, conservation tillage (CT) has been considered as a potential way to create carbon sinks. Over the last decade, China’s government has promoted the adoption of CT and established demonstration pilot projects in more than 10 provinces. Finally, extending intermittent irrigation and adopting new seed varieties for paddy fields are also strategies that have been supported and promoted as part of the effort to reduce GHG emissions.

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International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council
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Scott Rozelle
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This paper reviews the history of relations between Korea and the United States from the mid-nineteenth century to early 2008. The paper focuses on the growth and expansion of anti-American sentiment in South Korea-and the social movements to which this sentiment gave rise-after Korea's liberation in August 1945. Its primary argument is that anti-American sentiment and movements in South Korea were a product of the country's domestic politics. Two political forces are discernible in South Korea: "conservative-rightist" and "progressive-leftist." The former generally adopts a pro-America and anti-North Korea stance, while the latter tends to be anti-America and pro-North Korea. A significant portion of the progressive-leftist forces regard the United States as a barrier to Korean reconciliation and the unification of the Korean peninsula. During the George W. Bush administration, this group perceived that the United States was preparing to go to war against North Korea. During the period when the conservative-rightist forces assumed political power, the progressive-leftist forces were suppressed, through laws and even state violence. When the progressive-leftist forces controlled the government, between 1998 and 2008, when democratization was well underway, legal restrictions were substantially lifted and state violence could not be exercised. Accordingly, this group could-and did-express its anti-U.S. sentiment more freely.

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Shorenstein APARC
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Hakjoon Kim
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David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program, discussed China's increasing influence on North Korea with The New York Time's reporter Choe Sang-hun. Straub said that China's primary purpose in boosting trade and other ties with North Korea was not increased influence per se but the avoidance of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Contrary to official rhetoric on both sides, he noted, the two countries remain wary of each other.
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On February 26 and 27, 2010, the SPRIE-Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship hosted its second annual conference, "Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Japan" at the Bechtel Conference Center in Encina Hall at Stanford University, made possible through generous support from Cisco Systems and The Miner Foundation.

Scholars from universities across Japan and the United States gathered to present and discuss new papers seeking to understand the trends and dynamics of business and innovation in Japan through the lens of entrepreneurial companies, and institutions that affect those companies.

The conference agenda is below; presentation and other files will be linked as they are available.

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What explains the recent large swings in the behavior of Japanese voters? Last August, for the first time in the post-WWII era, Japan's leading political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, lost power, making way for a new DPJ government. During the preceding months leading up to the lower house elections in August 2009, popular media coverage pointed to fundamental structural changes in the Japanese political economy as the underlying causes for changing voter preferences. To what extent can structural changes in the economy and society explain changing voter behavior and electoral outcomes? Japan's two decade old stagnating economy, rapidly graying society, and post-industrial advanced economic structure provide an ideal case for studying this question. Using both national and sub-national level data spanning two decades, we test both popular theories and conventional wisdom about the political effects of a graying society, widening income disparities, and industrial structural change.

Kay Shimizu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. She received her undergraduate degree and PhD in political science from Stanford University (2008). Her research concerns the political economy of Japan and China, with a focus on fiscal politics, central local relations, and the politics of economic structural change. Her book manuscript, Private Money as Public Funds: the Politics of Japan's Recessionary Economy, examines the role of private financial institutions in Japan's political struggles to adjust to a changing economic and demographic landscape. She is on leave during the 2009-2010 academic year as an Advanced Research Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Program on US Japan Relations at Harvard University.

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Kay Shimizu Assistant Professor, Political Science, Columbia University (currently on leave) & Advanced Research Fellow, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Program on US Japan Relations, Harvard University Speaker
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The Korean Studies Program (KSP) of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to announce that Mr. John Everard will join the Center for the 2010-2011 academic year. Mr. Everard's research will be on North Korean life and society. During his fellowship at the Center, he will hold seminars related to his research project and will be involved in various projects on Korea.

With frequent appearances on BBC discussing North Korea, Mr. Everard, former British Ambassador to North Korea, 2006-2008, will bring extensive knowledge of North Korea, China and South America to APARC.  He served as British Ambassador to Uruguay in 2001-2005, and was head of the Political Section in Beijing 2000-2001.  He was responsible for political relations with the troubled states of West Africa and managed mutinational efforts to restore democracy to Bosnia, 1995-1998.  He became the youngest British Ambassador to Belarus in 1993.

Mr. Everard studied French, German and Chinese at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and studied Chinese history and economics at Bejing University. He holds an MA from Manchester Business School.

Pantech Fellowships, generously funded by Pantech Group of Korea, are intended to cultivate a diverse international community of scholars and professionals committed to and capable of grappling with challenges posed by developments in Korea. We invite individuals from the United States, Korea, and other countries to apply.

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Peter M. Beck
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This WSJ article by Peter Beck originally appeared as Shorenstein APARC Dispatch in April 2010

North Korea is usually described as the "most isolated country on earth," its people effectively cut off from the outside world. My research tells a different story-that perhaps one million North Koreans are secretly listening to foreign radio broadcasts. The number of listeners is believed to be growing, which is all the more amazing when one considers that North Korean authorities only distribute radios with fixed dials, assiduously jam foreign broadcasts, and send citizens caught listening to foreign radio to the country's notorious gulags for as long as ten years.

Over a dozen radio stations from the United States, South Korea, and Japan currently broadcast to North Korea. Voice of America (VOA), one of the most popular stations, has been broadcasting to the North since 1942, while the equally popular Radio Free Asia (RFA) began its Korean broadcasts soon after being created by Congress in 1997. VOA focuses on news of the United States and the world, while RFA concentrates on the two Koreas. RFA also carries commentaries by two Korean speakers who grew up in the former Soviet Union and Romania. RFA serves as a substitute for the lack of a "free" station in North Korea, but unlike a typical "surrogate station"-which would be staffed largely by émigrés-RFA only employs one North Korean defector.

South Korea's "Global Korean Network" has been declining in popularity since it ceased to focus on North Korea and adopted a decidedly soft approach after the election of Kim Dae-jung as president in 1997. However, three stations run by North Korean defectors have sprouted up over the past few years, led by Free North Korea Radio (FRNK). These stations employ stringers in North Korea who can communicate by cell phone or smuggle out interviews through China. As a result, information is flowing in and out of the North more rapidly than ever. For example, when major economic reforms were undertaken in 2002, it was months before the rest of the world knew. In contrast, when the regime launched a disastrous currency reform on November 30, 2009, FNKR filed a report within hours.

How do we know that North Koreans are actually listening to foreign broadcasts? First, on dozens of occasions, authorities in Pyongyang have used their own media to attack foreign broadcasters. The North reserves the insult "reptile" exclusively to describe foreign broadcasters. In late March 2010, the regime likened defector broadcasters to "human trash." Ironically, this diatribe also contained the first official mention of the currency revaluation, so broadcasters have clearly struck a nerve. If they were in fact irrelevant, the regime would ignore them instead of lavishing them with free publicity.

Broadcasters to North Korea frequently receive heartbreaking messages from North Koreans in China, thanking them for their efforts. One listener described RFA as "our one ray of hope." More importantly, over the past several years, thousands of North Korean defectors, refugees, and visitors to China have been interviewed about their listening habits. An unpublished 2009 survey of North Koreans in China found that over 20 percent had listened to the banned broadcasts, and almost all of them had shared the information with family members and friends. Several other surveys confirm these findings. While we cannot generalize the listening habits of a self-selected group to the general population, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there are more than a million surreptitious listeners. The North Korean regime is not only losing its monopoly on the control of information; defectors also cite foreign radio listening as one of the leading motivations to defect.

Despite valiant efforts and growing impact, much more could be done to improve broadcasting to North Korea. VOA and RFA only broadcast five hours a day, and the defector stations limp along with shoestring budgets, due to a pervasive indifference within South Korea.

President Obama's human rights envoy for North Korea, Robert King, has pledged to expand funding for Korean broadcasting. For its part, Pyongyang claims that foreign broadcasts are part of the Obama administration's "hostile policy" toward the North. Only time will tell if these efforts will lead to change we can believe in-both in Washington and Pyongyang.

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Donald K. Emmerson
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WASHINGTON - The National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars welcome the first class of Research Associates and Fellows of the National Asia Research Program (NARP). Thirty-nine outstanding scholars of Asia were chosen through a competitive, nationwide selection process based on their research into issues of importance to U.S. interests in Asia. The NARP will support the research of 27 Research Associates and 12 Research Fellows during their two-year terms and bring it to the attention of policymakers.

"Our goal in this new program is to highlight and reward scholars who have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy," said NBR President and NARP co-director Richard Ellings. "America's future security, prosperity, and well-being will be deeply linked with Asia's future, and thus America needs some of its best and brightest to understand our interests in Asia -- and the history, nations, peoples, and issues of Asia. In short the NARP is responding to the needs for information and assessment arising from the shift in locus in world power from the Atlantic to the Pacific."

Robert Hathaway, Asia Program Director at the Wilson Center and co-director of the NARP, underscored the role the Associates and Fellows will play in bridging the gap between the academic and policy communities. "The selection of these top scholars from across the United States marks the beginning of a new national association for U.S. experts who care about policy issues related to Asia. The enthusiastic response we've seen to the NARP is a good indication of the potential we have to achieve our goal of strengthening and reinvigorating the policy-relevant study of Asia."

The heads of universities and research organizations in the United States were invited to nominate outstanding scholars from their faculty and staff for consideration as Research Associates and Fellows. More than 140 experts were considered during the selection process, which concluded last month and was followed by private notifications to all of the candidates.

The National Asia Research Program (NARP) is a new research and conference program designed to reinvigorate and promote the policy-relevant study of Asia, particularly by highlighting the research of NARP Associates and Fellows, who will present their work at the inaugural Asia Policy Assembly in Washington, D.C., on June 17-18, 2010.

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David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program, discussed the reported infiltration of North Korean agents into South Korea to kill senior North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop. Straub said that Hwang's former closeness to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and Kim's late father Kim Il Sung probably made Kim Jong Il regard Hwang's outspoken criticism of North Korea as a personal betrayal.
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