China’s attitude toward the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, particularly the former, has
drawn a lot of attention in the post–Cold War era. How China views the utility and function
of these two security alliances and reacts to them could well shape the dynamics of the
alliances. From a historical perspective, however, this is not a new issue. China has lived with
these alliances for almost half a century. To better understand China’s current concerns
about the alliances and to predict its future posture, we might look for clues in what China
has done in the past. This paper attempts to provide a broad survey of Chinese perceptions of
the two security alliances in the Cold War period to elucidate Beijing’s post–Cold War policy
orientation. By tracing the evolution of the Chinese calculus of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-
Korea alliances, it hopes to find answers to the following questions. What are some of the
important variables or conditions that defined China’s attitudes and approaches to dealing
with these two alliances? How do these variables or conditions interact with each other?
Have they been constant or changing over time? Are they still relevant in the post–Cold War
era, and to what extent?
The paper draws its findings mainly from the Chinese official media. While this may not
be an ideal source, it nevertheless provides a systematic data basis for a historical analysis of
continuity and change. There is no question that the official Chinese media, particularly
before the 1980s, was full of rhetoric and propaganda. There has always been a gap between
rhetoric and behavior in Chinese foreign policy, as in other countries. Nevertheless it is
equally true that behind rhetoric always lie perceptions, self-serving or not, that provide
“diagnostic propensities” and “choice propensities” of the Chinese leaders and elites, and
thus have policy implications.
The findings of the paper suggest that China’s perceptions of the targets, internal
structures, and functions of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean alliances have changed remark-
ably over time, from extreme hostility to high tolerance. These changes resulted from the
interactions of such factors as China’s assessment of the world balance of power, the well-
being of its relationship with both indigenous and outside powers, and the priority of its
national policy. The evolution of Chinese perceptions also illustrates that China need not
view the two security alliances as inherently hostile to its interests. Under some circum-
stances they can be considered useful or at least harmless. Beijing’s attitudes are often
determined not by the two alliances per se but rather by its perception of the sources of threat
to its security and whether these security alliances can alleviate or aggravate the threat. On
the other hand, given the nature of China’s foreign policy, Beijing does not have intrinsic
love for these alliances. Since the 1980s, China has not particularly endorsed any bilateral or
multilateral military alliance in the region. Normatively China is also uneasy with the reality
of the American military presence in the region and tends to see it as a short-term arrange-
ment rather than a long-term phenomenon. During the Cold War, the Chinese perceived the
two security alliances as either against China or with China. In the post–Cold War period,
they have yet to be convinced that the function of the two alliances could be neither.
Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.
