Task force on U.S. policy toward Burma/Myanmar report update
On Monday, an undersea earthquake shook Indonesia's remote Mentawai Islands and triggered a 10-foot tsunami: It has killed at least 272 people, and left 412 missing. The first cargo plane with humanitarian supplies arrived today. Hundreds of miles away in eastern Java, the volcanic Mount Merapi erupted Tuesday and killed at least 30 people.
That's two disasters in less than 24 hours.
Indonesia is no stranger to catastrophe. It is located along the Pacific Ring of Fire, which is one of the most seismically and volcanically volatile areas in the world. Its last sizeable earthquake and tsunami duo struck in December of 2004, killing more than 225,000 people in 14 countries.
But despite the death and destruction of the last 48 hours, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said today that he doesn't yet see a need for foreign aid or rescue assistance.
So far, only the Philippines and the United States have offered to help Indonesia. But Natalegawa's behavior seems counter-intuitive. In the face of disaster, why would any country preemptively say no to aid?
A look into Indonesia's history reveals latent political sensitivities that may have influenced Natalegawa's decision. Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, an organization of countries who are not aligned with or against any major world power.
Indonesia prides itself on its "independent and active" foreign policy, which was first developed by then Vice President Mohammad Hatta on September 2, 1948 in Central Java. "Do we, Indonesians, in the struggle for the freedom of our people and our country, only have to choose between Russia and America?" he asked. "Is not there any other stand that we can take in the pursuit of our ideals?"
The "other stand" became known as "mendayung antara dua karang" or "rowing between two reefs."
Indonesia doesn't want to appear incompetent, or weak, to outside governments, and may also be wary to accept aid for fear of undermining its national legitimacy.
In 2004, Indonesia's acceptance of aid had an arguably negative effect on its citizens. "Though the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts in Aceh were generally successful, the amount of aid did engender some resentment in Jakarta over whether the national government had lost control of the reconstruction, and also potentially altered the economy in Aceh," explains Josh Kurlantzick a fellow for southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. "So people remember that."
Donald Emmerson, the director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, cites several reasons for Natalegawa's response. First, he says, if the Indonesian government solicited foreign aid, it would be inundated with offers. Coordinating offers of assistance right now would be a severe burden on the government.
Then there's the question of scale: so far, the destruction seems manageable in comparison to the 2004 disaster. Still, it's unclear whether Indonesia will be able to adequately respond on its own. "Indonesia is a large country, and its infrastructure is overstretched," Emmerson says. "Its capacity to respond effectively to domestic disasters is not as good as it might be."
Dr. Robert R. King became the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues in November 2009 following confirmation by the United States Senate.
Prior to his appointment, Ambassador King worked on Capitol Hill for 25 years – 24 of those years as Chief of Staff to Congressman Tom Lantos (D-California). Ambassador King was heavily involved in the planning and conduct of Lantos’ human rights agenda, including the establishment and supervision of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, (which recently became the Tom Lantos Congressional Human Rights Commission). Dr. King traveled with Congressman Lantos to North Korea and played a key role in the passage of the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act. He was concurrently Staff Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives (2007-2008), Democratic Staff Director of the Committee (2001-2007) and held various professional staff positions on the Committee since 1993.
Prior to his service on Capitol Hill, Ambassador King served on the National Security Council Staff as a White House Fellow during the Carter Administration. He was Assistant Director of Research and Analysis at Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany. Ambassador King holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has authored five books and some 40 articles on international relations.
Philippines Conference Room
Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall E313
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Mr. Yu is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea. He served as Korea's Ambassador to Israel, Japan and Philippines.
The world first became concerned about North Korea's nuclear development program in 1989 through satellite photos of a facility under construction near the town of Yongbyon. Since then, there have been on-again, off-again negotiations with North Korea by the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other countries in the region to halt and dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
A consistent strategy focused on dialogue and diplomacy is essential to get out of the current quagmire, urged Song Min-soon, a member of the Korean National Assembly and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, at a Korean Studies Program public seminar on October 18. Although the United States and the ROK must lead efforts, China's active involvement is also crucial. Resolving the nuclear issue is necessary to help ensure the long-term peace and prosperity of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the entire East Asia region.
Song explored reasons why
previous negotiation attempts failed, especially the lack of a shared vision
among the concerned countries for the future of the peninsula and region. He
suggested that this rendered China less willing to play a stronger role in the
negotiations. The imbalance of power among the negotiating countries is another
significant factor. North Korea's only effective bargaining card is its nuclear
weapons program, argued Song, while countries like the United States have the
capability to offer or withhold important aid, such as energy and development assistance.
Song advocated a firm, direct approach, stating that the United States has not adopted
a real strategy for effecting nuclear disarmament. Instead, it has opted for the
"slogan" of "strategic patience." He cautioned against taking a hard line, such
as the current ROK administration is pursuing. Song expressed the hope that the
United States would focus more on developing a well-planned diplomatic strategy
for resolving the nuclear issue and that the ROK would adopt a more
conciliatory approach toward North Korea.
To move forward in the Six-Party Talks-negotiations among the United States,
the ROK, North Korea, China, the Russian Federation, and Japan-and effectively resolve
the North Korea nuclear issue, Song made several recommendations. He pointed to
the long-term benefit of building trust incrementally by fulfilling small,
strategic commitments to North Korea. To balance the asymmetry of negotiating
cards, Song suggested that the other countries proceed with fulfilling their
commitments and allow North Korea more time to fulfill its own obligations.
Bringing China fully on board by building a logical basis for its involvement
is also a crucial element of the negotiations, he offered. Finally, Song
asserted that the United States, the ROK, and China must develop a shared,
solid vision for peaceful coexistence on the peninsula, taking into account different
scenarios and the roles each country should play.
Song expressed confidence that the approach he outlined would not only eventually resolve the nuclear issue but would also open the way for stability and prosperity for everyone in East Asia, including North Korea.