News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Little more than a decade ago, Rowen's answer to the question posed by this essay's title was the year 2015. His assessment, published in the Fall 1996 issue of the National Interest, began by observing that all countries (leaving aside states that make nearly all their money from oil exports) which had attained a Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) of at least US$8,000 per year (as measured by the Purchasing-Power Parity or PPP standard for the year 1995) stood no worse than Partly Free in the ratings of political rights and civil liberties published annually by Freedom House (FH).

As China's economy was growing at a rate that promised to carry it to a level near or beyond that GDPpc benchmark by 2015, Rowen reasoned that this, the world's largest country, was a good bet to move into the Partly Free category as well. Since then, China has remained deep in Not Free territory even though its civil-liberties score has improved a bit -- from an absolutely abysmal 7 to a still-sorry 6 on the 7-point FH scale -- while its political-rights score has remained stuck at the worst level. Yet today, surveying matters from a point slightly more than midway between 1996 and 2015, Rowen stands by his main conclusion: China will in the short term continue to warrant a Not Free classification, but by 2015 it should edge into the Partly Free category. Indeed, Rowen goes further and predicts that, should China's economy and the educational attainments of its population continue to grow as they have in recent years, the more than one-sixth of the world's people who live in China will by 2025 be citizens of a country correctly classed as belonging to the Free nations of the earth.

Hero Image
Journ Demo GIF
All News button
1
Authors
Gi-Wook Shin
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

The year 2007 marks the 20th anniversary of South Korea's June 10 civil uprising of 1987, and the 10th year since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. To commemorate these occasions, the Korea Herald published a series of contributions from prominent foreign scholars to analyze the significant changes that Korea has undergone during the past two decades. Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin wrote the op-ed below, on the problems of Korean nationalism.

When the Virginia Tech massacre shook American society, Koreans and Korean-Americans alike nervously responded with a deep sense of collective guilt. Many first-generation immigrants took it upon themselves to apologize for the actions of gunman Cho Seung-hui on the grounds that they all share the same Korean ethnicity (meaning blood).

South Korea's ambassador to Washington, Lee Tae-shik, went so far as to say that the Korean- American community needed to "repent," suggesting a 32-day fast, one day for each victim, to prove that Koreans were a "worthwhile ethnic minority in America." The South Korean government offered to send an official delegation to the funerals of the victims.

This episode may seem bizarre or perplexing to non-Koreans since most ethnicities (including Americans) don't have that strong sense of collective responsibility. Yet this incident well illustrates Korea's psyche, i.e., deeply rooted ethnic national identity, which remains strong today.

Korea has been democratizing and globalizing for the last two decades but neither force has weakened the power of nationalism. On the contrary, it has only become stronger.

How can we explain this phenomenon of persistent ethnic nationalism in a country at the forefront of globalization? Where does such a tradition of collectivistic, ethnic identity come from? What are the positive and negative aspects of ethnic nationalism in Korea? How can Korea, as it is becoming a multiethnic society, deal with it in a globalizing world?

Origins and History

Historically Koreans have developed a sense of nation based on shared blood and ancestry. The Korean nation was "ethnicized" or "racialized" through a belief in a common prehistoric origin, producing an intense sense of collective oneness.

Ethnicity is generally regarded as a cultural phenomenon based on a common language and history, and race understood as a collectivity defined by innate and immutable phenotypic and genotypic characteristics. However, Koreans have not differentiated between the two. Instead, race served as a marker that strengthened ethnic identity, which in turn was instrumental in defining the notion of nation. Koreans are said to believe that they all belong to a "unitary nation" ("tanil minjok"), one that is ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive from its neighbors.

This sense of ethnic homogeneity, contrary to the popular "prehistoric origin" belief, took root in the early 20th century. Faced with imperialist encroachments, from both the East (Japan) and West, Koreans developed the notion of a unitary nation to show its autonomy and uniqueness. For Korea, which had a long history of political, linguistic, and geographic continuity, the internal issues of political integration or geographic demarcation were less important than the threat of imperialism. Enhancement of collective consciousness and internal solidarity among Koreans against the external threat was more urgent. As a result, the ethnic base or racial genealogy of the Korean nation was emphasized.

Sin Chae-ho, a leading nationalist of the time, for instance, presented Korean history as one of the "ethnic nation" ("minjoksa") and traced it to the mythical figure Tangun. According to him, the Korean people were descendants of Tangun Chosun, who merged with the Puy of Manchuria to form the Kogury people. This original blend, Sin contended, remained the ethnic or racial core ("chujok") of the Korean nation, a nation preserved through defense and warfare against outside forces. The nation was defined as "an organic body formed out of the spirit of a people descended through a single pure bloodline" that would last even after losing political sovereignty.

The need to assert the distinctiveness and purity of the Korean nation grew more important under colonial rule, especially as Japan attempted to assimilate Koreans into its empire as "imperial subjects." The assimilation policy was based on colonial racism, which claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of common origin but the former always subordinate.

The theory was used to justify colonialist policies to replace Korean cultural traditions with Japanese ones in order to supposedly get rid of all distinctions and achieve equality between the two nations. Yet colonial assimilation policy meant changing Korean names into Japanese, exclusive use of Japanese language, school instruction in the Japanese ethical system, and Shinto worship. Koreans resented and resisted the policy by asserting their unique and great national heritage. Yi Kwang-su, a leading figure at the time, claimed that bloodline, personality, and culture are three fundamental elements defining a nation and that "Koreans are without a doubt a unitary nation ("tanil han minjok") in blood and culture." Such a view was widely accepted among Koreans: to impugn the natural and unique character of the Korean ethnic nation during colonial rule would have been tantamount to betraying Koreanness in the face of the imperial challenge of an alien ethnic nation. Ironically, Japanese rule reinforced Koreans' claim to a truly distinct and homogeneous ethnic identity.

After independence in 1945, and despite peninsular division into North and South, the unity of the Korean ethnic nation or race was largely taken for granted. Neither side disputed the ethnic base of the Korean nation, spanning thousands of years, based on a single bloodline of the great Han race. Instead, both sides contested for the sole representation of the ethnically homogeneous Korean nation.

Even today, Koreans maintain a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity based on shared blood and ancestry, and nationalism continues to shape Korean politics and foreign relations. Many ethnic Koreans overseas share this sense of ethnic homogeneity, which can explain the response by the Korean American community to the Virginia Tech massacre.

Prize and Price

Ethnic nationalism has been a crucial source of pride and inspiration for the Korean people during the turbulent years of their nation's transition to modernity that involved colonialism, territorial division, war, and dictatorship. It has enhanced collective consciousness and solidarity against external threats and has served Korea's modernization well. Nationalism is also the underlying principle of guiding the current globalization process in the South.

In the North, ethnic national consciousness offered the grounds for the formation of a belief that Koreans are a chosen people, a position that became the epistemological basis for the juche ideology and the recent "theory of the Korean nation as number one." Ethnic nationalism could also play an integrative role in a unification process, as this self-ascribed identity of homogeneity can serve as the basis for the initial impetus toward unification, if not as the stable foundation of a unified Korea.

At the same time, such a blood-based ethnic national identity became a totalitarian force in politics, culture, and society. Individuals were considered only part of an abstract whole, and citizens were asked to sacrifice individual freedom and civil rights for the collectivity.

Nation was also used as a trump card to override other competing identities as well as to justify violations of human and civic rights in both Koreas in the name of the "nation." The power of nationalism has thus hindered cultural and social diversity and tolerance in Korean society.

The dominance of collectivistic, ethnic nationalism constrained space for liberalism in the public sphere. In its formative years of nation building, nationalism developed in opposition to liberalism and these two ideologies were mistakenly positioned against each other. This historical legacy led to the poverty of modern thought in Korea, including liberalism, conservatism, and radicalism. A lack of a liberal base, for instance, made Korean conservatism highly vulnerable to manipulation by authoritarian leaders.

Ironically, the very belief in ethnic unity has also produced tension and conflict between the two Koreas over the last half-century. The prevailing sense of unity in the face of territorial partition has provoked contention over who truly represents the Korean ethnic nation versus who is at fault for undermining that Korean unity. This battle for true national representation helps to explain highly charged inter-Korea conflict, including the Korean War that killed millions of fellows in the name of "national liberation."

Challenges and Future Tasks

Ethnic nationalism will remain an important organizing principle of Korean society. Neither democratization nor globalization has been able to uproot the power of nationalism. It would thus be wrong and dangerous to ignore or underestimate its power, treating it as a mere myth or something to pass away in due course. At the same time, we can't remain simply content with its current role, either.

Instead, it should be recognized that ethnic nationalism has become a dominant force in Korean society and politics and that it can be oppressive and dangerous when fused with racism and other essentialist ideologies. Koreans must strive to find ways to mitigate its potential harmful effects and use it in constructive manner. In particular, Koreans must promote cultural diversity and tolerance, and establish democratic institutions that can contain the repressive, essentialist elements of ethnic nationalism.

This important task is urgent because Korea, on the contrary to popular perception, is becoming a multiethnic society. Today about a half-million migrant labor workers, with the majority coming from China and Southeast Asia, live in the South. Only a decade ago, the number was less than one hundred thousand. Similarly more than one out of 10 marriages is "international," meaning that the spouse is nonethnic Korean (reaching 13.6 percent in 2005). Considering that the figure was only 1.7 percent in 1994, Korea is fast becoming a multiethnic society.

Despite new realities, however, perception and institutions are slow to change. Most Koreans still have stronger attachment to "ethnic Koreans living in foreign countries" than to "ethnic non-Koreans living in Korea." It is also much easier for a Korean-American who to "recover" Korean citizenship than for an Indonesian migrant worker living in Korea to obtain Korean citizenship. This is true even if the Indonesian worker might be more culturally and linguistically Korean than a Korean-American.

The principle of "bloodline" or jus sanguinis still defines the notions of Korean nationhood and citizenship, which are often inseparable in the minds of Koreans. In its formative years, Koreans stressed the ethnic base of nation without a corresponding attention to its civic dimension, i.e. citizenship. After colonial rule, neither state (North or South) paid adequate attention or made serious effort to cultivate a more inclusive notion of citizenship.

Social institutions that can address issues of discrimination against ethnic non-Koreans (e.g., ethnic Chinese known as "hwagyo") have been overlooked and underdeveloped. The Korean nationality law based on jus sanguinis legitimizes consciously or unconsciously discrimination against foreign migrant workers by explicitly favoring ethnic Koreans.

Korea needs to institutionalize a legal system that mitigates unfair practices and discrimination against those who do not supposedly share the Korean blood. Koreans need an institutional framework to promote a national identity that would allow recognition of ethnic diversity and cultural tolerance among the populace, rather than appeal to an ethnic consciousness that tends to encourage a false uniformity and then enforcing conformity to it.

They should envision a society in which they can live together, not simply as fellow ethnic Koreans but as equal citizens of a democratic polity. In fact, it is only a matter of time before Koreans will face serious challenges living in a multiethnic society (e.g., children of ethnically mixed couples, civic rights of migrant labor workers) that it is unprepared to resolve. Preparing for such challenges through public education and legal institutions won't be an easy task and should be an integral part of democratic consolidation processes that are currently under way.

Discussion of unification is premature and problematic if unification occurs without such adjustments. As the German unification experience shows, a shared ethnic identity alone will not be able to prevent North Koreans from becoming "second-class citizens" in a unified Korea. Even worse, because of higher expectations resulting from a shared sense of ethnic unity, a gap between identity (ethnic homogeneity) and practice (second-class citizens) will add more confusion and tension to the unification process.

All said, Koreans should strive to promote ethnic diversity and cultural tolerance, and develop proper legal institution so that all can live together in a multiethnic or unified Korea as equal citizens of a democratic polity. This task will be all the more important and urgent as Korea consolidates democracy, globalizes its economy, and prepares for national unification.

Hero Image
1272 small Shin KH 071607 image
All News button
1
Paragraphs

Little more than a decade ago, Rowen's answer to the question posed by this essay's title was the year 2015. His assessment, published in the Fall 1996 issue of the National Interest, began by observing that all countries (leaving aside states that make nearly all their money from oil exports) which had attained a Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) of at least US$8,000 per year (as measured by the Purchasing-Power Parity or PPP standard for the year 1995) stood no worse than Partly Free in the ratings of political rights and civil liberties published annually by Freedom House (FH).

As China's economy was growing at a rate that promised to carry it to a level near or beyond that GDPpc benchmark by 2015, Rowen reasoned that this, the world's largest country, was a good bet to move into the Partly Free category as well. Since then, China has remained deep in Not Free territory even though its civil-liberties score has improved a bit -- from an absolutely abysmal 7 to a still-sorry 6 on the 7-point FH scale -- while its political-rights score has remained stuck at the worst level. Yet today, surveying matters from a point slightly more than midway between 1996 and 2015, Rowen stands by his main conclusion: China will in the short term continue to warrant a Not Free classification, but by 2015 it should edge into the Partly Free category. Indeed, Rowen goes further and predicts that, should China's economy and the educational attainments of its population continue to grow as they have in recent years, the more than one-sixth of the world's people who live in China will by 2025 be citizens of a country correctly classed as belonging to the Free nations of the earth.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Journal of Democracy
Authors
Henry S. Rowen
Paragraphs

For the past five years, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) has employed an unconventional monetary easing policy, called quantitative monetary easing. Under a zero interest rate regime, the BOJ shifted its tool for monetary easing from interest rates to quantity of money, thus providing the money market with much more money than it needs. It is difficult to find evidence that this monetary easing has contributed to the current economic recovery. What we can show is that this quantitative easing diluted the functions of interest rates in the money market, with the following consequences: quantitative easing hid the risks of the huge amount of fiscal debt and supported troubled commercial banks. Hence it helped to prevent both fiscal and financial crisis.

How did such a policy come about? It is misleading to suppose that the BOJ, which gained legislative independence in 1998, decides its policy on its own, or, conversely, to assume the government controls the BOJ completely. The conflict between the BOJ and the government should be carefully examined. In that sense, these two consequences have different stories. Preventing fiscal crisis had been an implicit agenda from the beginning of the conflict between the BOJ and the government. The BOJ tried to reject this implicit agenda at first, but finally accepted it to compensate for its own political failure in raising interest rates. The process shows that this implicit agenda has gradually become explicit. By contrast, supporting troubled banks was an unexpected consequence, which in the end helped the BOJ to defend its policy.

The situation has become complex amid the current economic recovery. The need to restore the function of interest rates has been rising. The need to support troubled banks has decreased, but supporting the fiscal debt still remains critical issue, since it has grown to a dangerous amount. Monetary policymakers therefore face a contradiction. Strategies for separating monetary policy from the management of government bonds, while avoiding fiscal crisis, are needed.

About the Author: Tetsufumi Arita has been a reporter for the Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, since 1990. He has extensive experience in reporting business and political news. Arita was a visiting fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center between 2004 and 2005.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Shorenstein APARC Corporate Affiliates Program
Authors
Tetsufumi Arita
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

On June 2, 2007 at Stanford University, the Southeast Asia Service Leadership Network (SEALNet) hosted a well-attended dinner to celebrate its third year of activity and its plans for social service projects in five Southeast Asian countries in Summer 2007.

SEALNet faculty adviser Donald K. Emmerson kicked off the event by congratulating the students on their accomplishments, talents, and enthusiasm. Leadership coach and author Leng Lim, whose Southeast Asia Leadership Initiative fostered the creation of SEALNet in 2004, gave an inspirational talk to the students who would soon leave for Southeast Asia to implement the network's projects. Other speakers included SEALNet Co-Director and Stanford graduating senior Viet Huynh (Stanford 2007) who was thanked for his commitment and service to the organization since its founding.

SEALNet's agenda for 2007 represents a dramatic expansion from the network's first project in Summer 2005. In that year the students delivered a dozen computers to a youth organization in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, and helped local youths learn how to use them. In Summer 2007 the following projects are planned:

Project Cambodia (Phnom Penh, 19 June - 1 July) empowers young Cambodian performing artists and selected high school students to spread awareness of Khmer traditional performing arts among Cambodian youths.

Project Indonesia (Sekayu, South Sumatra, 26 August - 8 September) promotes earthquake and sanitation awareness among members of a vulnerable rural community.

Project Philippines (Cebu, 18 - 29 June) disseminates attractive media messages to raise local and national awareness of the risk of gastrointestinal illness from worms.

Project Thailand (Krabi, 27 August - 7 September) tackles environmental problems and raises ecological awareness among inhabitants of a tsunami-affected area.

Project Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh City, 19 - 30 June) develops a sustainable vocational English program for street children that can help them get jobs in tourism and other service industries.

SEALNet's goals include:

  • Creating a cross-cultural network linking students and professionals interested in social and development issues in Southeast Asia;
  • Empowering students for positive social change through service leadership projects and by inspiring other students to become leaders in their own communities.
  • Working through community service leadership to help make Southeast Asia more united internally and more engaged internationally.
Hero Image
logo
All News button
1

Monday, June 11, 2007

1:30 - 3:30 Panel 1: Election Campaigning in Japan

"Surrogate Representation: Forging New and Broader Constituencies in Japanese Politics"

Sherry Martin, Cornell University

"Running for National Office in Japan: The Institutional and Cultural Constraints Faced by Women Candidates"

Alisa Gaunder, Southwestern University

"How Large are Koizumi's Coattails? Party Leader Visits in the 2005 Japanese Election"

Kenneth McElwain, Stanford University

Discussant: Laurie Freeman, University of California - Santa Barbara

3:45 - 5:30 Panel 2: The Organization and Behavior of Political Parties

"Where Have All the Zoku Gone? LDP DM Policy Specialization and Expertise" (written with Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen)

Ben Nyblade, University of British Columbia

"When Preferences are Not Behavior: Explaining Party Switch among Japanese Legislators in the 1990s"

Jun Saito, Wesleyan University

Discussant: Len Schoppa, University of Virginia

Tuesday, June 12, 2007

9:30 - 11:30 Panel 3: Electoral Systems and Voter Behavior

"The Political Economy of the Japanese Gender Gap"

Barry Burden, University of Wisconsin - Madison

"Has the Electoral System Reform Made Japanese Elections Party-Centered?"

Ko Maeda, University of North Texas

"The Incumbent Personal Vote in Japanese Politics"

Shigeo Hirano, Columbia University

Discussant: Mike Thies, University of California - Los Angeles

1:00 - 3:00 Panel 4: New Approaches to Electoral Analysis

"Stealing Elections on Election Night: A Comparison of Statistical Evidence from Japan, Canada, and the United States"

Ray Christensen, Brigham Young University

"Measuring Competitiveness in Multi-Member Districts"

Steven Reed, Chuo University and Kay Shimizu, Stanford University

"Declining Electoral Competitiveness: Post-reform Trends and Theoretical Pessimism"

Rob Weiner, Stanford University

Discussant: Margaret McKean, Duke University

3:00 - 3:15 Break

3:15 - 5:00 Panel 5: Legislative Issues in Japan Today

"Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Postal Privatization as a Window on Political and Policymaking Change"

Patricia Machlachlan, University of Texas - Austin

"The Slow Government Response to Japan's Bank Crisis: A Principal-Agent Analysis" (with Michio Muramatsu)

Ethan Scheiner, University of California - Davis

Discussant: Frances Rosenbluth, Yale University

5:15 - 5:45 Closing remarks

Philippines Conference Room

Barry Burden Speaker University of Wisconsin-Madison
Ray Christensen Speaker Brigham Young University
Alisa Gaunder Speaker Southwestern University
Shigeo Hirano Speaker Columbia University
Patricia Machlachlan Speaker University of Texas-Austin
Sherry Martin Speaker Cornell University
Ko Maeda Speaker University of North Texas
Kenneth Mori McElwain Speaker Stanford University
Benjamin Nyblade Speaker University of British Columbia
Steven Reed Speaker Chuo University
Jun Saito Speaker Wesleyan University
Ethan Scheiner Speaker University of California-Davis
Kay Shimizu Speaker Stanford University
Robert Weiner Speaker Stanford University
Conferences
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Throughout history, nations have waged war against epidemics from bubonic plague to pulmonary tuberculosis. Today we confront HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian influenza, among other major infectious diseases. Scientists around the world scrutinize viruses and bacteria more intently than ever. Yet while scientific advances are crucial, they are insufficient. The world is not well prepared for the next health crisis.

This timely book argues that the battle against infectious disease epidemics must be fought on two fronts. The first, of course, is the laboratory. The second is the wider social context that involves ordinary individuals and groups, legislators, and the state. The failure to contain HIV/AIDS and the emergence of new infectious diseases highlight the inadequacies of current preventive and management approaches to deal with epidemics.

The authors of Crisis Preparedness offer perspectives from social science, epidemiology, and public health, collectively seeking to answer the question: How can we prepare for the next global epidemic?

Hero Image
Quah CrisisPrepare
All News button
1

Cigarettes are producing an unprecedented worldwide health catastrophe. Global traffic in cigarettes has tripled in the last fifty years, in large part because governments have become addicted to tobacco taxes, international trade agencies have promoted tobacco sales, and marketers have devised ever more deceptive tactics. Meanwhile, tobacco-induced diseases are besieging local communities around the world. Whether in China, Brazil or Morocco, families are emptying bank accounts, often in vain, to treat smoking-caused illnesses, and then struggling with the shards of broken futures.

Paragraphs

Throughout history, nations have waged war against epidemics, from bubonic plague to pulmonary tuberculosis. Today, we confront HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian influenza, among other major infectious diseases. The failure to contain HIV/AIDS, the longest contemporary pandemic, and the difficulties in dealing with the threat posed by avian influenza, show that the world is not well prepared for the next health crises. Because preventing and controlling these infectious diseases is a race against time, scientists around the world scrutinize viruses and bacteria more intently than ever. Yet while scientific advances are crucial, they are insufficient.

This timely book addresses the urgent need to study the governance of infectious disease epidemics, and argues that the battle must be fought on two fronts, simultaneously. The first is within the laboratory; the second is located in a wider social context that involves ordinary individuals, groups, communities, legislators, and the state. Research by medical sociologists and other social scientists indicates that many factors influence people's behavior and, in turn, the level of success in preventing and containing an infectious disease epidemic.

Using Asia as a case study, Crisis Preparedness discusses the inadequacies of current preventive and management approaches to deal with epidemics. The distinguished international contributors to this volume present perspectives from the fields of social science, epidemiology, and public health, and collectively seek to answer the pressing question: How can we prepare for the next global epidemic?

About the Editor: Stella R. Quah is professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore. She is on the advisory boards of the British Journal of Sociology, Health Sociology Review, and Asian Population Studies. She also serves as editor of the Health Systems Section, Encyclopedia of Public Health (Elsevier).

This title is now out of print. You may download individual chapters below:

Front matter and preface (includes chapter 1) 

  1. Governance of Epidemics: Is There a Reason for Concern? (Stella R. Quah)
  2. The Global Governance of Epidemics: Possibilities and Limitations (Jim Whitman)
  3. Responding to Epidemic Disease Threats in Burma and Lessons for China: Why Good Governance Matters (Chris Beyrer)
  4. Global and Local Strategies against HIV/AIDS in South and Southeast Asia: The Cases of India and Thailand (Graham Scambler)
  5. Taming the Tiger: The Success and Failure of HIV/AIDS Policies in Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and China (Kari Hartwig)
  6. On Trust and Health Consensus-building in the Governance of Epidemics (Stella R. Quah)
  7. Global Public Health Research Preparedness against Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases (Gabriel M. Leung)
All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Authors
Stella Quah
Book Publisher
Shorenstein APARC
Subscribe to Asia-Pacific