Last month, on October 23, the Nishimatsu Construction Company reached an agreement in the Tokyo Summary Court to set up a trust fund for Chinese who had been forced into labor in Japan during World War II. According to the Asahi Shimbun, the trust fund—worth ¥250 million—will compensate 360 Chinese citizens who were compelled to work at a hydroelectric power plant in Hiroshima Prefecture. Under the terms of the summary settlement, Nishimatsu acknowledged that these Chinese workers were forcibly brought to Japan and apologized for their suffering.This outcome was both overdue and unexpected, particularly since Japan's Supreme Court in 2007 rejected the original lawsuit that five Chinese plaintiffs brought against the construction company in 1998.  Nishimatsu officials maintain that they want to set a new precedent for "social responsibility" in the wake of the corporation's recent scandal involving political donations.  The timing of Nishimatsu's decision coincides with the rise of the new Hatoyama administration, which has promised to improve Japan's relations with China and other Asian neighbors.

Former forced laborers and their bereaved families have pursued litigation against the Japanese government and the corporations that employed them, not only in Japan but also in the United States. The Hayden Bill, which passed the California State Senate in July 1999, opened the door for Chinese and Korean victims to sue Japanese corporations and demand compensation for their hard labor in inhumane working conditions. Although the U.S. Supreme Court thus far has rejected such cases, the unresolved issue of Asian forced labor redress has now been introduced into the U.S. legal system, indicating that the United States has become involved in Japan’s historical disputes.

In fact, the United States was intimately involved in the issue of Asian forced laborers during the Allied Occupation of Japan between 1945 and 1952. U.S. Occupation forces initially attempted to retain Korean coal miners until Japanese repatriates replaced them, but riots in Hokkaido and elsewhere forced authorities to abandon this policy in November 1945. Responding to strong Korean demands, in May 1946 a military government team in Hokkaido gathered over ¥3 million worth of wages, bonuses, and death benefits owed to Korean miners. This amount was but a small fraction of the more than ¥215 million that corporations throughout Japan deposited into an account at the Bank of Japan by 1948. Occupation authorities made several unsuccessful attempts to persuade unwilling Japanese officials to pay back the financial assets owed to Koreans, while U.S. policy gradually changed to oppose reparations demands against Japan. Article 14(b) of the American-drafted San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951 waived all reparations claims, and the unpaid wage deposits of forced laborers remained a well-kept secret of the Japanese government.

When former forced laborers from South Korea and China began appearing in Japanese courts in the 1990s, their lawsuits helped to clarify the historical record of wartime abuse and postwar cover-up. Lawyers, journalists, and researchers supporting the redress movement dug up hidden official documents, such as the voluminous reports by the Foreign Ministry on Chinese forced labor and by the Welfare Ministry on the unpaid financial deposits of Korean laborers, both compiled in 1946. Although the Japanese government refuses to make such ministry reports public, the Tokyo High Court in 2005 confirmed that the state continues to hold the ¥215 million deposits, which have never been disbursed. While Japanese records remain largely closed, declassified American records can help to answer important questions, including how closely the United States was involved in the process of postwar Japan’s forgetting and neglecting Asian victims of forced labor.

An Asahi Shimbun editorial on October 24, 2009 admonished the Japanese state to take action in the wake of Nishimatsu settlement, since other corporations facing litigation have vowed not to pay reparations unless the government becomes involved. The new Hatoyama administration should first make an unambiguous apology, the editorial contends, then propose a new framework whereby the government and corporations can establish a joint trust fund to compensate former forced laborers and bereaved families. The United States can support this reconciliation process by revisiting the unresolved issue of forced labor—which also included Allied POWs—and reinterpreting the San Francisco Peace Treaty to enable these victims to file legal claims in American and international courts. Proactive U.S. involvement at the government level should also be matched by an enhanced effort toward nongovernmental cooperation between researchers in the United States and Northeast Asia. Shorenstein APARC has been contributing to this effort through its Divided Memories and Reconciliation research project, now in its third year. The Center will also host a colloquium series titled “The American Role in Northeast Asian Reconciliation” during the 2010 winter quarter.

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Shorenstein APARC Dispatches are regular bulletins designed exclusively for our friends and supporters. Written by center faculty and scholars, Shorenstein APARC Dispatches deliver timely, succinct analysis on current events and trends in Asia, often discussing their potential implications for business.

The Asia Society has organized a Task Force on U.S. Policy toward Burma/Myanmar, co-chaired by retired U.S. Army General Wesley Clark and Holsman International Chair (and former USAID Administrator) Henrietta H. Fore.  The panel comprises a dozen or so individuals from various occupations and backgrounds, including SEAF's director, Donald K. Emmerson.  Assisting the Task Force is an also diverse Advisory Group of some thirty experts in Southeast Asian and other countries.  The Asia Society expects to release the Task Force's final report early in 2010.  

The timing of the study is of interest in view of the Obama administration’s willingness to meet with Myanmar’s rulers. 

America’s top diplomat on Asia is Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell.  Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel covers Southeast Asian and ASEAN affairs.  In early November 2009 the two men traveled to Myanmar.  There they met not only with the iconic opposition figure and Nobel Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but also with Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein.  The latter meeting was the highest-level contact between the two governments since 1995.  An even higher-level meeting was being planned for later in November at a US-ASEAN summit in Singapore, which would bring President Obama face to face with Myanmar’s head of state, Senior General Than Shwe.

Further enhancing the timeliness of the Task Force’s work is the announced prospect of national elections in Myanmar in 2010.  No independent observers expect the exercise to bring about anything resembling liberal democracy.  But some hold out hope that the balloting could yield a marginally more representative and accountable system. 

In early November 2009 it remained to be seen whether the current shifting of American policy toward dealing directly with the Burmese junta would prove effective in nudging its leaders toward political reform, or not. 

The Task Force’s report, scheduled for release early in 2010, should at least provide food for policymaking thought, as U.S. officials continue to review what has been and could be done with regard to a regime that has so far resisted both isolation and engagement.

More than any of his predecessors, President Obama has reached out to "the Muslim world." But what of the terms and the timing of that demarche? If, as expected, he visits Indonesia next year, he will try to build on his oratorical successes in Istanbul and Cairo by addressing Muslims in the country that has more of them than any other. He has a way with words. But what words should he use? Is "the Muslim world" too diverse even to exist? Do "radical Islam" and "Islamism" defame a religion for acts of violence done in its name, or are these terms only politically incorrect? Among Muslims around the world, sympathy for terrorism as jihad appears to have declined. Would the US be better off ignoring religion and dealing with Muslim-majority countries from Morocco to Malaysia in purely secular terms: as nations not congregations? Is it time to revisit the entrenched assumption that the revival of religion has killed secularism and rendered policies based on it as offensively ethnocentric as they are empirically naive? If the "clash of civilizations" misnames a plethora of clashes between Muslims themselves, should the enlightened mutual reassurances of elite-level "inter-faith" dialogues give way to less rhetorical and more realistic efforts toward "intra-faith" understanding and conciliation?

What, in short, is to be said, and done? Prof. Emmerson's talk will also reference his latest co-authored book, Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam (Stanford University Press, November 2009).