Korea's leading companies, Pantech Co., Ltd., and Curitel Communications, Inc. (known as the Pantech Group) have awarded a $2 million gift to support the Korean Studies Program at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), within the Stanford Institute for International Studies.

The Pantech gift will create the Stanford Korea Forum, led by Professor Gi-Wook Shin, which will convene a conference every year on different aspects of the U.S.-Korea relationship. Three fellowships will also be established: one for mid-career professionals in public service, journalism, and business who will spend three to nine months at Stanford as Pantech Fellows; one for invited Korean scholars to come to Stanford during the summer; and a third for undergraduate and graduate students interested in Korean studies. In addition, the gift will help to sustain critical activities of the Korean Studies Program in APARC, such as public lectures, ongoing research, and policy briefs.

Under the leadership of Byeong Yeop Park, the Founder and Chairman, the Pantech Group had combined sales of 14 million sets worldwide, with a total gross revenue of U.S. $1.7 billion in 2003, placing them in the top three mobile handset manufacturers in Korea, and the eighth largest in the global market.

The Korean government has recognized Mr. Park's achievements with numerous awards. His strong investment in R&D and his recruitment of top technological talent have led to steady and sustainable profits for Pantech, and the company has a record of supporting broad social programs in local communities.

Regarding the company's commitment to Stanford, Mr. Park said, "I am extremely pleased to be part of this outstanding and unique program on Korean Studies. I recognize Stanford's contribution to promoting mutual understanding between Korea and the U.S. by bringing together prominent scholars, policymakers, and business leaders of both countries. I'm so proud that Pantech Group will be contributing to developing the next generation of leaders in building the relationship between Korea and the United States. I hope that our pledge will help attract to Stanford some of the brightest young minds of our two countries."

Professor Shin was delighted about the generous Pantech gift. Korean Studies have blossomed at Stanford over the past three years under Shin's leadership, and he notes that this new commitment will "facilitate American understanding of Korea and elevate Stanford's Korean studies program to the next level of excellence." Shin also underscored the importance of the timing of this gift, "as the United States is now entering a new era in its relations with both North and South Korea."

The Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is a unique Stanford University institution focused on the study of contemporary Asia. APARC's mission is to produce and publish Asia Pacific-focused interdisciplinary research; to educate students, scholars, and corporate and governmental affiliates about the importance of U.S.-Asian relations; to promote constructive interaction to understand and resolve the region's challenges; to influence U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific; and to guide Asian nations on key foreign relations, government, political economy, technology, and social issues. APARC is part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies.

Below are excerpts from the Straits Times piece. The piece is not reprinted in its entirety due to copyright reasons. Please visit the link below below to read the whole article. "...Said Indonesia specialist Donald K. Emmerson at the Institute for International Studies at California's Stanford University: 'My sense is that the election will be primarily about crime, stability, prices, not about religious issues.' Many Indonesia watchers in the U.S. have been surprised that Islam has not appeared to be a dominant factor in the campaign. Said Dr Emmerson: 'It's quite remarkable that in the Malaysian election religion was very important with respect to the PAS factor, but in Indonesia that is just not the case. And that is a huge relief to the US as it seeks to win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims in the war against terrorism. ..."

APARC's Henry S. Rowen is featured in James Mann's new book, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet, Viking Penguin: New York, 2004, pp 186-97, for his role in formulating the military strategy that the United States should employ in a war against Iraq. The book details the Cheney-Wolfowitz-Rowen war plan -- dubbed "Operation Scorpion" -- which proposed an invasion of Iraq from the west, through the country's empty desert regions toward the Euphrates River.

While campaigning for president in 2000, George W. Bush downplayed his lack of foreign policy experience by emphasizing that he would surround himself with a highly talented and experienced group of political veterans. This core group, consisting of Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Condoleezza Rice, has a long history together dating back 30 years in some cases. Dubbing themselves the Vulcans, they have largely determined the direction and focus of the Bush presidency. In this new book, Mann traces their careers and the development of their ideas in order to understand how and why American foreign policy got to where it is today.

The clearest evidence of the Iran link came in January 1990, when Pakistan's army chief of staff conveyed his threat to arm Iran to a top Pentagon official. Henry S. Rowen, at the time an assistant defense secretary, said Pakistani Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg issued the warning in a face-to-face meeting in Pakistan. "Beg said something like, 'If we don't get adequate support from the U.S., then we may be forced to share nuclear technology with Iran,'" said Rowen, now a professor at Stanford University. Rowen said former President Bush's administration did little to follow up on Beg's warning. "In hindsight, maybe before or after that they did make some transfers," Rowen said. Rowen said he told Beg that Pakistan would be "in deep trouble" if it gave nuclear weapons to Iran. Rowen said he was surprised by the threat because at the time Americans thought Pakistan's secular government dominated by Sunni Muslims wouldn't aid Iran's Shiite Muslim theocracy. "There was no particular reason to think it was a bluff, but on the other hand, we didn't know," Rowen said.

China's government has sentenced two of its citizens to life in prison for their role in securing prostitutes for hundreds of male Japanese visitors in the southern city of Zhuhai last autumn. The Chinese government is also pressuring Tokyo to turn over the Japanese businessmen who allegedly requested the prostitutes. This story made headlines around the world, and fits well with how the world press typically covers Sino-Japanese relations. Regrettably, such incidents recur with enough regularity to feed the media machine that continues to stir a nationalism rooted in conflicting historical memories. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine -- which is widely viewed as a symbol of Japan's former militarism -- is a conspicuous example of this. The publicity that the press gives to these visits has helped impede an invitation to Koizumi from China's leaders for a state visit. Recently, the discovery of mustard gas canisters left behind by Japanese forces during World War II has also served to keep memories of the Imperial Japanese Army's wartime conduct alive among older Chinese. Moreover, rival Sino-Japanese claims to the Senkaku (or Diao Yutai) Islands resurfaced last year when the Japanese government leased three islets in the chain from private parties. The action, purportedly undertaken to reduce the prospect of landings and demonstrations by Japanese right-wingers, set off a brief, though frenzied, reaction in China, as well as in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Meanwhile, differences over Taiwan also foster tensions periodically, such as when former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui sought to visit Japan for medical treatment. But this is not the whole story. Although such incidents reveal a troubling level of mistrust between the Chinese and Japanese that is not merely a product of media coverage, it is noteworthy that both governments have worked consistently, diligently, and with considerable success to resolve such problems and contain their political fallout. Of course, official relations between the two countries are marked by much political and economic competition -- some of it healthy, some of it a possible harbinger of future strategic rivalry. The competitive strain in Sino-Japanese relations is especially visible in energy politics. Demand for oil in Asia is growing rapidly, and with China and Japan increasingly dependent upon imports, each has naturally sought to improve its energy security by diversifying sources of supply. Both countries covet access to Russian reserves, especially those located in the Angarsk fields of Siberia. Last spring, China appeared to have locked up a Russian commitment to build a pipeline to service the China market at Daqing. Japan, however, raised the ante with new offers of financial incentives. Its bid for an alternative pipeline to Nakhodka to serve Japanese, Korean and other markets remains alive, creating another point of competitive friction. In their rivalry for leadership in promoting Asian regional cooperation, meanwhile, China has taken an early lead. Nearly two years ago, China trumped Japan by offering a Free Trade Agreement to the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while front-loading its own tariff concessions. But this backdrop of contention and competition masks emerging collaborative aspects of Sino-Japanese relations that are profoundly important. For example, trade and investment flows continue to expand rapidly. Bilateral trade topped $100 billion in 2003, as Japan's exports to China increased by more than 10 percent, fueled by semiconductors, electrical equipment and automobiles. Meanwhile, China replaced the United States as Japan's biggest source of imports, and is now one of the few non-members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries with which Japan runs a trade deficit. Similarly, direct investment by Japanese firms is increasing as they relocate production facilities to China to capitalize on lower labor costs and high-quality engineering talent. Of course, there is no assurance that today's expanded commerce will preclude eventual strategic rivalry, or succeed in erasing lingering wartime animosity. But both countries now place a premium on extending their economic interdependence. Ultimately, the historical wounds that have long divided China and Japan, and the more current diplomatic flash points that the global media inevitably trumpet, tell only part of the Sino-Japanese story. There are economic and geopolitical rivalries between China and Japan that dwarf in importance the high-profile insults to national pride that make headlines. But there are also compelling economic and political inducements toward cooperation that prevent these rivalries from developing into full-blown crises.