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The rising sophistication of offshored service work is as dramatic as the continued speed with which offshoring is growing. The work now ranges from data entry and software services to datamining and R&D. The corporate strategies for offshoring services are increasingly complex as they combine international divisions of labor with both outsourced and internal provision. Not only have offshore service provision subsidiaries expanded, but also just as importantly, large developed nation outsourcing firms are rapidly expanding their offshore delivery capabilities.

The increasing cadre of outsourcing firms from developing nations, particularly India, but also Mexico, China and other countries in Asia, are shifting the terms of competition. They are dramatically improving their capabilities and are now capable of undertaking projects that are large in scale and sophistication.

The offshoring of service activities is no longer the province of only large firms as Silicon Valley firms and a myriad of smaller professional services firms are tapping offshore work delivery opportunities. This is leading to nothing less than a global reorganization of where and how non-manufacturing work is being done.

This conference, partially supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, brings together corporate leaders and university faculty to elucidate the complexities of global service provision and discuss the trends, the strategic issues, and policy implications. The conference will: (1) Compare outsourcing locally and globally, examining differences that arise from differences in skills, institutions, regulation, technologies, process and coordination requirements, (2) Take a global view of the value-chain, examining the quantity and quality of skills in-service delivery, migration and process management, verticals, and the impact on ownership structures and complexity of work done. (3) Examine roles of cross-border participants: venture capital, product developers, etc.

Global Services magazine, a division of CMP Technology has generously offered to be our media partner.

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Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301 MC 6055
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-0121 (650) 723-6530
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SPRIE Visiting Scholar
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Bou-Wen Lin is Professor of Institute of Technology Management at National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan. He gained his doctorate in Management of Technology in 1998 from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. He is a teacher and writer in the fields of international technology transfer, new product development, real options, and strategic management of technology.

Lin is author of articles in several journals including IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Journal of Business Research, R&D Management, International Journal of Human Resources Management, and Technological Forecasting and Social Change. His current research interests include technology valuation, interfirm collaboration, knowledge management in manufacturing firms, and new venture management.

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Recently, former senior officials of South Korean President Roh's own administration have expressed serious concern about his approach to North Korea and to the alliance with the U.S. Mr. Straub will examine the prospects for the U.S.-South Korean alliance, especially in light of major differences between the two governments over how to deal with North Korea. He will also explain the origins and the nature of anti-Americanism in South Korea today, and offer his views on how the U.S. and South Korea could put their alliance on a sounder footing.

David Straub retired from the U.S. Department of State in 2006 as a Senior Foreign Service Officer after a 30-year career focused on Northeast Asian affairs. He worked over 12 years on Korean affairs, first arriving in Seoul in 1979, just months before the assassination of President Park Chung Hee. He served as head of the political section at the U.S. embassy in Seoul from 1999 to 2002 during popular protests against the U.S., and played a key working-level role in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program as the State Department's Korea country desk director from 2002 to 2004.

Straub's final assignment was as the State Department's Japan country desk director in 2004, when he was co-leader of the U.S. delegation to talks with Japan on the realignment of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of U.S. military bases in Japan. He currently works as a consultant with Northeast Asia Associates, and lectures on U.S.-Korean relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is fluent in Korean, Japanese, and German.

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David Straub former Korea Country Director Speaker the United States Department of State
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For over a decade, policymakers in Washington and other capitals have predicted the imminent collapse of North Korea's political, economic, and social systems. In the last 15 years, however, the regime has survived the loss of its patron states, the death of founding leader Kim Il Sung, massive agricultural failure, and a nuclear weapons dispute with the U.S.

In this public seminar hosted by Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and Brookings' Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS), leading experts on North Korea will discuss the most recent developments in its grand strategy, economic, politics, and foreign relations.

 

This seminar is based on the book North Korea: 2005 and Beyond, edited by Philip Yun and Gi-Wook Shin and published in January 2006 by Shorenstein APARC and the Brookings Institution Press. Several speakers in this event contributed to the volume, copies of which will be available for purchase.

Westin Grand Hotel
Washington Room, Lower Level
2350 M Street, NW Washington, D.C.

Bruce Klinger Analyst Speaker Eurasia Group
Wonhyuk Lim Consultant Speaker The World Bank
Daniel C. Sneider Associate Director for Research Speaker Stanford University
Robert Carlin Visiting Fellow Speaker Stanford University
Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall E301
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
(650) 724-8480 (650) 723-6530
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor, by Courtesy, of East Asian Languages & Cultures
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Gi-Wook Shin is the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea in the Department of Sociology, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the founding director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) since 2001, all at Stanford University. In May 2024, Shin also launched the Taiwan Program at APARC. He served as director of APARC for two decades (2005-2025). As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, democracy, migration, and international relations.

In Summer 2023, Shin launched the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which is a new research initiative committed to addressing emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges in Asia. Across four research themes– “Talent Flows and Development,” “Nationalism and Racism,” “U.S.-Asia Relations,” and “Democratic Crisis and Reform”–the lab brings scholars and students to produce interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, policy-relevant, and comparative studies and publications. Shin’s latest book, The Four Talent Giants, a comparative study of talent strategies of Japan, Australia, China, and India to be published by Stanford University Press in the summer of 2025, is an outcome of SNAPL.

Shin is also the author/editor of twenty-seven books and numerous articles. His books include The Four Talent Giants: National Strategies for Human Resource Development Across Japan, Australia, China, and India (2025)Korean Democracy in Crisis: The Threat of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization (2022); The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security (2021); Superficial Korea (2017); Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War (2016); Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea (2015); Criminality, Collaboration, and Reconciliation: Europe and Asia Confronts the Memory of World War II (2014); New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan (2014); History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories (2011); South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society (2011); One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era (2010); Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia (2007);  and Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (2006). Due to the wide popularity of his publications, many have been translated and distributed to Korean audiences. His articles have appeared in academic and policy journals, including American Journal of SociologyWorld DevelopmentComparative Studies in Society and HistoryPolitical Science QuarterlyJournal of Asian StudiesComparative EducationInternational SociologyNations and NationalismPacific AffairsAsian SurveyJournal of Democracy, and Foreign Affairs.

Shin is not only the recipient of numerous grants and fellowships, but also continues to actively raise funds for Korean/Asian studies at Stanford. He gives frequent lectures and seminars on topics ranging from Korean nationalism and politics to Korea's foreign relations, historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia, and talent strategies. He serves on councils and advisory boards in the United States and South Korea and promotes policy dialogue between the two allies. He regularly writes op-eds and gives interviews to the media in both Korean and English.

Before joining Stanford in 2001, Shin taught at the University of Iowa (1991-94) and the University of California, Los Angeles (1994-2001). After receiving his BA from Yonsei University in Korea, he was awarded his MA and PhD from the University of Washington in 1991.

Director, Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC)
Director, Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab at APARC
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Gi-Wook Shin Director Speaker Stanford University

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-6530
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Pantech Fellow
MA

Scott Snyder is a senior associate in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS, and is based in Washington, DC. He spent four years in Seoul as Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation between 2000 and 2004. Previously, he served as a program officer in the Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and as acting director of the Asia Society's Contemporary Affairs Program. He has recently edited, with L. Gordon Flake, a study titled Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (2003), and is author of Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999).

Snyder received his BA from Rice University and an MA from the Regional Studies East Asia Program at Harvard University. He was the recipient of an Abe Fellowship, administered by the Social Sciences Research Council, in 1998-99, and was a Thomas G. Watson Fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea in 1987-88.

Scott Snyder Senior Associate Speaker The Asia Foundation

APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 724-9747 (650) 723-6530
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Pantech Visiting Scholar
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Philip W. Yun is currently vice president for Resource Development at The Asia Foundation, based in San Francisco. Prior to joining The Asia Foundation, Yun was a Pantech Scholar in Korean Studies at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

At Stanford, his research focused on the economic and political future of Northeast Asia. From 2001 to 2004, Yun was vice president and assistant to the chairman of H&Q Asia Pacific, a premier U.S. private equity firm investing in Asia. From 1994 to 2001, Yun served as an official at the United States Department of State, serving as a senior advisor to two Assistant Secretaries of State, as a deputy to the head U.S. delegate to the four-party Korea peace talks and as a senior policy advisor to the U.S. Coordinator for North Korea Policy.

Prior to government service, Yun practiced law at the firms of Pillsbury Madison & Sutro in San Francisco and Garvey Schubert & Barer in Seattle, and was a foreign legal consultant in Seoul, Korea. Yun attended Brown University and the Columbia School of Law. He graduated with an A.B. in mathematical economics (magna cum laude and phi beta kappa) and was a Fulbright Scholar to Korea. He is on the board of directors of the Ploughshares Fund and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on International Policy.

Philip Yun Vice President for Resources Development Speaker The Asia Foundation
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Heather Ahn
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As the new academic year draws near, visiting scholars and fellows are arriving to prepare for their time at Stanford. This year, KSP will see a number of visiting scholars and fellows arriving to spend a year or two to do their research in their areas of specialty within Korean Studies.

KSP welcomes two new fellows in the Pantech Fellowship for mid-career professionals. Donald MacIntyre and Xiyu Yang will join the program succeeding Dan Sneider and Scott Snyder. Donald has been working as a Bureau Chief in Seoul for Time Inc. since 1998. Donald's research will focus on the issues between Japan and Korea, focusing Japan's actions during the 35 years of colonial rule of Korea. Xiyu Yang was Director of the Office for Korean Peninsula Issues in the Chinese Foreign Ministry before coming to Stanford. His research will focus on prospects for security cooperation in the Northeast Asian region.

KSP also welcomes Myung-Koo Kang as a new postdoctoral fellow, joining Chiho Sawada who has been postodoctoral fellow at KSP since 2003. Myung-Koo holds a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley with a major in political science. His research interests include comparative political economy in East Asia.

This year, KSP especially welcomes two POSCO NGO fellows, Doo-Hyon Choi, Korean Federation for Environmental Movements, and Mi-Sun Kim, Migrant Workers Health Association in Korea, who were selected as Stanford's inaugural POSCO NGO Fellows. The POSCO NGO Fellowship was established last year and sees ten POSCO NGO Fellows spending a year doing research projects across five North American universities. Doo-Hyon's research will focus on the context of social capital formation and expansion in American society and Mi-Sun's research will explore advocacy networks for immigrant communities in the Bay Area.

In addition to the scholars and fellows named above, the Korean Studies Program will welcome a number of visiting scholars from different fields who will also actively participate in KSP seminars and programs. This year's incoming visiting scholars include Ki-Hyung Lee, Chairman and CEO of Interpark Corp; Doo-yeong Choi, Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs; Sei-Hoon Won, Deputy Mayor of Seoul City; Byung Woo Min, Deputy Director of Munhwa Broadcasting Corp.; and HakSek Kim, Prosecutor, Seoul Central Public Prosecutors' Office.

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The Korean Studies Program has hosted monthly roundtable seminars with the visiting scholars since 2005. This seminar has provided opportunities to hear the opinions of and learn about the experiences of practitioners and experts in the field. The speakers are visiting scholars of the Korean Studies Program at Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

The seminar is informal and conducted in Korean. It offers unique opportunities to hear unknown stories from the field. This seminar also provides an opportunities for visiting scholars and students to mingle together and share ideas and experiences. After the seminars, the participants often extend their discussions into dinner.

Past speakers have included Won Soon Park, Director of Beautiful Foundation; Hyung-o Kim, Member of the Korean National Assembly; Jae-seung Park, Former President of Korean Bar Association; and, most recently, Tae Hee Lee, Senior Editor of Munhwa Daily gave a talk entitled "Korean Media and Industrial Powers" on Thursday, August 3rd.

The roundtable is open to students and affiliates of the Stanford University who are interested in current issues and trends in Korean society.

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Koreans have developed a sense of nation based on shared blood and ancestry. The Korean nation was "racialized" through a belief in a common prehistoric origin, producing an intense sense of collective oneness. Ethnicity is generally regarded as a cultural phenomenon based on a common language and history, and race understood as a collectivity defined by innate and immutable phenotypic and genotypic characteristics.

But historically, Koreans have not differentiated between the two. Instead, race served as a marker that strengthened ethnic identity, which in turn was instrumental in defining the nation. Koreans thus believe that they all belong to a "unitary nation" (danil minjok), one that is ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive.

Despite 1,000 years of political, linguistic, and geographic continuity - and contrary to popular belief - this sense of ethnic homogeneity took root only in the early 20th century.

Faced with imperialist encroachments, Koreans developed the notion of a unitary nation to show its autonomy and uniqueness. They stressed the ethnic base, rather than civic elements, in defining the Korean nation.

Shin Chae-ho, a leading nationalist, for instance, presented Korean history as one of the "ethnic nation" (minjoksa) and traced it to the mythical figure Dangun. According to him, the Korean people were descendants of Dangun Joseon, who merged with Buyo of Manchuria to form the Goguryeo people. This original blend, Shin contended, remained the ethnic or racial core of the Korean nation, a nation preserved through defense and warfare against outside forces. The nation was defined as "an organic body formed out of the spirit of a people ... descended through a single pure bloodline" that would last even after losing political sovereignty.

The need to assert the distinctiveness and purity of the Korean nation grew even more important under colonial rule, especially as Japan attempted to assimilate Koreans into their empire as "imperial subjects." The Japanese assimilation policy was based on colonial racism, which claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of common origin but the former always subordinate.

The theory was used to justify colonialist policies to replace Korean cultural traditions with Japanese ones in order to supposedly get rid of all distinctions and achieve equality between Koreans and inlanders. Colonial assimilation policy included changing Korean names into Japanese, exclusive use of Japanese language, school instruction in the Japanese ethical system, and Shinto worship.

Koreans resisted by asserting their unique and great national heritage. Yi Kwang-su, a key figure during colonial rule, claimed that "hyeoltong" (bloodline), "seonggyeok" (personality), and "munhwa" (culture) are three fundamental elements of a nation and that "Koreans are without a doubt a unitary nation (danil han minjok) in blood and culture." Such a view was widely accepted among Koreans: To impugn the natural and unique character of the Korean ethnic nation during colonial rule would have been tantamount to betraying Koreanness in the face of the imperial challenge of an alien ethnic nation. Japanese rule did not erase Koreans' national consciousness but rather reinforced their claim to a truly distinct and homogeneous ethnic identity.

After independence in 1945, and despite peninsular division into North and South, the unity of the Korean ethnic nation or race was largely taken for granted. Neither side disputed the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation, spanning thousands of years, based on a single bloodline of the great Han race. Instead, both sides contested for the sole representation of the ethnically homogeneous Korean nation. Even today, Koreans maintain a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity based on shared blood and ancestry, and nationalism continues to function as a key resource in Korean politics and foreign relations.

Ethnic national identity has been a crucial source of pride and inspiration for people during the turbulent years of Korea's transition to modernity that involved colonialism, territorial division, war, and authoritarian politics. It has also enhanced collective consciousness and internal solidarity against external threats and has served Korea's modernization project as an effective resource.

At the same time, such a blood-based ethnic national identity became a totalitarian force in politics, culture, and society. It came to override other competing identities and led to the poverty of modern thought, including liberalism, conservatism, and radicalism. It has hindered cultural and social diversity and tolerance in Korean society.

Ethnic nationalism will remain an important organizing principle of Korean society. We cannot ignore ethnic national identity or treat it as a mere myth or fantasy. But neither can we remain simply content with its current role.

Instead, it should be recognized that ethnic nationalism has become a considerable force in Korean society and politics and that it can be dangerous and oppressive when fused with racism and other essentialist ideologies. Koreans must thus strive to find ways to use ethnic nationalism constructively and mitigate its potential harmful effects.

In particular, Koreans must seriously consider the establishment of a democratic

institution that can contain the repressive, essentialist elements of nationalism.

The principle of bloodline or "jus sanguinis" still defines the notion of Korean nationhood and citizenship, which are often inseparable in the mind of Koreans. In its formative years Koreans developed the ethnic base of nation without a corresponding

attention to the political notion of citizenship.

After colonial rule, neither state paid adequate attention or made any serious effort to develop a more inclusive notion of citizenship. Social institutions that can address issues of discrimination against ethnic non-Koreans (for example, ethnic Chinese known as "hwagyo" in Korea) have been largely overlooked. The Korean nationality law is still based on jus sanguinis and legitimizes, consciously or unconsciously, ethnic discrimination against foreign migrant workers.

In this context, most Koreans have stronger attachment to "ethnic Koreans living in foreign countries" than to "ethnic non-Koreans living in Korea." It is also much easier for a Korean-American who supposedly has "Korean blood" to "recover" Korean citizenship than for an Indonesian migrant worker living in Korea to obtain Korean citizenship. This is true even if the Indonesian worker might be more culturally and linguistically Korean than a Korean-American.

Korea needs to institutionalize a legal system that mitigates unfair practices and discrimination against those who do not supposedly share the Korean blood. Koreans need an institutional framework to promote a democratic national identity that would allow for more diversity and tolerance among the populace, rather than simply appeal to an ethnic consciousness that tends to encourage false uniformity and enforce conformity to it.

They should envision a society in which they can live together, not simply as fellow ethnic Koreans but as equal citizens of a democratic polity. It should be an integral part of democratic consolidation processes that Korea is currently undergoing. Otherwise, it would be hard to expect Korea to become "Asia's hub," which will require the accommodation of cultural and ethnic diversity and flexibility.

Discussion of unification is premature and can even be considered dangerous if unification occurs without such change. As the German unification experience shows, a

shared ethnic identity alone will not be able to prevent North Koreans from becoming "second-class citizens" in a unified Korea. Even worse, because of higher expectations resulting from a shared sense of ethnic unity, a gap between identity (ethnic homogeneity) and practice (second-class citizens) will add more confusion and tension to the unification process.

Thus, it will be a major challenge for Koreans to develop democratic institutions that can treat people living in Korea as equal citizens of a democratic polity. This task will be all the more important and urgent as Korea becomes more democratic, globalizes, and also prepares for national unification.

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Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Postdoctoral Fellow
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Myung-Koo Kang holds Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley (major in political science, specialty: comparative political economy, public administration, and East Asia) and M.A and B.A. from the Seoul National University (major in international relations). He was brought up in a rural area of South Korea, observing the massive social mobilization during the 1970s, and he served in the DMZ for three years before he came to the U.S. He conducted research at the Policy Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance, Japan, for a year as a visiting scholar about Japanese financial reforms.

Dr. Kang is currently conducting research on various projects: (1) preparing the dissertation for publication about the financial reforms in Japan and South Korea, and effects of financial restructuring on corporate financing and governance; (2) research on the social and historical origin of Korean power elite, and as its extension, leading research project on comparative studies on power elite in Japan, South Korea, and China; (3) the pattern of uneven regional integration in East Asia and its prospects; (4) research on the political and economic difficulties faced by North Korean refugees living in South Korea.

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North Korea's response to the United Nations resolution demanding that it suspend its ballistic missile program and resume a moratorium on launches was typically belligerent. But like the multiple launch of seven missiles earlier this month, the North Korean vow to continue to fire off its missiles should not be dismissed as mere political theater.

The missile tests were neither a gesture of defiance nor a desperate bid for negotiations. Nor can they be dismissed as the impulsive act of an irrational leader. It was, as Pyongyang itself so succinctly put it, a "military exercise."

The launches are only the latest evidence of a decadeslong effort by Pyongyang to redress the military balance in its favor. For North Korea, missiles are an attempt to compensate for weakness. The communist state has a large but technologically backward army, lacking the air power to compete with the United States and its South Korean ally. Rockets give it the firepower to back an assault on the South and to hold U.S. forces in Japan, the rear base for Korea, at bay.

The late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung set this goal as far back as 1965 when he established an academy to develop missiles and other modern weaponry.

"If war breaks out, the U.S. and Japan will also be involved," he said. "In order to prevent their involvement, we have to be able to produce rockets which fly as far as Japan."

I encountered one crucial tentacle of Kim's program some 14 years ago, in late October of 1992.

A group of 64 Russian rocket scientists, accompanied by their wives and children, were stopped just as they were about to board a flight to North Korea. The scientists were employees of a super-secret facility in the Urals, the V.P. Makeyev Design Bureau, responsible for the development of the Soviet Union's submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

As the bureau chief for the Christian Science Monitor, I pieced the story together later from Russian press accounts and interviews with the scientists and others. A middleman with apparent official backing had offered the bureau, starving for orders and left adrift by the sudden end of the Cold War, work in North Korea.

Scientists who were making the equivalent of $15 a month jumped at offers of up to $4,000 a month to help a former Soviet ally. In the spring, a group of 10 scientists had gone for an initial foray. The Koreans, one of the scientists told me, initially never directly asked about nuclear warheads or missile designs. They claimed only to be interested in rocket science.

The Russians came home that fall and signed up dozens of their comrades as recruits. But the project was not officially sanctioned, and the KGB held them outside of Moscow for two months while the broker tried to re-negotiate their departure. Russian officials later described the North Koreans' aim, without mentioning them by name, as an attempt to build "combat missile complexes that could carry nuclear weapons."

North Korea began with copies of Soviet short-range Scud missiles and moved on to medium-range "Nodong" missiles, but they lacked the range and accuracy to meet Kim's target. A decade after the airport incident, in 2003, credible reports emerged that the North Koreans were deploying a new, far more accurate missile based on the Soviet SS-N-6, a submarine-launched rocket developed by Makeyev in the 1960s. The Nodong-2, as some labeled it, could reach all U.S. bases in Japan and possibly even to Guam.

In the 1990s, the North Koreans developed a long-range missile, potentially reaching U.S. territory, to lend credence to claims they could deter a pre-emptive strike on their nuclear or missile facilities. Some experts believe the Nodong-2 also functions as the second stage of this missile. American intelligence officials believe an otherwise inexplicable leap in missile technology was thanks to the help of Russian scientists.

Still the self-imposed missile test moratorium that Pyongyang agreed to in 1999 made it difficult to move ahead. Late last year, according to a recent Wall Street Journal story, the North Koreans delivered a dozen Nodong-2 missiles to Iran, a close collaborator on missiles since the 1980s. Unconfirmed reports from Germany say Iran tested the missile in January.

The Nodong-2 may have been tested this month, one of the six short- and medium-range missiles set off in a wave or as a stage of the long-range missile. Data from the launch is not yet conclusive, according to U.S. and South Korean officials. Despite the failure of the long-range attempt, it may be more significant that Pyongyang carried out the first successful launch of a Nodong since 1993 and a nighttime barrage of Scuds and Nodongs.

The display of diplomatic unity at the United Nations may give Pyongyang pause. But the relentless nature of North Korea's pursuit of its ballistic missile strength suggests that this is not a bargaining chip that will be readily traded away.

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A Chinese delegation is visiting Pyongyang to discuss the crisis set off by Kim Jong Il's missile launches. Whether it will exert any real pressure remains unclear. Pantech scholar Scott Snyder comments on the debate.

BEIJING - A message from President Bush to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il will be delivered Monday in Pyongyang -- via two Chinese officials. Beijing now meets quarterly with Mr. Kim, the most contact the unpredictable North has with any outside party. Whether Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei and Vice Premier Hui Liangyu will surprise Kim Jong Il and exert real pressure is unclear.

With an international diplomatic effort under way a week after North Korea tested seven missiles, China has proposed informal six-party talks as a way to move the process along.

That is less than the US hoped for from China. But since China insists that it will veto any UN sanctions against the North, the US will accept such talks, according to envoy Christopher Hill.

All told, Beijing would appear key to shaping how the world deals with the defiant Kim. Yet from the moment Kim launched his missiles, China has denied it has clout; it politely insists that the US has the central role.

Since 2003, China has embarked on a historic effort to prop up and aid North Korea -- a state it had the frostiest relations with for more a decade. Now, $2 billion in aid gives Beijing unprecedented access -- something China is reluctant to squander, to "mix aid and diplomacy," as a Chinese scholar here puts it.

"China's influence on North Korea is more than it is willing to admit, but far less than outsiders tend to believe," says a recent report by the Seoul branch of the International Crisis Group.

To outsiders, it appears that a rising China -- running a lifeline of energy and food to its poor comrade - ought to have clout in Korea, as it holds more carrots and sticks than anyone. It seems axiomatic that Beijing can simply apply ancient Chinese wisdom and modern Chinese might to stop Kim's nuclear ambition. Both states are communist, wear green and red uniforms, fought the US together, and share borders and history. China is the only country with easy access, as well as trade and tourism, to the North.

"China does have leverage, but it is afraid it may overplay its hand," says Joseph Cheng, head of the political science department at City University in Hong Kong.

Since Kim Jong Il's July 4 missile shots, voices from Sandy Berger, President Clinton's security adviser, to John Bolton, US ambassador to the UN, have argued that "China is the key" to dealing with North Korean belligerence. It has become nearly a mantra in Washington. Twelve months ago, it was an article of faith in senior White House circles, misplaced or not, that China would deliver a deal with Kim to dismantle his nuclear program. Yet this did not happen.

Instead, with the US preoccupied in Iraq, China embarked on a quiet policy of self-interest: to strengthen North Korea. That policy helps to maintain the North as a "buffer state" between China and South Korea.

China does not want the North to collapse, and for US troops to fill the vacuum and appear on its northeast border. China has hosted Kim, and moved relations away from a bad patch in the 1990s, during the North's epic famine, when China asked for cash payments for food instead of barter.

In the past two years, Chinese officials have told Kim that he can reform his state along socialist lines just as China did. China has indicated it will help with economic aid, while he retains complete political control. To now castigate Kim could wreck that formula, sources say.

In the larger sense, Kim's launch of missiles, most of which could hit long-time nemesis Japan or US bases in East Asia, puts China in the position of choosing between its North Korean comrade and an evolving consensus in the international community. So far, China has tried to please both sides.

"I'm concerned that China isn't recognizing how serious this issue is," says Zhang Liangui, head of foreign studies at the Central Party School in Beijing, in a rare dissent. "China is taking a rigid position. Yet we have long said that if China wants to be viewed as a responsible superpower, it must not be isolated in the international community."

Adding to Beijing's problems is an unresolved ideological struggle in China -- where "neo-orthodox" hard-liners who maintain contact with North Korea want China to support its revolutionary posture. There is also genuine puzzlement in Beijing over how to deal with Kim, whose founder-father, Kim Il Sung, reputedly warned him many times that China would attempt to take over his regime one day.

"I hear often that China is the key, which involves a set of policy steps Beijing can take that will bring about the outcome the allies want," says Russell Leigh Moses of People's University. "But I have yet to see anyone show how if China does X, Pyongyang will do Y."

The White House seems to have abandoned its 2003 optimism that China will harness Kim. China may agree that a nuclear peninsula and a regime that test-fires rockets is not desirable. But it isn't clear on how to force Kim to open his highly controlled state and allow international inspectors to flood in, witness his system of gulags, and bring in potentially subversive material -- all to dismantle a nuclear program he's cherished for decades. The White House seems to understand this.

Scott Snyder of Stanford University argues the US is using the same strategy that it used with China in closing down Kim's accounts in Macau. China was forced to choose between the international regulatory authority, or North Korean money-laundering behavior.

Sunday, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns argued on FOX News Sunday that "It's time for China to exert its influence that it does have on North Korea." Also on Sunday programs, US and Japanese officials claimed they might have the votes to support a Japan-backed resolution for sanctions against the North.

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