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In a Q&A, Stanford postdoctoral fellow Darika Saingam explains why Thailand's battle against drugs continues and what is needed to introduce good policy that works to prevent illegal drug trade and supports recovering addicts.

Despite Thailand’s decade-long crackdown on drugs, demand for illegal substances has risen. A green leaf drug known as ‘kratom’ is a symbol of this rise as young people eagerly adopt the drug for entertainment and join an older generation of laborers who chewed it to survive long hours of work in the fields—and are now heavily addicted. Curtailing substance abuse and its consequences takes good public policy and solutions must be area-specific and evidence-based, according to a Stanford postdoctoral fellow.

Darika Saingam, the 2015-16 Developing Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellow, has conducted two cross-sectional surveys and more than 1,000 interviews with drug users, recovered addicts, and local public officials in an effort to better understand the evolution of substance abuse in southern Thailand.

At Stanford, she is preparing two papers that offer policy options suitable for Thailand and other developing countries in Southeast Asia. Saingam spoke with the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) where she will give a public talk on May 17. The interview text below was edited for brevity.

For decades, Thailand has been an epicenter of drugs. Can you describe the extent of the problem today?

According to a 2014 report, 1.2 million people were involved in illegal drug activities across Thailand. The total number of drug cases saw a 41 percent increase from 2013 to 2014. New groups of drug traffickers are mobilizing while existing groups are still active. Drug users who are young become drug dealers as they get older. The number of drug users below 15 years of age has increased dramatically.

According to your research, what drives Thais toward illegal drug use and the trafficking business?

Adults in Thailand use drugs to relieve stress and counteract the effects of work. Adolescents use them for entertainment. Historically, farmers and laborers from rural areas of Thailand would use opium for pain relief. More recently, a consumable tablet known as yaba has become popular along with crystal methamphetamine and marijuana. Young people are increasingly using yaba and kratom.

Thailand is still a developing country, but it is industrializing quickly. Social and cultural norms have been shifting and people want an improved quality of life. A lot of young people are unemployed and lack social support and are therefore more likely to turn to drug trafficking for economic opportunity. The economic recession and political strife in countries bordering Thailand have exacerbated the situation.


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Photos (left to right): A man holds up a kratom leaf. / Saingam examines kratom leaves as part of her research to understand illegal cultivation practices.


What is kratom and why is it popular?

For nearly a century, the native people of Thailand have chewed kratom. It is a leaf that grows on trees resembling a coffee plant. Historically, kratom was used to reduce strain following physical labor, to be able to work harder and longer, and to better tolerate heat and sunlight. Kratom is also embedded in Thai culture and given as a spiritual offering in religious ceremonies. My field research in the southern province of Nakhon Si Thammarat has shown that these motivations are still true today.

Within the past seven years, kratom use has skyrocketed and people are using it in increasingly harmful ways. Chewing kratom is not immediately harmful to health, but combining it with other substances is. This is the recent trend. Users have created new ways to consume it such as in a drink known as a ‘4x100.’ It contains boiled kratom leaves, cough syrup and soft drinks. Additional methamphetamines and benzodiazepines are sometimes added to that mixture.

What strategies must be employed to control substance abuse?

The first step is to realize that the patterns of substance abuse are specific to each location therefore solving the problem must also be. Drug usage is also dynamic. Placing hard control measures on one substance often provokes the emergence of another in its place therefore a holistic approach is important.

Thailand should employ multiple strategies toward effective prevention and control of substance abuse. These strategies include examining the problem and creating policies from an economic perspective (supply and demand), an institutional perspective (national and international drug control cooperation), and a social perspective (structural supports for recovered addicts and mobilization of public participation).



What is the Thai government doing to address the drug problem, and what could they be doing better?

Politicians in Thailand must do a better job at representing the people. Government health workers are often gathering information, assessing needs, and reporting findings to politicians, but these needs are not being accurately addressed. An example of this is politicians ordering to cut down kratom trees – a public display that does not get at the root cause of the problem. The reality is that drug users will quickly find substitutes. According to my study, of the regular users that stopped using kratom, more than 50 percent turned to alcohol instead and did so on a daily basis. This is merely a shift from one substance to another.

On the upside, a crop substitution program created under King Bhumibol Adulyadej offers a successful working model. The program works to replace opium poppy farming with cash crop production. It began in 1969 and is cited for helping an estimated 100,000 people convert their drug crop production to sustainable agricultural activities. Crops cultivated can be sold for profit in nearby towns. The program has also introduced a wide variety of crops and discouraged the slash-and-burn technique of clearing land. It is win-win because it stymies drug trade and provides economic opportunity while also being ecologically sound. This type of program should continue to be scaled up.

Can this model be co-opted elsewhere? What lessons from other countries could inform Thailand’s approach?

Yes, the model could plausibly be implemented in other areas in Thailand and in other Southeast Asian nations.

I think a judicial mechanism such as the kind seen in France could benefit the rural areas in Thailand. The French government has established centers across the country that act as branches of the court that try delinquency cases of minor to moderate severity, and also recommend support services for drug users. Members of the magistrate and civil society actors manage center operations thus placing some responsibility back onto the local community.

I believe an opportunity also exists for Thailand to legalize kratom. Legalization would show a respect for the cultural tradition of chewing kratom leaves and allow the government to suggest safer ways of using it. Bolivia has created a successful model of this through its legalization of coca leaves. Coca in its distilled form is cocaine, but left as a leaf, it is not a narcotic. Indigenous peoples are allowed to chew coca leaves. The government policy is being credited for a decrease in cocaine production as well.

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Sponsored by the Taiwan Democracy Project and the U.S. Asia Security Initiative at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC)

Abstract

During the recent meeting between PRC President Xi Jinping and Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, the “1992 One China Consensus” served as a mutually acceptable paradigm for maintaining “peaceful and stable” conditions across the Taiwan Strait.  For Xi Jinping, the warmth of the visit thinly veiled a message to Taiwan’s leaders and electorate, as well as to onlookers in Washington.  Chinese officials and media clearly link the talks and confirmation of the 1992 Consensus to “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—a concept that is increasingly unpalatable to many in Taiwan.  Xi hopes to keep DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (and perhaps even future KMT leaders) in the 1992 Consensus “box” and to co-opt the U.S. in this effort, but perhaps underestimates the political transformation underway on Taiwan. 

The Xi administration has also hardened its position regarding “core interests” such as Taiwan, embodied in a “bottom line principle” policy directive that eschews compromise.  Although many commentators and most officials across the region have shied away from stating that the PRC and Taiwan are at the crossroads of crisis, the collision of political transformation on Taiwan and the PRC’s “bottom line principle” will challenge the fragile foundations of peaceful cross-Strait co-existence.  Changes in the regional balance of military power brought about by a more muscular People’s Liberation Army compounds the potential for increased friction, providing Beijing with more credible options for coercion and deterrence.

This talk will consider the politics and principles involved in cross-Taiwan Strait relations in light of the upcoming 2016 Taiwan elections and the policies of the Xi Jinping administration; and will discuss some of the possible implications for China’s national security policy, regional stability, and the future of cross-Strait relations.

Bio

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Cortez Cooper
Mr. Cortez A. Cooper III joined RAND in April 2009, providing assessments of security challenges across political, military, economic, cultural, and informational arenas for a broad range of U.S. government clients.  Prior to joining RAND, Mr. Cooper was the Director of the East Asia Studies Center for Hicks and Associates, Inc.  He has also served in the U.S. Navy Executive Service as the Senior Analyst for the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, U.S. Pacific Command.  As the senior intelligence analyst and Asia regional specialist in the Pacific Theater, he advised Pacific Command leadership on trends and developments in the Command’s area of responsibility.  Before his Hawaii assignment, Mr. Cooper was a Senior Analyst with CENTRA Technology, Inc., specializing in Asia-Pacific political-military affairs.  Mr. Cooper’s 20 years of military service included assignments as both an Army Signal Corps Officer and a China Foreign Area Officer.  In addition to numerous military decorations, the Secretary of Defense awarded Mr. Cooper with the Exceptional Civilian Service Award in 2001.

2016 Taiwan Elections and Implications for Cross-Strait and Regional Security
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Cortez Cooper Senior International Policy Analyst RAND Corporation
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Abstract:

Both South Korea and Taiwan are considered consolidated democracies, but the two countries have developed very different sets of electoral campaign regulations. While both countries had highly restrictive election laws during their authoritarian eras, they have diverged after democratic transition. South Korea still restricts campaigning activities, including banning door-to-door canvassing, prohibiting pre-official period campaigning, and restricting the quantity and content of literature. Taiwan has removed most campaigning restrictions, except for finance regulations. This study explores the causes of these divergent trajectories through comparative historical process tracing, using both archival and secondary sources. The preliminary findings suggest that the incumbency advantage and the containment of the leftist or opposition parties were the primary causes of regulation under the soft and hard authoritarian regimes of South Korea and Taiwan. The key difference was that the main opposition party as well as the ruling party in South Korea enjoyed the incumbency advantage but that opposition forces in Taiwan did not. As a result, the opposition in Taiwan fought for liberalization of campaign regulations, but that in South Korea did not. Democratization in Taiwan was accompanied by successive liberalizations in campaign regulation, but in South Korea the incumbent legislators affiliated with the ruling and opposition parties were both interested in limiting campaigning opportunities for electoral challengers.

 

Bio:

Dr. Jong-sung You is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University. His research interests include comparative politics and the political economy of inequality, corruption, social trust, and freedom of expression. He conducts both cross-national quantitative studies and qualitative case studies, focusing on Korea and East Asia. He recently published a book entitled Democracy, Inequality and Corruption: Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines Compared with Cambridge University Press. His publications have appeared at American Sociological Review, Political Psychology, Journal of East Asian Studies, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Asian Perspective, Trends and Prospects, and Korean Journal of International Studies. He obtained his Ph.D. in Public Policy from Harvard University and taught at UC San Diego. Before pursuing an academic career, he fought for democracy and social justice in South Korea.

 

 

Jong-sung You Senior Lecturer College of Asia and the Pacific, Australia National University
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Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, imprisoned since February, is the focus of a pledge signed by 40 scholars and public figures lamenting his mistreatment and urging his immediate release.

The “Global Call for the Release of Anwar Ibrahim” condemns Anwar’s persecution by the Malaysian authorities and their ongoing repression of freedom of speech and assembly.

Anwar is serving a five-year prison sentence on a sodomy charge that virtually all observers believe was politically motivated. The pledge, released by Anwar’s family on Monday, marks his 68th birthday and almost a half-year spent in jail.

Stanford professor Donald Emmerson, who has known Anwar since the 1980s, welcomed the circulation of the pledge. “Even if the Malaysian government ignores the petition,” Emmerson said, “it is important for the international community to show that Anwar is not alone.”

Anwar’s ordeal dates back to 1998 when, as deputy prime minister, he had a falling out with then-prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, who drove him from office for apparently political reasons.

Malaysia’s current prime minister, Najib Razak, has continued this record of political persecution despite protests from around the world. Amnesty International has designated Anwar “a prisoner of conscience.”

Emmerson, who leads the Southeast Asia Program, joined Anwar on a panel in Nov. 2014 entitled “Islam and Democracy: Malaysia in Comparative Perspective,” hosted at Stanford by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

Following that event, Anwar traveled back to Malaysia despite signs pointing toward his possible arrest.

“Anwar’s courage in the face of adversity is inspiring,” Emmerson said. “He could have chosen not to return from Stanford to Malaysia, thereby avoiding the risk of imprisonment. He could have gone into exile. Or asked for asylum outside Malaysia. Instead, he went home. How many of us, in his shoes, would have done the same?”

The pledge is attached below. Remarks and video from the CDDRL event with Anwar, Emmerson and Stanford’s Larry Diamond and Francis Fukuyama can be accessed here.

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Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is launching a U.S.-Asia Security Initiative spearheaded by a former top American diplomat to deepen dialogue on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues and to further bridge American and Asian academics, government officials and industry leaders.

A new and uncertain multipolar system is emerging in Asia. The United States is and will remain a global power, but it is evident the post-Cold War international order is increasingly under strain. There is a pressing need for research about how developments in the Asia-Pacific region impact U.S. interests, and what the optimal strategies are to respond. Led by Karl Eikenberry, who served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011, the initiative will look beyond simplistic notions of nations engaging harmoniously or competing against each other and explore a range of policy options.

Combining expertise from across Stanford University, the initiative will gather faculty and researchers from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and take place under the auspices of Shorenstein APARC, a center focused on interdisciplinary research on contemporary issues of international cooperation, governance and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Eikenberry, an Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at Shorenstein APARC, retired from the U.S. Army as a lieutenant general after 35 years of service before taking the role as ambassador. At Stanford, he has returned to an early and longstanding interest in Asia, contributing to an urgent discussion about how the United States should respond regionally and globally to an increasingly strong China. The initiative is founded on the premise that there is a role for an institution that not only fosters groundbreaking research, but also serves to convene academic and governmental expertise from across the Asia-Pacific region in a dialogue aiming to inform policy and strategy.

“As China rises and Japan seeks a greater defense role in Asia, a number of questions are raised over the United States’ role in the region. This creates a great impetus for stakeholders to gather and develop an understanding of today’s perplexing security issues,” Eikenberry said.

“It’s an honor to lead this Stanford initiative and make possible opportunities for students, scholars, peers and leaders across the world.”

Before arriving at Stanford, Eikenberry’s Asia-related postings included assistant army, and later, defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy Beijing, operational assignments in the Republic of Korea and Hawaii, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy at U.S. Pacific Command, Senior Country Director for China at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and two senior command tours in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, holds master’s degrees from Harvard University and Stanford University, and has an advanced degree in Chinese history from Nanjing University.

The three-year initiative will build synergies with existing activities at Stanford, drawing scholars, government officials and industry leaders to engage at conferences and public seminars on important U.S.-Asia security themes. Understanding that inquiry is enlivened through interdisciplinary dialogue, participants will share best practices across multiple fields including diplomacy, military strategy and environmental risk.

“I can’t think of a better person to drive this initiative – Karl has a profound understanding of the economic, diplomatic and military complexities in the region. I have every confidence that it will develop into a robust, established project under his leadership,” said Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC.

Launching July 1, 2015, the initiative aims to bolster local, national and global networks through several foundational components, including a core working group of experts from Stanford and peer institutions to provide new perspectives on U.S. policies in Asia; educational opportunities for Stanford students; and public programs that will bring intellectual and strategic leaders to Stanford to enrich the conversation on Asia-Pacific security.

The initiative seeks to operate as a focal point for academic scholarship on the west coast of the United States and offer practical steps that stakeholders can take to strengthen the security architecture and U.S. alliance commitments in the region. Outcomes from the initiative’s activities will include publications and policy reports, many of which will be offered open access online.

“As the Asia-Pacific region continues to rise, we see new threats but also greater opportunity to work together,” said Michael McFaul, director of FSI. “Stanford and FSI excel in offering practical solutions to policy challenges and can play a role in identifying strategies aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the region.”

 

Initiative inquires: Charlotte Lee, Shorenstein APARC, cplee@stanford.edu, (650) 725-6445

Media inquires: Lisa Griswold, Communications and Outreach Coordinator, Shorenstein APARC, lisagris@stanford.edu, (650) 736-0656

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Karl Eikenberry recently returned from a visit to Rwanda where he lectured military and policy officials from across East Africa at the Rwanda Defence Force Command and Staff College (RDFCSC). Eikenberry, who is a retired lieutenant general from the U.S. Army and the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, was able to apply his experience to help build the capacity of the military and armed forces in post-conflict countries in Africa.

Reflecting on the trip, Eikenberry discussed the role that the military plays in supporting the development of the rule of law in post-conflict societies and how academic institutions can support state-building efforts abroad through knowledge exchange and training programs.

Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is also an affiliate of FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law as well as the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.


What attracted you to this opportunity? 

 

Last summer, I had the opportunity to present on civil-military relations at the tenth annual Draper Hills Summer Program, organized by the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Subsequently, I was asked by one of the participating fellows from Rwanda if I might visit the country to present to leaders of its armed forces on this same topic. I enthusiastically accepted the invitation extended by the Rwanda Defence Force Command and Staff College (RDFCSC), which opened just three-years ago, to lead a two-day seminar of 47 senior military and police officers from Rwanda, Tanzania, South Sudan, Burundi, Uganda, and Kenya.

We discussed strategy, security policy formulation and implementation, civil-military relations, and counterinsurgency warfare. These were topics relevant to my own professional experiences as a soldier and diplomat having served in post-conflict countries like Afghanistan. Given the challenges that several countries in the East African Community are facing in strengthening their political institutions, providing security for their populations, and improving their economies and peoples livelihoods, I thought I might be able to make a small contribution to the curriculum at the RDFCSC. I also hoped to learn from the faculty and students who have seen and accomplished a great deal over the course of their own 20-30 year careers.

 

What surprised you the most about the experience?

 

I was struck by the fact that many of the military officers participating in this 46-week masters degree course had served on multiple tours of duty in difficult multinational peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions in their own countries and the surrounding region. They had an extraordinary grasp of the political, security, and development problems that their civilian leaders were attempting to solve. Most realized that without regional cooperation that the prospects of their own country prospering were quite limited. So I was impressed with how they viewed security as having both national and collective dimensions. The students were keen to learn about the theory and practice of civil-military relations in democratic countries and some of the best learning resulted from exchanges among the students themselves.

 

What role can the military play in helping to advance democratic development in post-conflict societies like Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan?

 

Militaries can play several important roles in post-conflict societies, especially those that have been traumatized by civil war fought along ethnic or sectarian lines. First, if the armed forces are inclusive, they can serve as a very visible reassurance to the people that reconciliation is not only possible, but is being practiced. Second, if the armed forces demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law, they can provide an example worthy of emulation to political authorities attempting to establish effective government institutions. Third - and last - capable popular national military forces can eventually suppress and replace the violent unaccountable militias whose existence obstructs social and economic development.  

 

What role can experts from Stanford and other leading academic institutions play in helping to support the development and capacity building of the military in post-conflict societies?

 

I was impressed with how eager the Rwandan and East Africa Community military officers were to learn about the influence of history, constitutional law, political culture, society, missions, and resources on the character of a nation’s civil-military relations. I think the Stanford CDDRL faculty and fellows can contribute much to the development and capacity building of militaries in post-conflict societies due to their breadth and depth of experience. CDDRL collectively has global expertise in political, security, and development issues and brings to the table skills that can prove helpful to those grappling with difficult but important state-building challenges, such as ordering civil-military relations in democratic countries. At the same time, CDDRL can learn much by exchanging views with those responsible for managing change, like the military and police officers whom I spent time with in Rwanda. 

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Abstract:

Authoritarian ruling parties are expected to resist democratization, often times at all costs. And yet some of the strongest authoritarian parties in the world have not resisted democratization, but have instead embraced it. This is because their raison d’etre is to continue ruling, though not necessarily to remain authoritarian. Put another way, democratization requires ruling parties hold free and fair elections, but not that they lose them. Authoritarian ruling parties can thus be incentivized to concede democratization from a position of exceptional strength. This alternative pathway to democracy is illustrated with Asian cases – notably Taiwan – in which ruling parties democratized from positions of considerable strength, and not weakness. The conceding-to-thrive argument has clear implications with respect to “candidate cases” in developmental Asia, where ruling parties have not yet conceded democratization despite being well-positioned to thrive were they to do so, such as the world’s most populous dictatorship, China.

 

Bio:

Joseph Wong is the Ralph and Roz Halbert Professor of Innovation at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and Professor of Political Science and Canada Research Chair in Democratization, Health and Development. Professor Wong was the Director of the Asian Institute at the Munk School from 2005 to 2014. In addition to academic articles and book chapters, Professor Wong has published four books: Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea (2004) and Betting on Biotech: Innovation and the Limits of Asia’s Developmental State (2011), both published by Cornell University Press, as well as Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose, co-edited with Edward Friedman (Routledge, 2008), and Innovating for the Global South: Towards a New Innovation Agenda, co-edited with Dilip Soman and Janice Stein (University of Toronto Press, 2014). He is currently working on a book monograph with Dan Slater (University of Chicago) on Asia’s development and democracy, which is currently under contract with Princeton University Press. Professor Wong earned his Hons. B.A from McGill University (1995) and Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison (2001). 

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Joe Wong Professor and Canada Research Chair in Political Science University of Toronto
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For 14 years, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has been a tireless Stanford professor who has strengthened the fabric of university’s interdisciplinary nature. Joining the faculty at Stanford Law School in 2001, Cuéllar soon found a second home for himself at the Freeman Spogli for International Studies. He held various leadership roles throughout the institute for several years – including serving as co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation. He took the helm of FSI as the institute’s director in 2013, and oversaw a tremendous expansion of faculty, research activity and student engagement. 

An expert in administrative law, criminal law, international law, and executive power and legislation, Cuéllar is now taking on a new role. He leaves Stanford this month to serve as justice of the California Supreme Court and will be succeeded at FSI by Michael McFaul on Jan. 5.

 As the academic quarter comes to a close, Cuéllar took some time to discuss his achievements at FSI and the institute’s role on campus. And his 2014 Annual Letter and Report can be read here.

You’ve had an active 20 months as FSI’s director. But what do you feel are your major accomplishments? 

We started with a superb faculty and made it even stronger. We hired six new faculty members in areas ranging from health and drug policy to nuclear security to governance. We also strengthened our capacity to generate rigorous research on key global issues, including nuclear security, global poverty, cybersecurity, and health policy. Second, we developed our focus on teaching and education. Our new International Policy Implementation Lab brings faculty and students together to work on applied projects, like reducing air pollution in Bangladesh, and improving opportunities for rural schoolchildren in China.  We renewed FSI's focus on the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies, adding faculty and fellowships, and launched a new Stanford Global Student Fellows program to give Stanford students global experiences through research opportunities.   Third, we bolstered FSI's core infrastructure to support research and education, by improving the Institute's financial position and moving forward with plans to enhance the Encina complex that houses FSI.

Finally, we forged strong partnerships with critical allies across campus. The Graduate School of Business is our partner on a campus-wide Global Development and Poverty Initiative supporting new research to mitigate global poverty.  We've also worked with the Law School and the School of Engineering to help launch the new Stanford Cyber Initiative with $15 million in funding from the Hewlett Foundation. We are engaging more faculty with new health policy working groups launched with the School of Medicine and an international and comparative education venture with the Graduate School of Education. 

Those partnerships speak very strongly to the interdisciplinary nature of Stanford and FSI. How do these relationships reflect FSI's goals?

The genius of Stanford has been its investment in interdisciplinary institutions. FSI is one of the largest. We should be judged not only by what we do within our four walls, but by what activity we catalyze and support across campus. With the business school, we've launched the initiative to support research on global poverty across the university. This is a part of the SEED initiative of the business school and it is very complementary to our priorities on researching and understanding global poverty and how to alleviate. It's brought together researchers from the business school, from FSI, from the medical school, and from the economics department.  

Another example would be our health policy working groups with the School of Medicine. Here, we're leveraging FSI’s Center for Health Policy, which is a great joint venture and allows us to convene people who are interested in the implementation of healthcare reforms and compare the perspective and on why lifesaving interventions are not implemented in developing countries and how we can better manage biosecurity risks. These working groups are a forum for people to understand each other's research agendas, to collaborate on seeking funding and to engage students. 

I could tell a similar story about our Mexico Initiative.  We organize these groups so that they cut across generations of scholars so that they engage people who are experienced researchers but also new fellows, who are developing their own agenda for their careers. Sometimes it takes resources, sometimes it takes the engagement of people, but often what we've found at FSI is that by working together with some of our partners across the university, we have a more lasting impact.

Looking at a growing spectrum of global challenges, where would you like to see FSI increase its attention? 

FSI's faculty, students, staff, and space represent a unique resource to engage Stanford in taking on challenges like global hunger, infectious disease, forced migration, and weak institutions.  The  key breakthrough for FSI has been growing from its roots in international relations, geopolitics, and security to focusing on shared global challenges, of which four are at the core of our work: security, governance, international development, and  health. 

These issues cross borders. They are not the concern of any one country. 

Geopolitics remain important to the institute, and some critical and important work is going on at the Center for International Security and Cooperation to help us manage the threat of nuclear proliferation, for example. But even nuclear proliferation is an example of how the transnational issues cut across the international divide. Norms about law, the capacity of transnational criminal networks, smuggling rings, the use of information technology, cybersecurity threats – all of these factors can affect even a traditional geopolitical issue like nuclear proliferation. 

So I can see a research and education agenda focused on evolving transnational pressures that will affect humanity in years to come. How a child fares when she is growing up in Africa will depend at least as much on these shared global challenges involving hunger and poverty, health, security, the role of information technology and humanity as they will on traditional relations between governments, for instance. 

What are some concrete achievements that demonstrate how FSI has helped create an environment for policy decisions to be better understood and implemented?

We forged a productive collaboration with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees through a project on refugee settlements that convened architects, Stanford researchers, students and experienced humanitarian responders to improve the design of settlements that house refugees and are supposed to meet their human needs. That is now an ongoing effort at the UN Refugee Agency, which has also benefited from collaboration with us on data visualization and internship for Stanford students. 

Our faculty and fellows continue the Institute's longstanding research to improve security and educate policymakers. We sometimes play a role in Track II diplomacy on sensitive issues involving global security – including in South Asia and Northeast Asia.  Together with Hoover, We convened a first-ever cyber bootcamp to help legislative staff understand the Internet and its vulnerabilities. We have researchers who are in regular contact with policymakers working on understanding how governance failures can affect the world's ability to meet pressing health challenges, including infectious diseases, such as Ebola.

On issues of economic policy and development, our faculty convened a summit of Japanese prefectural officials work with the private sector to understand strategies to develop the Japanese economy.  

And we continued educating the next generation of leaders on global issues through the Draper Hills summer fellows program and our honors programs in security and in democracy and the rule of law. 

How do you see FSI’s role as one of Stanford’s independent laboratories?

It's important to recognize that FSI's growth comes at particularly interesting time in the history of higher education – where universities are under pressure, where the question of how best to advance human knowledge is a very hotly debated question, where universities are diverging from each other in some ways and where we all have to ask ourselves how best to be faithful to our mission but to innovate. And in that respect, FSI is a laboratory. It is an experimental venture that can help us to understand how a university like Stanford can organize itself to advance the mission of many units, that's the partnership point, but to do so in a somewhat different way with a deep engagement to practicality and to the current challenges facing the world without abandoning a similarly deep commitment to theory, empirical investigation, and rigorous scholarship.

What have you learned from your time at Stanford and as director of FSI that will inform and influence how you approach your role on the state’s highest court?

Universities play an essential role in human wellbeing because they help us advance knowledge and prepare leaders for a difficult world. To do this, universities need to be islands of integrity, they need to be engaged enough with the outside world to understand it but removed enough from it to keep to the special rules that are necessary to advance the university's mission. 

Some of these challenges are also reflected in the role of courts. They also need to be islands of integrity in a tumultuous world, and they require fidelity to high standards to protect the rights of the public and to implement laws fairly and equally.  

This takes constant vigilance, commitment to principle, and a practical understanding of how the world works. It takes a combination of humility and determination. It requires listening carefully, it requires being decisive and it requires understanding that when it's part of a journey that allows for discovery but also requires deep understanding of the past.

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Vietnamese news accounts of labor-management conflicts, including strikes, and even reports of owners fleeing their factories raise potent questions about labor activism in light of this self-proclaimed socialist country’s engagement in the global market system since the late 1980s. In explaining Vietnamese labor resistance, how important are matters of cultural identity (such as native-place, gender, ethnicity, and religion) in different historical contexts? How does labor mobilization occur and develop? How does it foster “class moments” in times of crisis? What types of "flexible protests" have been used by workers to fight for their rights and dignity, and how effective are they?

Based on her just-published book, Ties that Bind: Cultural Identity, Class, and Law in Vietnam's Labor Resistance, Prof. Trần will highlight labor activism since French colonial rule in order to understand labor issues and actions in Vietnam today. Her analysis will focus on labor-management-state relations, especially with key foreign investors/managers (such as from Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) and ethnic Chinese born and raised in Vietnam. She will convey the voices and ideas of workers, organizers, journalists, and officials and explain how migrant workers seek to empower themselves using cultural resources and appeals to state media and the rule of law. Copies of her book will be available for sale at her talk.

Prof. Trần's current research on global south-south labor migration focuses on Vietnamese migrants working in Malaysia and returning to Vietnam. In 2008 she was a Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Distinguished Fellow on Southeast Asia. Her co-authored 2012 book, Corporate Social Responsibility and Competitiveness for SMEs in Developing Countries: South Africa and Vietnam, compared the experiences of small-and-medium enterprises in these two countries. Her many other writings include (as co-editor and author) Reaching for the Dream: Challenges of Sustainable Development in Vietnam (2004). She earned her PhD in Political Economy and Public Policy at the University of Southern California in 1996 and an MA in Developmental Economics at USC in 1991.

Copies of Ties that Bind: Cultural Identity, Class, and Law in Vietnam's Labor Resistance will be available for signing and sale by the author following her talk.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(831) 582-3753 (650) 723-6530
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Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Distinguished Fellow on Southeast Asia
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MA, PhD

Angie Ngoc Trần is a professor in the Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB).  Her plan as the 2008 Lee Kong Chian National University of Singapore-Stanford University Distinguished Fellow is to complete a book manuscript on labor-capital relations in Vietnam that highlights how different identities of investors and owners—shaped by government policies, ethnicity, characteristics of investment, and the role they played in global flexible production—affect workers’ conditions, consciousness, and collective action differently.

Tran spent May-July 2008 at Stanford and will return to campus for the second half of November 2008.  She will share the results of her project in a public seminar at Stanford under SEAF auspices on November 17 2008.

Prof. Trần’s many publications include “Contesting ‘Flexibility’:  Networks of Place, Gender, and Class in Vietnamese Workers’ Resistance,” in Taking Southeast Asia to Market (2008); “Alternatives to ‘Race to the Bottom’ in Vietnam:  Minimum Wage Strikes and Their Aftermath,” Labor Studies Journal (December 2007); “The Third Sleeve: Emerging Labor Newspapers and the Response of Labor Unions and the State to Workers’ Resistance in Vietnam,” Labor Studies Journal (September 2007); and (as co-editor and author) Reaching for the Dream:  Challenges of Sustainable Development in Vietnam (2004).  She received her Ph.D. in Political Economy and Public Policy at the University of Southern California in 1996 and an M.A. in Developmental Economics at USC in 1991.

Angie Ngoc Tran Professor of Political Economy Speaker California State University-Monterey Bay
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