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"Moon's proposal of a trilateral summit between the two Koreas and the United States, undermining China's influence, turned out to be nothing more than a pipe dream," said researchers at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in a recently published article. "The series of summits that began with Kim's visit to Beijing should lead to Four Party Talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China."

The full article in The Diplomat is available here.

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President Moon of South Korea meeting at Cheong Wa Dae with Mr. Kim Yong-nam of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea
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The 10th Annual Koret Workshop

The aim of this year's workshop is to assess the current situation surrounding North Korea, and to examine all possible options for dealing with North Korea, from military intervention, containment, or sanctions to diplomatic engagement.

The annual Koret Workshop is made possible through the generous support of the Koret Foundation.

Stanford University

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Over the past year North Korean nuclear technology and delivery capabilities have advanced exponentially, until they are now believed to be within striking range of anywhere in the United States. The US administration has sought to counter this threat with a policy of maximum pressure combined with engagement—both options attracting fierce misgivings across the political spectrum. How did we get here? And what is the best way to reduce tension and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?

Ambassador Joseph Yun, the recently retired U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, will discuss the diplomatic challenges in dealing with North Korea, focusing on denuclearization, its scope and likelihood.  Yun will also sketch out the current state of US relations in the region and share his views on how the leading regional players—South Korea, Japan, China and Russia—view North Korea.
 
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Ambassador Yun is recognized as one of the nation’s leading experts on relations with North Korea, as well as on broader US-East Asian policy. His 33-year diplomatic career has been marked by his commitment to face-to-face engagement as the best avenue for resolving conflict and advancing cross-border cooperation. As Special Envoy on North Korea from 2016 to 2018, he led the State Department’s efforts to align regional powers behind a united policy to denuclearize North Korea. He was instrumental in reopening the “New York channel,” a direct communication line with officials from Pyongyang, through which he was able to secure the release of the American student, Otto Warmbier, who had been held in captivity for 15 months.
 
From 2013 to 2016 he served as US Ambassador to Malaysia, actively forwarding the administration’s goal of elevating relations with Southeast Asia. During his tenure, Ambassador Yun hosted two visits to Malaysia by President Obama—the first by any US President since 1966—resulting in the signing of the US-Malaysian Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, pledging closer cooperation on security, trade, education, technology, energy, the environment, and people-to-people ties.

As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (2011-2013), he helped to bring about the diplomatic normalization of American relations with Myanmar, traveling to Rangoon as the first US-based government official to meet with Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi following her release from house arrest. He also worked to lay the foundation for official participation by the President of the United States in the annual East Asian Summit, starting from 2011.

Previous assignments include Deputy Assistant Secretary for Southeast Asian Policy, Counselor for Political Affairs in the US Embassy in Seoul, Economic Counselor in the US Embassy in Bangkok, as well as earlier assignments in South Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and France. He has received a Presidential Meritorious Service Award, four Superior Honors Awards, and nine Foreign Service Performance Awards from the US State Department.

Ambassador Yun joined the Foreign Service in 1985. Prior to that he was a senior economist for Data Resources, Inc., in Lexington, Massachusetts.  He holds a M. Phil. degree from the London School of Economics and a BS from the University of Wales.
Joseph Yun <i>former US Special Representative for North Korea Policy</i>
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In a flurry of developments that left experts stunned, the long-stalled Korean peace train has suddenly left the station. Sitting in the locomotive is the engineer of these events, North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong Un.

Where is the peace train headed? No one really knows. It can easily be derailed. And it could lead not to peace, but to war, writes Sneider.

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Book cover of "Peace on a Knife's Edge" showing South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun alongside George W. Bush and Kim Jong-il

Lee Jong-Seok served as vice-secretary of South Korea’s National Security Council and as its unification minister under the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003–08). After Roh’s tragic death in 2009, Lee resolved to present a record of the so-called participatory government’s achievements and failures in the realm of unification, foreign affairs, and national security.

Peace on a Knife’s Edge is the translation of Lee’s 2014 account of Roh’s efforts to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula in the face of opposition at home from conservative forces and abroad from the Bush administration’s hard stances of “tailored containment” and its declaration of the North as part of the “axis of evil.” Lee’s narrative will give American readers rare insights into critical moments of Roh’s incumbency, including the tumultuous Six-Party Talks; the delicate process of negotiating the relocation and reduction of United States Forces Korea; Roh’s pursuit of South Korea’s “autonomous defense”; conflicts with Japan over history issues; and the North’s first nuclear weapons test.

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

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The Inside Story of Roh Moo-hyun's North Korea Policy

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NBC Bay Area spoke with Shorenstein APARC director Gi-Wook Shin following a press conference held by DPRK foreign minister Ri Yong-Ho on September 25, in which Ri asserted that recent comments by President Donald Trump amounted to a "declaration of war."

The verbal barrage between North Korea and the United States has sharply escalated, with increased U.S. bomber flights near and around North Korea being met by North Korean threats to shoot down such flights, even those outside its borders.

While Shin still holds that the war of words will not turn into war, he is concerned that the escalation of rhetoric is dangerous.

"The South Korean people are really worried about the possibility of a military conflict," noted Shin. He further advised the president to deescalate personal attacks on Kim Jong-un, pointing out that Kim's "god-like" status in North Korea was effectively forcing the DPRK leader to respond to White House threats.

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North Korea's foreign minister Ri Yong-Ho departs after speaking to reporters at the UN Millenium Plaza hotel on September 25, 2017 in New York City.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un now boasts that his country is in the final stages of completing a nuclear weapons development program, one capable of loading nuclear warheads on an ICBM that can reach the mainland United States.

Six years after his succession to power, Kim has continued to defy international pressure, conducting four nuclear tests and firing eighty-five ballistic missiles. Recently, the world has witnessed an extraordinary, high-intensity war of words between President Trump and the North Korean leader. Military tension mounts higher than ever as we enter a new phase, arguably the most serious one in decades, in dealing with a dangerous and bellicose North Korea.

There are many questions: Will North Korea conduct an atmospheric nuclear test? When will their weapons program really be capable of hitting the continental United States? How will the U.S. government respond to that capability? Will the likely result be war on the Korean Peninsula? What about the China factor?

Ambassador Kim will discuss some of these questions through his personal experiences at the Six-Party Talks, the UN Security Council and through his contacts with North Korean officials.

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Kim Sook former South Korean Ambassador to U.N; 2014-15 Pantech Fellow at APARC, Stanford University <i>former South Korean Ambassador to U.N; 2014-15 Pantech Fellow at APARC, Stanford University</i>
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President Donald Trump's ominous threat to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea succeeded at least in garnering the attention of not only Kim Jong Un but the globe. The vague assertion of readiness to carry out a preventive attack on North Korea, even to use nuclear weapons, roiled stock markets, sent Japanese to look for bomb shelters and prompted alarmed warnings against the use of force from both foes and allies, including South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The piece is available in Chinese, English and Japanese.

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In a Q&A, SK Center Fellow Yong Suk Lee discusses U.S. policy toward North Korea and the viability of 'secondary sanctions'

North Korea launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 3, a first for the country that has increasingly advanced proliferation and testing over the last three years despite condemnation from the international community.

The United States, following the ICBM launch, called for additional efforts to cut-off flows of currency into North Korea. Officials have said, as part of the proposals, they are considering ‘secondary sanctions’ that would target companies and financial institutions that deal with North Korea even beyond those already banned by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Just returned from Seoul, SK Center Fellow Yong Suk Lee spoke with Shorenstein APARC about the effectiveness of historical sanctions on North Korea, one of his research areas. He also shared thoughts on U.S. policy toward North Korea and the viability of new sanctions.

Could you describe how sanctions have historically been applied on North Korea? What do they generally look like in terms of scope and whom do they often target?

Sanctions generally fall into three different categories: trade, travel and financial transactions, and in the case of North Korea, all three kinds have been applied. Trade sanctions, for example, have focused on minerals, technology and energy sources, with the goal of hindering the purchase of products that could aid in weapons development. Financial sanctions, for example, have sought to control flows of money to and from certain individuals and entities associated with the government. Whether sanctions are applied multilaterally through the U.N. or unilaterally, it’s difficult to enforce them especially in a country as closed-off as North Korea. It’s also difficult to identify how to draw the line between sanctions that only punish the bad behaviors of a few versus those that affect the broader population: that’s a balance policymakers attempt to strike.

Your research has looked at the impact of sanctions in both rural and urban areas of North Korea from the 1990s through the 2000s. How did you analyze their implementation and performance? In a technical sense, have sanctions been effective?

In the 1990s, sanctions on North Korea relaxed in concert with the Sunshine Policy, an effort by the South Korean administration under Kim Dae-jung to engage North Korea. By the early to mid-2000s, the international community began to increase sanctions again as North Korea continued its nuclear and weapons development. The goal of my research in analyzing those two time periods was to compare and understand the impact of sanctions within North Korea, particularly the impact on its domestic economy. Since there’s not much subnational data available, I identified a proxy for economic activity – nighttime lights as seen from outer space – that acted as an indicator of consumption, production and energy allocation across North Korea.

I found that certain areas became relatively brighter than other areas when sanctions increased. The capital Pyongyang, cities that share a border with China, and pockets where manufacturing is clustered all became brighter. This result indicates that sanctions were effective in a technical sense, yet were ineffective in reaching their intended target. The North Korean regime has found ways to reallocate resources toward urban areas where government officials and elites reside.

How has North Korea evaded potential effects of sanctions in the past?

North Korea has avoided effects of sanctions through internal actions, such as redistribution of resources to government officials and elites, like those patterns identified in my research, and also though external actions, such as trade with other countries. Increasing financial activities and trade with neighbor countries fills in some of the gaps caused by sanctions. North Korea has also maintained ties with African, Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries, some of which receive migrant workers from North Korea. Those workers often send remittances back to acquaintances in North Korea, thereby supporting its economy.

In a recent report, you’ve written about China’s relationship with North Korea and how that relationship has aided in the development of markets. Can you describe how the two are tied?

The relationship between China and North Korea is close. By sheer numbers, around 80 percent of North Korea’s trade is with China. All sorts of goods are exchanged through China. For example, goods produced in Western countries that are barred from directly trading with North Korea are often funneled through China. Especially outside of urban areas, North Koreans seek goods from China because they can’t otherwise access them. They also make money by selling goods, mostly minerals, to China. The China-North Korea border is quite porous, so you have a situation where a large number of individuals are engaging in small transactions, and although they may be disparate, the transactions add up.

Is there a strategy that provides hope that China will step up pressure on North Korea?

A lot of the debate, especially in the United States, is about putting pressure on China to do something about North Korea. But if you take a step back and think about it from the Chinese perspective, I think a valid question to ask is: why would China be interested in pressuring their neighbor? For the United States, the main issue with respect to North Korea is the nuclear threat. For China, Japan and South Korea, however, the main issue is not necessarily the nuclear threat but instead the issue of regional stability. So, while China remains important, it is one of many actors that are involved in addressing challenges related to North Korea. I think that point is largely missing from the debate.

U.S. policy has maintained that sanctions will encourage the North Korean regime to change its behavior. Could additional sanctions help?

New sanctions might help. If the intended goal is to decrease flows of currency into North Korea, it would make sense to impose sanctions on Chinese entities or individuals since they remain North Korea’s most prolific trade partners. But the question remains: would it encourage the Chinese government to change its position, and in turn, the North Korean government to bow to additional pressure? From my perspective as an economist, I don’t think enough incentives are at play for either country to react significantly. North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world, and as history has shown, poor countries can survive in that manner for a long time. They find ways to adapt. Additionally, North Korea has nuclear weapons and the government sees them as leverage for maintaining the status quo.

What should officials keep in mind when considering sanctions?

Sanctions by their very nature are meant to inflict some harm, and that aspect alone does not sit well with the North Korean government. This, however, is where U.S. policy currently stands. It is caught in a deadlock. On one hand, the United States feels an immediate need to discipline the regime for its repeated missile launches under grounds that it threatens national security, and on another hand, the United States does not recognize North Korea’s nuclear program. Given this context, there is little room to consider tools of engagement.

There’s clearly no easy solution to the challenges posed by North Korea, and whatever the solution may be, it will consist of many steps. Over the long-term, I think slowly relaxing sanctions and pursuing quiet engagement with North Korea has greater likelihood of success. Putting aside political leadership and ideology for a moment, if North Koreans had an opportunity to engage in limited economic activities, it could create incentives. Economic development is already changing North Korea and might be its greatest motivation to come to the table to talk about change.

The United States has placed unilateral sanctions on other countries such as Iran, for example, which negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal, and Cuba, which saw opening and reforms in 2016. Do those cases provide lessons that could be applied to the North Korea case?

Iran, compared to North Korea, has a much larger population and holds a prominent position on the world’s stage. Sanctions on Iran carry weight because of the country’s economic ties across the world. That’s one aspect to keep in mind. Another is that Iran isn’t a totalitarian society. The government has to respond to its people to some degree. So, in general, there are more incentives that exist in Iran that could have influenced the decision to negotiate the 2015 Nuclear Deal.

As for Cuba, the case is also unique. The U.S. trade embargo that existed following the end of the Missile Crisis of 1962 lasted for decades not because of a continued existence of nuclear weapons, as in the case of North Korea, but I believe because of ideological issues that remained between two countries. Cuba wasn’t as isolated either, so it was able to conduct business with many countries during that time period. Sanctions have recently been lifted by the United States due to the passage of time and diplomatic efforts.

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A man reads a newspaper reporting on a rocket launch by North Korea.
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